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Lesson 14 of 14 · about 60 minutes · Updated November 15, 2026

Program Maturity Checklist and Roadmap

You'll be able to

  • Compare the main maturity and baseline models (CSF 2.0 Tiers and Profiles, C2M2 Version 2.1, the CMMI Cybermaturity Platform, CISA's Performance Goals, CIS Implementation Groups and the IG FISMA scale) and say what each one measures.
  • Run an evidence-based maturity assessment and set targets by area rather than one target for the whole program.
  • Lay out a 90-day plan for a new program and a three-year roadmap built from a current and target profile.
  • Use the 66-item Program Maturity Checklist to review a program by CSF 2.0 Function and find the lesson that explains each item.
  • Recognize the documented patterns that stall programs and the signs that separate a mature program from a paper one.
  • Find the free official resources and the module's sample policies that support each part of the program.

Start here: the short version

  • A maturity model measures how reliably the organization does security work, not whether it is safe. NIST's Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 Tiers, the Energy Department's C2M2 maturity indicator levels and the federal inspectors general's five-level FISMA scale all grade process rigor: is the practice done, written down, resourced, measured and improved. None of them proves an attacker will fail.123
  • Pick one model as the backbone and map the rest to it. For most large U.S. organizations that backbone is CSF 2.0 (six functions, 22 categories, 106 subcategories) with a current and a target Organizational Profile, plus the CIS Controls Implementation Groups or CISA's Performance Goals as the short list of basics that must be in place first.145
  • Higher is not always better. The C2M2 says plainly that striving for the top level in every domain "may not be optimal." A mature program sets a target per area based on risk, then funds the gaps that matter.2
  • Programs stall in predictable ways: remediation that never closes (federal bank regulators fined Citigroup $135.6 million in July 2024 for "insufficient progress" on 2020 orders), the same rating year after year (HHS's program was rated "Not Effective" for the sixth straight year in fiscal 2025), and basic controls that exist on paper but not in production.67
  • A paper program is one whose claims outrun its evidence. New York requires the top executive and the CISO to sign a yearly statement of compliance, or an acknowledgment of gaps with a fix timeline, and to keep the evidence for five years. A signature without evidence has already cost companies millions.89
  • This lesson closes the module. It gives a 90-day plan for a new program, a three-year roadmap for a fictional 5,000-person company, a 66-item Program Maturity Checklist organized by CSF 2.0 function with links to the lesson that explains each item, a resource library for program leaders, and the library of every sample policy in this module.

Rules and standards described: NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 (NIST CSWP 29, Feb. 26, 2024) and its quick-start guides, including SP 1301 (Organizational Profiles) and SP 1302 (Tiers, Oct. 21, 2024); NIST SP 800-55 Volumes 1 and 2 (Dec. 4, 2024); NIST SP 800-181 Rev. 1 (Nov. 16, 2020) and NICE Framework Components v2.2.0 (April 28, 2026); DOE Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model Version 2.1 (June 2022); CISA Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPG 2.0 announced Dec. 10, 2025); CIS Critical Security Controls v8.1 (June 2024); the fiscal year 2025 Inspector General FISMA metrics maturity scale; 23 NYCRR 500.17(b) as amended Nov. 1, 2023; FTC Safeguards Rule, 16 CFR 314.4 (eCFR current as of Aug. 10, 2026); SEC Regulation S-K Item 106 (17 CFR 229.106); Idaho Technology Authority Policy P4140 (revised Aug. 20, 2024). All read Nov. 13 to 15, 2026. Frameworks are revised and rules change; check the publisher's or regulator's current text before relying on any point.

Before you change anything. Plan changes to production systems, test them first, keep a way back, and follow your change management process. For clinical, plant-floor or other safety systems, involve the vendor, your safety lead and qualified engineers (see modules 109 and 111).

Every lesson in this module has described one part of a security program in a large or regulated organization: the charter and the CISO, the budget, the metrics, the policies, the audits, the certifications, the testing, the insurance, privacy, mergers, resilience and artificial intelligence. This last lesson asks the question a new board member, a new CISO, a state legislator or a reporter eventually asks about all of it: how good is this program, really, and what should it do next?

There are two honest ways to answer. One is to measure risk directly, in dollars and likelihoods, which module 108, lesson 2 explains. The other is to measure maturity: how consistently the organization performs the practices that reduce risk, whether those practices are written down and funded, whether anyone measures them, and whether the organization learns and improves. Most large organizations use both. This lesson is about the second, about turning a maturity assessment into a roadmap, and about the checklist and libraries that let a program leader find every tool this module has offered in one place.

It is written for CISOs and their deputies, chief risk officers, internal auditors, audit and risk committee members, general counsel's offices and compliance officers, CFOs who fund the roadmap, agency heads and state technology officials, and the reporters and advocates who ask whether the program behind a public statement is real. The small business version of running a program is in module 73, lesson 18, and the frameworks themselves are mapped in module 108, lesson 3. This lesson does not repeat them.

What maturity means, and what it does not

A maturity model is a ladder of descriptions. At the bottom, the work happens because a capable person happens to do it. At the top, the work is defined, assigned, funded, measured, reviewed and improved, and it keeps happening when that person leaves. The rungs in between describe the steps from one to the other. The idea came from software engineering in the 1980s and 1990s and spread into security in the 2000s; today every major U.S. security framework has some version of it.

Three distinctions keep maturity talk honest:

  • Maturity is not compliance. Compliance asks whether the organization meets a specific rule: does it have multifactor authentication where 23 NYCRR 500.12 requires it, did the Qualified Individual report to the board in writing this year as 16 CFR 314.4(i) requires.10 A program can comply with every rule that applies to it and still run on heroics, and a mature program can still miss a rule it did not know about. The compliance program is the subject of lesson 4.
  • Maturity is not effectiveness. A practice can be written, funded, measured and improved and still be aimed at the wrong threat. The federal inspectors general draw the line where measurement starts: at Level 4, "Managed and Measurable," the organization gathers quantitative and qualitative measures of how well its policies and procedures work and uses them to drive change. OMB treats Level 4 as the point at which a program is "effective."3
  • Maturity is not a grade for the security team. Most of what moves a score sits outside the security department: whether the business owns its risks, whether HR removes access when people leave, whether finance funds the multi-year plan, whether the board asks for evidence. A low score is an organizational finding.

With those limits in mind, maturity scores are useful for four things: describing where the program is in words a board can follow, setting targets that differ by area, showing progress over several years, and comparing parts of a large organization (business units, subsidiaries, agencies) on the same scale.

Maturity models compared

A large organization will meet several of these at once: one chosen by the CISO, one required by a regulator or a contract, one used by an insurer's questionnaire, and one used by internal audit. The useful skill is knowing what each one measures.

NIST CSF 2.0: Tiers and Organizational Profiles

The NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0, published Feb. 26, 2024, organizes security outcomes into six Functions (Govern, Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover), 22 Categories and 106 Subcategories. It offers two tools that work together as a maturity method.1

Organizational Profiles. A Current Profile describes the outcomes the organization is achieving now; a Target Profile describes the outcomes it wants to achieve, with priorities. The gap between them is the work plan. NIST's quick-start guide for Organizational Profiles (SP 1301) walks through scoping a profile, gathering the information, writing it and analyzing the gaps; NIST also offers a profile template as a spreadsheet.11

Tiers. CSF 2.0 defines four Tiers that "characterize the rigor of an organization's cybersecurity risk governance and management practices": Tier 1, Partial; Tier 2, Risk Informed; Tier 3, Repeatable; and Tier 4, Adaptive. In NIST's own quick-start guide (SP 1302, final Oct. 21, 2024), Tiers are applied to Organizational Profiles to show how the organization views risk and what processes it uses to manage it, and to track progress.12 Two points are often missed. First, NIST does not call the Tiers maturity levels and does not say every organization should reach Tier 4; the framework says organizations should pick a target Tier that fits their risks, resources and obligations.1 Second, the Tiers grade risk governance and management as a whole, not individual controls, so a single Tier for "the program" is a summary judgment that hides variation.

In practice, many large organizations borrow the Tier idea and score each CSF Category or Subcategory on a 0 to 4 or 1 to 5 scale. NIST does not publish such a scoring scheme, and two firms' scores are not comparable unless both use the same written definitions. When a vendor or consultant reports "CSF maturity 3.2," the first question is: on whose scale, defined how?

CSF 2.0 is required for Idaho's own executive branch agencies. Idaho Technology Authority Policy P4140, revised Aug. 20, 2024, says state agencies "shall adopt the current NIST Cybersecurity Framework as the basis for assessing their cybersecurity programs."13

C2M2 Version 2.1: maturity indicator levels by domain

The Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) was built by the U.S. Department of Energy with the energy industry and is now used well beyond it. Version 2.1, released in June 2022, has 356 practices grouped into 10 domains: Asset, Change, and Configuration Management; Threat and Vulnerability Management; Risk Management; Identity and Access Management; Situational Awareness; Event and Incident Response, Continuity of Operations; Third-Party Risk Management; Workforce Management; Cybersecurity Architecture; and Cybersecurity Program Management.2

Each domain is scored on four maturity indicator levels (MILs):

  • MIL0: "Practices are not performed."
  • MIL1: "Initial practices are performed but may be ad hoc."
  • MIL2: practices are documented and supported by adequate resources, with a more complete approach than at MIL1.
  • MIL3: activities are guided by policy, responsibility is assigned, people are skilled, and effectiveness is tracked, with a more advanced approach than at MIL2.

Two design choices make C2M2 especially useful for a large organization. The levels are cumulative within a domain (MIL2 requires all MIL1 practices), and they "apply independently to each domain," so a utility can be MIL3 in incident response and MIL1 in third-party risk, and the report will say so. And the model tells users not to chase the top everywhere: "Striving to achieve the highest MIL in all domains may not be optimal." It adds that "Establishing a target MIL for each domain is an effective strategy for using the model to guide cybersecurity program improvement."2

The model, its self-evaluation tool (an online HTML tool at c2m2.doe.gov) and DOE facilitation for U.S. energy organizations are free. As of Nov. 15, 2026, DOE's program page still listed Version 2.1 as current, offered mappings from C2M2 2.1 to CSF 1.1, and said mappings to CSF 2.0 were "coming soon." DOE added a Cybersecurity Threat Profile Development Guide in July 2026.14

CMMI Cybermaturity Platform: a commercial, risk-driven model

The CMMI Institute, owned by the professional association ISACA, sells the CMMI Cybermaturity Platform by annual subscription. It works from a risk profile: the organization rates the likelihood and impact of risk events, the platform sets maturity targets for related capabilities from that profile, the organization marks whether practices are in place across "over 1,800 capabilities" in seven functional areas, and the platform produces gap reports and a risk-ranked roadmap. ISACA says the content is "updated biannually." Prices are not published.15 It is a reasonable choice for an organization that wants a vendor-supported tool and benchmarking; the trade-off is cost and the fact that the scoring logic is proprietary, which matters if a regulator or a court later asks how a score was produced.

CISA Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals

The Performance Goals (CPGs) are not a maturity ladder; they are a short list of high-impact practices that CISA considers the floor for critical infrastructure. CISA first issued them in October 2022 and updated them in March 2023. As displayed on CISA's goals page on Nov. 15, 2026, the set has 38 goals arranged by CSF function: 9 under Identify, 24 under Protect, 1 under Detect, 3 under Respond and 1 under Recover, each with an outcome, the threats it addresses, its scope and a recommended action. The page also said CISA was "in the process of updating its CPGs to NIST's CSF 2.0."16

CISA announced CPG 2.0 on Dec. 10, 2025, adding a component on governance, which it called "the cornerstone of a resilient cyber posture," with an emphasis on accountability, risk management and building security into daily operations.5 Trade press reported that the update also merged separate IT and operational technology goals into universal goals and added goals on third-party risk, zero trust architecture and incident communication.17 This lesson could not confirm the final count and numbering of the 2.0 goals from CISA's own pages; check CISA's site for the current list before citing a number. CISA also offers a free CPG assessment through its regional advisors.18

How to use the CPGs in a maturity program: treat them as a gate. Before a large organization spends money on Tier 4 analytics, every CPG that applies should be in place, because those are the practices whose absence shows up in incident reports year after year.

CIS Controls Implementation Groups

The Center for Internet Security's Critical Security Controls, version 8.1 (released June 2024), contain 18 Controls and 153 Safeguards.19 CIS sorts the Safeguards into three Implementation Groups (IGs). IG1, which CIS calls "essential cyber hygiene," is the floor for every organization (56 Safeguards in the v8 handout); IG2 adds Safeguards for organizations with several departments and regulated data (130 cumulative); IG3 includes all 153.4 IGs measure scope, not process rigor. A 5,000-person organization that handles regulated data should plan on IG2 at least, and an organization facing capable, targeted attackers on IG3. Version 8.1 also added a Governance function to align with CSF 2.0.19

The federal FISMA maturity scale

Every year, each federal agency's inspector general evaluates the agency's information security program under the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA), using metrics written by OMB, CISA and the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE). Each area is scored on five levels:3

  1. Ad hoc: "Policies, procedures, and strategies are not formalized; activities are performed in an ad-hoc, reactive manner."
  2. Defined: "Policies, procedures, and strategies are formalized and documented but not consistently implemented."
  3. Consistently Implemented: policies and procedures are consistently carried out, but quantitative and qualitative measures of their effectiveness are lacking.
  4. Managed and Measurable: those measures are collected across the organization and used to assess the policies and procedures and make changes.
  5. Optimized: policies and procedures are fully institutionalized and repeatable, and updated as threats, technology and missions change.

"OMB believes that achieving a Level 4 or above represents an effective level of security."3 This is the most public maturity scale in the United States, because the reports are posted (with security details removed) on oversight.gov and agency inspector general websites. It is also sobering. CIGIE's 2024 review of fiscal years 2020 to 2023 found that "the share of agencies with an effective information security program has held around 60 percent."20 HHS's inspector general rated the department's program "Not Effective" for fiscal 2025, the sixth year in a row; the core metrics averaged "Consistently Implemented," and no function area reached "Managed and Measurable."7

Private organizations can borrow this scale directly. Its great strength is the bright line at Level 4: a practice is not considered effective until someone measures whether it works.

Other scales you will meet

  • CMMC levels are certification levels, not maturity levels. The first version of the Defense Department's Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification had process maturity requirements. CMMC 2.0, in the program rule at 32 CFR Part 170 effective Dec. 16, 2024, ties Level 1 to the 15 basic safeguarding requirements of FAR 52.204-21, Level 2 to the 110 requirements of NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2, and Level 3 to selected SP 800-172 requirements. Despite its name, it measures whether requirements are met, not how mature the process is.21 The defense acquisition side of the program has changed during 2026; the Defense Department suspended Phase 2 by a July 13, 2026 memorandum carried in a class deviation signed Sept. 3, 2026.22 Lesson 6 covers CMMC in full.
  • ISO/IEC 27001 has no maturity scale. A certification body decides whether the management system conforms or not, with nonconformities to fix. Consultants often add a 0 to 5 scale to ISO assessments; that is their scale, not ISO's. See lesson 6.
  • SOC 2 has no maturity scale. A SOC 2 Type 2 report gives an auditor's opinion on whether controls were suitably designed and operated effectively over a period, with exceptions listed. See lesson 5.
  • Insurer questionnaires and security ratings use their own scores. They influence premiums and contracts, which makes them important, but their methods are proprietary and they mostly see the organization from the outside. See lesson 9.
  • Measurement guidance. NIST SP 800-55, finalized in two volumes on Dec. 4, 2024, is not a maturity model but tells an organization how to pick measures (Volume 1, Identifying and Selecting Measures) and how to run a measurement program (Volume 2, Developing an Information Security Measurement Program), the work that moves a program from Level 3 to Level 4 on the FISMA scale.23 Lesson 3 applies it.

The models side by side

ModelWhat it gradesScaleCostBest use in a large organization
NIST CSF 2.0 Tiers and Profiles (Feb. 26, 2024)Rigor of cyber risk governance and management; outcomes achieved now versus targetedTier 1 Partial to Tier 4 Adaptive; Profiles are outcome lists, not scoresFreeThe backbone for board reporting, regulators and cross-framework mapping1
DOE C2M2 v2.1 (June 2022)356 practices in 10 domainsMIL0 to MIL3 per domain, cumulativeFree, with a free online toolA detailed, defensible per-domain score; strong for utilities, plants and anyone with operational technology2
CMMI Cybermaturity Platform (ISACA)Over 1,800 capabilities in seven areas, targets set from a risk profileCurrent versus target maturity (proprietary)Annual subscriptionOrganizations wanting a supported tool and a ready roadmap15
CISA CPGs (2022, 2023; 2.0 announced Dec. 10, 2025)Whether high-impact baseline practices are in placeIn place or notFree, with free CISA assessmentsA gate: basics first, before advanced work165
CIS Controls v8.1 IGs (June 2024)153 Safeguards in 18 ControlsIG1, IG2, IG3 (scope)Free download with registrationA prioritized control list; deciding how far down the list to go4
IG FISMA metrics (federal)Agency programs in each CSF functionLevel 1 Ad hoc to Level 5 Optimized; Level 4 is "effective"Free (public metrics)Public agencies; anyone wanting a clear "effective" line3
Four ladders: what each one counts as a step up NIST CSF 2.0 Tiers rigor of risk governance, whole program Tier 1Partial Tier 2Risk Informed Tier 3Repeatable Tier 4Adaptive DOE C2M2 v2.1 MILs scored separately for each of 10 domains MIL0not performed MIL1ad hoc MIL2documented MIL3by policy Federal IG FISMA metrics five levels; Level 4 counts as effective effective line 1 Ad hoc 2 Defined 3 ConsistentlyImplemented 4 Managed andMeasurable 5 Optimized CIS Controls v8.1 IGs Implementation Groups (scope, not process) IG1: 56 Safeguardsessential cyber hygiene IG2: 130 Safeguardsadds for regulated data IG3: all 153targeted attackers The scales do not officially map to one another; rows are aligned for reading only.
The maturity staircase: four ladders a large organization is likely to meet. Original graphic for this module; level names from NIST CSWP 29 (Feb. 26, 2024), DOE C2M2 Version 2.1 (June 2022), the FY 2025 IG FISMA metrics as quoted in CIGIE's FY 2025 FISMA audit report (Aug. 18, 2025), and CIS Implementation Groups materials, read Nov. 15, 2026.

How to run a maturity assessment

An assessment is a project with a sponsor, a scope, a method, evidence and a report. Done well, it takes a large organization six to twelve weeks of part-time work by a small team; done badly, it takes two afternoons of interviews and produces a number nobody can defend. The steps below assume CSF 2.0 as the backbone, with the C2M2 or FISMA scale for scoring. They follow the profile process in NIST SP 1301 and the measurement workflow in SP 800-55 Volume 2.1123

Decide why, and for whom

An assessment for the board, one for a regulator, one to plan a budget and one to integrate an acquisition need different depth and different evidence. Write the purpose down in a one-page charter signed by the sponsor (usually the CISO, with the chief risk officer or the audit committee chair for an independent one). Say who will see the results. If the assessment may be used in litigation or a regulator's examination, the general counsel's office will want to decide in advance how drafts and the final report are handled; the security team should not make that decision alone.

Pick the model and the scope

Choose one scoring scale and write its level definitions into the charter, word for word. Define the scope: the whole enterprise, or one business unit, subsidiary or system. A 5,000-person organization usually assesses the enterprise once and then, in later years, the units with the most risk. Map regulatory requirements to the CSF Subcategories so the assessment also answers the compliance questions (NIST SP 1347, the Informative References quick-start guide finalized Aug. 25, 2026, explains how to use NIST's mappings).24

Gather evidence, not opinions

The single biggest difference between a defensible score and a paper score is evidence. For each practice, ask three questions: Is it written (policy, standard or procedure)? Is it done (a sample of records showing it happened, such as tickets, logs, access reviews, restore tests)? Is it measured (a metric with a target and a trend)? Interviews tell the assessor where to look; they do not prove anything. Internal audit's methods for sampling and testing, described in lesson 8, are the right model.

Score and calibrate

Score each area against the written definitions. Then calibrate: have two people score a sample independently and compare, and have a group review every score that changed by more than one level since the last assessment. Record the reason for each score in a sentence, with a pointer to the evidence. A score without a reason cannot be defended to an auditor or improved by the team.

Set the target

The target is a business decision, not a security wish list. Set it area by area, using the organization's risk assessment, its legal obligations, its risk appetite and what peers face. The C2M2's advice applies to every model: the top level in every area is rarely the right goal.2 Typical results for a regulated 5,000-person organization: Tier 3 (Repeatable) or MIL2 to MIL3 for identity, vulnerability management, detection, incident response and recovery; Tier 2 to 3 elsewhere; IG2 complete, IG3 where threats justify it. These are illustrations, not standards.

Turn gaps into a roadmap

List every gap between current and target. For each, estimate the risk reduction (high, medium or low, or in dollars if the organization uses quantitative methods), the cost, the effort and the dependencies (single sign-on before privileged access management, an asset inventory before vulnerability metrics). Sort by risk reduction per dollar, respect dependencies, and group into workstreams with an owner each. The roadmap example later in this lesson shows the result.

Self-assessment or independent review

Self-assessments are cheaper and teach the team the model; independent reviews (internal audit, a consulting firm, or a regulator's examination) catch optimism. A sensible pattern for a large organization is a yearly self-assessment and an independent one every two to three years, plus an independent review whenever the results will be stated publicly or to a regulator. The SolarWinds case shows why. The SEC alleged that the company publicly said it followed the NIST Cybersecurity Framework while its own internal assessment in September 2019 found a "program/practice in place" for only 21 of 325 controls. Those were allegations; the court dismissed most claims in July 2024 and the SEC dismissed the rest with prejudice on Nov. 20, 2025.2526 But the case was built from the company's own assessment, which is exactly what any regulator or plaintiff will ask for first.

  1. Write a one-page assessment charter: purpose, sponsor, scope, model, scale definitions, who sees results, how drafts are handled.
  2. Map applicable laws, rules and contracts to CSF 2.0 Subcategories.
  3. Build the evidence request list (written, done, measured) for each area and send it two weeks before interviews.
  4. Interview control owners, including owners outside IT (HR, procurement, facilities, finance, the business units).
  5. Test samples: pick records at random and confirm the practice happened.
  6. Score each area with a written reason and an evidence pointer; calibrate with a second scorer.
  7. Set target levels with the risk owners and record who approved them.
  8. List gaps, estimate risk reduction and cost, and sequence them into a roadmap.
  9. Report to management and the board committee: current versus target, top gaps, the roadmap and the funding request.
  10. Repeat yearly, and keep each year's evidence so trends can be shown and tested.
A construction crane with workers at a building site in London
A construction crane at a building site in Haringey, London, April 2025. A security roadmap is built in stages, like a building, with each floor resting on the one below. Photo: Acabashi. Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0.

A 90-day plan for a new program

Sometimes there is no program to assess. A company has grown past the point where an IT manager can carry security, a public agency has just hired its first information security officer, or an acquisition has brought in a business with nothing in place. The first 90 days decide whether the program starts as a set of controls that work or as a stack of documents. Lesson 1 covers the first 100 days of a new CISO in an existing program; this plan is for building one where none exists.

Three principles shape it. Fix the exposures that cause most incidents before writing most of the policies. Get the authority (a charter and a reporting line) in writing early, because everything else depends on it. And measure a baseline in the first month, so progress can be shown in the third.

Days 1 to 30: authority, inventory and the urgent fixes

  • Get a draft charter approved by the CEO or agency head, naming the security leader, the scope and the reporting line, with board or governing-body approval scheduled. Sample charter language is in lesson 1.
  • List the legal, regulatory and contract obligations: which breach notice laws, sector rules (GLBA, HIPAA, NYDFS Part 500, PCI DSS, CMMC, state agency policy) and customer contracts apply. Start the compliance calendar described in lesson 4.
  • Build a first inventory of internet-facing systems, cloud accounts, remote access paths and the systems that hold the most sensitive data. It will be incomplete; that is expected.
  • Close the most common entry points: multifactor authentication on remote access, email and administrator accounts; patches for anything on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on internet-facing systems; at least one backup copy that attackers cannot reach, with one test restore. Remind every team to plan each production change, test it and have a way back.
  • Write down who to call in an incident: the incident response firm or retainer, the insurer's hotline, the people who decide on notices. Module 108, lesson 10 explains the plan.
  • Record baseline numbers: percentage of accounts with multifactor sign-in, number of internet-facing KEV vulnerabilities, days since the last successful restore test.

Days 31 to 60: baseline assessment and the top-level policy

  • Run a light CSF 2.0 Current Profile, scoring each Category with evidence where it exists and flagging where it does not. The CISA CPG list makes a good first pass for what must be in place.16
  • Start the risk register, with business owners named for each risk (module 108, lesson 2).
  • Draft the top-level information security policy and the exception process (lesson 4), plus the few topic policies regulators always ask for first: access control, acceptable use, incident response, vendor risk.
  • List the 20 vendors with the most access or the most sensitive data, and collect their SOC reports or equivalent (lesson 5).
  • Pick five to eight metrics and set up the data feeds (lesson 3).

Days 61 to 90: target, roadmap, budget and the first board report

  • Agree target levels by area with the risk owners and the executive sponsor.
  • Draft the three-year roadmap and the first year's budget request (lesson 2).
  • Run a two-hour executive tabletop exercise on a ransomware scenario (lesson 12).
  • Deliver the first board or governing-body report: what was found, what was fixed, baseline numbers against day 1, the target, the roadmap and the decisions needed.
  • Schedule the next 12 months: quarterly reports, the yearly assessment, the first penetration test (lesson 7) and the insurance renewal (lesson 9).
The first 90 days of a new program Days 1 to 30 authority and urgent fixes Days 31 to 60 baseline and policy Days 61 to 90 target and plan Charter and reporting line Laws, rules, contracts listed Inventory: internet-facing, cloud, sensitive data MFA: remote, email, admins Patch KEV items on the edge Unreachable backup + restore Incident call list Baseline numbers recorded Light CSF 2.0 current profile CPGs as a first pass Risk register, business owners Top-level policy and exception process Top 20 vendors, SOC reports Five to eight metrics Targets agreed by area Three-year roadmap Year one budget request Executive ransomware tabletop First board report vs day 1 12-month calendar set Fix exposures first, write policy second, measure throughout
A 90-day plan for a new program. Original graphic for this module; the order of urgent fixes follows CISA's Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals and Known Exploited Vulnerabilities guidance, read Nov. 15, 2026.

A three-year roadmap: a worked example

Everything in this section is fictional and illustrative. The company, its numbers, its scores and its budget are invented to show how an assessment becomes a roadmap. They are not benchmarks, and no real organization is described.

The fictional company

Call it Lochsa Financial Holdings, a fictional publicly traded company with 5,000 employees in six states. It owns a federally chartered bank (so the OCC's information security guidelines in 12 CFR Part 30, Appendix B apply), an insurance agency licensed in New York (so 23 NYCRR Part 500 applies to that unit), and a payments business that stores card data (so PCI DSS applies). As a public company it reports cyber risk management and board oversight in 10-K Item 1C under Regulation S-K Item 106.278 It has 140 people in IT, 22 in security, two data centers, three cloud providers, about 700 vendors and dozens of AI tools in use.

A new CISO arrives after an incident in which a vendor's remote support account was used to reach an internal file server. No customer data was taken, but the board asked two questions: how mature is our program, and what will it take to fix it?

What the assessment found

The CISO ran the assessment described above, using CSF 2.0 Categories scored on the C2M2's MIL0 to MIL3 definitions, with internal audit reviewing a sample of the evidence. The (fictional) results:

CSF 2.0 FunctionCurrent (illustrative)Target in three years (illustrative)Biggest gaps found
GovernMIL1MIL3No board-approved charter; risk appetite not stated for cyber; 140 open policy exceptions, 60 of them expired; vendor tiering not done
IdentifyMIL1MIL2 to MIL3Asset inventory 70 percent complete; data inventory only for the bank; risk assessment last done two years ago
ProtectMIL2MIL3Multifactor sign-in on email and VPN but not on vendor remote support or two legacy admin consoles; no privileged access management; backups not isolated
DetectMIL1MIL3Logs from cloud and identity systems not collected centrally; monitoring business hours only
RespondMIL2MIL3Plan exists but not tested with executives; no documented SEC materiality process; NYDFS 72-hour notice not in the plan
RecoverMIL1MIL2 to MIL3Recovery time objectives set for the core banking system only; no full restore test in two years

Notice what the CISO did not do. She did not set MIL3 everywhere on day one, she did not report a single "maturity score" to the board, and she tied every gap to evidence. The board saw six rows, each with a current level, a target, a reason and a cost.

The roadmap, year by year

Year 1: close the doors and build the base. Multifactor sign-in on every remote path, including vendor support tools, and on every administrator account; a privileged access management tool for the 400 most powerful accounts; immutable, isolated backups and a full restore test of core banking; 24-hour monitoring through a managed detection and response provider while the internal team is hired; a board-approved charter and risk appetite statement; the policy exception backlog cleared; vendor tiering for the top 100 vendors; the SEC materiality process and the NYDFS and banking notice timelines written into the incident response plan (module 108, lesson 11). Every change to production systems is planned, tested and given a way back.

Year 2: make it repeatable and measured. Complete the asset and data inventories (lesson 10); move identity to a single platform with quarterly access reviews for critical systems; central logging for cloud and identity; a measurement program with KRIs reported quarterly (lesson 3); vendor tiering for all 700 vendors; business impact analysis and recovery objectives for the top 20 services (lesson 12); the first full penetration test and a purple team exercise (lesson 7); an AI use inventory and acceptable use policy (lesson 13); and a SOC 2 Type 2 report for the payments business if customers require it (lesson 5).

Year 3: make it adaptive and independently checked. Bring part of the monitoring in-house or keep the provider, based on a cost and performance review; threat-led red teaming; segmentation of the payments environment and the data centers; continuous control monitoring for the controls auditors test most (lesson 8); an independent maturity assessment; and, if the board wants it, ISO/IEC 27001 certification for the payments unit (lesson 6).

What it might cost, illustratively

For the fictional company, the CISO's request was a security budget rising from $14 million in the base year to $19 million in Year 1 and $21 million in Years 2 and 3, then settling near $20 million, with one-time costs in Years 1 and 2 (tools, migration and consulting) and lasting costs in staff, managed services and audits. These numbers are made up to show the shape of a request: a front-loaded increase, a plateau and a smaller permanent increase. Real benchmarks, and how to build the business case, are in lesson 2.

How the board tracks it

The roadmap becomes a standing item on the risk or audit committee's quarterly agenda: each workstream's status against plan, the KRIs that show whether risk is falling (percentage of privileged accounts under management, KEV vulnerabilities past due, restore test success, mean time to detect), new risks, and any change in scope or cost. Every 12 months the CISO repeats the assessment and shows the movement in the six rows. The 10-K Item 1C description of risk management and board oversight is reviewed against this evidence before it is filed (module 108, lesson 4).27

Illustrative three-year roadmap (fictional company) Year 1Year 2Year 3 Governance, metrics Identity Assets, vulnerabilities Detection, response Resilience Vendors and data Assurance Charter Exceptions Quarterly KRIs Independent MFA all paths; PAM 400 One platform; reviews Continuous monitoring Inventory to 100 percent; KEV deadlines met Segmentation 24-hour managed MDR Central logging Sourcing review; red team Isolated backups; restore BIA top 20 services Failover exercise Tier top 100 vendors All 700; data and AI Pen test; SOC 2 ISO 27001 option Diamonds: yearly maturity reassessment Fictional and illustrative; not a benchmark
A three-year roadmap for a fictional 5,000-person company, built from a current and target profile. Original graphic for this module; all content is invented for illustration. Workstream order follows NIST CSF 2.0 (Feb. 26, 2024) and the C2M2 v2.1 advice to set per-domain targets.

The Program Maturity Checklist

This checklist gathers the whole module, and its foundations in module 108, into 66 items organized by the six CSF 2.0 Functions. Each item says what a mature program in a large or regulated organization has, what evidence proves it, and which lesson explains it. It is not a regulation and not a substitute for the regulator's current text; it is a way for a CISO, an internal auditor, a board committee or an agency head to see the whole program on a few pages.

How to use it: mark each item Yes (in place, with evidence), Partly (in place for some units or without evidence), or No. A "Yes" requires the evidence in the third column, not a statement in an interview. Items marked with an asterisk (*) are among the basics that CISA's Performance Goals or the CIS IG1 Safeguards treat as the floor; a program with any of those marked No should fix them before spending on anything else.164

Govern (18 items)

No.What a mature program hasEvidence to ask forExplained in
G1A security program charter approved by the board or governing body, stating mission, scope, authority and reporting lineSigned charter; board minutes approving it112-1
G2*A named executive accountable for the program (CISO, Qualified Individual or equivalent) with direct access to the board or a committeeAppointment record; committee calendar showing CISO sessions112-1; 108-4
G3A board committee with cyber oversight written into its charter; minutes that show questions and follow-upCommittee charter; last four sets of minutes108-4
G4Cyber risk appetite and tolerance statements, approved and used in decisionsApproved statement; one decision memo that cites it108-2
G5Cyber risks in the enterprise risk register, owned by business leadersRegister extract with owners outside IT108-2
G6An inventory of legal, regulatory and contract obligations, reviewed yearlyObligations register with review date108-3; 112-4
G7A policy hierarchy reviewed on schedule, with exceptions logged, time-limited and accepted by an authorized ownerPolicy index with review dates; exception log with expiry dates112-4
G8Defined roles and a responsibility chart, with job descriptions mapped to the NICE FrameworkRACI chart; role descriptions112-1
G9A multi-year budget built from the risk assessment and the roadmapBudget request tied to roadmap items112-2
G10A staffing plan with succession for key roles and a retention planOrg chart; vacancy and turnover figures; named deputies112-2
G11Key risk and performance indicators with targets, reported at least quarterly, showing trendsLast four quarterly reports112-3
G12Board reports that include incidents, failed tests, overdue fixes and exceptions, not only project statusLast board report112-3
G13*Vendor risk management: vendors tiered by risk, security terms in contracts, assurance reports reviewedVendor tier list; contract clause library; SOC report reviews108-8; 112-5
G14A compliance calendar with an owner for every filing, certification and reportCalendar; last NYDFS, PCI, SOC or CMMC submissions as they apply112-4
G15Internal audit coverage of cyber in the audit plan, with findings tracked to closureAudit plan; findings tracker with ages112-8
G16Public statements (10-K Item 1C, website security pages, customer questionnaires) checked against evidence before releaseReview sign-off for the last 10-K and the security web page108-4
G17An inventory of AI use and an approved generative AI acceptable use policyAI inventory; policy; approval records for high-risk uses112-13
G18A privacy program connected to security: a privacy leader, a data inventory, privacy impact assessmentsPrivacy office charter; last three assessments112-10; 108-12

Identify (11 items)

No.What a mature program hasEvidence to ask forExplained in
I1*A hardware and software asset inventory, maintained by automated discovery and reconciledInventory counts by source; reconciliation report108-6
I2A data inventory showing where sensitive data lives, with a classification schemeData inventory; classification standard112-10; 108-7
I3Critical services and their dependencies mapped through a business impact analysisBIA for the top services112-12
I4A documented risk assessment method, used at least yearly and on major changeMethod document; last assessment report108-2
I5*Vulnerability management with deadlines by severity and for CISA Known Exploited VulnerabilitiesStandard with deadlines; past-due counts by month108-6
I6Threat information relevant to the sector (an ISAC, government alerts) used in planningMembership; examples of alerts acted on108-1
I7A third-party inventory with criticality and data access recordedInventory with tier and data fields108-8
I8Independent penetration tests at least yearly and after major change; red or purple teams for the most exposedLast test reports; remediation tracker112-7
I9A maturity assessment against a named model at least yearly, with current and target profilesAssessment report; approved targetsthis lesson
I10One improvement register for findings from audits, tests, incidents and assessmentsRegister with owners, dates and ages112-8
I11A security due diligence process for acquisitions and a Day 1 integration planDiligence checklist; last deal's findings112-11

Protect (17 items)

No.What a mature program hasEvidence to ask forExplained in
P1*Multifactor sign-in for all remote access, email, cloud administration, vendor support tools and privileged accountsCoverage report by system; exception list108-5
P2Privileged access management, with administrator accounts separate from daily accountsCount of privileged accounts under management108-5
P3*Joiner, mover and leaver processes that remove access promptly, and access reviews for critical systemsSample of leavers with removal dates; last review sign-offs108-5; 112-8
P4*Security training by role, with phishing reports measuredCompletion and report rates108-9
P5Encryption of sensitive data in transit and at rest, with key managementEncryption standard; key inventory108-7
P6*Backups with at least one copy attackers cannot alter, and tested restoresBackup architecture; restore test results108-7
P7Secure configuration baselines with drift monitoredBaselines; compliance percentages108-6
P8*Patching deadlines met, with internet-facing and edge devices firstPatch age report for edge devices108-6
P9Network segmentation of crown-jewel systems and operational technologyNetwork diagrams; firewall rule reviews108-6; 111-7
P10*Endpoint detection and response on all workstations and serversCoverage percentage versus the asset inventory108-10
P11Email protections, including DMARC enforcement, and web filteringDMARC policy record; filter reports108-9
P12Secure software development and application security testing for code the organization buildsDevelopment standard; scan and test results112-7
P13Cloud accounts inventoried, with guardrails and posture monitoringAccount list; posture findings trend108-6
P14A records retention schedule enforced, with secure disposal of data and devicesSchedule; disposal certificates108-7; 73-17
P15Change management that auditors can rely on (approval, testing, separation of duties)Sample of changes with approvals112-8
P16Physical and device controls for data centers, offices and mobile devicesAccess logs; device management coverage73-14
P17An insider risk program run with HR and the general counsel's officeProgram charter; case handling procedure108-9

Detect (6 items)

No.What a mature program hasEvidence to ask forExplained in
D1*Central collection of identity, endpoint, network and cloud logs, kept as long as rules and investigations requireLog source list; retention settings108-10
D2Monitoring around the clock (in-house or a managed provider) with written escalation rulesContract or staffing roster; escalation runbook108-10; 112-1
D3Detection rules mapped to the threats the sector faces, tested by purple team exercisesCoverage map; exercise results112-7
D4Time to detect and time to contain measured and trendedQuarterly figures112-3
D5Vendor security events and exceptions in vendor assurance reports trackedVendor incident log; SOC exception follow-ups112-5
D6Monitoring of operational technology where the organization runs itOT monitoring coverage111-1

Respond (8 items)

No.What a mature program hasEvidence to ask forExplained in
R1*A written incident response plan with roles, approved and updated at least yearlyPlan with approval date108-10
R2A documented process for deciding materiality for SEC Form 8-K Item 1.05 (public companies)Procedure; committee membership108-4
R3A notification matrix covering every regulator, state law and contract deadline that appliesMatrix with deadlines and owners108-11
R4Incident response and forensic retainers that match the insurer's panel and consent rulesRetainer letters; policy panel list112-9
R5A decision process for ransom and extortion demands, including sanctions screeningPlaybook; decision authority108-10
R6Tabletop exercises at least yearly with executives, and periodically with the boardExercise reports; attendance112-12
R7A crisis communications plan with approved holding statementsPlan; contact lists112-12
R8Lessons learned from every significant incident, tracked to closureAfter-action reports; closure dates108-10

Recover (6 items)

No.What a mature program hasEvidence to ask forExplained in
C1Recovery time and recovery point objectives set for each critical service and testedObjectives table; test results against them112-12
C2*A full restore of at least one critical system tested every yearRestore test record with time taken108-7
C3Manual workarounds and downtime procedures for critical operationsProcedures; last drill112-12
C4A business continuity plan, exercised, with exit plans for concentrated vendorsPlan; exercise report; exit plans112-12
C5Cyber insurance matched to the organization's worst realistic scenarios, with renewal evidence readyCoverage summary; scenario losses; renewal file112-9
C6Recovery communications to customers, regulators and staff planned in advanceTemplates; approval chain112-12

Scoring the checklist: a simple and honest method counts Yes as 2, Partly as 1 and No as 0, reports the percentage by Function, and lists every asterisked item marked No by name. Report the list, not just the percentage. A program at 80 percent with multifactor sign-in missing on remote access is in more danger than one at 60 percent with every basic in place.

Wooden staircase steps through a forest at dusk
Wooden steps on the Eorimok Trail in Hallasan Park, Jeju Island, South Korea, 2024. Maturity models describe a program climbing one step at a time. Photo: Basile Morin. Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0.

Why programs stall

Most security programs do not fail in one dramatic moment. They stop improving, and then an incident shows how long ago they stopped. The public record offers a clear set of patterns.

Remediation that never closes

In October 2020 the Federal Reserve and the OCC took enforcement actions against Citigroup over risk management, data governance and internal controls. On July 10, 2024, they penalized the bank again, $60.6 million from the Fed and $75 million from the OCC, $135.6 million in all, because, in the Fed's words, "Citigroup has made insufficient progress remediating its problems with data quality management." The OCC also amended its 2020 order, citing persistent weaknesses, particularly in data.6 That case was about data and risk management rather than security in the narrow sense, but it is the clearest public example of a regulator punishing a remediation program for moving too slowly. Every large organization's open audit findings, exceptions and roadmap items carry the same risk.

The same rating every year

The FISMA reports show programs that stay on a plateau. CIGIE's 2024 review of four fiscal years found the share of federal agencies with an effective program "held around 60 percent."20 HHS, one of the largest civilian departments, was rated "Not Effective" for the sixth straight year in fiscal 2025.7 The pattern in many such reports is a program stuck at Level 3: policies exist and are followed, but nobody measures whether they work, so nothing drives the next improvement. The fix is less glamorous than a new tool: pick measures, collect them, and act on them, as SP 800-55 describes.23

Basics that exist on paper but not in production

The Equifax breach of 2017 is still the textbook case. GAO reported that attackers reached personal information of at least 145.5 million people, and Equifax identified failures in identifying the vulnerability, detecting the intrusion, separating access to databases and data governance.28 The House Oversight Committee's December 2018 report found that Equifax "did not patch the Apache Struts software" in the affected system, leaving it exposed for 145 days; that a device monitoring that system's traffic "had been inactive for 19 months due to an expired security certificate"; and that the company had "allowed over 300 security certificates to expire." Its conclusion: "Such a breach was entirely preventable."29

In the 2024 Change Healthcare attack, UnitedHealth Group's chief executive told the Senate Finance Committee that on Feb. 12, 2024, "criminals used compromised credentials to remotely access a Change Healthcare Citrix portal," and that "The portal did not have multi-factor authentication." Ransomware followed nine days later.30 A program can rate itself highly on identity while one remote access portal, often an acquired company's, is left out. Item P1 of the checklist exists for that reason, and lesson 11 explains why acquired systems are where it most often happens.

Moving faster than the risk process

On Aug. 6, 2020, the OCC assessed an $80 million civil money penalty against Capital One for "failure to establish effective risk assessment processes" before migrating significant information technology operations to the public cloud, and for failing to correct the deficiencies in a timely way. The OCC found these were unsafe or unsound practices and violations of the information security guidelines in 12 CFR Part 30, Appendix B.31 The lesson for a roadmap: large migrations, acquisitions and AI rollouts are where the risk process must lead, not follow.

Other common causes

  • Leadership turnover. A new CISO, CIO or CEO every two years resets priorities. A board-approved charter and roadmap survive turnover better than a plan in one person's head.
  • Annual budgets for multi-year work. Identity consolidation, logging and segmentation take two to three years. A roadmap approved as a multi-year plan, with the board's knowledge, is harder to cut quietly in year two.
  • Tool sprawl. Buying a tool is not the same as running it. Unconfigured tools add cost and false confidence; lesson 2 discusses consolidation.
  • Activity metrics. Counting blocked emails and training completions shows effort, not results. Programs that report only activity cannot tell whether they are improving (lesson 3).
  • Security owned only by security. When business units treat risk as the CISO's problem, the exceptions pile up and nobody with budget authority feels the risk.
  • Compliance as the finish line. Passing an audit or renewing a certificate can become the goal. Audits test a sample against a standard; attackers test everything.

How to tell a mature program from a paper one

A paper program has documents that describe a program that does not fully exist. It is not always deliberate; often the documents were written in good faith and the work fell behind. The danger is the same either way: the organization, its board, its customers and its regulators believe something that is not true, and the documents become evidence of what the organization knew it should be doing.

Question to askPaper program answerMature program answer
Show me the evidence for this score."The control owner confirmed it in an interview."A sample of records, a metric and a trend, linked to the score.
How many policy exceptions are open, and how many have expired?Unknown, or "a few."An exact count, an age report and named owners who accepted the risk.
When did you last restore a critical system from backup, and how long did it take?"Backups run every night."A date, a system, a time, and what went wrong.
What did the last penetration test find, and what is still open?The executive summary.The findings tracker with ages and closure evidence.
What changed after the last incident or tabletop?"We discussed it."A list of actions with closure dates.
Which systems are not covered by MFA, EDR or logging?"None."A named list, with the risk accepted by an owner and a date to fix.
Who signed the annual compliance certification, and what did they review?The signers relied on a summary.A documented review package kept for the required period.

The certification test. New York's cybersecurity regulation turns this distinction into a legal duty. Each covered entity must file by April 15 either a certification that it "materially complied" with Part 500 during the prior year, supported by documentation, or a written acknowledgment of noncompliance that lists the sections, describes the gaps and gives a remediation timeline. The highest-ranking executive and the CISO must both sign, and the supporting records must be kept for five years.8 The acknowledgment option exists so that an honest "not yet" has a lawful path. When DFS fined Carnival $5 million in June 2022, among the failures it cited were missing multifactor authentication, inadequate training and an incident reported 10 months late, and it found the company's certification of compliance improper.9

The public statement test. Website security statements, customer questionnaires and SEC filings are statements of fact. The SolarWinds allegations described above are the warning: if a public claim says the organization "follows" a framework, its own assessments will be used to test that claim.25

The executive accountability test. Regulators increasingly name people. The FTC's 2022 order in the Drizly case bound the company's chief executive personally, including obligations that follow him to certain future companies.32 The SEC's case against SolarWinds' CISO ended in dismissal, but it showed that a security leader's own words in public statements can be examined.26 A mature program protects its leaders by making sure what they sign and say is backed by evidence.

Sample: Maturity Assessment and Roadmap Record

Sample only. Adapt it to your organization's risks, systems and laws, have qualified people review it, and do not treat it as a substitute for a risk assessment.

Follows: NIST CSF 2.0 (CSWP 29, Feb. 26, 2024) and SP 1301 and SP 1302 quick-start guides; DOE C2M2 Version 2.1 (June 2022) maturity indicator level definitions; NIST SP 800-55 Volumes 1 and 2 (Dec. 4, 2024); 23 NYCRR 500.17(b) (as amended Nov. 1, 2023) for record keeping.

1. Assessment header

  • Organization or unit assessed: [name]. Scope: [enterprise / business unit / system]. Exclusions and reasons: [list].
  • Sponsor: [title]. Assessment lead: [name, title]. Independent reviewer: [internal audit / firm / none, with reason].
  • Model and scale: [NIST CSF 2.0 Categories scored on C2M2 MIL0 to MIL3 / FISMA Levels 1 to 5]. The level definitions used are attached word for word as Appendix A.
  • Period covered: [dates]. Evidence cutoff date: [date]. Distribution: [list]. Draft handling: [as decided by the general counsel's office].

2. Scoring table (one row per CSF Category)

  • Category: [e.g., GV.SC, Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management].
  • Current level: [ ]. Reason (one sentence): [ ]. Evidence references: [document IDs, samples tested].
  • Prior year level: [ ]. Change explained: [ ].
  • Target level: [ ]. Approved by (risk owner): [name, date]. Basis for target: [risk, law, contract, appetite].
  • Second scorer agreed: [yes / no; if no, resolution].

3. Basics gate

List every CISA Performance Goal and CIS IG1 Safeguard that applies and is not fully in place: [item, systems affected, owner, fix date]. No advanced roadmap item may displace a basics item without a written risk acceptance by [title].

4. Gap list and roadmap

  • Gap: [ ]. Risk reduction: [high / medium / low or estimated dollars]. Cost: [one-time / yearly]. Dependencies: [ ]. Workstream: [ ]. Owner: [ ]. Start and finish: [quarter]. Production change controls: [planned, tested, rollback defined].
  • Roadmap approved by [executive committee] on [date] and presented to [board committee] on [date].

5. Tracking and reporting

Status of each workstream is reported to [committee] each quarter with the KRIs listed in Appendix B. Items more than [90] days late are reported by name with the reason. The assessment is repeated every [12] months; an independent assessment is performed at least every [24 to 36] months and before any public statement that relies on these results.

6. Records

The assessment report, evidence index, scoring worksheets and approvals are kept for [five] years or longer if a law, regulation or legal hold requires.

A clipboard with every box ticked
A clipboard with every box ticked. A finished checklist is a starting point for questions, not proof of security. Photo: https://pixabay.com/users/472301-472301/. Wikimedia Commons, CC0.

The Resource Library for program leaders

These are the resources a program leader in a large or regulated organization returns to. Module 108's resource library covers the control catalogs, incident response guides and privacy law sources; this list focuses on running, measuring, assuring and governing the program. Government publications are free and public domain; standards from ISO, the IIA and the PCI Security Standards Council are copyrighted and are described here, not reproduced. Links and status were checked Nov. 13 to 15, 2026, as shown.

Frameworks, maturity and measurement

ResourceWhat it isWho it is forCostHow to use itChecked
NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 (CSWP 29)Six Functions, 22 Categories, 106 Subcategories; Tiers and Profiles; published Feb. 26, 20241Every organization; boards and regulatorsFreeWrite a Current and Target Profile; report by FunctionNov. 15, 2026
CSF 2.0 Quick-Start GuidesShort guides including Organizational Profiles (SP 1301), Tiers (SP 1302), Enterprise Risk Management (SP 1303), supply chain (SP 1305), Cybersecurity, ERM and Workforce Management (SP 1308) and Informative References (SP 1347); a Community Profiles guide (CSWP 32) and SP 1353 remain drafts11CISOs, risk officers, profile teamsFreeUse SP 1301 and its template to run the assessment in this lesson; SP 1302 to set Tier targetsNov. 15, 2026
NIST SP 800-55 Vol. 1 and Vol. 2Measurement Guide for Information Security, final Dec. 4, 202423Metrics owners, internal auditFreePick measures (Vol. 1) and build the measurement program (Vol. 2); see lesson 3Nov. 15, 2026
NIST SP 800-181 Rev. 1 and the NICE Framework Resource CenterThe Workforce Framework for Cybersecurity (Nov. 16, 2020); NICE Framework Components v2.2.0 released April 28, 202633CISOs, HR, training leadsFreeMap roles and job descriptions to work roles; plan training; see lesson 1Nov. 15, 2026
DOE C2M2 Version 2.1 and its self-evaluation tool356 practices, 10 domains, MIL0 to MIL3; June 2022214Energy, utilities, manufacturers, any organization wanting a per-domain scoreFree; free DOE facilitation for U.S. energy organizationsRun the online tool; set target MILs per domainNov. 15, 2026
CISA Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance GoalsBaseline practices for critical infrastructure; CPG 2.0 announced Dec. 10, 2025165Critical infrastructure, public agencies, any organizationFreeUse as the basics gate before advanced workNov. 15, 2026
CISA free services and toolsRegional advisors, vulnerability scanning, CPG assessments and other no-cost services18Public agencies, hospitals, utilities, critical infrastructureFreeAsk the regional advisor for a CPG assessment and cyber hygiene scanningNov. 13, 2026
CIS Critical Security Controls v8.118 Controls, 153 Safeguards, three Implementation Groups4Security engineering and operationsFree with registration; license limits commercial reusePick the Implementation Group; track Safeguards as checklist itemsNov. 15, 2026
CMMI Cybermaturity PlatformCommercial risk-based maturity platform from ISACA's CMMI Institute15Organizations wanting a supported tool and benchmarksPaid subscriptionConsider if the organization wants vendor support; ask how scores are derivedNov. 15, 2026
IG FISMA reports and oversight.govYearly federal agency program ratings on the five-level scale3Public agencies; anyone benchmarking maturity languageFreeBorrow the Level 4 "effective" line; read peer agency findingsNov. 15, 2026

Assurance, audit and certification

ResourceWhat it isWho it is forCostHow to use itChecked
AICPA SOC suite of servicesThe SOC 1, SOC 2, SOC 3 and SOC for Cybersecurity reports and the Trust Services Criteria; proposed 2027 SOC 2 criteria were exposed for comment on Oct. 26, 20263435Vendor managers, service organizations, auditorsOverview free; criteria free download; some guides paidSee lesson 5Nov. 13, 2026
IIA Global Internal Audit Standards and Cybersecurity Topical RequirementStandards for internal audit (effective Jan. 9, 2025); the cyber Topical Requirement issued Feb. 5, 2025, effective Feb. 5, 202636Chief audit executives, audit committeesStandards free to read with registration; IIA guidance and training paidCheck the audit plan covers the Topical Requirement; see lesson 8Nov. 15, 2026
ISO/IEC 27001:2022Information security management system requirements; certifications to the 2013 edition had to transition by Oct. 31, 202537Organizations selling internationally; service providersPaid standard; certification audits paidSee lesson 6Nov. 13, 2026
ISO 22301:2019Business continuity management system requirements (described, not reproduced)Continuity and resilience leadersPaid standardSee lesson 12Nov. 15, 2026
PCI SSC document libraryPCI DSS v4.0.1 (June 2024), self-assessment questionnaires, attestation forms38Merchants and payment service providersFree with license termsDownload the current standard and the right SAQ or ROC templateNov. 13, 2026
FedRAMP.govFederal cloud authorization program; 559 certified services and 39 through FedRAMP 20x as of Nov. 15, 2026; plan to stop accepting new Rev. 5 certifications on June 11, 20273940Cloud providers selling to agencies; agency buyersFree information; authorization costs borne by providerCheck the marketplace for a vendor's status; see lesson 6Nov. 15, 2026
DoD CMMC programCMMC program rule, 32 CFR Part 170, effective Dec. 16, 2024; acquisition phase-in changed during 20262122Defense contractors and subcontractorsFree information; assessments paidConfirm current phase and clauses before bidding; see lesson 6Nov. 15, 2026

Rules, insurance, privacy, AI and the public sector

ResourceWhat it isWho it is forCostHow to use itChecked
SEC cybersecurity disclosure rules and Regulation S-K Item 106Form 8-K Item 1.05 and 10-K Item 1C requirements27Public companies, boards, disclosure committeesFreeCheck the 10-K description against the maturity evidence; see 108-4Nov. 13, 2026
NYDFS 23 NYCRR Part 500New York's cybersecurity regulation, including the April 15 certification or acknowledgment8Banks, insurers and other DFS licenseesFreeBuild the certification evidence package from the maturity assessmentNov. 15, 2026
FTC Safeguards Rule, 16 CFR 314.4Program elements and the Qualified Individual's written report to the board at least yearly10Non-bank financial institutionsFreeUse the rule's elements as a checklist cross-checkNov. 15, 2026
DOJ Evaluation of Corporate Compliance ProgramsThe questions federal prosecutors ask about any compliance program, updated Sept. 23, 202441General counsel's offices, compliance officers, boardsFreeTest whether the security compliance program is resourced, tested and improved; see lesson 4Nov. 15, 2026
NAIC 2026 Report on the Cybersecurity Insurance MarketPremium, policy and claim data for 2025, released Oct. 21, 202642Risk managers, insurance buyers, regulatorsFreeContext for renewal negotiations; see lesson 9Nov. 15, 2026
NIST AI Risk Management Framework and PlaybookAI RMF 1.0 (Jan. 26, 2023), Generative AI Profile NIST AI 600-1 (July 26, 2024); NIST says the AI RMF "is being revised"43AI governance committees, CISOs, privacy officersFreeUse the Playbook's suggested actions for the Govern, Map, Measure and Manage functions; see lesson 13Nov. 15, 2026
NIST Privacy FrameworkVersion 1.0 (Jan. 2020) is current; Version 1.1 was released as a draft April 14, 202544Privacy officersFreePair privacy profiles with CSF profiles; see lesson 10Nov. 13, 2026
California Privacy Protection Agency regulationsRegulations on risk assessments, cybersecurity audits and automated decisionmaking, approved Sept. 23, 2025; first audit certifications due April 1, 2028, 2029 or 2030 by revenue45Businesses subject to the CCPAFreePlan the first cybersecurity audit as part of the roadmap; see lesson 10Nov. 15, 2026
Idaho Technology Authority policiesPolicies for Idaho executive branch agencies, including P4140 (current NIST CSF as the basis for assessments)13Idaho agencies; local governments looking for a modelFreeUse P4140 and the related security policies as a state-level baselineNov. 13, 2026

The Sample Policy Library

Every sample in this module is listed below with a link to the lesson that holds it. Each one is labeled as a sample, uses [brackets] for blanks and names the sources it follows; none replaces a risk assessment or review by qualified people who know the organization's systems and the laws that apply to it. The foundation documents (the top-level Information Security Policy, access control, incident response, breach notification, vendor risk and others) are in module 108's Sample Policy Library, which also lists the samples in modules 109, 110 and 111.

SampleTypeWhere it is
Security Program CharterCharterModule 112, Lesson 1: Building the Security Program
Security Budget Request templateTemplateModule 112, Lesson 2: Budgets, Staffing and the Business Case
Board Security Report templateTemplateModule 112, Lesson 3: Metrics and Reporting to Leadership
Policy Management ProcedureProcedureModule 112, Lesson 4: Policy Management and the Compliance Program
Exception and Risk Acceptance ProcedureProcedureModule 112, Lesson 4
SOC Report Review ChecklistChecklistModule 112, Lesson 5: SOC Reports and Attestations
Vulnerability Disclosure PolicyPolicyModule 112, Lesson 7: Security Testing, Pen Tests, Red Teams and Disclosure
Penetration Test Rules of Engagement templateTemplateModule 112, Lesson 7
IT General Controls ChecklistChecklistModule 112, Lesson 8: Internal Audit, SOX and the Three Lines
Cyber Insurance Renewal Readiness ChecklistChecklistModule 112, Lesson 9: Cyber Insurance
Data Inventory and Records of Processing WorksheetWorksheetModule 112, Lesson 10: Privacy Programs and Data Inventories
Privacy Impact Assessment templateTemplateModule 112, Lesson 10
M&A Cyber Due Diligence ChecklistChecklistModule 112, Lesson 11: Security in Mergers and Acquisitions
Business Continuity and Crisis Management PolicyPolicyModule 112, Lesson 12: Operational Resilience and Crisis Management
Crisis Communications Plan outlinePlanModule 112, Lesson 12
Generative AI Acceptable Use PolicyPolicyModule 112, Lesson 13: AI Governance and Security
Program Maturity Checklist (66 items)ChecklistModule 112, this lesson, above
Maturity Assessment and Roadmap RecordTemplateModule 112, this lesson, above
Foundation policies, plans and worksheets for modules 108 to 111LibraryModule 108, Lesson 12: Privacy Law Overview, Resource and Policy Library

Lesson 6 (certifications and government authorizations) has no sample policy; its infographics on the certification lifecycle and the FedRAMP path serve as its tools. How the documents fit together: the charter (lesson 1) and the board-approved Information Security Policy (module 108, lesson 4) set authority; the policy procedure (lesson 4) governs every other document; topic policies state rules; checklists and templates hold the evidence that the maturity assessment in this lesson relies on.

Pictures, Numbers and Infographics

NumberWhat it measuresSource
6, 22, 106, 4CSF 2.0 Functions, Categories, Subcategories and TiersNIST CSWP 29, Feb. 26, 20241
356 practices, 10 domains, 4 levels (MIL0 to MIL3)Size and scale of C2M2 Version 2.1DOE, June 20222
18 Controls, 153 Safeguards; IG1 56, IG2 130CIS Controls v8.1 and Implementation GroupsCIS, 2024194
38 goals (9, 24, 1, 3, 1 by Function)CPG set shown on CISA's goals page, Nov. 15, 2026; CPG 2.0 announced Dec. 10, 2025CISA165
Over 1,800 capabilities, 7 areasScope of the CMMI Cybermaturity PlatformISACA15
Level 4 of 5The FISMA level OMB treats as "effective"CIGIE FY 2025 FISMA audit report, Aug. 18, 20253
About 60 percentShare of federal agencies with an effective program, FY 2020 to 2023CIGIE capstone, May 21, 202420
6 yearsConsecutive "Not Effective" ratings for HHS, through FY 2025HHS OIG, March 24, 20267
$135.6 millionFed and OCC penalties on Citigroup for insufficient remediation progress, July 10, 2024Federal Reserve and OCC, as reported6
$80 millionOCC penalty on Capital One for risk assessment failures before a cloud migration, Aug. 6, 2020OCC NR 2020-10131
$5 millionNYDFS penalty on Carnival, June 2022, including an improper compliance certificationNYDFS settlement as reported9
145.5 million; 145 days; 19 months; over 300Equifax: people affected; days unpatched; months a monitoring device was blind; expired certificatesGAO-18-559; House Oversight report, Dec. 20182829
9 daysChange Healthcare: from entry through a portal without MFA (Feb. 12, 2024) to ransomware (Feb. 21)Witty testimony, May 1, 202430
21 of 325 (6 percent)SolarWinds internal assessment cited in the SEC's complaint (allegation; case dismissed Nov. 20, 2025)SEC complaint and LR-264232526
April 15; 5 yearsNYDFS annual certification or acknowledgment deadline; record retention23 NYCRR 500.17(b)8
April 1, 2028, 2029, 2030First CCPA cybersecurity audit certifications, by revenue tierCPPA regulations approved Sept. 23, 202545
559 and 39FedRAMP certified services, and those certified through 20x, Nov. 15, 2026FedRAMP.gov39
26 percent; 43 daysShare of critical known exploited vulnerabilities fully remediated, and median days to remediate, 2026 reportVerizon 2026 DBIR46
$7.46 billion; 5.84 million; 56,323U.S. domestic cyber direct written premium, policies in force and reported claims, 2025NAIC, Oct. 21, 202642
66Items in this lesson's Program Maturity Checklist (18, 11, 17, 6, 8, 6 by Function)This lesson
Program Maturity Checklist: 66 items by CSF 2.0 Function 05101520 181117686 GovernIdentifyProtectDetectRespondRecover 2 basics2 basics6 basics1 basic1 basic1 basic 13 items marked * are basics to fix first. Govern and Protect hold 35 of the 66 items, because most failures in the public record are governance or basic protection failures.
Checklist coverage by Function. Original graphic for this module; counts are of the checklist in this lesson, organized by NIST CSF 2.0 (Feb. 26, 2024), with basics drawn from CISA's Performance Goals and CIS IG1.

The maturity staircase, the 90-day plan and the three-year roadmap above are the other infographics for this lesson.

Common mistakes

  • Saying "we follow the framework" without the evidence. The SEC's complaint against SolarWinds quoted the company's public statement that it "follows the NIST Cybersecurity Framework" and set it against an internal assessment that found practices in place for 21 of 325 controls. The case was later dismissed, but the internal assessment was the center of it.2526 Fix: tie every public framework claim to a current, evidenced assessment, and word it to match.
  • Certifying compliance instead of acknowledging gaps. NYDFS found Carnival's certification improper and fined it $5 million in 2022, citing missing multifactor authentication, inadequate training and a 10-month delay in reporting.9 Fix: use the acknowledgment of noncompliance with a remediation timeline when the evidence does not support a certification.8
  • Letting remediation drift. Citigroup's $135.6 million in 2024 penalties came from insufficient progress on orders issued four years earlier.6 Fix: report overdue roadmap items and audit findings to the board by name and age.
  • Running major change ahead of risk assessment. The OCC's $80 million penalty on Capital One in 2020 cited the failure to establish effective risk assessment processes before a large cloud migration.31 Fix: make the risk assessment a gate in the project plan, not a document produced after go-live.
  • Measuring that a control exists instead of that it works. Equifax's monitoring device sat blind for 19 months behind an expired certificate, and a critical patch went unapplied for 145 days.29 Fix: monitor the monitors, and measure patch age, certificate expiry and log source health.
  • Leaving one path out of a basic control. The Change Healthcare portal used in the February 2024 attack lacked multifactor authentication.30 Fix: measure coverage against the full inventory of remote paths, including acquired companies and vendor tools.
  • Staying at "Consistently Implemented." Agencies rated not effective year after year often have policies that are followed but not measured.720 Fix: pick measures with SP 800-55 and use them to change something every quarter.23
  • Chasing the top level everywhere. The C2M2 warns that the highest level in every domain "may not be optimal."2 Fix: set targets by risk and say why.

Questions people ask

Which maturity model should we use?

Use the one your most important regulator or customer already speaks, and map the others to it. For most U.S. organizations that is CSF 2.0, because regulators, insurers and the SEC filings of peers use its vocabulary and NIST publishes mappings to other standards.124 Add the C2M2 scale if you want a defensible per-domain score and run operational technology, and the CISA goals or CIS IG1 as a basics gate. Federal agencies use the FISMA scale whether they like it or not.

What level should we aim for?

There is no universal answer, and anyone who gives one is guessing. NIST asks organizations to choose a target Tier that fits their risk and obligations, and the C2M2 asks for a target per domain.12 The FISMA scale gives the clearest floor: practices should be measured (Level 4) before anyone calls them effective.3 For a regulated organization, the areas attackers use most (identity, vulnerability management, detection, response and recovery) usually justify higher targets than the rest.

How long does it take to move up a level?

No public study gives a reliable average, and the answer depends on the area and the money. Identity and logging projects in large organizations usually run 18 to 36 months; a policy refresh can take a quarter. Be skeptical of any plan that promises a full level of improvement across the whole program in one year, and of any report that shows one.

Should maturity scores go in the 10-K or in customer questionnaires?

Regulation S-K Item 106 asks public companies to describe their processes for assessing, identifying and managing material cyber risks and how the board oversees them; it does not ask for a maturity score.27 Some companies say they use a framework or engage assessors. Whatever is said must be accurate, and a number invites the question "on what scale, measured how, by whom." The safer practice is to describe the process and keep the scores in the evidence file, available to auditors and regulators.

Does a high maturity score mean we will not be breached?

No. Maturity measures the reliability of the program, not the outcome against a particular attacker. A mature program is more likely to detect an attack early, contain it and recover, and more likely to show regulators and courts that it acted reasonably. But Verizon's 2026 report found only 26 percent of critical known exploited vulnerabilities were fully remediated, with a median of 43 days to fix; mature programs face the same race against fast exploitation that immature ones do.46

Is CMMC a maturity model?

Not in the sense this lesson uses. CMMC 2.0 levels are certification levels tied to specific requirement sets (FAR 52.204-21, NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2 and selected SP 800-172 requirements), assessed as met or not met.21 A defense contractor can still use a maturity model to plan how it will meet and keep meeting those requirements.

How often should we reassess?

Self-assess every year, so trends exist; get an independent assessment every two to three years and before any public statement that relies on the results; and reassess an area after a major incident, acquisition or platform change. Idaho's executive branch moved its agencies away from a fixed assessment cycle toward continuous, risk-based evaluation in a November 2025 policy revision, which is a reasonable model for large organizations too.47

Where should a county, city or school district in Idaho start?

With the free tools: ask CISA's regional advisor for a CPG assessment and vulnerability scanning, use the CSF 2.0 small business and Organizational Profile quick-start guides, and use the Idaho Technology Authority's policies as a model even though they bind only state executive agencies.181113 Then use the 90-day plan in this lesson and the checklist's asterisked basics as the first year's work. Module 73, lesson 16 covers the Idaho public sector at smaller scale.

Hard questions

Should the board see a single maturity number?

The case for: directors oversee dozens of risks and need a simple signal; a single number tracked over time shows direction, and peers and rating firms already reduce security to scores. The case against: an average hides the gap that matters (one portal without multifactor sign-in), invites gaming, and cannot be compared across firms that use different scales. What the evidence shows: the public failures in this lesson (Equifax, Change Healthcare, Capital One) were specific gaps, not low averages.293031 A reasonable compromise is a small table by Function, with the basics gate shown separately and every critical gap named.

Can self-assessments be trusted?

The case for self-assessment: the people who run the controls know them best; self-assessment is cheap, builds ownership and can be done every year. The case for independent review: people grade their own work generously, and regulators, courts and customers give little weight to a score the team gave itself. What the evidence shows: the most damaging public examples involve gaps between what was certified or stated and what the organization's own records showed, such as the Carnival certification and the SolarWinds allegations.925 Both methods have a place; the line falls where results are used outside the organization.

Should government require a minimum maturity for critical infrastructure?

The case for a mandate: voluntary adoption is uneven, attackers find the weakest operators, and failures at hospitals, pipelines and utilities harm the public, not just shareholders. CISA's goals already describe a floor.5 The case against: mandates freeze practices in place, become paperwork exercises, and cost small operators heavily; sector regulators already impose rules where they have authority, and the federal FISMA experience shows that required ratings do not by themselves move agencies to "effective."20 What the evidence shows: the record supports targeted requirements for specific basics (multifactor sign-in, patching of known exploited vulnerabilities, tested backups) more clearly than it supports a required maturity level across a whole program.

Is a maturity model the right tool, or should programs measure risk in dollars?

The case for maturity models: they are easier to explain, need less data and track the processes that lower risk across many scenarios. The case for quantified risk: boards decide in dollars, maturity does not say which gap costs the most, and quantitative methods such as FAIR support budget trade-offs (module 108, lesson 2). What the evidence shows: NIST's own guidance ties CSF profiles to enterprise risk management and measurement rather than choosing one method, and the CMMI platform sets maturity targets from a risk profile.1115 Many large organizations use maturity to manage the program and quantified risk to prioritize and fund it.

For reporters and advocates

What public records exist.

  • SEC filings on EDGAR. Every public company's 10-K Item 1C describes its cyber risk management and board oversight; many name the framework they use or the assessors they hire. Use EDGAR full-text search to find the words, then compare them with any later 8-K Item 1.05 incident filing and any enforcement record.4827
  • Federal agency ratings. Inspector general FISMA reports, with each agency's maturity levels and whether its program was rated effective, are posted on oversight.gov and agency inspector general sites. The year-to-year trend is the story.720
  • Regulators' orders. The OCC and the Federal Reserve publish enforcement actions; NYDFS publishes consent orders under Part 500; the FTC publishes Safeguards Rule and Section 5 orders. Orders often describe what a company certified or promised and what examiners found.31932
  • Congressional and GAO reports. After major breaches, GAO and committee reports, such as those on Equifax, give the most detailed public accounts of what failed.2829
  • Idaho records. Under the Idaho Public Records Act (Idaho Code Title 74, Chapter 1), ask a state agency for the date and scope of its most recent assessment under ITA Policy P4140, its Annual IT Security Plan dates, and the number of open policy exceptions. Ask counties, cities, school districts and hospital districts, which ITA policies do not bind, what framework they assess against, if any. Expect technical details to be withheld under Idaho Code 74-105, which exempts records whose release would reveal how cybersecurity systems work or would put critical infrastructure at risk; the existence and dates of assessments and the governing body's briefings are usually public.4913

What to ask a company or agency.

  • Which maturity model or framework do you assess against, who did the last assessment, and when?
  • Was it a self-assessment or independent? If you state publicly that you follow a framework, what evidence supports the statement?
  • Which basics (multifactor sign-in on every remote path, patching of known exploited vulnerabilities, tested backups) are not yet complete, and by when will they be?
  • How many audit findings and policy exceptions are open, and how many are past due?
  • For New York-regulated entities: did you file a certification or an acknowledgment of noncompliance this year?8
  • For federal agencies: what was your FISMA rating, and what changed from the year before?
  • How often does the board or governing body see the roadmap, and what did it ask for at the last meeting?

The Idaho angle. Idaho's executive branch has used the NIST framework since 2016, required the current CSF since 2024, and required multifactor sign-in by statute; its new state security operations center had four full-time employees in September 2026 and aimed for round-the-clock coverage by June 2027.135051 The questions worth asking are whether agencies' assessments show measured improvement (the FISMA Level 4 test applied to the state), whether the security operations center reaches its staffing goal, and what local governments outside ITA's authority are doing at all.

Watch the language. "Mature," "best in class," "aligned with NIST" and "certified" mean different things. Ask which scale, which assessor, which date, and whether the claim covers the whole organization or one unit.

Where to go next

Still being checked (6 items)

These points could not be fully confirmed against a primary source when this lesson was written and fact checked in November 2026. The text above states each one as uncertain.

  • The final number and numbering of goals in CISA's CPG 2.0: CISA's goals page on Nov. 15, 2026 still displayed the earlier 38-goal set and said an update to CSF 2.0 was in progress; the contents of 2.0 described here rely on CISA's Dec. 10, 2025 bulletin and a trade press report.
  • Whether the DOJ Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs has been revised after Sept. 23, 2024: the DOJ page could not be opened by this lesson's tools, and secondary sources through March 2026 refer to the September 2024 version.
  • The Citigroup penalty details come from a secondary news report of the Federal Reserve and OCC releases, and the Carnival details from a law firm summary of the NYDFS consent order; the agency documents themselves were not opened.
  • The CPPA cybersecurity audit and risk assessment due dates come from a law firm summary of the regulations approved Sept. 23, 2025; the regulation text was not reread for this lesson.
  • Several facts (CMMC Phase 2 suspension, FedRAMP's June 11, 2027 Rev. 5 date, Idaho ITA P2045 and P4140 revisions, the Idaho security operations center staffing, the Verizon 2026 DBIR figures) were verified for module 108 on Nov. 13, 2026 and reused here without a second check on Nov. 15.
  • The NICE Framework Components page does not state counts of work roles or competency areas for v2.2.0, so none are given.

Last verified November 15, 2026. General education, not legal, compliance, audit or other professional advice; rule versions and dates are stated in the text, and the sources used are listed in the Notes and Sources below. Check the regulator's current text before relying on any point.

Notes

  1. National Institute of Standards and Technology, The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29, Feb. 26, 2024: Functions, Categories and Subcategories (6, 22 and 106, tallied from Appendix A), Tiers (Partial, Risk Informed, Repeatable, Adaptive) and Organizational Profiles (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  2. U.S. Department of Energy, Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) Version 2.1, June 2022: 10 domains, 356 practices, MIL0 to MIL3 definitions, cumulative and per-domain application, and the guidance that "Striving to achieve the highest MIL in all domains may not be optimal" (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  3. Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, independent auditor's FY 2025 FISMA audit report, Aug. 18, 2025, Table 1 (the five IG FISMA metrics maturity levels) and the statement that "OMB believes that achieving a Level 4 or above represents an effective level of security" (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  4. Center for Internet Security, "CIS Critical Security Controls Implementation Groups" (153 Safeguards in v8 and v8.1; IG1 as "essential cyber hygiene"); IG1 and IG2 counts of 56 and 130 from CIS's published v8 Implementation Groups handout (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  5. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, bulletin "Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 for Critical Infrastructure," released Dec. 10, 2025, sent Dec. 11, 2025 (new governance component; governance as "the cornerstone of a resilient cyber posture") (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  6. InvestmentNews, "Citigroup fined $135M for failure to comply with Fed, OCC enforcements," July 11, 2024 (Federal Reserve $60.6 million and OCC $75 million penalties announced July 10, 2024; Fed quote on "insufficient progress"). Secondary report of the agencies' releases (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  7. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General, Review of the Department of Health and Human Services' Compliance With the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 for Fiscal Year 2025, report OAS-25-18-041, issued March 24, 2026 ("Not Effective" for the sixth straight year; core metrics "Consistently Implemented") (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  8. New York State Department of Financial Services, 23 NYCRR 500.17(b) as amended effective Nov. 1, 2023 (annual April 15 certification of material compliance or acknowledgment of noncompliance with remediation timeline, signed by the highest-ranking executive and the CISO; records kept five years), Cornell LII text (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  9. Hunton Andrews Kurth, "NYDFS Imposes Fine of $5 Million on Carnival for Cybersecurity Breaches," July 1, 2022 (settlement announced June 24, 2022; MFA, training, 10-month reporting delay, improper certification). Secondary summary of the DFS consent order (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  10. 16 CFR 314.4, Elements of the FTC Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, paragraphs (a) (Qualified Individual) and (i) (written report to the board "regularly and at least annually"), eCFR up to date as of Aug. 10, 2026 (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  11. National Institute of Standards and Technology, "CSF 2.0 Quick-Start Guides" page, last updated Oct. 16, 2026 (SP 1299, 1300, 1301, 1302, 1303, 1305, 1308 and 1347; CSWP 32 and SP 1353 as drafts; Organizational Profile template) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  12. NIST SP 1302, NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0: Quick-Start Guide for Using the CSF Tiers, final Oct. 21, 2024, abstract (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  13. Idaho Technology Authority, Enterprise Policy P4140, "Cybersecurity Framework" (authority Idaho Code 67-831 to 67-833; established Oct. 17, 2001; NIST CSF adopted 2016; revised Aug. 20, 2024 to require the "current" NIST Cybersecurity Framework) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  14. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, "Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2)" program page (Version 2.1 current; free self-evaluation tool at c2m2.doe.gov; mappings to CSF 1.1, CSF 2.0 mappings "coming soon"; Cybersecurity Threat Profile Development Guide, July 2026) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  15. ISACA, "CMMI Cybermaturity Platform" product page (risk profile, "over 1,800 capabilities" in seven functional areas, "updated biannually," annual subscription; no prices published) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  16. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, "Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals" page as displayed Nov. 15, 2026 (38 goals arranged by CSF function, 1.A to 5.A; statement that CISA is "in the process of updating its CPGs to NIST's CSF 2.0"); first issued October 2022, updated March 2023 (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  17. ExecutiveGov, "CISA Releases Updated Cybersecurity Performance Goals," Dec. 12, 2025 (secondary report of CPG 2.0 contents and a statement by Acting Director Madhu Gottumukkala) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  18. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Free Cybersecurity Services and Tools catalog (regional advisors, Cyber Hygiene services, CPG assessments) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  19. Center for Internet Security, "Center for Internet Security (CIS) Releases CIS Controls v8.1 with New Governance Recommendations," press release, June 25, 2024 (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  20. Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, FISMA capstone review of fiscal years 2020 to 2023, May 21, 2024 ("the share of agencies with an effective information security program has held around 60 percent"), as posted by the Federal Reserve Board OIG (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  21. Department of Defense, "Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) Program," final rule, 89 FR 83092, Oct. 15, 2024 (32 CFR Part 170, effective Dec. 16, 2024), including Table 1 (levels and requirement sources) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  22. Department of Defense, DFARS Class Deviation 2026-O0025, Revision 3, signed Sept. 3, 2026, implementing the July 13, 2026 memorandum suspending CMMC Phase 2 (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  23. NIST Computer Security Resource Center, "NIST Releases Volumes 1 and 2 of SP 800-55" (Vol. 1, Identifying and Selecting Measures; Vol. 2, Developing an Information Security Measurement Program), Dec. 4, 2024 (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  24. NIST SP 1347, NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0: Informative References Quick-Start Guide, final, Aug. 25, 2026 (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  25. Complaint, SEC v. SolarWinds Corp. and Timothy G. Brown, No. 1:23-cv-09518 (S.D.N.Y., filed Oct. 30, 2023), allegations including the internal assessment of September 2019 (allegations, not findings) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  26. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Litigation Release No. 26423, SEC v. SolarWinds Corp. and Timothy G. Brown, Nov. 20, 2025 (joint stipulation to dismiss with prejudice, after the court's July 18, 2024 ruling dismissing most claims) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  27. 17 CFR 229.106 (Regulation S-K Item 106, Cybersecurity), paragraphs (b) risk management and strategy and (c) governance, adopted by SEC Release No. 33-11216 (July 26, 2023) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  28. U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-18-559, Data Protection: Actions Taken by Equifax and Federal Agencies in Response to the 2017 Breach, published Aug. 30, 2018, released Sept. 7, 2018 (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  29. U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Majority Staff Report, The Equifax Data Breach, December 2018, pp. 2 to 4, 27 and 33 to 34 (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  30. Andrew Witty, Chief Executive Officer, UnitedHealth Group, written testimony to the Senate Committee on Finance, May 1, 2024 (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  31. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, News Release 2020-101, "OCC Assesses $80 Million Civil Money Penalty Against Capital One," Aug. 6, 2020 (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  32. Federal Trade Commission, "FTC Takes Action Against Drizly and its CEO James Cory Rellas for Security Failures that Exposed Data of 2.5 Million Consumers," Oct. 24, 2022 (order later finalized) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  33. NIST, "NICE Framework Latest Updates" (NICE Framework Components v2.2.0 released April 28, 2026; SP 800-181 Rev. 1 released Nov. 16, 2020), page modified Sept. 8, 2026 (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  34. AICPA and CIMA, "System and Organization Controls: SOC Suite of Services" (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  35. AICPA Assurance Services Executive Committee, "AICPA Exposure Drafts: Proposed 2027 SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria and Description Criteria," Oct. 26, 2026 (landing page; drafts not read) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  36. The Institute of Internal Auditors, "Cybersecurity Topical Requirement" page (issued Feb. 5, 2025; effective Feb. 5, 2026; Global Internal Audit Standards effective Jan. 9, 2025) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  37. Irish National Accreditation Board, "Transition requirements for ISO/IEC 27001:2022," applying IAF MD 26 (certified clients to be transitioned by Oct. 31, 2025) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  38. PCI Security Standards Council, "Just Published: PCI DSS v4.0.1," June 11, 2024 (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  39. FedRAMP home page (559 FedRAMP certified services and 39 FedRAMP 20x certified services; notices of Nov. 2 and Nov. 10, 2026) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  40. FedRAMP, "FedRAMP 20x" program page (plan to "stop accepting new Rev5 Certifications on June 11, 2027") (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  41. U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs, updated Sept. 23, 2024 (the DOJ page could not be opened by this lesson's tools; date confirmed through Carlton Fields, "DOJ Updates Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs Guidance" and Mayer Brown, "DOJ Releases First-Ever Department-Wide Corporate Enforcement Policy for All Criminal Matters," March 12, 2026, which describes the March 10, 2026 policy and refers to the September 2024 ECCP update) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  42. National Association of Insurance Commissioners, "NAIC Report Finds Cyber Insurance Market Has Nearly Tripled Since 2020 as Cyber Risk Grows," Oct. 21, 2026, on the 2026 Report on the Cybersecurity Insurance Market (2025 data: domestic direct written premium $7.46 billion, or $9.46 billion with alien surplus lines; policies in force 5.84 million; reported claims 56,323) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  43. National Institute of Standards and Technology, "AI Risk Management Framework" page (AI RMF 1.0, Jan. 26, 2023; Generative AI Profile NIST AI 600-1, July 26, 2024; Playbook; "The AI RMF 1.0 is being revised as part of the White House AI Action Plan") (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  44. National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST Privacy Framework page (Version 1.0 current; Version 1.1 initial public draft, announced April 14, 2025, per Hunton Andrews Kurth, "NIST Releases Updated Privacy Framework") (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  45. White and Case, "CPPA Finalizes Rules on ADMT, Risk Assessments and Cybersecurity Audits Requirements," Sept. 25, 2025 (OAL approval Sept. 23, 2025; first cybersecurity audit certifications due April 1, 2028, 2029 or 2030 by revenue; ADMT compliance by Jan. 1, 2027). Secondary summary of the California regulations (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  46. Verizon, 2026 Data Breach Investigations Report: Executive Summary (26 percent of critical KEV vulnerabilities fully remediated, median 43 days). Copyrighted industry report, described (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  47. Idaho Technology Authority, Enterprise Policy P2045, "IT Risk Management Program" (established July 7, 2023; revised November 2025, moving agencies to risk-based, continuous evaluation with assessment dates recorded in each agency's Annual IT Security Plan) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  48. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, EDGAR full text search (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  49. Idaho Code Title 74, Chapter 1 (Public Records Act), including 74-105(4)(b) (critical infrastructure records) and 74-105(21) (records on "the nature, location, or function of cybersecurity devices, programs or systems") (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  50. Idaho Code 67-827A, Powers and duties of the Office of Information Technology Services, as amended through 2025, including multifactor authentication requirements (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  51. East Idaho News (Idaho Statesman report), Sept. 8, 2026, on the state Information Technology Services Cyber Resilience Operation Center in Boise: four full-time employees plus part-time staff, aiming for 24/7 operations by June 2027 (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩

Check yourself

1. What do the NIST CSF 2.0 Tiers describe?

2. According to the C2M2 Version 2.1, how should an organization set its maturity targets?

3. In the federal IG FISMA metrics, which maturity level does OMB treat as effective?

4. How many Safeguards does CIS Controls v8.1 contain, and what is IG1?

5. What did CISA add in CPG 2.0, announced Dec. 10, 2025?

6. Under 23 NYCRR 500.17(b), what may a covered entity file by April 15 if it did not materially comply with Part 500 in the prior year?

7. Why did the Federal Reserve and the OCC penalize Citigroup $135.6 million on July 10, 2024?

8. What did the OCC cite when it assessed an $80 million penalty against Capital One on Aug. 6, 2020?

9. Which statement about CMMC 2.0 levels is correct?

10. What does Regulation S-K Item 106 ask public companies to describe?

Terms in this lesson

Maturity model
A ladder of written descriptions that grades how reliably an organization performs a set of practices, from ad hoc to measured and continuously improved.
Organizational Profile (CSF 2.0)
A description of the cybersecurity outcomes an organization achieves now (Current Profile) or wants to achieve (Target Profile); the gap between them is the work plan.
CSF Tier
One of four NIST CSF 2.0 levels (Partial, Risk Informed, Repeatable, Adaptive) that characterize the rigor of an organization's cyber risk governance and management.
Maturity indicator level (MIL)
The C2M2's four-step scale (MIL0 to MIL3), applied separately to each of its 10 domains and cumulative within a domain.
C2M2
The Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model, a free U.S. Department of Energy model with 356 practices in 10 domains (Version 2.1, June 2022).
Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs)
CISA's voluntary list of high-impact baseline practices for critical infrastructure; version 2.0 was announced Dec. 10, 2025.
Implementation Group (IG)
One of three CIS Controls tiers (IG1, IG2, IG3) that set how many of the 153 Safeguards an organization should implement, based on its risk and resources.
IG FISMA metrics
The yearly metrics federal inspectors general use to rate agency security programs on five levels, with Level 4, Managed and Measurable, treated as effective.
Target profile
The levels or outcomes an organization decides it needs, area by area, based on risk, law, contracts and risk appetite.
Basics gate
A rule that baseline practices (such as multifactor sign-in, patching of known exploited vulnerabilities and tested backups) must be in place before money goes to advanced work.
Paper program
A security program whose documents, certifications or public statements describe more than its evidence shows is actually in place.
Acknowledgment of noncompliance
Under 23 NYCRR 500.17(b), the written filing that lists the Part 500 sections not met, describes the gaps and gives a remediation timeline, in place of a certification.
Roadmap
A multi-year, sequenced plan of workstreams, owners, costs and dates that closes the gaps between current and target maturity.
Calibration
Having a second scorer independently rate a sample of assessment areas and resolving differences, so scores mean the same thing across areas and years.

Full glossary

Sources