Lesson 8 of 14 · about 60 minutes · Updated November 15, 2026
Internal Audit, SOX and the Three Lines
You'll be able to
- Explain the roles of the governing body, first and second line roles, internal audit and external assurance providers for cybersecurity, and why internal audit's reporting line matters.
- Describe what the IIA Global Internal Audit Standards ask of boards and what the 17 items in the IIA Cybersecurity Topical Requirement cover, and when that requirement applies.
- Distinguish disclosure controls from internal control over financial reporting, and summarize what Sarbanes-Oxley Sections 302, 404 and 906 require and who is exempt from auditor attestation.
- Identify the four IT general control domains and explain how outside auditors rely on them under PCAOB AS 2201.
- Read a 10-K's Item 9A disclosure of an IT-related material weakness and judge whether remediation is real, using the Rivian and Super Micro Computer filings.
- Find and use the public records that reveal audit and control failures, including SEC filings, enforcement orders, GAO and inspector general reports, and Idaho legislative audit reports.
Start here: the short version
- Three kinds of people check a security program, and they must stay distinct. Managers who run controls (first line roles), the risk, compliance and CISO functions that set rules and monitor them (second line roles), and internal audit, which reports to the board and gives independent assurance (the third line role). The Institute of Internal Auditors' Three Lines Model of July 2020 is the common vocabulary.1
- Internal audit now has a mandatory baseline for cyber work. The IIA's Global Internal Audit Standards took effect Jan. 9, 2025, and its Cybersecurity Topical Requirement took effect Feb. 5, 2026. When internal audit gives assurance on cybersecurity, it must assess 17 listed items across governance, risk management and control processes, or document why an item does not apply.234
- Sarbanes-Oxley puts IT inside the financial statements. Section 302 makes the chief executive and chief financial officer certify controls every quarter, Section 404 requires a yearly management report on internal control over financial reporting, and larger companies also need the outside auditor's opinion on it. Section 906 makes a knowing false certification a crime punishable by up to 10 years in prison.567
- IT general controls are where many control failures start. Access to programs and data, program changes, program development and computer operations decide whether every automated control in the finance systems can be trusted. Rivian reported IT general control weaknesses for 2021 and 2022 before fixing them in 2023; Super Micro Computer fixed three of its four material weaknesses in fiscal 2026 but still reported one in IT controls as of June 30, 2026.8910
- The SEC tried to treat weak cyber controls as accounting control violations and a court said no. R.R. Donnelley paid $2,125,000 in 2024 on that theory over two commissioners' dissent; weeks later a federal judge in the SolarWinds case held that the internal accounting controls provision does not reach cybersecurity controls generally, and the SEC dropped the rest of that case on Nov. 20, 2025.111213
- The rules are moving. On May 19, 2026 the SEC proposed to limit the outside auditor's internal control attestation to companies with at least $2 billion in public float. As of this lesson's check it was still a proposal.1415
- Government has its own auditors. GAO has listed federal information security as high risk since 1997, inspectors general evaluate every agency's security program yearly under FISMA, and in Idaho the Legislative Services Office audits the state's books and reviews each executive department at least every three years.161718
Rules and standards described: IIA Three Lines Model (July 20, 2020); IIA Global Internal Audit Standards (released Jan. 9, 2024, effective Jan. 9, 2025); IIA Cybersecurity Topical Requirement (issued Feb. 5, 2025, effective Feb. 5, 2026), Third-Party Topical Requirement (effective Sept. 15, 2026) and Organizational Behavior Topical Requirement (released Dec. 15, 2025); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Sections 301, 302, 404 and 906 (15 U.S.C. 78j-1(m), 7241, 7262; 18 U.S.C. 1350); SEC Exchange Act Rule 13a-15 and the 2020 accelerated filer amendments; the SEC's May 19, 2026 filer status proposal (Release 33-11419, not adopted as of this check); PCAOB AS 2201; COSO Internal Control, Integrated Framework (2013); COBIT 2019; GAO Government Auditing Standards (2024 revision) and FISCAM (2026 revision); 44 U.S.C. 3555 (FISMA 2014); 12 CFR Part 363 as shown on eCFR Oct. 23, 2026; 23 NYCRR Part 500 as amended Nov. 1, 2023; Idaho Code 67-702 as amended through the 2026 session. All read Nov. 15, 2026. Rules, standards and audit practice change; check the regulator's or standard setter's current text before relying on any point.
Before you change anything. Plan changes to production systems, test them first, keep a way back, and follow your change management process. For clinical, plant-floor or other safety systems, involve the vendor, your safety lead and qualified engineers (see modules 109 and 111).
The audit committee meets at 8 a.m. on a Thursday in late January. The chief audit executive has 25 minutes. She reports that her team's cybersecurity audit found that 14 of 60 sampled administrator accounts on the finance system belonged to people who had changed jobs months earlier and still had full rights. The outside auditor, sitting in, adds that it found the same thing while testing controls for the year-end audit and is still deciding whether the problem is a significant deficiency or a material weakness. The CISO says the access review tool was configured last spring and that the gap is a process problem in the business units, not a security problem. The chief financial officer wants to know whether the company has to say anything in the 10-K due in five weeks. The committee chair wants to know why three different groups found the same issue and nobody fixed it.
That meeting is what this lesson is about. A large organization does not just run a security program; it has the program checked, by people who report to different bosses, under rules written for different purposes. Internal auditors check it under the IIA's standards for the board. Outside auditors check the slice of it that touches financial reporting under Sarbanes-Oxley and the PCAOB's standards for investors. Regulators and government auditors check it under their own laws. If those checks are planned together and their findings land in one place, the board gets a clear picture and problems get fixed. If they are not, the same finding is written up three times and closed zero times.
This lesson is written for audit committee members and directors, chief audit executives and internal auditors, CISOs and IT leaders whose controls are being tested, chief financial officers and controllers who sign the certifications, compliance officers, public officials who answer to legislative auditors, and the reporters and advocates who read the results. It builds on Governance, Boards, Officers and Disclosure in the foundations module, which introduces the three lines idea, board oversight duties and the SEC cyber disclosure rules; this lesson does not repeat that material but goes further into how assurance is planned, performed, reported and acted on. Inside this module, the security program and the CISO's role are in lesson 1, board metrics in lesson 3, policies and the compliance calendar in lesson 4, and SOC reports (the outside assurance reports a company gets from its vendors) in lesson 5.
Who checks the checkers: assurance in a large organization
"Assurance" is the word auditors use for an independent conclusion that something is working as claimed, given to someone who needs to rely on it. A board cannot personally watch the firewall, the access reviews or the backup tests. It relies on reports. The question every board has to answer is how much it can trust those reports, and the answer depends on who wrote them and how independent they are from the work being described.
The Three Lines Model in detail
The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), the global professional body for internal auditors, published The IIA's Three Lines Model on July 20, 2020, replacing its 2013 position paper on the "Three Lines of Defense." The 2020 model rests on six principles: governance, governing body roles, management and first and second line roles, third line roles, third line independence, and creating and protecting value. It names the governing body, management, internal audit and external assurance providers, and it describes how they relate rather than drawing walls between them.1
Three changes from the older version matter for cybersecurity:
- Roles, not departments. The model speaks of first line and second line roles. A CISO's office often does both: it runs security operations (a first line role, because it operates controls) and it writes policy and monitors compliance across the company (a second line role). The model allows that, but the organization has to say so and make sure someone independent checks the operating work.
- Value, not only defense. The IIA dropped "defense" from the name and wrote that risk management contributes to achieving objectives and creating value, not just to protecting it.1 For a security program this is the difference between a function that only says no and one that helps the business launch a product safely.
- External assurance gets a place. Outside auditors, regulators' examiners, SOC report auditors and certification bodies are in the model, outside the organization but feeding the governing body.1
The governing body (the board, or for a public agency the commission, board of trustees or elected officials) is accountable to the organization's owners or the public. It delegates to management the job of running the organization and managing risk, and it relies on internal audit for an independent view. Internal audit's independence comes from its reporting line: it reports on its work directly to the board, usually through the audit committee, and is not under the control of the managers whose work it audits. The Global Internal Audit Standards, covered below, turn that principle into specific duties.19
Who does what for cyber, line by line
| Role | Typical people | What they do for cybersecurity | What they should not do |
|---|---|---|---|
| Governing body | Board, audit or risk committee; for agencies, the commission or board | Set risk appetite, approve the top-level security policy and the internal audit charter and plan, receive reports from management and internal audit, hold management accountable for fixing findings | Run the program or approve individual technical exceptions |
| First line roles | IT operations, application owners, business unit leaders, cloud and network engineers, the security operations center | Operate controls every day: grant and remove access, patch, change systems under change management, back up and restore, monitor and respond | Grade their own homework as the only check |
| Second line roles | CISO's governance, risk and compliance team; enterprise risk management; compliance; privacy office; SOX program office | Write policies and standards, run risk assessments, monitor control performance, challenge the first line, track exceptions, prepare management's SOX assessment | Claim to be independent of the first line when they also operate the controls |
| Third line role | Internal audit, led by the chief audit executive (CAE) | Give the board independent assurance and advice on governance, risk management and controls, including cybersecurity, under a risk-based plan the board approves | Design or operate the controls it later audits, or accept risk on management's behalf |
| External assurance | Financial statement auditor, regulators' examiners, government auditors, SOC 2 and ISO auditors, penetration testers | Test what their mandate covers (financial reporting controls, a regulation, a certification scope) and report to the body that hired or oversees them | Stand in for internal audit's broader view; their scope is usually narrower than the whole program |
Combined assurance: one map instead of five audits
A large company may have its security controls tested in one year by internal audit, the outside financial auditor, a payment card assessor, a SOC 2 auditor, a bank examiner, a state insurance examiner, a customer's audit team and two penetration testing firms. Each produces findings. Without coordination, the same access control is tested five times while cloud configuration is tested by no one. "Combined assurance" is the practice of mapping every assurance provider against the organization's main risks so the board can see where coverage overlaps and where it is missing. The Global Internal Audit Standards ask the chief audit executive to coordinate with other assurance providers and consider relying on their work.20
A simple combined assurance map is a grid: rows are the major cyber risks or control areas (identity, vulnerability management, third parties, data protection, resilience, incident response), columns are the providers, and each cell says what was covered, when, by whom and with what result. The audit committee sees it once a year next to the internal audit plan. It is also where the findings from every source should end up in one register, a point this lesson returns to in the section on remediation.
The IIA Global Internal Audit Standards
Internal auditors in most large U.S. companies, many public agencies, universities and hospital systems follow the IIA's International Professional Practices Framework. Its core, the Global Internal Audit Standards, was released Jan. 9, 2024 and took effect Jan. 9, 2025, replacing the 2017 standards, which the IIA now keeps only for research.2 The standards are organized into five domains, 15 principles and 52 standards.20 The domains cover the purpose of internal auditing, ethics and professionalism, governing the internal audit function, managing the internal audit function, and performing internal audit services. Each standard sets requirements, "considerations for implementation" and examples of evidence that the requirement was met. The IIA standards are a paid professional publication; this lesson describes them and quotes only short phrases from published summaries.
Some government auditors follow GAO's Government Auditing Standards (the "Yellow Book") instead of, or alongside, the IIA standards; that is covered in the government section below. The IIA standards also include guidance for applying them in smaller and public sector audit functions.20
What the standards ask of the board
The biggest change in 2024 was Domain III, "Governing the Internal Audit Function." For the first time the IIA wrote "essential conditions": things the board and senior management must do for internal audit to work, which the chief audit executive is expected to discuss with them. In plain terms:19
- Principle 6, authorized by the board. The board approves internal audit's mandate (its authority, role and responsibilities) and a written charter, and the minutes should show it. Internal audit gets "unrestricted access to information, personnel, and physical properties." The board also approves the audit plan, budget and resource plan.
- Principle 7, positioned independently. The chief audit executive reports functionally to the board and confirms the function's independence at least once a year. If the CAE takes on any non-audit duty (for example, running the SOX program office or the compliance hotline), the charter must say so and set safeguards, and any temporary operational role requires an independent party to assure that area during the role and for 12 months afterward.
- Principle 8, overseen by the board. The CAE gives the board what it needs for oversight and seeks the board's views on risks, explicitly including nonfinancial risks such as cybersecurity. The board and senior management set criteria for which issues must be escalated to the board. The CAE tells the board when resources are not enough to carry out the plan and what the shortfall means. The function keeps a quality assurance and improvement program and has an external quality assessment at least once every five years by a qualified independent assessor, with at least one member holding the Certified Internal Auditor credential.
For an audit committee chair, those conditions are a checklist in their own right. When did the committee last approve the charter? Does the CAE meet the committee in a private session without management present? Has the CAE ever said the budget was too small to cover cybersecurity, and what did the committee do? When was the last external quality assessment, and what did it find?
The reporting line and why it matters for cyber
The standards prefer that the CAE report functionally to the board and administratively (for budget approvals, travel, office space) to the chief executive, which published commentary calls leading practice.19 When the CAE reports administratively to the chief financial officer, as is common, the arrangement can work, but the committee should ask whether audits of finance-owned systems (the ERP, treasury platforms, payment systems) are ever softened. For cybersecurity specifically, internal audit should never report to the CIO or the CISO, because those are the leaders whose programs it audits.
Topical requirements, starting with cybersecurity
In 2025 the IIA added a new mandatory layer to its framework: "Topical Requirements," which set a minimum baseline for how internal auditors assess specific high-risk subjects. Cybersecurity was first. The IIA issued the Cybersecurity Topical Requirement on Feb. 5, 2025, with an effective date of Feb. 5, 2026, giving audit functions a year to prepare.3
When the requirement applies
The requirement does not order every internal audit function to audit cybersecurity each year. It applies when cybersecurity is (a) the subject of an engagement in the internal audit plan, (b) identified while performing another engagement, or (c) the subject of a request for an engagement that was not in the original plan. Conformance is mandatory for assurance engagements and recommended for advisory ones. Internal audit must document evidence that it assessed each requirement for applicability, and if it excludes any requirement it must document and keep the reason.4 Commentators were quick to note the gap this leaves: a function that never puts cybersecurity in its plan never triggers the requirement, which is why some firms advise assessing cyber risk every year and planning coverage on purpose.2122
External quality assessments performed after the effective date check whether the function conformed, so a decision to scope out part of the requirement can become a quality assessment finding if the reason is weak.23
The 17 requirements, in plain terms
The requirement lists four governance items, six risk management items and seven control process items.21 Paraphrased from the IIA's published text:4
| Area | Item | What internal audit must assess (paraphrase) |
|---|---|---|
| Governance | A | A formal cybersecurity strategy and objectives exist, are refreshed periodically, and the board gets regular progress updates, including on funding and resources. |
| B | Cybersecurity policies and procedures are written and updated regularly. | |
| C | Roles and responsibilities are defined, and someone checks periodically that the people in them have the needed knowledge, skills and abilities. | |
| D | Senior management, operations, risk, human resources, legal, compliance, vendors and others are engaged on current vulnerabilities and emerging threats. | |
| Risk management | A | Risk assessment covers identifying, analyzing, mitigating and monitoring cyber threats and their effect on strategic goals. |
| B | Cyber risk management reaches across the organization, not only IT: enterprise risk, HR, legal, compliance, operations, supply chain, accounting and finance. | |
| C | A named person or team is accountable for monitoring and reporting how cyber risks are managed, what resources are needed and what is emerging. | |
| D | There is a process to escalate quickly any cyber risk that becomes unacceptable under internal risk guidelines or legal and regulatory requirements, considering financial and nonfinancial impact. | |
| E | Management and staff are made aware of cyber risk, and management periodically reviews issues, gaps and control failures, with timely reporting and remediation. | |
| F | An incident response and recovery process covers detection, containment, recovery and post-incident analysis and is tested periodically. | |
| Control processes | A | Internal and vendor-run controls protect confidentiality, integrity and availability, are evaluated periodically, and issues are resolved promptly. |
| B | A talent management process builds and maintains technical cybersecurity skills and is reviewed periodically. | |
| C | Emerging threats and vulnerabilities are continuously monitored and reported, and improvements are prioritized and carried out. | |
| D | Cybersecurity is part of the life cycle of all IT assets (hardware, software, vendor services) from selection through decommissioning. | |
| E | Configuration, end-user device administration, encryption, patching, user access management and availability monitoring are managed, and security is built into software development. | |
| F | Network controls are in place: access control, segmentation, firewalls, limits on external connections, VPN or zero trust access, controls for internet-connected devices, and intrusion detection or prevention. | |
| G | Controls cover endpoint communication services such as email, browsers, video meetings, messaging, social media, cloud services and file sharing. |
Readers of the foundations module will recognize most of these items. Strategy and roles are in 108 lesson 4; risk assessment in 108 lesson 2; access in 108 lesson 5; network and cloud in 108 lesson 6; vendors in 108 lesson 8; incident response in 108 lesson 10. A security program that can show evidence for each of those lessons can usually answer each of the 17 items. The IIA has also published a user guide and a mapping of the requirement to other frameworks.3
The other topical requirements
The IIA has since added more. The Third-Party Topical Requirement was issued Sept. 15, 2025 and took effect Sept. 15, 2026.24 The Organizational Behavior Topical Requirement was released Dec. 15, 2025, and the IIA said the next would cover organizational resilience.25 Published practitioner commentary gives Dec. 15, 2026 as the organizational behavior effective date.23 An Organizational Resilience Topical Requirement dated April 2026 is posted on the IIA's site; this lesson could not confirm its effective date, and commentators differed on it.2623 For a security program, the third-party requirement matters as much as the cyber one, because vendor access and cloud providers are where many breaches start (see 108 lesson 8), and the resilience requirement connects to lesson 12 of this module.
How internal audit plans and performs IT and cyber audits
The audit universe and the risk assessment
Internal audit starts with an "audit universe": a list of everything it could audit, usually organized by business process, legal entity, system and risk. For technology, a large organization's universe might include 40 to 100 entries: the ERP and other financial applications, identity and privileged access, the security operations center, cloud platforms, network perimeter, endpoint management, data protection and backup, third-party risk, software development, operational technology in plants or hospitals, privacy, and incident response. Each entry is rated for inherent risk (how bad it could be), the strength of the controls management says it has, how much change is underway, when it was last audited and what was found, and whether some other assurance provider already covers it.
The result is a risk-ranked list. The highest-risk entries go into the coming year's plan; others rotate on a two- to four-year cycle. Good functions update the risk assessment during the year, not just once, because a ransomware attack on a peer, a new regulation or a cloud migration can change the ranking in a month. The IIA's cybersecurity requirement applies to whatever engagement on the list is a cybersecurity engagement, and to cyber issues that come up inside other audits.4
The annual plan and board approval
The chief audit executive presents the plan, budget and resource needs to the audit committee for approval.19 A typical large-company plan has 30 to 80 engagements, of which technology and cyber might be a fifth to a third, but there is no rule; the point is that the number should follow the risk assessment. The committee should see what was left out and why, and whether the function has the skills to do the technical audits it plans or will buy them.
A practical way to make sure cyber is covered over time is a multi-year coverage map. The example below is illustrative, not a standard, for a large organization with a three-year cycle:
| Year | Cyber and IT engagements (illustrative) | Main criteria used |
|---|---|---|
| Year 1 | Cyber governance and strategy; incident response readiness and a tabletop review; identity and privileged access; SOX IT general controls support | IIA Cybersecurity Topical Requirement; NIST CSF 2.0 Govern, Respond and Protect; company policy |
| Year 2 | Cloud configuration and shared responsibility; third-party and vendor access; vulnerability and patch management; backup and restore testing | CSF 2.0 Identify and Protect; CIS Controls; vendor contracts; IIA Third-Party Topical Requirement |
| Year 3 | Secure software development and change management; data protection and retention; operational technology or medical devices where relevant; security awareness and phishing program | CSF 2.0; NIST SP 800-53 or ISO/IEC 27001 controls as adopted by the company; sector rules |
| Every year | Follow-up on open findings; continuous monitoring of key indicators; advisory reviews of major projects | Management action plans; the board's escalation criteria |
How an engagement runs
A cybersecurity audit, like any internal audit, follows a defined path. The details vary by function; the steps below are the common sequence.
- Planning and scoping. The audit team learns the area, interviews owners, reads prior findings and incident reports, and agrees a scope with management in an engagement letter or planning memo. Scope says which systems, locations, time period and risks are in, and which are out.
- Choosing criteria. Criteria are the yardstick: company policy and standards, the IIA topical requirement, NIST CSF 2.0, NIST SP 800-53 controls, the CIS Controls, ISO/IEC 27001 Annex A controls (a paid standard), and any regulation that applies. Without stated criteria, a finding is just an opinion. 108 lesson 3 maps these frameworks.
- Walkthroughs. The auditor follows one real example through the process, for example one new hire's access request from approval to account creation to the first quarterly review, to confirm the process works as described.
- Testing design and operating effectiveness. Design testing asks whether the control, if it worked, would address the risk. Operating effectiveness testing asks whether it actually worked over the period, using inquiry, observation, inspection of records and reperformance (redoing the control to see if the result matches). Samples are drawn from full populations, such as all terminations in the year, and the auditor checks that the population itself is complete.
- Developing findings. A well-written finding has five parts: the condition (what was found), the criteria (what should be), the cause (why it happened), the effect (the risk or harm) and the recommendation. Findings are rated, usually high, medium or low, against a scale the audit committee has approved.
- Management response. Management agrees or disagrees and commits to an action plan with an owner and a date. If management chooses to accept the risk instead of fixing it, that decision should be made by someone with authority to accept that level of risk, and a high-rated risk acceptance should be reported to the committee.
- Reporting. The report goes to the owners, senior management and the audit committee, usually with an overall rating for the area.
- Follow-up and validation. Internal audit tracks the action plans and tests that the fixes work before closing them. A finding closed on management's word alone is a common weakness in audit functions.
Where an audit recommendation leads to changes in production systems, such as removing access or changing firewall rules, management should plan the change, test it and have a way to roll it back, under its normal change management process.
Skills, co-sourcing and independence
Few internal audit departments can staff every technical audit themselves. Common answers are hiring IT auditors with the Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA, from ISACA) or similar credentials, "co-sourcing" specialist work to an accounting or security firm under the CAE's direction, and borrowing "guest auditors" from other departments for a single engagement. Each has an independence question. A guest auditor from the security team cannot audit the security team. A firm that implemented the identity system should not audit it. The IIA's 12-month rule for a CAE's former operational duties reflects the same idea.19
The cyber requirement's governance item C, on whether people in cyber roles have the needed skills, applies to the people being audited; the auditors' own competence is governed by the standards' ethics and professionalism principles, and the CAE must tell the board when resources fall short.419
Advisory work and continuous auditing
Internal audit also gives advice: reviewing the controls design of a new ERP, a cloud migration or an AI deployment before go-live, when fixing a problem is cheap. The cyber requirement is recommended, not mandatory, for advisory work.4 The risk is that advising on a design and then auditing it later threatens objectivity, so many functions assign different staff or wait a year.
Larger functions also run continuous auditing: automated scripts that pull data from systems (user lists, change tickets, vulnerability scan results, backup logs) and flag exceptions every week or month. These do not replace engagements, but they let the audit committee see trends between audits and help the CAE decide where to look next. Lesson 3 covers the related management metrics.

The audit committee's role
For a U.S. listed company, the audit committee's core duties are set by federal law. Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. 78j-1(m), requires that each member be an independent director who takes no consulting or other fees from the company, and makes the committee directly responsible for appointing, paying and overseeing the outside auditor, including resolving disagreements between management and the auditor. The committee must set up procedures for receiving and handling complaints about "accounting, internal controls, or auditing matters," including confidential, anonymous submissions by employees. It may hire independent advisers, and the company must fund them.27 The outside auditor must report to the committee on critical accounting policies, alternative treatments discussed with management and other material written communications.27
The law says nothing about cybersecurity. But because the committee owns the relationship with both the outside auditor and, by charter at most companies, internal audit, cyber reaches it through three doors: IT general controls in the SOX work, cyber audits in the internal audit plan, and, at many companies, explicit cyber oversight in its charter. Many companies' Item 1C disclosures name the audit committee as the committee responsible for cyber oversight. Rivian's 10-K for 2025, filed Feb. 12, 2026, states that its audit committee "is responsible for oversight of cybersecurity risks" and hears periodic updates from the CISO.28 Super Micro Computer's 10-K for fiscal 2026 says its audit committee "reviews the adequacy and effectiveness" of the company's information security policies and practices and the internal controls over information security risks.10 108 lesson 4 compares committee choices.
What a good committee asks
- Does the internal audit plan cover cybersecurity this year, which parts, and how does that follow from the risk assessment? If cyber is not in the plan, where is the documented reason?
- Which of the 17 topical requirement items did internal audit exclude from its cyber engagements, and why?
- Do internal audit's staff, or the firms it hires, have the technical skills for these audits?
- What did the outside auditor find in IT general controls, and has any deficiency been rated significant? Is the same issue in the internal audit and regulatory findings?
- How many high-rated findings are past due, and who accepted the risk on the ones management chose not to fix?
- Has the CAE met with us without management this year? Is there anything the CAE was not able to audit?
Regulators that require independent audits
Some regulators go beyond the voluntary standards:
- New York's 23 NYCRR Part 500, as amended effective Nov. 1, 2023, requires each "Class A company" (the largest covered financial and insurance firms) to design and conduct independent audits of its cybersecurity program based on its risk assessment.29
- Federally insured banks fall under the FDIC's Part 363 annual audit and reporting rules. As shown on eCFR on Oct. 23, 2026, institutions with $1 billion or more in assets need an annual independent audit of their financial statements, those with $5 billion or more need a management report on internal control over financial reporting and an accountant's attestation on it, and audit committee independence requirements scale with the same thresholds. The FDIC raised those thresholds from the $500 million and $1 billion levels that applied for many years in a final rule announced Nov. 25, 2025 (FIL-54-2025), which applies to thresholds in effect on Jan. 1, 2026 and indexes them to inflation from then on.30
- HIPAA requires covered entities and business associates to perform a periodic technical and nontechnical evaluation of how well their security policies meet the Security Rule, which many health systems assign to internal audit or an outside assessor; see 109 lesson 4.31
- The FTC Safeguards Rule requires covered financial institutions to monitor or test their safeguards, either through continuous monitoring or yearly penetration testing and twice-yearly vulnerability assessments, and to have the Qualified Individual report in writing to the board at least yearly.32
Bank regulators also examine internal audit itself. When the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency fined Capital One $80 million in 2020 after its cloud-related breach, the consent order found that the bank's internal audit "failed to identify numerous control weaknesses and gaps in the cloud operating environment" and "did not effectively report on and highlight identified weaknesses and gaps to the Audit Committee," and that for concerns internal audit did raise, the board "failed to take effective actions to hold management accountable."33 That is the three lines model failing at every level, in a regulator's own words.
Sarbanes-Oxley: Sections 302, 404 and 906
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was Congress's answer to the Enron and WorldCom accounting frauds. It was not written about cybersecurity, but its internal control provisions reach every system that produces the numbers in a public company's financial statements, and in a modern company that is almost every system that matters.
Section 302: quarterly certifications
Section 302, codified at 15 U.S.C. 7241, requires the principal executive and principal financial officers to certify each annual and quarterly report. Among other things, they certify that they are responsible for establishing and maintaining internal controls; that they designed those controls so that material information reaches them; that they evaluated the controls' effectiveness within 90 days before the report and stated their conclusions; that they disclosed to the auditors and the audit committee all "significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls," identified any material weaknesses, and disclosed any fraud involving management or employees with a significant role in internal controls; and whether there were significant changes in internal controls after the evaluation, including corrective actions.5
The SEC's rules turn this into two related duties. Under Exchange Act Rule 13a-15, management must evaluate "disclosure controls and procedures" every quarter and "internal control over financial reporting" (ICFR) every year, and evaluate each quarter any change that materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, ICFR.34 The two terms are different, and cybersecurity touches both:
- Disclosure controls and procedures are controls designed to make sure that information required in SEC reports is recorded, processed, summarized and reported on time, and reaches the officers in time for disclosure decisions.34 A process that gets news of a serious cyber incident from the security team to the disclosure committee is a disclosure control; that is the subject of 108 lesson 4.
- Internal control over financial reporting is a process designed under the supervision of the principal officers "to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting," including policies on keeping accurate records, recording transactions properly and only with authorization, and the "prevention or timely detection of unauthorized acquisition, use or disposition" of assets that could materially affect the financial statements.34 Controls over who can change the general ledger or approve a wire are ICFR.
Section 404: management's report and the auditor's attestation
Section 404, codified at 15 U.S.C. 7262, has two parts. Section 404(a) requires each annual report to contain an internal control report stating management's responsibility for adequate ICFR and management's assessment of its effectiveness as of year end. Section 404(b) requires the company's outside auditor to attest to and report on management's assessment.6 Management must use a "suitable, recognized" control framework; nearly all U.S. companies use COSO's 2013 framework, discussed below. SEC interpretive guidance issued in 2007 (Release 34-55929) gives management a top-down, risk-based way to do its evaluation.34
Not every public company needs the auditor's attestation. Section 404(c) exempts companies that are neither "large accelerated filers" nor "accelerated filers," and emerging growth companies are also exempt.6 In amendments announced March 12, 2020, the SEC excluded from the accelerated filer categories companies that qualify as smaller reporting companies and had annual revenue under $100 million, so those companies no longer need a separate auditor attestation of ICFR. They still must maintain effective ICFR, have their officers certify it, and have a financial statement audit in which the auditor considers internal control.35
Section 906: criminal certifications
Section 906, at 18 U.S.C. 1350, requires a separate written statement by the chief executive and chief financial officer with each periodic report that the report fully complies with the Exchange Act and fairly presents the company's financial condition and results. An officer who certifies knowing the report does not comply faces a fine of up to $1 million, up to 10 years in prison, or both; a willful false certification raises the maximums to $5 million and 20 years.7 Those penalties are one reason CFOs ask hard questions about IT general control deficiencies before they sign.
The 2026 filer status proposal
On May 19, 2026 the SEC proposed to overhaul its filer categories. Under the proposal, the public float threshold for a "large accelerated filer" would rise from $700 million to $2 billion, measured over the last 10 trading days of the second fiscal quarter and met for two consecutive years; the "accelerated filer" category would be eliminated; and companies that are not large accelerated filers would become non-accelerated filers, which would carry no auditor attestation under Section 404(b).14 A Goodwin summary of the public comments in October 2026 identified the release as 33-11419 and reported that supporters see "a meaningful opportunity to reduce the costs of being a public company," while accounting firms, institutional investors and academics argued that auditor attestation finds material weaknesses that management's own assessment may miss.15 As of this lesson's check it remained a proposal. If it is adopted, many companies now subject to 404(b) would lose the outside auditor's opinion on their controls, which would make internal audit's work, and the audit committee's questions, more important, not less. The hard questions section below gives each side's case.
How deficiencies are graded
Control problems found in SOX work are graded on a three-step ladder. The definitions come from the SEC's rules and PCAOB AS 2201, the auditing standard for an audit of ICFR:36
- A control deficiency exists when a control's design or operation does not let management or employees, in the normal course of their work, prevent or detect misstatements on a timely basis.
- A significant deficiency is a deficiency, or combination of deficiencies, in ICFR that is less severe than a material weakness, "yet important enough to merit attention by those responsible for oversight" of the company's financial reporting.
- A material weakness is a deficiency, or combination of deficiencies, in ICFR "such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the company's annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis."
Severity depends on the likelihood and size of a potential misstatement, not on whether a misstatement actually happened. AS 2201 says plainly that "the severity of a deficiency does not depend on whether a misstatement actually has occurred."36 That is why an access control failure can be a material weakness even when nobody misused the access. If a material weakness exists at year end, management cannot conclude that ICFR is effective, and the auditor "must express an adverse opinion."36
IT general controls
"IT general controls" (ITGCs) are the controls over the computing environment that every automated control and every system-generated report depends on. They are called general because they are not tied to one transaction: a weak password reset process or an uncontrolled change process affects every calculation the system makes. PCAOB AS 2201 lets an auditor rely on an unchanged automated control from a prior year without retesting it ("benchmarking") only "if general controls over program changes, access to programs, and computer operations are effective and continue to be tested."36 If ITGCs fail, the auditor cannot assume the automated controls worked, and testing balloons.
Auditors and SOX programs usually group ITGCs into four domains:
1. Access to programs and data
Who can get into the financial applications, their databases, the operating systems and the network that carries them, and what they can do there. Typical controls: access requests approved by the data owner before an account is created; prompt removal at termination (often within one to three business days, by company policy); periodic user access reviews, usually quarterly for privileged and high-risk access; restriction and monitoring of privileged and generic administrator accounts; segregation of duties rules inside the ERP so that no one person can, for example, create a vendor and pay it; password and multifactor authentication settings; and review of service and system accounts. Both Rivian and Super Micro Computer cited access or segregation of duties in their IT-related material weaknesses.3738 The security program's identity work in 108 lesson 5 is the same work, seen from the auditor's chair.
2. Program changes
Whether changes to applications, configurations, databases and infrastructure are requested, tested, approved and moved into production in a controlled way, by people who are not the developers. Typical controls: change tickets with business approval; testing evidence and user acceptance; approval before deployment; separation between developers and the people or pipelines that deploy to production; emergency change procedures with after-the-fact review; and monitoring that detects changes made outside the process. In modern pipelines, much of this is automated, and the auditor tests the pipeline's settings and its logs rather than paper tickets.
3. Program development and implementation
Whether new systems and major upgrades are built and put into service with proper controls: project governance, requirements that include control needs, testing, data conversion checks (did every balance move correctly from the old system?), and go-live approval. Large ERP implementations are a common source of material weaknesses because conversion and new role design are done under schedule pressure.
4. Computer operations
Whether scheduled jobs (interfaces, batch postings, reconciliations) run completely and on time and failures are fixed; whether backups run and can be restored; and whether incidents and problems affecting financial systems are logged and resolved. This is where security incidents meet SOX: a ransomware attack that takes the ERP offline for two weeks puts the completeness of records in doubt and forces manual workarounds, which then need their own controls. Backup and restore practice is in 108 lesson 7.
Reports, spreadsheets and service organizations
Three more areas trip up SOX programs. First, "information produced by the entity": system reports used in controls (an aging report, a user listing, a list of journal entries) must be shown to be complete and accurate, or the control that relies on them is not reliable. Super Micro's fiscal 2024 and 2025 material weaknesses included controls over the completeness and accuracy of information it produced.3839 Second, end-user computing: spreadsheets and small databases that calculate reserves or allocations need their own change and access controls. Third, service organizations: when payroll, a cloud ERP or a data center is run by a vendor, the company and its auditor usually rely on the vendor's SOC 1 report (a report on controls relevant to customers' financial reporting), and the company must perform the "complementary user entity controls" the report says customers are responsible for. Lesson 5 explains how to read those reports.
SOX scope versus security scope
A clean SOX ITGC result does not mean the company is secure. SOX scope covers systems that matter to financial reporting; it usually leaves out email, customer-facing websites, product systems, plants and most personal data stores, which is where many attacks begin. The reverse is also true: a strong security program can still produce SOX deficiencies if it cannot show evidence that controls ran every quarter. The practical lesson for a CISO and a CFO is to share a single control library where they overlap (identity, change, backup, logging), test once and use the evidence for both, and never let a SOX pass be described to the board as a security clean bill of health.
PCAOB AS 2201: how outside auditors rely on IT controls
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), created by Sarbanes-Oxley and overseen by the SEC, sets the auditing standards for public company audits. AS 2201, "An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting That Is Integrated with An Audit of Financial Statements," governs the 404(b) attestation.36 The points that matter most for IT and security leaders:
- Top-down and risk-based. The auditor begins at the financial statement level, identifies the significant accounts and the risks to them, and works down to the controls that address those risks, including entity-level controls such as the control environment and the audit committee's oversight.36
- IT is part of understanding the flow. The auditor "should understand how IT affects the company's flow of transactions," and walkthroughs, following a transaction from start to finish, are usually the most effective way to do it.36
- Using the work of others. The auditor may use work done by internal audit, other company staff and third parties working under management or the audit committee, after assessing their competence and objectivity: "The higher the degree of competence and objectivity, the greater use the auditor may make of the work." As the risk of the control rises, the auditor must do more of the testing itself.36 An internal audit function that is independent and technically strong can therefore reduce outside audit fees as well as improve assurance.
- Evaluating severity. The auditor weighs the likelihood and magnitude of misstatement, considers compensating controls only if they are precise enough, and treats some situations as indicators of a material weakness, including fraud by senior management, restatements, and "ineffective oversight" by the audit committee.36
The PCAOB itself changed in 2025 and 2026. Its chair, Erica Williams, resigned in July 2025 at the SEC chairman's request; the SEC replaced most of the board in early 2026 and cut board salaries; and the PCAOB adopted a 2026 budget of $362.1 million, 9.4 percent below 2025.4041 AS 2201 itself was not changed by those events, but audit committees should expect continuing debate about how much inspection pressure outside auditors will face.

Material weaknesses tied to IT: two filings read closely
Material weaknesses are reported publicly in Item 9A of the 10-K, and they are one of the few places where a company must describe, in its own words, a specific failure in its controls. Two recent sets of filings show how IT general controls problems appear, how long they can last and how they end.
Rivian Automotive, 2021 to 2023
Rivian, the electric vehicle maker, went public in November 2021. Its first 10-K, for 2021 and filed March 31, 2022, said the company had previously identified material weaknesses that "pertained to controls to address segregation of duties across financially relevant functions and IT general controls over our Enterprise Resource Planning systems, applications, and tools used in financial reporting," that they continued to exist at Dec. 31, 2021, and that they "did not result in a material misstatement." It explained that the weaknesses arose because, as a fast-growing private company, it "did not have the necessary business processes, systems, personnel, and related internal controls" of a public company, and it listed remediation steps including implementing ITGCs "to manage access and program changes."8
The 10-K for 2022, filed Feb. 28, 2023, was the first in which Rivian's auditor, KPMG, attested to ICFR. It reported that the weaknesses "had not been remediated" at Dec. 31, 2022, and KPMG issued an adverse opinion on internal control. The filing described remediation actions, including a risk assessment over the IT systems used in financial reporting and the involvement of the chief information officer, chief operating officer, corporate controller and head of SOX compliance, with audit committee oversight. KPMG's report also showed the cost of weak controls to the audit itself: it increased its sample sizes compared with what it would have used if controls had been effective.37
The 10-K for 2023, filed Feb. 26, 2024, reported that the weaknesses identified as of Dec. 31, 2022 "were remediated during the year ended December 31, 2023," and KPMG issued an unqualified opinion on ICFR.9 From disclosure to clean opinion took about two and a half years.
Super Micro Computer, fiscal 2024 to 2026
Super Micro Computer, the server maker, filed its 10-K for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2024 on Feb. 25, 2025, months after the usual deadline. Management, using the COSO 2013 framework, identified five material weaknesses, the first being that "information technology general controls for certain IT systems that support the Company's financial reporting process were not appropriately identified, designed or implemented." Others covered segregation of duties, unauthorized access to post journal entries, the completeness and accuracy of information the company produced, and documentation of control procedures. The company said these weaknesses "could have increased the risk of unauthorized access to certain information technology systems that support our financial reporting processes, manipulation of data" and other errors, and that it had "not remediated any of those material weaknesses" as of the filing date. Its auditor, BDO USA, issued an attestation report.38
A year later, the 10-K for fiscal 2025, filed Aug. 28, 2025, reported four unremediated material weaknesses, still led by IT general controls.39 The 10-K for fiscal 2026, filed Aug. 31, 2026, reported that the company had remediated the segregation of duties, information completeness and documentation weaknesses, in part through "a full redesign" of its ERP security role structure and segregation of duties rules, but that one material weakness remained: its IT controls for certain systems "did not operate for a sufficient period of time," and it did not consistently and timely monitor user access to certain financial applications, infrastructure and programs. Management concluded that ICFR was not effective as of June 30, 2026.10
What the two cases show
- IT control weaknesses often travel with access and segregation of duties. Both companies paired ITGC failures with segregation of duties problems inside the ERP. Role design is a security problem and an accounting problem at once.
- Fixing a control is not the same as remediating a weakness. Remediation requires that the new control operate effectively "for a sufficient period of time," in Rivian's words, and that management test it.37 Super Micro's last weakness was precisely that its IT controls had not yet operated long enough.10 A new quarterly access review needs at least a couple of quarters of evidence.
- IT tends to be the last weakness standing. Accounting process fixes can be made by hiring and redesign; ITGC fixes require changing systems, roles and habits across IT, and then waiting for evidence.
- Weak controls cost money even without a misstatement. The outside auditor has to test more, as KPMG described, and the company carries the disclosure for years.37
Long-running material weaknesses can also lead to enforcement. On Jan. 29, 2019, the SEC settled with four companies that had disclosed material weaknesses for seven to ten consecutive years without fixing them, with penalties from $35,000 to $200,000. The SEC's chief accountant said then that "adequate internal controls are the first line of defense" against material errors and fraud.42
When cybersecurity meets the accounting controls rules
Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act, added by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, requires public companies to keep a system of "internal accounting controls" sufficient to give reasonable assurance that transactions are authorized and assets are protected. Between 2023 and 2025 the SEC tested whether that provision covers cybersecurity controls.
- R.R. Donnelley (June 18, 2024). The SEC found that R.R. Donnelley & Sons, a business communications company, had not designed effective disclosure controls for cyber information, had not responded to alerts of unusual activity in late 2021 in a timely way, and had not maintained "cybersecurity-related internal accounting controls" sufficient to make sure access to its systems was permitted only with management's authorization. The company paid a $2,125,000 civil penalty without admitting or denying the findings, and the SEC credited its cooperation.11 Commissioners Hester Peirce and Mark Uyeda dissented in a statement titled "Hey, look, there's a hoof cleaner!" They argued that computer systems are not the kind of asset the provision protects, which is about assets that are the subject of corporate transactions such as cash, and that the agency was turning the law into a "Swiss Army Statute" to regulate cybersecurity indirectly while penalizing the victim of an attack.12
- SolarWinds (July 18, 2024 and Nov. 20, 2025). In the SEC's case against SolarWinds and its CISO, Judge Paul A. Engelmayer of the Southern District of New York dismissed the claim that gaps in the company's cybersecurity controls violated the internal accounting controls provisions, and the claim that its disclosure controls were inadequate, while letting fraud claims about its public security statements go forward.13 The SEC dismissed the remaining case with prejudice on Nov. 20, 2025.43
- First American Financial (order of June 14, 2021). An earlier case shows the disclosure controls theory the SEC still has. The SEC found that First American's senior executives were not told that its information security staff had identified, months before a 2019 journalist's report, the vulnerability that exposed sensitive documents, and that the company had not fixed it under its own policies. The company paid $487,616.44
The practical result in late 2026: the accounting controls theory for cybersecurity is weak after the SolarWinds ruling and the SEC's change of direction, but disclosure controls remain squarely in play, especially since the 2023 rules require timely materiality decisions on cyber incidents. And within SOX, IT general controls over financial systems are still tested every year, whatever the label. For the disclosure process, see 108 lesson 4.
COSO and COBIT
COSO's Internal Control, Integrated Framework (2013)
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) is a joint initiative of five U.S. professional associations, including the IIA and the AICPA. Its Internal Control, Integrated Framework, first issued in 1992 and refreshed in 2013, is the "suitable, recognized" framework most U.S. public companies name in their ICFR reports; Super Micro's filings, for example, say management used COSO 2013.4538 The 2013 framework has five components (control environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring activities) and 17 principles. Principle 11 says the organization selects and develops general control activities over technology to support its objectives, which is where ITGCs sit. Principles on information quality and internal communication cover the reports and data controls rely on, and the monitoring principles cover how deficiencies are evaluated and communicated to those responsible for fixing them, including senior management and the board.
COSO has also published guidance applying its frameworks to newer risks. Its internal control page lists Achieving Effective Internal Control Over Generative AI (2026) and similar guidance on robotic process automation (2024) and sustainability reporting (2023).45 COSO's enterprise risk management framework, updated in 2017 as Enterprise Risk Management: Integrating with Strategy and Performance, is described in 108 lesson 2.46 COSO and Deloitte also published guidance on applying COSO to cyber risk in 2015 and 2019; this lesson did not re-read those documents. AI governance is the subject of lesson 13.
COBIT 2019
COBIT, published by ISACA (the professional association of IT auditors), is a framework for the governance and management of enterprise information and technology. COBIT 2019 remained the current version as of this lesson's check; ISACA's site listed no newer edition.47 Its core model has 40 governance and management objectives grouped in five domains: Evaluate, Direct and Monitor (the governance domain, for the board and executives) and four management domains, Align, Plan and Organize; Build, Acquire and Implement; Deliver, Service and Support; and Monitor, Evaluate and Assess. "Design factors" help tailor the system to the organization, and "focus area" guides cover information security, IT risk and DevOps.47
Where COSO answers "are our controls over financial reporting effective?", COBIT answers "is IT governed and managed well across the enterprise?" Internal auditors use COBIT objectives as criteria for IT governance audits, and many SOX programs borrow its control objectives for ITGCs. COBIT is a paid ISACA publication beyond its introductory material; this lesson describes it only.
Government auditors
Public agencies answer to auditors who report to legislatures and the public, under standards written by GAO.
GAO, the Yellow Book and FISCAM
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Congress's audit agency, has designated federal information security as a government-wide high-risk area since 1997, adding critical infrastructure protection in 2003 and the privacy of personal information in 2015. GAO reports that since 2010 it has made more than 4,400 cybersecurity recommendations to federal agencies and that, as of February 2026, more than 730 had not been fully implemented, 48 of them priority recommendations.16
GAO's Government Auditing Standards, the Yellow Book, govern audits of government entities and of organizations that receive government awards. The 2024 revision (GAO-24-106786) applies to financial audits and attestation engagements for periods beginning on or after Dec. 15, 2025 and to performance audits beginning on or after that date.48 For information system controls, GAO and the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency publish the Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual (FISCAM). Its 2026 revision (GAO-26-108633) applies to fiscal year and calendar year 2026 audits of federal financial statements and to attestation engagements and performance audits beginning on or after Oct. 1, 2026. It addresses user, application and general controls and is designed for use with GAO's Financial Audit Manual.49 GAO also publishes the "Green Book," the internal control standards for federal agencies, adapted from COSO's five components and 17 principles; this lesson could not reload GAO's Green Book page on Nov. 15, 2026 to confirm the latest edition, so check it before citing a version.
Inspectors general and FISMA
The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 requires every federal agency to have its information security program independently evaluated each year, including testing a representative subset of systems. Where an agency has an inspector general, the IG performs the evaluation or hires an independent external auditor to do it; results go to the Office of Management and Budget, which summarizes them for Congress, and GAO periodically evaluates the agencies' policies and practices.17 The IG evaluations score agencies on a maturity scale defined in annual IG FISMA reporting metrics developed with OMB and CISA; the reports, published on IG websites and at oversight.gov, are among the most detailed public assessments of any large organization's security program.
State auditors and Idaho
Every state has a legislative or elected auditor that audits state agencies, and many audit IT controls as part of the state's annual financial report and the federal Single Audit. In Idaho, Idaho Code 67-702 directs the Legislative Services Office, under the Legislative Council, to audit the state's annual financial report prepared by the state controller under generally accepted government auditing standards, to audit federal financial assistance, and to perform a management review of each executive department at least once in a three-year period, which "may include evaluation of internal controls over financial and program activities and other matters related to the department's operations." It may audit any fund in the state treasury and any entity created by or receiving appropriations from the Legislature, and it reports to the attorney general facts that may indicate malfeasance, illegal expenditure or misappropriation of public funds.18 The Legislative Audits Division publishes its audit of the state's annual financial report (the ACFR), the Statewide Single Audit and agency accountability reports.50 About 90 days after a report with findings, the division checks the agency's progress on its corrective action plan and sends a follow-up report to the Joint Finance-Appropriations Committee; reports for the Office of Information Technology Services are among those posted.51 The division's special reports list includes a yearly "Report on Uncorrected Findings."52
The Legislature's separate Office of Performance Evaluations released an evaluation of Luma, the state's enterprise resource planning system run by the State Controller's Office, in November 2024. It found that the system was less efficient and functional than expected, in part because the controller's office gave too little attention to end users, and said that "centering the end-user is essential to the system's success."53 Statewide ERP projects are exactly where program development, access and segregation of duties controls are tested hardest. Idaho's executive branch security rules, including Idaho Technology Authority Policy P4140, which adopts the NIST Cybersecurity Framework for state agencies, give state auditors and agency internal auditors a stated benchmark.54 More on Idaho's public sector security structure is in 73 lesson 16.

Audit findings and remediation tracking
Every assurance provider produces findings. The value of all that assurance depends on what happens next.
One register for every finding
Large organizations that handle this well keep a single issues register, usually in their governance, risk and compliance platform, for findings from internal audit, the outside auditor's management letter, SOX testing, regulators' examinations, penetration tests, SOC reports on vendors, customer audits and self-identified issues. Each entry has a source, a rating translated to one common scale, an accountable executive, an action plan, a due date, status and evidence of closure. Duplicates are linked rather than closed separately, so the board in the opening scenario would have seen one access review problem found three times, not three problems.
Validation and closure
The owner proposes closure with evidence; for high-rated findings, internal audit (or the second line for lower ratings) tests the fix before the item is closed. For SOX deficiencies, the test is whether the corrected control has operated long enough to show it works, as the Rivian and Super Micro filings illustrate.3710 The IIA's cybersecurity requirement expects management to review gaps and control failures periodically "with timely reporting and remediation."4
What to report to the audit committee
- Open findings by rating and age, with past-due items named, not just counted.
- Findings whose due dates were extended more than once, and by whom.
- Risk acceptances: who accepted what, for how long, and the compensating controls.
- Repeat findings: the same issue found again after being closed is a sign the fix did not stick or the root cause was missed.
- Coverage: which major risks no assurance provider looked at this year.
Lessons 3 and 4 cover metrics and the exception process that feed this report, and lesson 7 covers tracking penetration test results.
How this connects to the SEC cyber rules
Regulation S-K Item 106, reported in Item 1C of the 10-K, asks public companies to describe their processes for assessing, identifying and managing material cyber risks, including whether they engage "assessors, consultants, auditors, or other third parties," and to describe the board's oversight and management's role.55 Item 1C is therefore a public description of the company's assurance structure. Directors and auditors should check that it matches reality: if the 10-K says internal audit reviews the program, there should be audit reports to show it, and if it says the audit committee oversees cyber, the committee's minutes should show the reports it heard. The SEC's 2023 release that created Item 106 also created the Form 8-K Item 1.05 incident disclosure, which depends on disclosure controls that move incident information quickly to the people who decide materiality.56 Those rules, and the 2025 and 2026 debate over them, are covered in 108 lesson 4; incident handling is in 108 lesson 10.
Sample: IT General Controls Checklist
This checklist is written for a SOX program office, an internal audit team planning ITGC work, or a CISO and controller who want to see whether their evidence would hold up. It covers each in-scope financial application and the database, operating system, network and cloud layers beneath it. Lessons 4 (policy management and exceptions) and 5 (SOC reports) supply related samples.
Sample only. Adapt it to your organization's risks, systems and laws, have qualified people review it, and do not treat it as a substitute for a risk assessment.
Follows: PCAOB AS 2201 (including paragraphs 36 and B29); SEC Exchange Act Rule 13a-15 and Release 34-55929 (2007 management guidance); COSO Internal Control, Integrated Framework (2013), Principle 11; IIA Cybersecurity Topical Requirement (effective Feb. 5, 2026), Control Processes A, D and E; NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 (Feb. 26, 2024), Protect function.
0. Scope and inventory
- [ ] List of in-scope applications, with the significant accounts and processes each supports, approved by [SOX steering committee] on [date].
- [ ] For each application: the database, operating system, hosting (on premises, IaaS, SaaS) and the identity system used to sign in.
- [ ] Service organizations identified, with current SOC 1 Type 2 reports obtained, periods checked, bridge letters on file, exceptions reviewed and complementary user entity controls mapped to owners.
- [ ] Key reports and spreadsheets used in controls listed, with completeness and accuracy checks defined.
1. Access to programs and data
- [ ] New and changed access requires documented approval by the [data owner / manager] before provisioning; sample of [25] requests tested per year.
- [ ] Terminated users removed from applications, databases, VPN and cloud consoles within [1 business day] for involuntary and [3 business days] for voluntary departures; HR termination list reconciled to system removals [monthly].
- [ ] User access reviews performed [quarterly] for privileged and financial-posting roles and [semiannually] for others, by people who know what access is appropriate; reviewers cannot certify their own access; removals confirmed in the system.
- [ ] Privileged, administrator, generic and service accounts inventoried; owners assigned; passwords vaulted or rotated; activity logged and reviewed [monthly]; use of shared accounts justified in writing.
- [ ] Segregation of duties rule set defined for the ERP; conflicts reported [monthly]; approved conflicts have documented compensating controls.
- [ ] Multifactor authentication required for remote access, cloud consoles and all privileged access; exceptions recorded and approved under the exception procedure.
- [ ] Direct database changes to financial data restricted to [named roles], logged and reviewed.
2. Program changes
- [ ] All changes to in-scope applications, configurations, interfaces and databases have a ticket with description, risk rating and business approval.
- [ ] Testing evidence (including user acceptance where business logic changes) is attached before approval to deploy.
- [ ] Developers cannot deploy their own changes to production, or, where pipelines deploy automatically, pipeline settings require peer review and approval and those settings are themselves change controlled.
- [ ] Emergency changes are reviewed and approved within [2 business days] after deployment.
- [ ] A monthly comparison of production changes (from system logs) to approved tickets identifies any unauthorized change.
- [ ] Vendor-delivered SaaS releases are reviewed for effects on configured controls before or promptly after release.
3. Program development and implementation
- [ ] Major projects affecting financial systems have a steering committee, documented control requirements and a SOX and security review at design and before go-live.
- [ ] Data conversion is reconciled (record counts and control totals) and signed off by finance before go-live.
- [ ] New roles are designed with segregation of duties rules before users are assigned.
- [ ] Go-live approval is documented, and a rollback plan exists and was tested.
4. Computer operations
- [ ] Scheduled jobs and interfaces affecting financial data are monitored; failures are logged, resolved and reviewed.
- [ ] Backups of in-scope systems run on the defined schedule; restore tests performed at least [annually] for each critical system, with results recorded.
- [ ] Incidents affecting financial systems, including security incidents, are logged, assessed for effect on financial data and disclosure, and reported to [SOX office and disclosure committee] when they meet [criteria].
- [ ] Manual workaround procedures for outages have their own approvals and reconciliations, and the period of manual operation is documented.
5. Evidence, deficiencies and reporting
- [ ] For each control: owner, frequency, evidence location and the population from which samples are drawn.
- [ ] Deficiencies evaluated for severity using the [company's SOX deficiency evaluation procedure], aggregated by account and by IT system, and reported to the audit committee [quarterly].
- [ ] Remediated controls tested after operating for at least [two quarters / the required number of instances] before a deficiency is closed.
- [ ] ITGC findings from internal audit, the outside auditor, regulators and security testing recorded in the single issues register.
- [ ] Changes to production made to fix a finding are planned, tested and reversible under the change process.
Approved by [Chief Financial Officer] and [Chief Information Officer] on [date]. Reviewed by [Chief Audit Executive]. Next review [date].
Pictures, Numbers and Infographics
The numbers an audit committee member, auditor, public official or reporter is most likely to need from this lesson, each with its source.
| Item | Number or date | Source |
|---|---|---|
| IIA Three Lines Model published | July 20, 2020 | Journal of Accountancy1 |
| IIA Global Internal Audit Standards released; effective | Jan. 9, 2024; Jan. 9, 2025 | IIA2 |
| Structure of the Standards | 5 domains, 15 principles, 52 standards | KPMG summary20 |
| External quality assessment of internal audit | At least once every 5 years | Standard 8.4, as summarized19 |
| Cybersecurity Topical Requirement issued; effective | Feb. 5, 2025; Feb. 5, 2026 | IIA3 |
| Items in the Cybersecurity Topical Requirement | 17 (4 governance, 6 risk management, 7 control processes) | IIA; Forvis Mazars421 |
| Third-Party Topical Requirement effective | Sept. 15, 2026 | IIA24 |
| Section 302 evaluation window | Within 90 days before the report | 15 U.S.C. 72415 |
| Section 906 maximum penalties (knowing; willful) | $1 million and 10 years; $5 million and 20 years | 18 U.S.C. 13507 |
| Revenue below which smaller reporting companies avoid accelerated filer status | $100 million | SEC, March 12, 202035 |
| Proposed large accelerated filer public float threshold (now $700 million) | $2 billion (proposed May 19, 2026) | Orrick14 |
| FDIC Part 363 thresholds: audit; ICFR report and attestation | $1 billion; $5 billion in assets | eCFR, Oct. 23, 202630 |
| R.R. Donnelley civil penalty | $2,125,000 (June 18, 2024) | SEC11 |
| First American Financial civil penalty | $487,616 (order of June 14, 2021) | SEC44 |
| OCC penalty on Capital One, with findings on internal audit | $80 million (Aug. 2020) | OCC consent order33 |
| Years four companies left material weaknesses unfixed before SEC action | 7 to 10 years (settled Jan. 29, 2019) | SEC42 |
| PCAOB 2026 budget | $362.1 million, down 9.4% | King and Spalding41 |
| GAO cyber recommendations since 2010; open as of Feb. 2026 | More than 4,400; more than 730 (48 priority) | GAO16 |
| Federal information security on GAO's high-risk list since | 1997 | GAO16 |
| Idaho management review of each executive department | At least every 3 years | Idaho Code 67-70218 |
| Idaho LSO follow-up on findings | About 90 days after the report | LSO51 |
Common mistakes
- An internal audit function that does not find or report the cloud and security gaps. The OCC found that Capital One's internal audit "failed to identify numerous control weaknesses and gaps in the cloud operating environment" and did not effectively report the gaps it did find to the audit committee, and that the board did not hold management accountable for issues internal audit raised. The bank paid $80 million.33
- Security staff know; the people who sign the disclosures do not. First American's information security staff had found the vulnerability months before a journalist reported it, but senior executives who made public statements were not told, and the flaw had not been fixed under the company's own policies. The SEC charged a disclosure controls violation.44
- Treating a fix as a remediation. Rivian disclosed ITGC and segregation of duties weaknesses at the end of 2021 and still had them at the end of 2022, drawing an adverse auditor opinion, before reporting them remediated for 2023.379 Super Micro fixed three weaknesses in fiscal 2026 but not its IT controls, which "did not operate for a sufficient period of time."10
- Leaving material weaknesses open for years. The SEC's 2019 actions against four companies followed seven to ten consecutive years of disclosed, unfixed material weaknesses.42
- Alerts nobody escalates. The SEC found R.R. Donnelley did not assess and respond to alerts of unusual activity in a timely way and lacked disclosure controls to get cyber information to decision-makers. Whatever one thinks of the accounting controls charge, the escalation failure was the part no commissioner defended.1112
- A committee that hears about cyber but never reports up. The SolarWinds derivative case in Delaware described board committees that did not report to the full board on cyber for 26 months;57 see 108 lesson 4.
- Scoping cyber out of the audit plan. The IIA's requirement applies only when cyber is audited, so a plan with no cyber engagement avoids it entirely; practitioners have warned that this flexibility "could lead to avoidance of cybersecurity" in audit plans.22
- Calling a SOX pass a clean bill of health. SOX ITGC testing covers financial systems only. Email, websites, plants, product systems and most personal data stores are outside it.
Questions people ask
Is a company required to have an internal audit function?
Not by Sarbanes-Oxley. The New York Stock Exchange requires listed companies to have one (Nasdaq does not, as a general rule), banks are expected by their regulators to have one, and many states require it for state agencies or universities. Where it exists, the IIA standards are the usual benchmark. This lesson did not re-read the exchange listing rules; check the current NYSE Listed Company Manual section 303A.07.
Does the IIA cyber requirement mean internal audit must audit cyber every year?
No. It applies when cybersecurity is in the plan, comes up during another engagement, or is requested. But an audit function that never plans cyber work will find that hard to defend to its audit committee and in its external quality assessment, given how cyber ranks in nearly every risk survey.423
Can the CISO report to the chief audit executive, or the CAE run the SOX program?
The CISO should not report to the CAE, because internal audit would then be auditing its own operation. A CAE can run the SOX program office or other non-audit functions only if the charter says so and safeguards are in place, and an independent party should provide assurance over those areas.19
Why does the outside auditor test our access reviews but not our firewall?
Because its mandate is financial reporting. It tests IT general controls over systems that produce the financial statements, plus the network and identity layers directly beneath them, and stops there.36 Internal audit and the security program have to cover the rest.
What happens to SOX if a cyberattack takes down the ERP near year end?
Management and the auditor must evaluate whether records stayed complete and accurate, whether manual workarounds were controlled, and whether the incident revealed a control deficiency. Separately, the disclosure committee must decide whether the incident is material for Form 8-K Item 1.05 purposes. An incident is not automatically a material weakness, but the controls it exposed may be.3656
Do public agencies have a SOX equivalent?
Federal agencies follow OMB Circular A-123 on internal control and enterprise risk management58 and are audited under the Yellow Book and FISCAM, with yearly FISMA evaluations by inspectors general.484917 States and local governments are audited under the Yellow Book by state auditors and independent CPA firms, and federal award recipients get a Single Audit. In Idaho, the Legislative Services Office audits the state and reviews each executive department.18
How does a board know it has enough assurance on cyber?
Ask for a combined assurance map: for each major cyber risk, who looked at it in the last 12 to 24 months, what they found and what remains open. Gaps on that map, not the number of audits, tell the board where it is exposed.
Hard questions
Should the outside auditor's internal control attestation be limited to the largest companies?
For narrowing: Supporters of the SEC's May 2026 proposal argue that 404(b) attestation is among the most expensive parts of being public, that smaller companies already must maintain controls, certify them and report material weaknesses themselves, and that lowering the cost will bring more companies to public markets.1514 Against: Accounting firms, institutional investors and academics argue that auditors find material weaknesses that management's own assessment misses, and that investors in mid-sized companies would lose a check they now rely on.15 What the evidence shows: The Rivian case illustrates the auditor's role: the weaknesses were disclosed by management, but it was the auditor's adverse opinion that made their continuation unambiguous.37 Whether the benefit outweighs the cost for companies between $700 million and $2 billion in float is the empirical question the comment record is meant to answer; the rule was not final at this lesson's check.
Should the SEC use the accounting controls provision to police cybersecurity?
For: Access to systems that hold financial records is access to company assets, and weak access controls let intruders alter or steal them; a company that lets unauthorized people into its networks has not limited access to "management's authorization."11 Against: Commissioners Peirce and Uyeda argued that the provision covers assets that are the subject of corporate transactions, not computer systems generally, and that stretching it makes the SEC a cyber regulator without Congress's say.12 What the evidence shows: The only court to rule, in SolarWinds, rejected the broad theory, and the SEC dropped that case in 2025.1343 Disclosure controls and ITGCs over financial systems remain enforceable.
Should internal audit be required to audit cybersecurity on a fixed cycle?
For: Cyber is a top risk almost everywhere; a mandatory cycle would stop functions from scoping it out, and the Capital One findings show what happens when internal audit misses it.3322 Against: Risk-based planning is the core of internal audit; a fixed mandate would crowd out other risks in small functions, and the IIA chose instead to require a baseline whenever cyber is audited and to have quality assessors review scoping decisions.423 What the evidence shows: Regulators already require independent cyber audits for some sectors, such as New York's Class A companies.29 For others, the audit committee is the control: it approves the plan and can insist on coverage.
Should government IT audit findings be public?
For publishing: Taxpayers and legislators cannot hold agencies accountable for findings they cannot see, and GAO's public list of open recommendations shows how disclosure keeps pressure on.16 Against: Detailed descriptions of unfixed weaknesses can guide attackers; FISMA itself requires protecting information whose disclosure could harm security.17 What the evidence shows: Most auditors publish the existence, rating and status of findings and keep technical details in restricted reports. The fair question for a reporter is whether the public summary is specific enough to show whether the problem is getting fixed.
For reporters and advocates
Audit and control failures leave public records, often more specific than anything a company or agency says voluntarily.
- 10-K Item 9A and Item 1C on EDGAR. Item 9A reports management's ICFR conclusion, any material weaknesses in the company's own words and the remediation plan; Item 8 holds the auditor's report, including any adverse ICFR opinion. Item 1C describes who oversees cyber and whether outside assessors or auditors are used.55 Compare years: a material weakness that appears in three straight 10-Ks is a story.
- Form 8-K Item 4.01 and 4.02. Item 4.01 reports a change of outside auditor and any disagreements; Item 4.02 reports that prior financial statements can no longer be relied on.
- SEC enforcement releases and statements. Settled orders, such as R.R. Donnelley and First American, describe failures in detail; dissents explain where commissioners disagree.111244
- PCAOB inspection reports. The PCAOB publishes reports on audit firms' inspected engagements, including deficiencies in testing ITGCs, without naming client companies.
- Bank regulators' orders. OCC, Federal Reserve and FDIC enforcement actions, like the Capital One order, name internal audit and board failures.33
- GAO and inspectors general. GAO reports and its open recommendations; IG FISMA evaluations on IG sites and oversight.gov.1617
- Idaho. Legislative Audits Division reports (statewide financial report, Single Audit, agency accountability reports and follow-ups, the Report on Uncorrected Findings) and Office of Performance Evaluations reports, including the November 2024 Luma evaluation.50515253 Agency internal audit reports, audit committee minutes and corrective action plans can be requested under the Idaho Public Records Act, Idaho Code Title 74, Chapter 1; expect security-sensitive details to be withheld under its exemptions.
Questions worth asking a company, agency or university:
- When did internal audit last audit cybersecurity, and what did it find? Is anything rated high still open?
- Has your outside auditor reported any significant deficiency in IT general controls in the last three years?
- Who does your chief audit executive report to, and does the audit committee meet the CAE without management?
- When was internal audit's last external quality assessment?
- For an Idaho agency: what were the findings in the last Legislative Audits Division review, what did the follow-up report say, and is any finding on the uncorrected list?
Where to go next
- IIA Cybersecurity Topical Requirement and User Guide: Free download from the IIA. The 17 items and the user guide are a ready list of questions for audit committees, CAEs and CISOs. Use it to scope a cyber audit or to check whether your program can show evidence for each item.
- SEC EDGAR full-text search: Free. Search 10-K filings for phrases such as "information technology general controls" and "material weakness" to find companies' own descriptions of control failures. For reporters, investors and audit committees benchmarking peers.
- PCAOB auditing standards (AS 2201 and others): Free. The standards outside auditors follow for public company audits. Read AS 2201 to understand how your auditor decides what to test and how it grades deficiencies.
- GAO Yellow Book and FISCAM: Free. The standards and audit manual for government audits. Agency leaders and internal auditors can use FISCAM to anticipate how IT controls will be tested.
- GAO cybersecurity reports and open recommendations: Free. GAO's cyber work and the count of open recommendations. Useful to reporters, legislators and federal managers.
- Idaho Legislative Audits Division reports: Free. Statewide financial report audits, Single Audits, agency accountability reports and follow-ups for Idaho. For Idaho officials, legislators, reporters and residents.
- COSO Internal Control guidance: The 2013 framework is a paid publication; COSO's executive summary and some guidance documents are free. Use it to understand the criteria management names in its ICFR report.
Still being checked (7 items)
These points could not be fully confirmed against a primary source when this lesson was written and fact checked in November 2026. The text above states each one as uncertain.
- The effective date of the IIA Organizational Resilience Topical Requirement (document dated April 2026) could not be confirmed; one commentator gave April 30, 2026 as an expected date and another said no date was set.
- GAO's Green Book page could not be loaded on Nov. 15, 2026 (rate limited), so the latest Green Book edition and effective date are not stated.
- COSO and Deloitte guidance applying COSO to cyber risk (2015 and 2019) is mentioned from memory and was not re-read; the month of COSO's 2026 generative AI guidance was not confirmed.
- The NYSE requirement that listed companies maintain an internal audit function (Listed Company Manual 303A.07) was not re-read for this lesson.
- The names of the IG FISMA maturity levels were not stated because the current IG FISMA reporting metrics could not be loaded.
- Details of the IIA Global Internal Audit Standards (Domain III essential conditions, Standard 9.5) come from published summaries by Wolters Kluwer and KPMG, not the paid standards text.
- Web search capacity ran out during research; later facts were checked by fetching primary documents directly (SEC EDGAR filings, eCFR, Cornell LII, GAO, Idaho Legislature).
Last verified November 15, 2026. General education, not legal, compliance, audit or other professional advice; rule versions and dates are stated in the text, and the sources used are listed in the Notes and Sources below. Check the regulator's current text before relying on any point.
Notes
- "3 lines of defense model for risk management gets major update," Journal of Accountancy, July 2020, describing the Institute of Internal Auditors' Three Lines Model issued July 20, 2020, its six principles and the place of external assurance providers (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- The Institute of Internal Auditors, Standards page: the 2024 International Professional Practices Framework was released Jan. 9, 2024 and the Global Internal Audit Standards had to be adopted by Jan. 9, 2025, superseding the 2017 framework (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- The Institute of Internal Auditors, Cybersecurity Topical Requirement page: issued Feb. 5, 2025, effective Feb. 5, 2026, with a user guide and application guidance (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- The Institute of Internal Auditors, Cybersecurity Topical Requirement (February 2025), requirements for Governance (A to D), Risk Management (A to F) and Control Processes (A to G), applicability, and documentation of exclusions. Paraphrased in this lesson; the IIA's text governs (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- 15 U.S.C. 7241 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 302), corporate responsibility for financial reports, subsection (a)(1) to (6), Cornell Legal Information Institute text (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- 15 U.S.C. 7262 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 404), management assessment of internal controls, subsections (a) to (c), including the emerging growth company and non-accelerated filer exemptions, Cornell Legal Information Institute text (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- 18 U.S.C. 1350 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 906), failure of corporate officers to certify financial reports, subsection (c) penalties, Cornell Legal Information Institute text (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Rivian Automotive, Inc., Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended Dec. 31, 2021, filed March 31, 2022, risk factors and Item 9A (material weaknesses in segregation of duties and IT general controls over ERP systems), SEC EDGAR (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Rivian Automotive, Inc., Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended Dec. 31, 2023, filed Feb. 26, 2024, Item 9A ("Remediation of Previously Reported Material Weaknesses") and KPMG LLP's unqualified opinion on internal control, SEC EDGAR (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Super Micro Computer, Inc., Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2026, filed Aug. 31, 2026, Item 1C (audit committee role) and Item 9A (remaining material weakness in information technology controls; three prior weaknesses remediated), SEC EDGAR (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, press release 2024-75, "SEC Charges R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. with Cybersecurity-Related Controls Violations," June 18, 2024 ($2,125,000 civil penalty; Exchange Act Section 13(b)(2)(B) and Rule 13a-15(a)) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Commissioners Hester M. Peirce and Mark T. Uyeda, "Hey, look, there's a hoof cleaner! Statement on R.R. Donnelley & Sons, Co.," June 18, 2024 (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Covington and Burling LLP, "SEC Voluntarily Dismisses SolarWinds Litigation," Inside Privacy, November 2025, summarizing Judge Paul A. Engelmayer's July 18, 2024 opinion in SEC v. SolarWinds Corp., No. 1:23-cv-09518 (S.D.N.Y.), which rejected the internal accounting controls and disclosure controls claims (secondary source) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Orrick, Herrington and Sutcliffe LLP, "Enhancing the Public Company Reporting Framework: New SEC Proposals on Filer Status and Disclosure Requirements," May 22, 2026, describing the SEC's May 19, 2026 proposals (large accelerated filer threshold of $2 billion; elimination of the accelerated filer category; no Section 404(b) attestation for non-accelerated filers) (secondary source) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Goodwin Procter LLP, "Proposed Changes to Filer Status Rules: Goodwin Summarizes Key Themes in Public Comments on the Proposal," Oct. 9, 2026 (Release 33-11419; proposal not yet adopted; summary of comments for and against narrowing Section 404(b)) (secondary source) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- U.S. Government Accountability Office, Cybersecurity topic page: information security a government-wide high-risk area since 1997 (expanded 2003 and 2015); more than 4,400 recommendations since 2010; more than 730 not fully implemented as of February 2026, 48 of them priority recommendations (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- 44 U.S.C. 3555, Annual independent evaluation (Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014), subsections (a), (b), (e) to (h), Cornell Legal Information Institute text (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Idaho Code 67-702, Legislative Services Office audit functions (annual audit of the state's financial report; federal financial assistance; management review of each executive department at least once in a three-year period, which may include evaluation of internal controls; referrals to the attorney general), as amended through the 2026 session (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Wolters Kluwer, "Domain III: Governing the internal audit function," June 13, 2024, summarizing Principles 6 to 8 and Standards 6.1 to 8.4 of the IIA Global Internal Audit Standards, including essential conditions, independence, the 12-month safeguard after non-audit roles, and the five-year external quality assessment (secondary source) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- KPMG Ireland, "2024 Global Internal Audit Standards": five domains, 15 principles and 52 standards; released Jan. 9, 2024, effective Jan. 9, 2025; Standard 9.5 on coordination with other assurance providers; guidance for smaller and public sector functions (secondary source) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Forvis Mazars, "2025 IIA Cybersecurity Topical Requirement: What IAFs Should Know," March 2025 (four governance, six risk management and seven control activity criteria; conformance required only if cybersecurity internal audit work is conducted) (secondary source) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Cross Country Consulting, "IIA Cybersecurity Topical Requirement" (warning that scoping flexibility "could lead to avoidance of cybersecurity" in audit plans) (secondary source) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Plante Moran, "IIA's Topical Requirements: A New Baseline," Oct. 15, 2026 (effective dates: cybersecurity Feb. 5, 2026; third-party risk Sept. 15, 2026; organizational behavior Dec. 15, 2026; organizational resilience not yet set; external quality assessments will check conformance; deviations must be documented) (secondary source) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- The Institute of Internal Auditors, Third-Party Topical Requirement page: issued Sept. 15, 2025, effective Sept. 15, 2026 (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- The Institute of Internal Auditors, press release, "The Institute of Internal Auditors Releases Organizational Behavior Topical Requirement," Dec. 15, 2025 (next requirement to focus on organizational resilience) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- The Institute of Internal Auditors, Organizational Resilience Topical Requirement, document dated April 2026; effective date not stated in the text read for this lesson (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- 15 U.S.C. 78j-1, subsections (k) (reports to audit committees) and (m) (standards relating to audit committees, added by Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 301), Cornell Legal Information Institute text (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Rivian Automotive, Inc., Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended Dec. 31, 2025, filed Feb. 12, 2026, Item 1C, Cybersecurity, SEC EDGAR (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- New York Department of Financial Services, 23 NYCRR Part 500, Cybersecurity Requirements for Financial Services Companies, as amended effective Nov. 1, 2023, sections 500.1 (Class A company) and 500.2(c) (independent audits) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- 12 CFR Part 363, Annual Independent Audits and Reporting Requirements (FDIC), sections 363.1 to 363.5, eCFR "up to date as of" Oct. 23, 2026 ($1 billion audit threshold; $5 billion internal control report and attestation threshold; audit committee composition). The earlier $500 million and $1 billion thresholds are stated from the prior rule as widely reported ; FDIC, Financial Institution Letter FIL-54-2025, "Final Rule Adjusting and Indexing Certain Regulatory Thresholds," Nov. 25, 2025 (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- 45 CFR 164.308(a)(8), Evaluation (HIPAA Security Rule administrative safeguards), Cornell Legal Information Institute text of the current eCFR (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- 16 CFR 314.4(d)(2) (continuous monitoring or annual penetration testing and vulnerability assessments every six months) and 314.4(i) (written report to the board at least annually), FTC Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, eCFR (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Consent Order for a Civil Money Penalty, In the Matter of Capital One, N.A. and Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., EA 2020-036, signed Aug. 5, 2020, Article II, Comptroller's Findings, paragraphs 2 and 3; announced in OCC news release 2020-101, Aug. 6, 2020 ($80 million) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- 17 CFR 240.13a-15, Issuer's disclosure controls and procedures and internal control over financial reporting, paragraphs (a) to (f), including the reference in (c) to the Commission's interpretive guidance in Release No. 34-55929 (2007), Cornell Legal Information Institute text (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, press release 2020-58, "SEC Adopts Amendments to Reduce Unnecessary Burdens on Smaller Issuers by More Appropriately Tailoring the Accelerated and Large Accelerated Filer Definitions," March 12, 2020 (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, AS 2201, An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting That Is Integrated with An Audit of Financial Statements, paragraphs .16 to .19, .21, .36, .37, .62 to .70, .90, B28 to B33 and Appendix A definitions (A3, A7, A11) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Rivian Automotive, Inc., Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended Dec. 31, 2022, filed Feb. 28, 2023, Item 9A (material weaknesses not remediated; remediation actions) and KPMG LLP's reports (adverse opinion on internal control; critical audit matter on sufficiency of evidence), SEC EDGAR (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Super Micro Computer, Inc., Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2024, filed Feb. 25, 2025, Item 9A (five material weaknesses; COSO 2013 framework; BDO USA attestation report), SEC EDGAR (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Super Micro Computer, Inc., Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2025, filed Aug. 28, 2025, Item 9A (four unremediated material weaknesses), SEC EDGAR (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Parker Poe, "SEC Installs New Chair and Board Members at PCAOB," Feb. 4, 2026 (Erica Williams resigned July 2025; new chair named; salary cuts) (secondary source) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- King and Spalding, "PCAOB Approves Budget Decrease for 2026" (budget of $362.1 million approved Dec. 19, 2025, compared with $399.7 million for 2025, a 9.4 percent decrease) (secondary source) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, press release 2019-6, "SEC Charges Four Public Companies With Longstanding ICFR Failures," Jan. 29, 2019 (Grupo Simec, Lifeway Foods, Digital Turbine, CytoDyn) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Litigation Release No. 26423, SEC v. SolarWinds Corp. and Timothy G. Brown, Nov. 20, 2025 (joint stipulation to dismiss with prejudice) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, press release 2021-102, "SEC Charges Issuer With Cybersecurity Disclosure Controls Failures," June 15, 2021 (First American Financial Corporation; $487,616) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO), Internal Control page (Internal Control, Integrated Framework, 1992, refreshed 2013; guidance listed includes Achieving Effective Internal Control Over Generative AI, 2026, robotic process automation, 2024, and sustainability reporting, 2023). The five components and 17 principles are as published in COSO's 2013 framework (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- COSO, Enterprise Risk Management page (Enterprise Risk Management: Integrating with Strategy and Performance, 2017, updating the 2004 framework) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- ISACA, COBIT resources page (COBIT 2019 current; 40 governance and management objectives; design factors; focus areas for information security, IT risk and DevOps; no newer edition listed) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- U.S. Government Accountability Office, Yellow Book page, Government Auditing Standards: 2024 Revision, GAO-24-106786 (effective for financial audits and attestation engagements for periods beginning on or after Dec. 15, 2025 and for performance audits beginning on or after Dec. 15, 2025) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- U.S. Government Accountability Office and Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual (FISCAM): 2026 Revision, GAO-26-108633, FISCAM page (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Idaho Legislative Services Office, Legislative Audits Division page (statewide Annual Comprehensive Financial Report audit, Statewide Single Audit, management reviews of executive departments at least every three years) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Idaho Legislative Services Office, Agency Accountability Reports page (authority Idaho Code 67-702; follow-up about 90 days after a report with findings; follow-up reports to the Joint Finance-Appropriations Committee; Information Technology Services listed) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Idaho Legislative Services Office, Legislative Audits Division, Special Audit Reports page (including Report on Uncorrected Findings, 2020 and 2022 to 2025) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Idaho Office of Performance Evaluations, report r2403, Luma, November 2024, report page and highlights (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Idaho Technology Authority, Enterprise Policy P4140, "Cybersecurity Framework" (authority Idaho Code 67-831 to 67-833; adopts the NIST Cybersecurity Framework for state agencies; revised Aug. 20, 2024), as listed on the ITA policies page (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- 17 CFR 229.106 (Regulation S-K Item 106, Cybersecurity), paragraphs (b) and (c), eCFR (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, "Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy, Governance, and Incident Disclosure," Release Nos. 33-11216 and 34-97989, 88 Fed. Reg. 51896 (Aug. 4, 2023), creating Regulation S-K Item 106 and Form 8-K Item 1.05 (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Construction Industry Laborers Pension Fund v. Bingle, C.A. No. 2021-0940-SG (Del. Ch. Sept. 6, 2022), memorandum opinion (SolarWinds derivative litigation), as relied on in module 108, lesson 4 (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Office of Management and Budget, Memorandum M-16-17, OMB Circular No. A-123, Management's Responsibility for Enterprise Risk Management and Internal Control, July 15, 2016 (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
Check yourself
1. Under the IIA's Three Lines Model (2020), which role gives the governing body independent assurance on governance, risk management and controls?
The IIA Three Lines Model (July 20, 2020) assigns independent assurance to internal audit as the third line role; external auditors are external assurance providers, and the CISO's risk function usually fills a second line role.
2. When did the IIA Cybersecurity Topical Requirement take effect?
The IIA issued the Cybersecurity Topical Requirement on Feb. 5, 2025 with an effective date of Feb. 5, 2026. Jan. 9, 2025 is the effective date of the Global Internal Audit Standards and Sept. 15, 2026 of the Third-Party Topical Requirement.
3. Does the IIA Cybersecurity Topical Requirement oblige every internal audit function to audit cybersecurity each year?
The requirement's applicability section lists those three triggers; conformance is mandatory for assurance services and recommended for advisory services, and exclusions must be documented.
4. Under Sarbanes-Oxley Section 302 (15 U.S.C. 7241), within what period before the report must the certifying officers have evaluated the effectiveness of internal controls?
15 U.S.C. 7241(a)(4)(C) requires the officers to have evaluated the controls as of a date within 90 days prior to the report.
5. Which companies are exempt from the outside auditor's internal control attestation under Section 404(b) today?
15 U.S.C. 7262(b) and (c) exempt emerging growth companies and issuers that are neither large accelerated filers nor accelerated filers; since the SEC's March 12, 2020 amendments, smaller reporting companies with under $100 million in revenue are not accelerated filers.
6. What maximum penalty does 18 U.S.C. 1350 (Section 906) set for a willful false certification?
18 U.S.C. 1350(c)(2) sets a fine of up to $5,000,000, imprisonment up to 20 years, or both for willful certification; knowing certification carries up to $1,000,000 and 10 years.
7. According to PCAOB AS 2201, does the severity of a control deficiency depend on whether a misstatement actually occurred?
AS 2201 paragraphs .63 and .64: severity depends on reasonable possibility and magnitude, and does not depend on whether a misstatement actually has occurred.
8. What did Super Micro Computer's 10-K for fiscal 2026 (filed Aug. 31, 2026) report about its material weaknesses?
The fiscal 2026 Item 9A reports remediation of the segregation of duties, information completeness and documentation weaknesses and a remaining weakness because certain IT controls did not operate for a sufficient period and user access was not consistently monitored.
9. In the SolarWinds case, what did Judge Engelmayer hold on July 18, 2024 about the SEC's internal accounting controls claim?
As summarized by Covington (November 2025), the court rejected the claim that gaps in SolarWinds' cybersecurity controls violated the internal accounting controls provisions and the disclosure controls claim; the SEC dismissed the remaining case Nov. 20, 2025.
10. Under Idaho Code 67-702, how often must the Legislative Services Office perform a management review of each executive department?
Idaho Code 67-702(1)(c) authorizes a management review of each executive department at least once in a three-year period, which may include evaluation of internal controls over financial and program activities and other matters related to the department's operations.
Terms in this lesson
- Three Lines Model
- The IIA's 2020 description of governance roles: the governing body; management in first line roles (running operations and controls) and second line roles (risk, compliance and oversight expertise); internal audit in the third line role giving independent assurance; plus external assurance providers.
- Chief audit executive (CAE)
- The leader of the internal audit function, who reports functionally to the board or its audit committee and administratively, ideally, to the chief executive.
- Topical Requirement
- A mandatory IIA baseline for assessing a specific risk subject, such as cybersecurity or third parties, whenever internal audit gives assurance on it.
- Audit universe
- The full list of auditable areas (processes, systems, entities, risks) from which internal audit builds its risk-based plan.
- Combined assurance
- Coordinating and mapping all assurance providers against the main risks so the board can see overlaps and gaps.
- Internal control over financial reporting (ICFR)
- The process, designed under the chief executive's and chief financial officer's supervision, that gives reasonable assurance that financial statements are reliable (17 CFR 240.13a-15(f)).
- Disclosure controls and procedures
- Controls that make sure information required in SEC reports is recorded, processed and reported on time and reaches the officers for disclosure decisions (17 CFR 240.13a-15(e)).
- IT general controls (ITGCs)
- Controls over access to programs and data, program changes, program development and computer operations that automated controls and system reports depend on.
- Significant deficiency
- A deficiency in ICFR less severe than a material weakness but important enough to merit the attention of those overseeing financial reporting.
- Material weakness
- A deficiency in ICFR creating a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis; it must be disclosed and leads to an adverse auditor opinion.
- Benchmarking (automated controls)
- An AS 2201 approach letting the auditor rely on an unchanged automated control without retesting it, only if general controls over program changes, access and operations are effective.
- Accelerated filer
- An SEC filer category, based on public float and revenue, that determines filing deadlines and whether Section 404(b) auditor attestation applies; the SEC proposed eliminating it in May 2026.
- FISCAM
- GAO and CIGIE's Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual for auditing information system controls in federal audits; 2026 revision GAO-26-108633.
- Yellow Book
- GAO's Government Auditing Standards, followed by auditors of government entities and award recipients; the 2024 revision took effect for periods and audits beginning on or after Dec. 15, 2025.
Sources
- IIA, Cybersecurity Topical Requirement (PDF) (2025-02-05) checked 2026-11
- IIA, Global Internal Audit Standards (2024-01-09) checked 2026-11
- 15 U.S.C. 7241 (Sarbanes-Oxley Section 302) (2026-11-15) checked 2026-11
- 15 U.S.C. 7262 (Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404) (2026-11-15) checked 2026-11
- 17 CFR 240.13a-15 (2026-11-15) checked 2026-11
- PCAOB AS 2201 (2026-11-15) checked 2026-11
- SEC press release 2024-75, R.R. Donnelley (2024-06-18) checked 2026-11
- OCC Consent Order EA 2020-036, Capital One (2020-08-05) checked 2026-11
- Rivian Automotive Form 10-K for 2022 (Item 9A) (2023-02-28) checked 2026-11
- Super Micro Computer Form 10-K for fiscal 2026 (Item 9A) (2026-08-31) checked 2026-11
- GAO, FISCAM 2026 Revision (2026-11-15) checked 2026-11
- 44 U.S.C. 3555 (FISMA annual independent evaluation) (2026-11-15) checked 2026-11
- Idaho Code 67-702 (2026-11-15) checked 2026-11