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Lesson 11 of 14 · about 55 minutes · Updated November 15, 2026

Security in Mergers and Acquisitions

You'll be able to

  • Explain what the Yahoo, Starwood and Change Healthcare cases show about inherited cyber risk and when it surfaces.
  • List the areas a buyer should examine before signing and the evidence to request for each.
  • Describe diligence methods, from questionnaires to compromise assessments, and the antitrust limits on pre-closing involvement.
  • Match security findings to deal terms: representations, specific indemnities, escrows, price changes, covenants and insurance.
  • Identify the SEC, Hart-Scott-Rodino, CFIUS and 28 CFR Part 202 touch points that carry security content.
  • Plan Day 1, the first 100 days, network gating and transition services so that integration does not open new doors.

Start here: the short version

  • When you buy a company, you buy its breaches, including the ones nobody has found yet. Yahoo signed a deal to sell its operating business to Verizon in July 2016 with a representation that, to its knowledge, there had been no security breaches. Two months later it disclosed a 2014 theft of data on 500 million accounts. Verizon cut the price by $350 million (7.25 percent), and the SEC later fined Yahoo's successor, Altaba, $35 million.123
  • The buyer owns the cleanup and the penalties. Marriott bought Starwood in 2016. An intrusion into Starwood's guest reservation system that began around July 2014 was not found until September 2018. Marriott paid a UK fine of 18.4 million pounds in 2020, accepted a 20-year FTC order, and paid $52 million to 49 states and the District of Columbia, including Idaho, in October 2024.456
  • Integration is where the risk peaks. UnitedHealth Group's chief executive told the Senate that Change Healthcare "came into our group a little over a year and a half ago," had "older legacy technologies," and was being upgraded when attackers entered through a server without multifactor sign-in in February 2024.7
  • Diligence is a process, not a questionnaire. It runs from the first look at a target through the first year after closing: document review, interviews, an outside view of what the target exposes to the internet, and, for deals where the stakes justify it, a compromise assessment to look for intruders already inside.
  • Deal terms move risk but do not remove it. Representations, indemnities, escrows, price adjustments and insurance decide who pays. None of them stops an attacker who is already in the network you are about to connect to your own.
  • Government review is part of the deal. Antitrust rules limit what buyer and seller may share and do before closing. Foreign investment review (CFIUS) and the Justice Department's 2025 bulk data rule can impose security conditions, and CFIUS fined T-Mobile $60 million in 2024 for breaking one.89
  • Connect last, not first. The safest integration keeps the acquired network separate until identity, endpoint protection, logging and the worst vulnerabilities are fixed, then connects it through gates the security team controls.

Rules and standards described: SEC Release No. 33-11216 (88 Fed. Reg. 51896, Aug. 4, 2023), Form 8-K Items 1.01, 1.05 and 2.01 and Regulation S-K Item 106 (17 CFR 229.106), as in force Nov. 15, 2026; Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 15 U.S.C. 18a, and 16 CFR 1.98 (penalty amounts for penalties assessed after Jan. 17, 2025, as shown on the eCFR for Nov. 1, 2026); CFIUS regulations, 31 CFR Part 800, including the penalty amendments published Nov. 26, 2024 (89 Fed. Reg. 93179, effective Dec. 26, 2024), read on the eCFR for Nov. 1, 2026; the Justice Department's Data Security Program, 28 CFR Part 202 (90 Fed. Reg. 1706, Jan. 8, 2025, effective April 8, 2025), read on the eCFR for Nov. 1, 2026; NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 (CSWP 29, Feb. 26, 2024); Idaho Code 67-827, 67-827A, 28-51-105 and Title 74, Chapter 1, as in force through the 2026 session; all read Nov. 15, 2026. Rules, regulators' priorities and deal practice change; check the regulator's current text before relying on any point.

Before you change anything. Plan changes to production systems, test them first, keep a way back, and follow your change management process. For clinical, plant-floor or other safety systems, involve the vendor, your safety lead and qualified engineers (see modules 109 and 111).

The board of a regional health system meets on a Thursday afternoon to approve the purchase of a 40-clinic physician group in three states. The price is set, the financing is lined up, and the press release is drafted. The chief information security officer has had nine days to look at the target. She has a 140-question security questionnaire the target answered "yes" to almost everywhere, a SOC 2 report from the target's billing vendor, a list of the target's cloud accounts that turned out to be incomplete, and one interview with an IT director who has given notice. She also has a short note from an outside review of the target's internet-facing systems: a remote access portal that accepts a password alone, two web servers running software past its end of support, and a domain the target forgot it owned. The deal team wants to know one thing: is any of this a reason not to sign?

That question, and the ones that follow it for the next year, are the subject of this lesson. Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are a security event. The buyer takes on the target's systems, data, vendors, regulators, insurance history, unfinished projects and undiscovered intrusions. The seller, in a divestiture, has to cut a working business out of shared networks without leaving doors open on either side. Government agencies that merge departments or consolidate IT shops face the same work with different rules. The lesson is written for the people who make and live with those decisions: corporate development teams, CFOs, general counsel's offices and compliance officers, CISOs and their staffs, internal auditors, insurance buyers, boards and audit committees, agency heads, and the reporters, advocates and legislators who ask how it went.

It builds on the foundations module. The vendor and supply chain discipline that diligence borrows from is in Vendors and Supply Chain; board oversight and SEC disclosure are in Governance: Boards, Officers and Disclosure; the risk vocabulary used here is in Risk Management in Plain Terms; and the incident response and breach notice machinery you may have to run on day one is in Detection and Incident Response and Breach Notification. Inside this module, lesson 5 explains how to read the SOC reports a target will hand you, lesson 6 covers the certifications (ISO 27001, PCI DSS, FedRAMP, CMMC) whose status may change when ownership changes, lesson 9 covers the insurance policies that respond (or do not) to inherited incidents, lesson 10 covers the data inventories you will need to merge, and lesson 12 covers the continuity planning that a carve-out tests hard.

Why diligence matters: three deals that changed the conversation

Security professionals cite the same handful of transactions when they argue for diligence budgets. They are worth knowing in detail, because each one teaches something different: what a seller's representations are worth, how long an undiscovered intrusion can travel with a business, and how integration plans become attack surface.

Verizon and Yahoo: the representation and the price cut

In December 2014, according to the SEC, Russian intruders stole what Yahoo's own information security team called the company's "crown jewels": usernames, email addresses, phone numbers, birthdates, encrypted passwords and security questions and answers for hundreds of millions of accounts. The security team learned of the theft within days, and senior management and the legal department were told. The SEC found that Yahoo did not properly investigate, did not adequately consider whether investors needed to know, and did not share the information with its auditors or outside lawyers. For nearly two years its quarterly and annual reports described data breaches only as a risk that might happen.1

On July 23, 2016, Yahoo signed a stock purchase agreement to sell its operating business to Verizon for $4,825,800,000 in cash. In it, Yahoo represented that "To the Knowledge of [Yahoo], there have not been any incidents of, or third party claims alleging, (i) Security Breaches." The agreement was filed with the SEC on July 25, 2016. On or about Sept. 22, 2016, Yahoo disclosed the 2014 breach and the theft of data involving 500 million user accounts.2

The parties renegotiated. Under amendments dated Feb. 20, 2017 and announced the next day, Verizon cut the price by $350 million, to about $4.48 billion. The two companies agreed to split equally any cash liabilities after closing from non-SEC government investigations and third-party lawsuits about the breaches, while "Liabilities arising from shareholder lawsuits and SEC investigations will continue to be the responsibility of Yahoo." And they agreed that "the data breaches or losses arising from them will not be taken into account in determining whether a 'Business Material Adverse Effect' has occurred," which took away Verizon's best argument for walking away.3 Verizon closed on June 13, 2017. Yahoo's remaining company renamed itself Altaba.2

On April 24, 2018, the SEC announced that Altaba had agreed to pay a $35 million penalty, without admitting or denying the findings, in what law firm commentators at the time described as the first SEC case of its kind against a public company for failing to disclose a cyber breach. The order (Securities Act Release No. 10485) ties the breach to the deal directly: it says Yahoo "made affirmative representations denying the existence of any significant data breaches" in the Verizon agreement, and that after the disclosure Verizon renegotiated to reduce the price "by $350 million, representing a 7.25% reduction in price."2 The enforcement division's co-director said the SEC does "not second-guess good faith exercises of judgment about cyber-incident disclosure," but that this case clearly warranted action.1

What it teaches. A representation qualified "to the knowledge of" the seller protects the seller, not the buyer, unless the agreement defines whose knowledge counts and the buyer tests it. Yahoo's security team knew. Whether that knowledge was attributed to the company for purposes of the agreement was a question the parties settled with a price cut rather than a lawsuit. The buyer's protection came from the fact that the breach surfaced before closing. If it had surfaced a year later, Verizon would have had only whatever indemnity the agreement provided.

Marriott and Starwood: the intrusion that came with the deal

Marriott acquired Starwood Hotels and Resorts in 2016. The FTC's account of what Marriott bought is stark. A first Starwood breach, of payment card data for more than 40,000 customers, began in June 2014 and went undetected for 14 months; Starwood notified customers in November 2015, four days after Marriott announced the acquisition. A second intrusion, into Starwood's guest reservation database, began around July 2014 and was not detected until September 2018, two years after closing. Attackers reached 339 million guest records worldwide, including 5.25 million unencrypted passport numbers. A third intrusion, into Marriott's own network, ran from September 2018 to February 2020 and reached 5.2 million guest records.4

The FTC said that after Marriott acquired Starwood in 2016, "it was responsible for the data security practices of both brands," and its complaint alleged failures in password and access controls, firewalls and network segmentation, patching of outdated software, logging and monitoring, and multifactor authentication. The order, announced Oct. 9, 2024 and made final in December 2024, requires a full information security program for 20 years, an independent assessment every two years, annual compliance certifications to the FTC, a way for U.S. customers to request deletion of their data, data minimization, and a review process for loyalty accounts with restoration of stolen points. The FTC noted that it "does not have legal authority to obtain civil penalties in this case."4

The states did. On the same day, 50 attorneys general (49 states and the District of Columbia, Idaho among them, and California not among them) announced a $52 million settlement. North Carolina's announcement counted 131.5 million guest records of U.S. customers. Among the conditions listed in the announcement: "Assessing information security when acquiring any future entities and developing plans to address any identified security gaps."5 That term is now part of a multistate settlement, and it is a fair statement of what regulators expect from any acquirer.

In the United Kingdom, the Information Commissioner's Office announced in July 2019 that it intended to fine Marriott more than 99 million pounds. Elizabeth Denham, then the commissioner, said the accountability principle in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) can "include carrying out proper due diligence when making a corporate acquisition," including assessing "what personal data has been acquired" and "how it is protected."10 The final penalty, announced Oct. 30, 2020, was 18.4 million pounds, reduced partly for the economic effect of COVID-19.6 The final decision covered only the period after the GDPR took effect in May 2018, so it made no finding that Marriott's pre-acquisition diligence itself broke the law. It did say diligence is "not a time-limited or a one-off requirement," and it recorded that Marriott had planned to decommission the Starwood systems in early 2018 but delayed that until the end of 2018.11

Shareholders also sued Marriott's directors, claiming they failed to oversee cyber risk. The Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed that derivative case on Oct. 5, 2021, finding that the board and audit committee had been "routinely apprised" of cyber risks.12 So the board escaped personal liability, but the company did not escape the regulators. (Lesson 108-4 explains the oversight duty behind that ruling.)

What it teaches. An intrusion can survive the closing by years. The acquirer becomes responsible for the target's security the day the deal closes, and regulators measure the acquirer's conduct from that day forward. Running an acquired legacy system "for a while" while integration plans mature is a decision to carry a known risk, and it should be made, recorded and time-limited like any other risk acceptance.

UnitedHealth and Change Healthcare: the integration window

UnitedHealth Group's Optum unit completed its combination with Change Healthcare on Oct. 3, 2022, after the Justice Department's antitrust challenge to the deal failed in court.13 On Feb. 12, 2024, according to the written testimony of UnitedHealth Group's chief executive, Andrew Witty, criminals used compromised credentials to reach a Change Healthcare Citrix remote access portal that "did not have multi-factor authentication." Ransomware followed on Feb. 21.14 The HHS Office for Civil Rights counted about 192.7 million individuals affected as of July 31, 2025, the largest health data breach reported to it.15

At the Senate Finance Committee hearing on May 1, 2024, Mr. Witty returned again and again to the acquisition. Change Healthcare, he said, "just came into our group a little over a year and a half ago" and "was an older company, had older legacy technologies." To Senator Grassley he called it "a 40 year-old company with many different technology generations within it," adding: "As we always do with new companies like that, we strive to upgrade them to the standards of UnitedHealth Group." To Senator Barrasso: "We have been upgrading their technology since we acquired it," and "unfortunately, we have discovered a server which was not covered by MFA." And to Senator Blackburn: "We were in the process of upgrading that technology when this attack occurred," and the attack "had the effect of locking up the various backup systems which had been developed inside Change before it was acquired."7

What it teaches. About 16 months after closing, a core control the parent company required (multifactor sign-in on external access) was still missing on at least one acquired system, and the acquired company's backups were not separate enough to survive the attack. Large acquirers often have the right standards on paper. The risk lives in the gap between the standard and the acquired estate, and that gap is widest in the first two years. The integration plan has to rank the controls that stop the most likely attacks (remote access, identity, backups) ahead of the ones that are merely convenient to integrate first, such as email and finance systems.

What the three cases teach together

DealWhen the problem surfacedWho paid, and howThe lesson for buyers
Verizon and Yahoo (signed July 2016, closed June 2017)Between signing and closing (disclosed Sept. 2016)Seller: $350 million price cut, 50 percent of most post-closing breach cash liabilities, all SEC and shareholder liabilities; later a $35 million SEC penalty23Test the seller's knowledge. Define whose knowledge counts. Make breaches a specific indemnity, not just a general representation.
Marriott and Starwood (closed 2016)About two years after closing (Sept. 2018)Buyer: 18.4 million pound UK fine (2020), 20-year FTC order (2024), $52 million to 50 attorneys general (2024)456Assume you may be buying an intrusion. Hunt for one. Retire legacy systems on a schedule you keep.
UnitedHealth (Optum) and Change Healthcare (closed Oct. 2022)About 16 months after closing (Feb. 2024)Buyer: ransom, recovery and the largest health breach on the HHS list; about 192.7 million people715Close the highest-risk gaps (remote access, identity, backups) first, and verify, rather than assume, that parent standards have reached every acquired system.

What a buyer inherits

Corporate lawyers distinguish between a stock purchase or merger, in which the buyer acquires the legal entity with everything attached to it, and an asset purchase, in which the buyer picks the assets and the liabilities it agrees to take. The distinction matters less for cyber risk than people hope, for four reasons.

  • The data and the systems come either way. Even in an asset deal, the buyer takes the customer database, the applications, the cloud accounts and often the staff who run them. Any intruder hiding in those systems comes along.
  • Regulators look at who holds the data now. The FTC's Marriott complaint rested on Marriott's responsibility for both brands after closing.4 State breach notice laws, including Idaho's, put the notice duty on whoever "owns or licenses" the computerized personal information when a breach is discovered.16
  • Orders and agreements travel. FTC orders typically bind the company's successors and assigns. Some follow individuals: the FTC's 2022 order against the alcohol delivery company Drizly, by then an Uber subsidiary, also bound its chief executive, James Cory Rellas, who must put an information security program in place at any future company that collects data on more than 25,000 people where he is a majority owner, chief executive or a senior officer with security responsibility.17 Government mitigation agreements imposed in national security reviews stay with the business, as T-Mobile learned (below).
  • Disclosure duties attach at once. A public company that acquires a business owns the duty to assess the materiality of incidents at that business under Form 8-K Item 1.05 from the day of closing, and its next annual report must describe how its cyber risk management covers the combined company (Regulation S-K Item 106).1819

The inheritance also includes things that are not liabilities in a legal sense but cost money all the same: unsupported software, missing asset inventories, cloud accounts on personal credit cards, shared administrator passwords, vendor contracts with no security terms, a security team of two people who are leaving, and policies that exist only as a binder no one has opened. Diligence is the effort to find and price those things before the price is fixed.

Who does what in a deal

Large acquirers run diligence through workstreams: finance, tax, legal, human resources, operations, IT and, increasingly, a separate cybersecurity and privacy workstream. The most common failure is not a bad workstream but a late one. Security is called in after the letter of intent is signed and the exclusivity period is half over, with a document request that the seller answers in the last week.

RoleWhat it owns in the dealWhat it needs from security
Board or its designated committeeApproves the deal; oversees the integration risk afterwardA plain statement of the material cyber findings, how they were priced or protected against, and the integration plan's top risks and dates
Corporate development (the deal team)Sourcing, valuation, timeline, negotiationEarly warning of deal-breakers; findings stated in dollars and in terms the agreement can address
General counsel's office and compliance officerAgreement terms, regulatory filings, antitrust limits on information sharing, privacy lawSpecific findings to turn into representations, specific indemnities, closing conditions and covenants; data maps for privacy review
CFO and financePrice, escrow, financing, purchase accounting, integration budgetCost estimates for remediation and integration (people, tools, licenses, contract terminations)
CISO and security teamCyber diligence, Day 1 controls, integration security planAccess to documents, people and (where allowed) systems; enough time
CIO and integration management officeTechnology integration plan, transition servicesGating criteria before connecting networks or migrating identities
Privacy officeData inventory, notices, consent, cross-border transfers, use limits that travel with the dataJoint review of what personal data the target holds and where
Risk management and insurance buyerTransaction insurance, the target's own cyber policy, tail coverageFindings that underwriters will exclude; claims history
Internal auditPost-closing review of whether integration commitments were metThe integration plan and its dates, as the baseline for an audit

Two practical rules make this work. First, put the CISO (or a named deputy) on the deal team's distribution list from the first look at a target, under the same confidentiality terms as everyone else. Second, agree in advance what counts as a "stop" finding that must reach the decision-makers within 24 hours: evidence of an active intrusion, a concealed breach, an open regulatory order, a sanctions or national security problem, or a core system that cannot be secured without being replaced. The board's governance calendar and reporting habits described in lesson 3 should treat a pending acquisition as a standing agenda item until integration ends.

The deal timeline and where security fits

Deals vary, but most follow the same sequence. Security work changes at each stage, because what you are allowed to see, and what you can still change, changes.

  1. Screening (before any agreement). Public information only: news, regulator databases, court records, breach notice databases, SEC filings if the target is public, and a passive look at what the target exposes to the internet. Goal: spot reasons not to proceed.
  2. Letter of intent and confidentiality agreement. The parties sign a nondisclosure agreement and often an exclusivity period. Security should ask for its document request list to be included in the first wave.
  3. Confirmatory diligence. Document room review, questionnaires, management interviews, and, where the target agrees, deeper testing. Findings are rated and turned into deal terms.
  4. Signing. The definitive agreement is signed with representations, covenants, indemnities and closing conditions. Public companies usually report a material definitive agreement on Form 8-K Item 1.01.20
  5. Signing to closing (the interim period). Regulatory approvals (antitrust, CFIUS, sector regulators) run. The buyer cannot yet run the target's business, but it can plan Day 1, require the seller to keep its security controls in place and to report incidents, and in some deals complete a compromise assessment.
  6. Closing and Day 1. Ownership transfers. Public acquirers report completion of a significant acquisition on Form 8-K Item 2.01.20 Day 1 controls take effect: access changes for departing staff, monitoring, incident response contacts, and the rule that networks stay separate.
  7. First 100 days. Stabilize: identity, endpoint protection, logging, critical vulnerabilities, backups, remote access, policy adoption.
  8. Integration (often one to three years). Connect networks through gates, migrate users, retire legacy systems, merge programs, and audit the result.
Yahoo headquarters buildings in Sunnyvale, California, in 2018
Yahoo's Sunnyvale, California campus in July 2018. Yahoo's undisclosed breaches cut the price Verizon paid for its operating business in 2017. Photo: Scott Schiller. Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 2.0.

What to examine before signing

A target's security posture is not one thing. It is a set of facts in a dozen areas, each of which can change the price, the agreement or the integration plan. The sample checklist later in this lesson turns these into document requests and questions; here is what each area is for.

The security program and its governance

Who leads security, to whom they report, how big the team is, and what the board or owners have been told. Ask for the last two years of board or owner security reports, the risk register, the information security policy with its approval date, and the latest independent assessment against a framework such as the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0.21 A program that has never been assessed is not necessarily weak, but it is unmeasured, and the buyer should price the assessment it will have to do. The anatomy of a well-run program is in lesson 1, and the maturity models for rating one are in lesson 14.

Breach and incident history

Ask for every security incident in the last five years that required outside forensic help, notice to individuals or regulators, an insurance claim, a ransom payment or a report to law enforcement, with the forensic reports if they exist. Ask what was done about each root cause. Cross-check the answer against public sources: state attorney general breach notice postings, the HHS Office for Civil Rights breach portal for health data, court dockets and news. A seller's list that leaves out something you found publicly is a finding in itself. Remember Yahoo: the question is not only what the seller has disclosed, but what its security team knows. Ask to interview the security lead without the deal team present, if the seller will allow it.

SEC filings and public statements

If the target is public, read its 10-K Item 1C (cybersecurity risk management, strategy and governance) for the last three years, any Form 8-K Item 1.05 or 8.01 incident filings, and its risk factors.19 Compare what it told investors with what the diligence finds. A gap is a disclosure problem the buyer may inherit, and the SEC's Yahoo case shows such gaps get enforced.2 Even private targets make public statements, in privacy notices, security pages, marketing and customer contracts, and the FTC treats false security claims as deception, as it did with Marriott and Starwood's claims of "reasonable and appropriate data security."4

Open regulatory matters and litigation

Consent orders, open investigations, examination findings (for banks, insurers and other supervised firms), corrective action plans with the HHS Office for Civil Rights, settlement agreements with state attorneys general, and pending class actions. Each carries obligations, often for 20 years, and some carry assessment and reporting duties that the buyer's program must now meet. Ask for the order, the latest assessor report and the correspondence, not just a summary.

Technical debt and unsupported systems

"Technical debt" means the accumulated cost of shortcuts: software past its end of support, systems no one fully understands, custom code with no maintainer, missing documentation. It is where legacy intrusions hide and where integration costs explode. Ask for the asset inventory and the list of systems past end of support, with plans and budgets for each. Treat a missing inventory as a large finding, since you cannot secure what you have not counted.

Identity, remote access and privileged accounts

Remote access is where the most consequential intrusions in this lesson began. Ask how every remote access path (VPN, remote desktop gateways, vendor support tools, web portals) authenticates users, whether multifactor sign-in covers all of them and all privileged accounts, how many administrator accounts exist and who reviews them, and whether service accounts have owners. Ask for evidence (a configuration export or a screenshot from a live session), not a yes on a form. The baseline controls are explained in lesson 108-5.

Cloud accounts and software-as-a-service

Targets often do not know how many cloud accounts and subscriptions they have. Ask for a list of every cloud provider account, subscription and tenant, with owners, billing contacts and administrator lists; every software-as-a-service application holding company data; and how sign-in to them is controlled. Accounts paid for on an employee's card or set up by a former contractor are common, and they leave with the person who controls them unless the buyer finds them first. Cloud security basics are in lesson 108-6.

Operational technology

For manufacturers, utilities, hospitals, labs and logistics firms, the plant floor and building systems matter as much as the office network. Ask for a list of industrial control systems, how they are separated from business networks, how vendors reach them remotely, and which run unsupported software that cannot be patched without the equipment vendor. Integration plans that connect a plant to a corporate network without a segmentation design repeat the mistakes described in lesson 111-1 and lesson 111-7.

Data and privacy compliance

What personal data does the target hold, about whom, where, and under what promises? Ask for the data inventory or records of processing, privacy notices in force over the past several years, consent records, the list of states and countries whose residents' data it holds, cross-border transfer mechanisms for European data, and any regulated data: protected health information, cardholder data, nonpublic personal financial information, children's data, biometrics. Data collected under one privacy promise generally cannot be used for a new purpose just because a new owner arrived; plan any change in use with the privacy office. The data inventory methods are in lesson 10.

Certifications, attestations and government authorizations

SOC 2 reports, ISO/IEC 27001 certificates, PCI DSS attestations of compliance, HITRUST certifications, FedRAMP authorizations and CMMC status are all evidence, but each covers a defined scope and period. Read the scope: a SOC 2 for one product line says nothing about the rest of the company, and a certificate's period may have ended. Find out whether a change of ownership or integration will require reassessment or notice to the certifying body, assessor or agency, and plan for it so that a government contract or a payment relationship does not lapse. Lesson 5 explains how to read a SOC report; lesson 6 covers the certification and authorization programs.

Insurance history

Ask for the target's cyber insurance policies for the last three to five years, the applications it signed, claims made, and the insurer's loss runs. Applications matter: if the target told an insurer it had multifactor sign-in everywhere and the diligence shows it did not, the policy may not respond to an incident that happened before closing. Ask whether the policy has a change-in-control clause that ends coverage at closing, and whether "tail" or "run-off" coverage can be bought to cover claims made after closing for events before it. Lesson 9 explains these terms.

Vendor contracts and the supply chain

Ask for the list of vendors with access to systems or sensitive data, the contracts with the top tier, and any assignment or change-of-control clauses that require consent. Vendors with remote access are a doorway; vendors whose contracts end at closing can leave critical services unsupported. Apply the tiering method from lesson 108-8 to the target's vendors as if they were your own, because after closing they are.

Product and software security

If the target sells software, devices or connected products, its product security is part of what you are buying. Ask about its secure development practices, open vulnerability reports, how it handles reports from outside researchers, the age and composition of its code (including open-source components and any software bill of materials), and its record of customer-affecting incidents. Products sold to hospitals, governments or defense contractors carry their own regulatory baggage. Lesson 7 covers testing and vulnerability disclosure.

People and key staff

Who knows how the systems work, and will they stay? Ask for the security and IT organization chart, open positions, recent departures, and which people hold the only administrator credentials for critical systems. Retention agreements for a handful of technical staff are often the cheapest risk reduction in the deal. Plan for the reverse risk too: an announced acquisition unsettles people, and departing or disgruntled staff with access are a known insider risk, covered in lesson 108-9.

The deal timeline and the security work at each stage 1. Screening Public records, breach databases, SEC filings, passive outside view 2. Letter of intent, NDA Security request list in the first wave; agree stop criteria 3. Confirmatory diligence Data room, questionnaires backed by evidence, interviews, ratings 4. Signing Representations, specific indemnities, escrow, interim covenants 5. Signing to closing Antitrust and CFIUS review; Day 1 plan; deal-themed phishing warnings 6. Closing and Day 1 Take the keys, disable accounts, monitor; networks stay separate 7. First 100 days Multifactor sign-in, endpoint detection, logging, KEV fixes, backups 8. Integration (1 to 3 years) Connect through gates, migrate identities, retire legacy, audit Shaded dark (1 to 3): findings can still change the price and the agreement. Shaded light (6 to 8): the buyer owns the systems, the data and the regulators' attention.
Where security work sits in an acquisition, from first look to full integration. Original graphic for this module, based on the deal stages and practices described in this lesson (Nov. 2026).

How cyber diligence is done

Diligence methods range from cheap and shallow to expensive and deep. Large acquirers scale them to the deal: a small software tuck-in may get a questionnaire, interviews and an outside review; a multibillion-dollar purchase of a company holding health or financial data on millions of people should get all of the methods below, including a look for intruders already inside.

Questionnaires and document requests

The standard opening is a written request list and a questionnaire. Their weakness is obvious: the seller answers them, under time pressure, with every incentive to say yes. Make them work harder by asking for evidence rather than assertions ("provide the export of multifactor enrollment for all remote access users," not "do you use MFA?"), by asking the same question two ways in different documents, and by keeping the list short enough that the seller's staff answer it themselves rather than handing it to a salesperson. Many acquirers start from the industry questionnaires used in vendor risk programs, trimmed to what matters for the deal.

The virtual data room

Sellers post documents in a virtual data room, an access-controlled website with logging, watermarking and download limits. Security should have its own folder index and should ask for the documents that tend not to appear unprompted: forensic reports, regulator correspondence, penetration test reports with their remediation status, insurance applications and loss runs, and the last board security report. The data room itself is sensitive; it holds the target's crown jewels in one place, and the buyer's team should treat its credentials accordingly.

Management interviews

An hour with the target's security lead, IT lead and privacy lead is worth more than a hundred questionnaire answers, if the questions are good. Ask open questions: "Tell me about the worst incident you have handled here." "What would you fix first with more budget?" "Which system worries you most?" "What did your last penetration test find that is still open?" "Who has administrator access to the domain, and how do you know?" Ask the same question of different people and compare.

An outside view of what the target exposes

Without touching the target's systems, a qualified team can review what any outsider can see: registered domains and certificates, internet-facing services and their software versions as publicly reported, email security records, leaked credentials offered for sale, and mentions on criminal forums. Commercial "security rating" services sell versions of this view. It is useful for spotting forgotten systems and obvious exposures, and it is limited: it cannot see inside, and its scores can mislead. Any active testing of the target's systems, even a light scan, needs the target's written authorization first; testing a company you do not yet own without permission can break the law and the confidentiality agreement. Lesson 7 covers authorization and rules of engagement.

Compromise assessments

A compromise assessment is a structured search for evidence that an intruder is already present or was present in the recent past: reviewing logs, endpoint telemetry and identity records for signs of attacker activity. It answers the Marriott question (is there someone inside?) better than any document. It is also intrusive, takes weeks, costs real money, and requires the seller to let a buyer's contractor into its environment before the buyer owns it. Sellers often refuse before signing. Common compromises: run it between signing and closing under a covenant in the agreement, run it in the first 30 days after closing with a specific indemnity or escrow covering anything found, or have the seller commission it from a firm both sides accept and share the results.

Clean teams and what competitors may not share

When buyer and seller compete, antitrust law limits what they may exchange and do before closing. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act requires parties to larger deals to file with the FTC and the Justice Department and wait (generally 30 days after filing, or 15 for a cash tender offer, unless extended) before closing, and a party that fails to comply faces a civil penalty for each day of violation.22 The statutory figure of $10,000 a day is adjusted for inflation; for penalties assessed after Jan. 17, 2025, the FTC's table sets it at $53,088 per day.23 The government treats a buyer that starts running the target's business before the waiting period ends ("gun-jumping") as violating the Act, and Section 1 of the Sherman Act separately forbids competitors from coordinating on prices and customers whether or not a deal is pending.

For security teams, this has two consequences. First, competitively sensitive information (pricing, customer-specific terms, strategic plans) may need to go only to a clean team: a small group, often outside advisers and a few employees not involved in day-to-day competition, who sign special confidentiality terms and report only summaries. Security details rarely fall in that category, but customer lists and contracts might. Second, before closing, the buyer should not take operational control of the target's security: no buyer staff with administrator rights, no buyer directing the target's incident response, no merged security operations. What the buyer may do is plan, and require in the agreement that the seller maintain its controls, report incidents and cooperate with Day 1 preparation. The general counsel's office sets these limits for each deal; the security team should know them before it starts asking for access.

Rating findings so the deal team can use them

Findings must translate into decisions. A practical scale:

RatingMeaningExamplesTypical deal response
StopCould change whether the deal should happenActive intrusion; concealed breach; open order the buyer cannot meet; national security or sanctions problemEscalate within 24 hours; pause, restructure or walk away
PriceKnown cost or liability large enough to change valueCore platform past end of support; unremediated major breach with pending claims; required re-certificationPrice adjustment, specific indemnity, escrow or holdback
ProtectUncertain exposure the buyer cannot measure before closingNo logs to rule out past intrusion; unclear data inventorySpecific representation, covenant to investigate, closing condition, insurance
PlanFixable gap with known costPartial multifactor coverage; missing policies; unmanaged laptopsIntegration budget and 100-day plan
NoteMinor or informationalDocumentation gaps; awareness training out of dateTrack in the integration backlog

The diligence report to the deal team should fit on two pages: the stop and price findings first, each with an estimated cost range and a recommended contract response, then the plan items with a total integration estimate. The detail goes in an appendix that the integration team will live by.

Deal terms in plain terms

The purchase agreement allocates risk between buyer and seller. Security leaders do not draft it, but they should understand its parts well enough to say which finding belongs where.

Representations and warranties

Representations are statements of fact the seller makes in the agreement about the business as of signing (and usually again at closing). Typical cyber and privacy representations say that the seller complies with privacy and security laws and its own published policies, maintains reasonable security, has had no security breaches (or none except those listed on a schedule), has given all required breach notices, and is not under investigation. The details matter more than the headings:

  • Knowledge qualifiers. "To the seller's knowledge" limits the statement to what certain people knew. The agreement should name those people, and the list should include the security lead. Yahoo's representation was knowledge-qualified, and the company's security team knew of the 2014 breach.2
  • Materiality qualifiers. "No material breaches" invites argument about what is material. A disclosure schedule listing every known incident is clearer.
  • Look-back period. How far back the "no breach" statement reaches (three years, five years, since a date).
  • Definitions. What counts as a "security breach" or "security incident"? Unauthorized access only, or also ransomware that encrypts without taking data? Attempts?

The point of a representation is not only to create a claim if it proves false. Negotiating it forces the seller to search its records and disclose, which is often how buyers learn the most.

Indemnities, escrows and holdbacks

An indemnity is the seller's promise to pay for specified losses. General indemnities for breached representations are usually capped and limited in time. A specific indemnity covers a named risk (for example, "losses arising from the 2023 ransomware incident") regardless of whether any representation was broken, often with a higher cap and longer survival. An escrow or holdback keeps part of the price aside, with a neutral agent or with the buyer, for a set period to fund indemnity claims. For a known incident with uncertain cost, a specific indemnity backed by an escrow is the standard tool. The Verizon and Yahoo split of post-closing breach liabilities is a public example of a negotiated sharing arrangement.3

Price adjustments and the material adverse effect clause

Where a finding has a reasonably known cost, the cleanest answer is to take it off the price. Most agreements also let the buyer walk away between signing and closing if a "material adverse effect" (an event that substantially damages the business over the long term) occurs. Courts set a high bar for invoking one, and sellers often negotiate carve-outs. Verizon gave up its argument when it agreed that the Yahoo breaches "will not be taken into account" in deciding whether such an effect had occurred, in exchange for the lower price.3

Covenants between signing and closing, and closing conditions

Covenants are promises about conduct. Security-relevant interim covenants require the seller to keep its security controls and insurance in place, not to weaken them, to notify the buyer promptly of any incident, to cooperate with Day 1 planning and (if agreed) a compromise assessment, and to deliver credentials, documentation and administrator access at closing. A closing condition can require that a specific remediation be finished (for example, multifactor sign-in on all remote access) before the buyer must close. Specific, checkable conditions work; vague ones ("reasonable security") invite dispute.

Representation and warranty insurance and its cyber limits

Representation and warranty insurance (often "R&W" or "RWI") is a policy, usually bought by the buyer, that pays for losses from breached representations, so the seller can take its proceeds with a smaller escrow. It has become common in private deals. Underwriters review the buyer's diligence reports and exclude what diligence found or should have found: known breaches, identified gaps and areas the buyer did not examine. Cyber representations may be covered, partly covered or excluded depending on the depth of the cyber diligence the underwriter sees. A thin cyber workstream therefore costs twice: the buyer learns less, and the insurer covers less. Known issues are not insurable through this product at all; they go into the price, a specific indemnity or an escrow. The target's own cyber policy (lesson 9) is a separate question, and its change-in-control and tail terms should be reviewed before closing.

Where a cyber finding goes in the deal Finding Deal tool Active intrusion orconcealed breach Escalate in 24 hours; pause, restructure or walk away Known incident,uncertain cost Specific indemnity backed by escrow or holdback Known cost (for example, a coreplatform past end of support) Price reduction Uncertain exposure (for example,no logs to rule out intrusion) Specific representation, covenant to investigate,closing condition; R&W insurance if not excluded Fixable gap (for example,partial multifactor coverage) Integration budget and the 100-day plan Insurance excludes what diligence found: known issues belong in price, indemnity or escrow.
How a security finding becomes a contract term. Original graphic for this module, based on the deal practices described in this lesson and the Verizon and Yahoo amendment of Feb. 21, 2017.
The JW Marriott Hotel in downtown Houston
The JW Marriott Hotel in downtown Houston, 2020. Marriott inherited a breach already under way in Starwood's reservation system when it bought Starwood. Photo: Jim Evans. Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0.

Government review and filing touch points

Several government processes run alongside a deal, and each has security content. The general counsel's office owns the filings; the security team should know what each one may ask of it.

SEC filings for public companies

A public buyer or target reports a material definitive agreement on Form 8-K Item 1.01 and the completion of a significant acquisition on Item 2.01.20 The 2023 cyber disclosure rules add two touch points. Under Form 8-K Item 1.05, a company must disclose a cybersecurity incident it determines to be material within four business days of that determination, which must be made "without unreasonable delay" after discovery; after closing, that duty covers incidents in the acquired business.18 And under Regulation S-K Item 106, reported in 10-K Item 1C, the annual report must describe the company's processes for assessing, identifying and managing material cyber risks, including whether it has processes to oversee risks from third-party service providers, and how the board oversees those risks.19 A company that just bought a large business with a weaker program should make sure its Item 1C description is accurate for the combined company, not a description of the parent alone. Proxy statements and merger proxies may also describe the board's oversight of the deal. (The full disclosure regime is in lesson 108-4.)

Antitrust review

The Hart-Scott-Rodino filing and waiting period, described above under clean teams, govern what the buyer may do before closing.22 The FTC rewrote the premerger notification form in a rule that took effect Feb. 10, 2025, requiring considerably more information than before. Business groups challenged it, and on Feb. 12, 2026 a federal district court vacated the new form; after the Fifth Circuit denied the FTC a stay pending appeal on March 19, 2026, the agencies went back to accepting the form and instructions in use before Feb. 10, 2025. The FTC says the 2026 filing thresholds took effect Feb. 17, 2026. Deal teams should confirm the current form and thresholds on the FTC's premerger page when they file, since the appeal may change the answer.24 For security planning, the practical effect of antitrust review is the length and uncertainty of the interim period, which can run many months for deals that draw a second request, and during which the target's security remains the seller's job.

CFIUS and foreign investment review

The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), chaired by the Treasury Department, reviews certain investments by foreign persons in U.S. businesses for national security risk. Its rules, at 31 CFR Part 800, give special attention to a "TID U.S. business," one that deals in critical Technologies, critical Infrastructure or sensitive personal Data of U.S. citizens.25 "Sensitive personal data" is defined in detail: it includes identifiable data in listed categories (financial distress data, consumer report data, insurance application data, health data, nonpublic electronic communications, geolocation, biometric enrollment data, government ID data, security clearance data) when the business targets national security agencies or their personnel, or has held such data on more than one million individuals in the prior 12 months, or has a business objective of doing so, plus identifiable genetic test results.26 Some transactions require a mandatory filing (a "declaration"), including certain investments by foreign government-connected buyers in TID U.S. businesses and certain transactions involving critical technologies that would need an export license.27

CFIUS often clears deals subject to a mitigation agreement, frequently called a national security agreement, with security terms: limits on foreign access to data, a U.S.-based security officer, audits, and incident reporting. These are enforced. CFIUS's public enforcement page lists a $60 million penalty against T-Mobile in 2024 for violating its 2018 national security agreement, from August 2020 to June 2021, by failing to prevent unauthorized access to certain sensitive data and failing to report some incidents promptly; an $18 million penalty in 2024 against parties that failed to move sensitive assets into a protected subsidiary at closing, giving the foreign acquirer potential access; and an $8.5 million penalty in 2024 after majority shareholders removed the independent directors and left the security director post vacant.8 Treasury raised the maximum penalties in a rule effective Dec. 26, 2024: up to $5 million for material misstatements, and for violations of mitigation agreements up to the greatest of $5 million, the value of the transaction or the violator's interest in the U.S. business.28

For a security team, a CFIUS mitigation agreement is a set of controls with a regulator watching. Treat each term as a requirement in the program, assign an owner, collect evidence, and test it, exactly as you would a consent order.

The Justice Department's bulk data rule

A newer federal rule reaches some deals that CFIUS does not. Under Executive Order 14117 (Feb. 28, 2024), the Justice Department issued the Data Security Program rule at 28 CFR Part 202, effective April 8, 2025.9 It prohibits or restricts U.S. persons from certain transactions that could give "countries of concern" or "covered persons" access to government-related data or bulk U.S. sensitive personal data. The countries of concern are China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia and Venezuela.29 "Bulk" thresholds are low: for example, personal health or financial data on more than 10,000 U.S. persons, precise geolocation data on more than 1,000 U.S. devices, or covered personal identifiers on more than 100,000 U.S. persons, at any point in the preceding 12 months.9 "Investment agreements," which include obtaining ownership interests in a U.S. legal entity (with exclusions for passive investments such as publicly traded securities), are one of the restricted transaction types, along with vendor and employment agreements. Restricted transactions are allowed only if the U.S. person meets security requirements published by CISA in January 2025 and incorporated into the rule.9 A deal that brings an investor or acquirer connected to a country of concern into a business holding bulk sensitive data needs a review under this rule as well as CFIUS.

Sector regulators and licenses

Banks, insurers, broker-dealers, utilities, telecommunications carriers, hospitals and defense contractors often need regulators' approval for a change of control, or must notify them. Those reviews may ask about the combined company's information security and IT integration plans. Federal bank regulators, for example, generally consider technology integration as part of supervising merged banks (this lesson did not tie that to a specific current issuance), and if the combined company is a covered entity under New York's 23 NYCRR Part 500, its cybersecurity program must meet that regulation for the whole combined business. Ask the compliance officer early which approvals apply and what they require.

Between signing and closing

The interim period is short for small deals and can last a year for large ones under antitrust or CFIUS review. It is the best time to prepare and the worst time to relax. Three things happen in it.

The announcement draws attackers. Public deal news tells criminals that two finance departments are about to exchange wire instructions, invoices and new vendor details, that staff expect emails from unfamiliar colleagues, and that IT help desks are about to reset many accounts. Business email compromise and fake "integration" messages spike in exactly these conditions. Warn staff on both sides the day the deal is announced, require call-back verification for any change in payment instructions, and tell help desks to verify identity before resets. The payment fraud controls are in lesson 110-6.

The seller's people start leaving. Administrators with the only copy of a critical password may take a new job. The interim covenants should require the seller to maintain an accurate administrator list and hand over credentials and documentation at closing, and the buyer should identify the few people it must retain.

Day 1 has to be designed. Day 1 is the first day the buyer owns the business. Its security plan is short and specific: who the target's staff call when something goes wrong; who decides on incident response and disclosure; which accounts are disabled at closing (departing executives, the seller's shared-services staff); which monitoring the buyer turns on; and the rule that no network connection between the companies opens until the gates below are met. If the deal is a carve-out, Day 1 also starts the transition services agreement.

The first 100 days after closing

The first 100 days set the course of the integration. The goal is not to make the acquired company look like the parent. It is to remove the risks most likely to cause an incident, gain visibility, and put the acquired business under the parent's governance. Any of the changes below that touch production systems (turning on multifactor sign-in for all remote access, replacing endpoint tools, changing backup arrangements, cutting off old accounts) should be planned, tested on a small group first, and paired with a way back if something important breaks.

  1. Days 1 to 7: take control of the keys. Confirm the list of domain, cloud and application administrators; rotate the most powerful credentials; disable accounts of departed staff; take ownership of domain registrations, certificates and cloud billing; confirm who can approve payments and wire changes.
  2. Days 1 to 30: see what is happening. Deploy or confirm endpoint detection and response on servers and workstations; send identity, endpoint, firewall and cloud logs to the parent's security operations center; agree on an incident escalation path; if no compromise assessment was done before closing, run one now.
  3. Days 1 to 30: close the front doors. Require multifactor sign-in on every remote access path, every privileged account and every internet-facing administrative interface; shut down remote access tools that are not needed; fix internet-facing vulnerabilities on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog first.30
  4. Days 15 to 45: protect recovery. Verify that backups of critical systems exist, are separated from the production network and its administrator accounts, and can be restored; run a restore test. The Change Healthcare testimony shows why backups built inside an acquired company may not survive an attack on it.7
  5. Days 30 to 60: bring it under governance. Adopt the parent's top-level security policy, with a list of time-limited exceptions; enter the target's risks in the enterprise risk register; assign each open finding an owner and date; tell the board or its committee what was found and what is being done (lesson 3).
  6. Days 30 to 90: map the data and the vendors. Merge the data inventory; check that privacy notices and use limits are respected; tier the acquired vendors and fix contracts for the critical ones.
  7. Days 60 to 100: plan the long integration. Decide which systems will be retired, migrated or kept, with dates; set the network connection design; put legacy decommissioning on a schedule with an executive owner, so that the Marriott pattern of "decommission later" does not take hold.11

Identity integration

Merging identity systems is usually the hardest and most important integration project, because identity is how attackers move. Common patterns, from most separated to most merged: keep the two directories fully separate, with separate accounts for anyone who needs both; set up a one-way or two-way trust between directories; federate sign-in so that users of one organization can reach selected applications of the other; or migrate users into a single directory. Trusts between directories are fast but can let an intruder in one environment reach the other. A common approach is to start with federation to selected applications, with multifactor sign-in, and to migrate users into the parent's directory in waves only after their devices and accounts are clean. Never migrate an account that cannot be tied to a current person and owner.

Network connection gating

"Gating" means the acquired network connects to the parent's only after it passes defined checks, and then only through controlled points. A reasonable set of gates:

  • Gate 1, visibility: endpoint detection on all reachable servers and workstations, central logging working, asset inventory reconciled.
  • Gate 2, identity: multifactor sign-in on remote and privileged access, administrator accounts reviewed and reduced, stale accounts removed.
  • Gate 3, exposure: known exploited and critical internet-facing vulnerabilities fixed or isolated; unsupported systems isolated or scheduled for retirement.
  • Gate 4, assurance: a compromise assessment with no unresolved findings, and backups verified.
  • Then connect narrowly: application by application, through firewalls or a zero trust access layer, with the connection logged and reviewable, rather than by joining the two networks wholesale.

Gating takes discipline because business leaders want shared email, shared files and shared finance systems on day one. Most of those needs can be met with cloud applications and federation without joining networks. When an executive asks for an exception, record it as a risk acceptance with an owner and an expiration, the same way lesson 4 describes for any policy exception.

Connect last: gates before the networks meet Acquired network: kept separate on Day 1 Gate 1 VisibilityEndpoint detection everywhere; central logs; inventory checked Gate 2 IdentityMultifactor on remote and admin access; stale accounts removed Gate 3 ExposureKnown exploited flaws fixed; unsupported systems isolated Gate 4 AssuranceCompromise assessment clean; backups separated and restore tested Narrow connections to the parent network One application at a time, through firewalls or zero trust, logged Exceptions Written riskacceptance,named owner,expiration date
Network connection gating after an acquisition: the acquired environment joins the parent's only after passing four checks, and then only through narrow, logged connections. Original graphic for this module; criteria drawn from the integration practices in this lesson and the control failures in the Marriott (FTC, Oct. 9, 2024) and Change Healthcare (Senate Finance Committee, May 1, 2024) records.

Cloud migrations and decommissioning during integration

Integration often coincides with moving acquired workloads to the parent's cloud and retiring the target's data centers. Both are risky. The OCC's $80 million penalty against Capital One in 2020 cited the bank's failure to establish effective risk assessment processes before migrating significant IT operations to the public cloud.31 Its $60 million penalty against Morgan Stanley the same year cited failures in overseeing the decommissioning of data center hardware and the vendor hired to do it.32 Neither case was about an acquisition, but both describe exactly the projects that integration creates. Assess the risk before each migration, and track every retired device and storage system until its data is verifiably destroyed.

The Frankfurt Stock Exchange
The Frankfurt Stock Exchange, 2015. Deals cross borders, and so do the regulators who review them. Photo: Ank Kumar. Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0.

Divestitures, carve-outs and transition services

A divestiture is the sale of part of a business. When the part shares networks, identity, applications, data centers and staff with the rest of the seller (a "carve-out"), separating it is a project as large as an acquisition, run in reverse and usually under more time pressure.

Because the buyer rarely can stand up every system by closing, the parties sign a transition services agreement (TSA): the seller keeps providing named services (email, payroll, network, help desk, security monitoring, hosting) to the divested business for a fee and a fixed period, often 6 to 24 months. TSAs create a period in which two separate companies, with different owners and different interests, share infrastructure. Security terms in the TSA should cover:

  • Logical separation: which data the buyer's staff can reach and which they cannot; how the seller keeps its own data out of reach; how shared systems are segmented.
  • Access management: who approves access for each side's staff, how fast departures are processed, and how privileged access is controlled and logged.
  • Security service levels: whether the seller's monitoring and incident response cover the divested business during the TSA, with what notice obligations in each direction.
  • Incident cooperation: who investigates, who decides on notifications to regulators and individuals, and how costs are split, especially where the data now belongs to the buyer but sits in the seller's systems.
  • Data separation and return: how the divested business's data is identified, copied out, verified and then deleted from the seller's systems, with a certificate of deletion.
  • Exit: a written exit plan with milestones, and an end date after which all cross-company access is removed, all shared credentials are changed and all trusts and network links are cut.

The most common TSA failure is the forgotten connection: a VPN tunnel, a directory trust, a shared service account or a vendor login that both sides assumed the other would remove. At TSA exit, inventory every link between the two environments and confirm each one is gone. For the seller, a carve-out is also a chance to retire data it no longer needs; for the buyer, it is the start of the first 100 days. Continuity planning for both sides during separation is in lesson 12.

Public sector consolidation: merging agencies and IT shops

Governments do not buy each other, but they merge agencies, consolidate IT departments, share services among counties and cities, and combine school districts or hospital districts. The security work is the same (inventory, identity, exposure, gating, retirement), with three differences: legal authority comes from statutes and executive orders rather than contracts; public records laws apply to the records of the work; and there is no purchase price to adjust, so problems found late come out of operating budgets.

The largest federal example is the Department of Homeland Security, assembled in 2003 from many existing agencies. GAO has kept "Strengthening Department of Homeland Security Management Functions," including its IT management, on its High-Risk List since 2003, a sign of how long integration takes in government.33

Idaho. Idaho consolidated most executive branch IT under the Office of Information Technology Services (ITS). The Legislature created the office's current framework in 2018 (House Bill 607, codified at Idaho Code 67-827 and following).34 ITS describes the IT Modernization Initiative under Gov. Brad Little as covering all executive agencies except the constitutional offices (some of which keep embedded IT staff), with consolidation complete and modernization on track for completion in 2027. Its stated goals include letting agencies become "IT consumers rather than IT providers" and providing full-time compliance staff for IRS, payment card and health data requirements.35 Since 2025, Idaho Code 67-827A has required multifactor sign-in for access to state systems across state agencies.36 For legislators, auditors and reporters, consolidations like this raise the same questions as a corporate deal: was every agency's environment assessed before it was absorbed, which legacy systems remain and when will they be retired, and who owns the risk while they run?

Local governments face smaller versions. When a county takes over a city's dispatch center, or two library districts merge, the receiving organization inherits accounts, vendor remote access, unsupported systems and records retention duties. The same checklist applies, scaled down; lesson 73-16 covers the smaller-organization basics for Idaho public bodies.

Sample: M&A Cyber Due Diligence Checklist

Sample only. Adapt it to your organization's risks, systems and laws, have qualified people review it, and do not treat it as a substitute for a risk assessment.

Follows: NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 (CSWP 29, Feb. 26, 2024), Govern, Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond and Recover functions; SEC Form 8-K Items 1.01, 1.05 and 2.01 and Regulation S-K Item 106; 31 CFR Part 800 (CFIUS); 28 CFR Part 202 (Data Security Program); the Marriott multistate settlement term on assessing security when acquiring entities (Oct. 9, 2024); the vendor diligence practices in lesson 108-8.

1. Deal information

Target: [name]. Deal type: [stock purchase / merger / asset purchase / carve-out / minority investment]. Deal lead: [name]. Security lead for the deal: [name]. Privacy lead: [name]. Data room access granted: [date]. Expected signing: [date]. Expected closing: [date]. Foreign investor or acquirer involved: [yes/no; if yes, CFIUS and 28 CFR Part 202 review requested on [date]]. Competitor deal requiring a clean team: [yes/no].

2. Screening (public sources, before access)

  • [ ] News, court dockets and regulator websites searched for breaches, orders and investigations involving the target and its predecessors (last [10] years).
  • [ ] State attorney general breach notice postings and the HHS breach portal checked.
  • [ ] If public: last [3] years of 10-K Item 1C, any 8-K Item 1.05 or 8.01 cyber filings, and risk factors read.
  • [ ] Privacy notices and security statements (current and archived) saved.
  • [ ] Passive outside view of internet-facing domains, services and certificates obtained from [provider]; no active testing without written authorization.
  • [ ] Sanctions, export control and foreign ownership questions referred to the compliance officer.

3. Governance and program

  • [ ] Security organization chart, leader's reporting line, headcount and open positions.
  • [ ] Information security policy and standards, with approval dates.
  • [ ] Last [2] years of board or owner security reports and minutes extracts.
  • [ ] Risk register and accepted risks with expiration dates.
  • [ ] Most recent independent assessment against [NIST CSF 2.0 / ISO/IEC 27001 / other], with remediation status.
  • [ ] Security budget for the last [2] years and the current year.

4. Incidents, breaches and claims

  • [ ] List of all incidents in the last [5] years involving outside forensics, notice to individuals or regulators, insurance claims, ransom payment or law enforcement.
  • [ ] Forensic reports and root cause remediation evidence for each.
  • [ ] Breach notices sent and regulator correspondence.
  • [ ] Interview with the security lead about known or suspected incidents, without the deal team present if the seller permits.
  • [ ] Comparison of the seller's list with public sources; differences explained in writing.
  • [ ] Consent orders, settlement agreements, corrective action plans, examination findings and open investigations, with the latest assessor or monitor reports.
  • [ ] Pending or threatened lawsuits about privacy or security.
  • [ ] Cyber insurance policies, applications and loss runs for the last [5] years; change-in-control and tail terms identified.
  • [ ] Customer contracts with security commitments, audit rights or breach notice duties shorter than [72] hours.
  • [ ] Government contracts and the security clauses they carry (for example DFARS cyber clauses and CMMC level, FedRAMP or GovRAMP status, CJIS, IRS Publication 1075).

6. Technical posture (evidence, not answers)

  • [ ] Hardware, software and cloud asset inventory, with systems past end of support and their retirement plans.
  • [ ] Every remote access path and its authentication method; export showing multifactor enrollment for remote and privileged users.
  • [ ] Count and list of domain, cloud and application administrators; service accounts and their owners.
  • [ ] Every cloud provider account, subscription and tenant, with administrators and billing owners; list of software-as-a-service applications holding company data.
  • [ ] Endpoint protection coverage and logging: what is collected, where, and for how long.
  • [ ] Last [2] penetration test reports and the status of each finding.
  • [ ] Vulnerability management metrics, including time to fix items on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
  • [ ] Backup design, separation from production credentials, and date and result of the last restore test.
  • [ ] Operational technology inventory, segmentation design and vendor remote access (if applicable).
  • [ ] Product security: secure development practices, open vulnerability reports, disclosure policy, software bill of materials (if applicable).

7. Data and privacy

  • [ ] Data inventory or records of processing, including categories of regulated data and the number of individuals by state and country.
  • [ ] Privacy notices in force over the last [5] years and any material changes.
  • [ ] Consumer request volumes and handling; consent records where required.
  • [ ] Cross-border transfer mechanisms; data held about U.S. persons that could meet 28 CFR Part 202 "bulk" thresholds or CFIUS "sensitive personal data" definitions.
  • [ ] Retention schedule and evidence of deletion.

8. Vendors and people

  • [ ] Vendors with system access or sensitive data, tiered; top-tier contracts reviewed for security terms and change-of-control consent.
  • [ ] SOC reports and certifications for top-tier vendors, with scope and period checked.
  • [ ] Key security and IT staff identified for retention; single points of knowledge listed.

9. Deeper assurance (where the deal justifies it)

  • [ ] Compromise assessment by [firm], timing [before signing / between signing and closing / within [30] days after closing], with written authorization from the target.
  • [ ] Independent review of the highest-risk application or platform.

10. Findings and deal response

  • [ ] Each finding rated Stop, Price, Protect, Plan or Note, with an estimated cost range.
  • [ ] Stop findings escalated to [deal lead and general counsel's office] within [24] hours.
  • [ ] Recommended terms delivered: specific representations and disclosure schedule items, specific indemnities, escrow amount, interim covenants (maintain controls, report incidents within [48] hours, deliver credentials at closing), closing conditions.
  • [ ] Findings shared with the representation and warranty insurance underwriter as required; exclusions reviewed.
  • [ ] Two-page summary delivered to [deal committee / board] on [date].

11. Day 1 and first 100 days readiness

  • [ ] Day 1 contact list, escalation path and incident decision rights agreed.
  • [ ] Accounts to disable at closing listed; administrator credentials to be delivered at closing listed.
  • [ ] Staff warned about deal-themed phishing and payment fraud on announcement day; call-back verification required for payment changes.
  • [ ] Network gating criteria approved by [CISO and CIO]; no connection before Gate [4].
  • [ ] 100-day plan with owners and dates; integration budget approved.
  • [ ] For public acquirers: 8-K Item 1.05 materiality process extended to the acquired business at closing; next 10-K Item 1C reviewed for the combined company.
  • [ ] For carve-outs: TSA security terms, data separation plan and exit plan signed.

Approved by: [CISO] on [date]. Reviewed by: [general counsel's office / compliance officer] on [date].

Pictures, Numbers and Infographics

NumberWhat it isSource
$4,825,800,000Original cash price in Verizon's July 23, 2016 agreement to buy Yahoo's operating businessSEC Altaba order, 20182
500 millionUser accounts whose data Yahoo disclosed in September 2016 had been stolen in 2014SEC Altaba order2
$350 million (7.25%)Price cut Verizon negotiated after the disclosure (amendments of Feb. 20, 2017)SEC Altaba order; Yahoo 8-K, Feb. 21, 201723
50%Yahoo's share of post-closing cash liabilities from non-SEC government investigations and third-party breach litigationYahoo 8-K, Feb. 21, 20173
$35 millionSEC penalty against Altaba (formerly Yahoo), April 24, 2018SEC press release 2018-711
About July 2014 to September 2018Duration of the undetected Starwood guest reservation intrusion; Marriott bought Starwood in 2016FTC, Oct. 9, 20244
339 million; 5.25 millionStarwood guest records worldwide reached; unencrypted passport numbers among themFTC, Oct. 9, 20244
99.2 million pounds, then 18.4 million poundsICO's proposed (July 2019) and final (Oct. 30, 2020) GDPR fine against MarriottHunton summary of ICO announcements6
$52 million; 50 attorneys generalMarriott multistate settlement (49 states, including Idaho, and D.C.), Oct. 9, 2024; 131.5 million U.S. guest recordsNorth Carolina Department of Justice5
20 years; every 2 yearsLength of Marriott's FTC order; frequency of independent assessmentsFTC, Oct. 9, 20244
Oct. 3, 2022 to Feb. 12, 2024Optum and Change Healthcare closing to the date attackers entered a portal without multifactor sign-in (about 16 months)Becker's; Witty written testimony1314
About 192.7 millionIndividuals affected by the Change Healthcare breach, as of July 31, 2025HHS Office for Civil Rights15
30 days (15 for cash tenders)Hart-Scott-Rodino waiting period after filing, unless extended15 U.S.C. 18a(b)22
$53,088 per dayMaximum civil penalty for HSR violations assessed after Jan. 17, 202516 CFR 1.9823
More than 1 million individualsA key threshold for "sensitive personal data" in CFIUS rules31 CFR 800.24126
$60 millionCFIUS penalty against T-Mobile (2024) for violating a 2018 national security agreementCFIUS enforcement page8
$5 millionNew CFIUS maximum for material misstatements and floor of the maximum for mitigation violations, effective Dec. 26, 202489 Fed. Reg. 93179, summarized by Covington28
April 8, 2025Effective date of the Justice Department's Data Security Program, 28 CFR Part 20228 CFR 202.2169
10,000; 100,000Bulk thresholds under 28 CFR Part 202 for personal health or financial data, and for covered personal identifiers (U.S. persons)28 CFR 202.2059
When the problem surfaced, in months relative to closing Closing Verizon / Yahoo Disclosed about 9 months before closing: $350M price cut, shared liabilities Marriott / Starwood Found about 2 years after closing: UK fine, 20-year FTC order, $52M to states Optum / Change Entry about 16 months after closing: about 192.7 million people affected -12 0 +12 +24 +30 Months before (minus) or after (plus) closing
Three deals, three moments of discovery. The earlier a problem surfaces, the more the buyer can still do about the price and terms. Original graphic for this module; dates from the SEC Altaba order (2018), the Yahoo 8-K of Feb. 21, 2017, the FTC's Marriott announcement (Oct. 9, 2024), the North Carolina Department of Justice (Oct. 9, 2024), the ICO via Hunton (2020), Becker's (Oct. 3, 2022), the Senate Finance Committee record (May 1, 2024) and HHS OCR (July 31, 2025). Marriott's bar is approximate because the sources give only the closing year.

Common mistakes

  • Accepting a knowledge-qualified "no breach" representation without testing whose knowledge counts. Yahoo represented that, to its knowledge, there had been no security breaches, while its information security team knew of the 2014 theft. The buyer learned the truth only because the disclosure came before closing.2 Fix: name the security lead among the knowledge parties, ask the security lead directly, and require a disclosure schedule of every incident.
  • Treating the target's incident history as the seller's problem. Marriott became responsible for Starwood's security at closing; the intrusion it inherited ran two more years and produced a UK fine, an FTC order and a $52 million multistate payment.456 Fix: look for intruders, not just policies, and assume the worst until evidence says otherwise.
  • Letting legacy systems run "until integration." The ICO recorded that Marriott planned to retire Starwood's systems in early 2018 and delayed that to the end of 2018.11 Fix: put retirement on a schedule owned by an executive, report slippage to the board, and isolate what cannot yet be retired.
  • Assuming parent standards reached every acquired system. UnitedHealth's chief executive told the Senate that a policy requiring multifactor sign-in existed, but a Change Healthcare server without it was exploited about 16 months after closing.7 Fix: verify coverage of the critical controls system by system, starting with remote access, and report coverage as a number.
  • Failing to carry out security terms imposed in government review. CFIUS fined T-Mobile $60 million for failing to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive data and to report incidents promptly under a 2018 agreement, and fined other parties $18 million for failing to move sensitive assets into a protected subsidiary at closing.8 Fix: treat every mitigation term as a control with an owner, evidence and testing.
  • Letting governance structures lapse after closing. CFIUS's $8.5 million penalty in 2024 followed the removal of independent directors and a vacant security director post that a national security agreement required.8 Fix: list every governance role that an order or agreement requires and check that each is filled every quarter.
  • Forgetting that executives' obligations follow them. The FTC's Drizly order binds the company's chief executive personally at future companies.17 Fix: in diligence on a target and on its leaders, ask whether any officer is personally under an order.
  • Rushing decommissioning and migration. The OCC's Morgan Stanley and Capital One penalties both arose from technology changes managed without adequate risk assessment or vendor oversight.3231 Fix: assess each migration and track each retired device until its data is destroyed.
  • Bringing security in after the price is set. Once the price and the agreement are fixed, findings can only go into the integration budget. Fix: give the CISO a seat at screening and a document request in the first wave.

Questions people ask

How long does cyber diligence take, and what does it cost?

It depends on the deal. A questionnaire, document review, interviews and an outside view can be done in two to four weeks by a small team. A compromise assessment usually takes several more weeks once the target agrees to it. Costs range from internal staff time for a small deal to substantial outside fees for a large one; this lesson did not find a public, independent survey of diligence costs to cite. The right comparison is not to the deal price but to the cost of a missed finding: Verizon's price cut was $350 million.3

Can the buyer test the target's systems before closing?

Only with the target's written authorization, and within the limits of antitrust law and the confidentiality agreement. Passive review of what the target exposes publicly does not touch its systems. Anything more, including a compromise assessment or a penetration test, needs written permission, defined scope and rules of engagement (lesson 7), and in competitor deals the general counsel's office should approve how the results are handled.

Who pays for a breach discovered after closing?

The buyer, first, because it now owns the business and its regulatory duties. Whether it can recover from the seller depends on the agreement: whether a representation was breached, whether the indemnity survives, caps and deductibles, any specific indemnity or escrow, and whether representation and warranty insurance covers it. Regulators do not care how the agreement split the cost. Marriott's settlements were Marriott's.45

Does a public acquirer have to file an 8-K for an incident at a company it just bought?

If, after closing, the acquirer determines that a cybersecurity incident affecting its systems (which now include the acquired company's) is material, Form 8-K Item 1.05 requires disclosure within four business days of that determination, made without unreasonable delay after discovery.18 Before closing, an incident at the target is the target's to disclose if it is public, though it may be material to the buyer's deal disclosures. Extend the materiality process to the acquired business on Day 1.

What if the target will not share forensic reports?

Sellers often protect forensic reports to preserve legal privilege. Ask for a summary prepared for the purpose, a call with the forensic firm, or a review by the buyer's outside advisers under a common-interest arrangement. If none is offered, treat the incident as unresolved, price it or cover it with a specific indemnity, and plan a compromise assessment at closing.

Does every deal with a foreign investor need CFIUS review?

No. Many foreign investments fall outside CFIUS's jurisdiction or are not subject to mandatory filing; parties then decide whether to file voluntarily. Mandatory declarations apply to defined situations, such as certain investments in TID U.S. businesses by buyers in which a foreign government has a substantial interest and certain critical technology transactions.27 Data matters: a business holding sensitive personal data on more than one million people may be a TID U.S. business.26 Separately check the Justice Department's 28 CFR Part 202 for any investor connected to a country of concern.9

Should we merge the two security teams right away?

Merge governance right away (one CISO, one policy, one risk register, one escalation path) and merge operations in stages. The acquired team knows its systems, and losing it in the first months is a common cause of blind spots. Retention agreements for key people, clear reporting lines, and early wins (closing the front doors together) do more than reorganization charts. Lesson 1 discusses operating models for a combined organization, and lesson 2 covers staffing and budgets.

How should a board oversee integration?

Ask for the stop and price findings before approving the deal, then a quarterly integration report: coverage of the critical controls in the acquired business (multifactor sign-in, endpoint detection, logging, backups) as percentages; open high-risk findings and their dates; legacy systems still running and their retirement dates; incidents in the acquired business; and the status of any regulatory or mitigation obligations. The Marriott derivative case shows that documented, regular board attention matters.12

Hard questions

Should an acquirer be punished for a breach that began before it owned the company?

The case for holding the acquirer responsible: the acquirer chose to buy, set the diligence budget, controlled the systems after closing and could have found the intrusion. Holding acquirers responsible makes diligence worth paying for and protects the people whose data changed hands without their say. The Marriott multistate settlement wrote an acquisition-diligence duty into its terms.5

The case for limits: an acquirer cannot see everything before closing; sellers control access, antitrust rules limit pre-closing involvement, and sophisticated intrusions evade skilled investigators. Penalizing buyers for predecessors' failures may discourage acquisitions that would improve security, since a well-run acquirer is often the best thing that can happen to a weak target's data.

What the evidence shows: regulators have generally measured the acquirer by its conduct after closing. The UK ICO's final Marriott decision covered only the period after May 2018 and made no finding on pre-acquisition diligence, while saying diligence is ongoing; the FTC's complaint rested on Marriott's responsibility for both brands after the 2016 acquisition.114 In practice, the acquirer's exposure grows each month an inherited problem goes unfound.

Does representation and warranty insurance weaken diligence?

The case that it does: when an insurer, not the seller, pays for breached representations, the buyer has less reason to dig and the seller less reason to disclose, and the risk shifts to a party that never saw the systems.

The case that it does not: underwriters read the diligence reports and exclude areas that were not examined or problems that were found, so a buyer who skimps on cyber diligence gets less coverage; the insurer thus acts as a check on diligence quality.

What the evidence shows: this lesson did not find independent public data measuring the effect on diligence depth. The structure of the product (exclusion of known issues and of areas not diligenced) gives buyers a reason to do the work, but it cannot cover the hidden intrusion that neither side knew about, which is the scenario that matters most.

Should national security review of data-heavy deals be broader?

The case for broader review: large collections of health, location, financial and genetic data can be used for intelligence, coercion and targeting, and ownership is one of the easiest ways to get access. The 2018 expansion of CFIUS to sensitive personal data and the 2025 bulk data rule both reflect that judgment, with low thresholds such as 10,000 people for health or financial data in the bulk data rule.269

The case for restraint: broad and complex rules add cost and delay to ordinary investment, deter capital the U.S. economy uses, and push compliance burdens onto small companies that cannot easily tell whether a rule applies. Penalties large enough to deter can also chill voluntary cooperation.

What the evidence shows: CFIUS's public enforcement record shows that mitigation terms have been broken in practice, including access and reporting failures at a major carrier.8 The bulk data rule is recent (effective April 2025), and this lesson found no public enforcement record under it to judge its effect.

Should state and local governments centralize IT through consolidation?

The case for consolidation: small agencies cannot afford specialists, monitoring or compliance staff; one well-run office can apply multifactor sign-in, patching and logging everywhere, as Idaho's statute now requires for state systems.3635

The case for caution: consolidation concentrates risk (one compromise can reach many agencies), slows service for agencies with specialized needs, and can blur accountability for data that each agency is legally responsible for.

What the evidence shows: the federal experience with DHS shows that integration takes many years and needs sustained oversight.33 Whether a given consolidation improved security is an empirical question that legislative auditors can answer with coverage metrics and incident data, and that reporters can ask for.

For reporters and advocates

What public records exist.

  • SEC filings on EDGAR. Merger agreements are often filed as exhibits to Form 8-K Item 1.01 reports or to merger proxies and registration statements; read the cybersecurity and privacy representations, the disclosure schedule references and the indemnity terms. Completion reports (Item 2.01), incident reports (Item 1.05), and each year's 10-K Item 1C show how the acquirer describes its program after a deal. EDGAR full-text search finds filings by phrase and date.3720
  • Enforcement orders. SEC administrative orders (such as the Altaba order), FTC complaints and orders (Marriott, Drizly), state attorney general settlements, and the OCC's enforcement actions are public.241732
  • CFIUS enforcement. CFIUS publishes penalty summaries, though usually without naming parties other than in notable cases such as T-Mobile; filings themselves are confidential by law.8
  • Breach records. The HHS Office for Civil Rights breach portal lists health data breaches of 500 or more people; many state attorneys general post breach notices.38
  • Congressional hearings. Hearing records such as the Senate Finance Committee's May 1, 2024 Change Healthcare hearing contain executives' sworn answers about acquisitions and integration.7
  • Court records. Derivative suits, securities class actions and contract disputes between buyers and sellers are on PACER and CourtListener; Delaware Court of Chancery opinions are public.3912
  • Vulnerability data. CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog lets you check whether systems an organization announced it was running were on the list.30
  • Idaho public records. Requests under Idaho Code Title 74, Chapter 1, can reach state and local agencies' consolidation plans, contracts, interagency agreements and audit reports, subject to the statute's exemptions.40

What to ask a company after a deal. Did security take part in diligence, and from what stage? Was a compromise assessment done, and when? Which acquired systems are still connected only through gates, and when will legacy systems be retired? What percentage of the acquired business's remote access and privileged accounts have multifactor sign-in today? Has the 10-K Item 1C description been updated for the combined company? Are there any national security agreements or regulatory orders the company inherited, and who owns compliance?

What to ask a government after a consolidation. Was each agency's environment assessed before it was absorbed? Which legacy systems remain, and what are their retirement dates? Who owns the risk for each agency's data now? How do coverage numbers for multifactor sign-in, endpoint detection and logging compare before and after? What did the legislative auditors find?

The Idaho angle. Idaho joined the 2024 Marriott multistate settlement.5 Idaho's breach notice law puts the notice duty on whoever owns or licenses the data, which after a deal is usually the buyer.16 And Idaho's own IT consolidation under ITS is a public sector integration that is still finishing its modernization phase, with completion projected for 2027; legislators and reporters can ask ITS and the Legislature's auditors how the absorbed agencies' security was measured before and after.35

Where to go next

  • SEC EDGAR full-text search: Free. Find merger agreements, 8-K Item 1.05 incident reports and 10-K Item 1C descriptions by phrase and date; useful to deal teams studying peers' cyber representations and to reporters checking what an acquirer told investors.
  • CFIUS (Treasury) website: Free. Official guidance, regulations, filing instructions and the enforcement and penalty pages for foreign investment review; for corporate development teams, compliance officers and security leads who may have to carry out mitigation terms.
  • Justice Department National Security Division, Data Security Program: Free. The Justice Department's guidance, compliance materials and frequently asked questions for 28 CFR Part 202, including how investment agreements are treated; for compliance officers and deal teams with foreign investors.
  • FTC Premerger Notification Program: Free. Current Hart-Scott-Rodino thresholds, forms and informal interpretations; for deal teams planning the interim period between signing and closing.
  • CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog: Free. The list of vulnerabilities known to be exploited; use it to rank which flaws in an acquired environment to fix first in the first 100 days.
  • NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0: Free. A common structure for assessing a target's program and the combined program after closing; the Govern function covers risk strategy, roles, policy and supply chain.
  • HHS Office for Civil Rights breach portal: Free. Health data breaches affecting 500 or more people; check a health care target's history during screening.
Still being checked (8 items)

These points could not be fully confirmed against a primary source when this lesson was written and fact checked in November 2026. The text above states each one as uncertain.

  • The FTC's appeal of the Feb. 12, 2026 district court ruling vacating the revised HSR form: the FTC premerger page (re-read by the fact checker Nov. 16, 2026) reports the March 19, 2026 denial of a stay pending appeal and no merits decision; the court case names and docket numbers were not read directly.
  • The exact September 2016 closing date of Marriott's Starwood acquisition was not re-read from a primary source; the lesson uses only the year (2016) given by the FTC, and the bar in the case chart is approximate.
  • The statement that Change Healthcare's breach is the largest health data breach reported to HHS OCR relies on the OCR count of about 192.7 million (July 31, 2025) as read for module 108; the lesson did not re-read the OCR breach portal ranking on Nov. 15, 2026.
  • The UK ICO's own announcement pages could not be retrieved; ICO figures and quotations come from law firm summaries (Hunton, Cooley, Mayer Brown).
  • GAO's website refused automated retrieval, so the continued High-Risk designation of DHS management functions since 2003 was not re-read on Nov. 15, 2026.
  • The Justice Department's antitrust challenge to the UnitedHealth and Change Healthcare deal failing in court before the Oct. 3, 2022 closing was not re-read from the court record.
  • No independent public survey of cyber diligence costs, or of the effect of representation and warranty insurance on diligence depth, was found to cite; the lesson says so.
  • The general statement that federal bank regulators consider technology integration risk when supervising merged banks was not tied to a specific current issuance; the lesson says so.

Last verified November 15, 2026. General education, not legal, compliance, audit or other professional advice; rule versions and dates are stated in the text, and the sources used are listed in the Notes and Sources below. Check the regulator's current text before relying on any point.

Notes

  1. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, press release 2018-71, "Altaba, Formerly Known as Yahoo!, Charged With Failing to Disclose Massive Cybersecurity Breach; Agrees To Pay $35 Million," April 24, 2018 (quotes of Steven Peikin and Jina Choi) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  2. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, In the Matter of Altaba Inc., f/d/b/a Yahoo! Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10485, Exchange Act Release No. 83096, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 3937, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-18448 (April 24, 2018), paragraphs 3, 4, 7, 11 and 19 (July 23, 2016 agreement; knowledge-qualified breach representation; Sept. 22, 2016 disclosure; Feb. 20, 2017 amendments; $350 million, 7.25 percent reduction; June 13, 2017 closing). Read from a copy of the order hosted by A&O Shearman because sec.gov blocks scripted retrieval (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  3. Yahoo Inc., Form 8-K, Exhibit 99.1, "Verizon and Yahoo Amend Terms of Definitive Agreement," Feb. 21, 2017 (price reduced by $350 million to about $4.48 billion; 50 percent sharing of certain post-closing cash liabilities; shareholder suits and SEC investigations stay with Yahoo; breaches excluded from the Business Material Adverse Effect determination) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  4. Federal Trade Commission, press release, "FTC Takes Action Against Marriott and Starwood Over Multiple Data Breaches," Oct. 9, 2024, with complaint and proposed order; the FTC made the order final in December 2024 (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  5. North Carolina Department of Justice, "Attorney General Josh Stein Reaches $52 Million Multistate Data Breach Settlement with Marriott," Oct. 9, 2024 (list of participating attorneys general, including Idaho; 131.5 million U.S. guest records; injunctive terms including assessing information security when acquiring any future entities and developing plans to address identified security gaps) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  6. Hunton Andrews Kurth, Privacy and Cybersecurity Law Blog, "ICO Fines Marriott International 18.4 Million for Security Breach," November 2020, summarizing the UK Information Commissioner's Office announcement of Oct. 30, 2020 and the proposed fine of 99,200,396 pounds announced July 2019. The ICO's own announcement page could not be retrieved on the read date (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  7. U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, hearing record, Hacking America's Health Care: Assessing the Change Healthcare Cyberattack and What's Next, May 1, 2024, S. Hrg. 118-785 (answers of UnitedHealth Group chief executive Andrew Witty to Senators Crapo, Grassley, Barrasso and Blackburn about the acquisition, legacy technology, the server without multifactor authentication and backups) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  8. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, "CFIUS Enforcement" (penalty summaries for 2018 to 2024, including the $60 million T-Mobile penalty, the $18 million and $8.5 million penalties of 2024; no 2025 or 2026 penalties listed on the read date) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  9. 28 CFR Part 202, Data Security Program (90 Fed. Reg. 1706, Jan. 8, 2025), sections 202.101 (scope, Executive Order 14117), 202.205 (bulk thresholds), 202.216 (effective date April 8, 2025), 202.228 (investment agreement), 202.248 (CISA security requirements, January 2025) and 202.401 (restricted transactions), eCFR version for Nov. 1, 2026 (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  10. Cooley LLP, "UK ICO Cites Inadequate M&A Data Protection Due Diligence as a Factor in Proposing $125M Breach Fine," July 2019, quoting the Information Commissioner's statement of July 9, 2019 (Elizabeth Denham on due diligence in corporate acquisitions) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  11. Mayer Brown, "Marriott International Inc. Fined 18m for Personal Data Breach by the UK ICO Under the GDPR," Nov. 16, 2020 (decision limited to the period from May 25, 2018; due diligence "not a time-limited or a one-off requirement"; decommissioning of Starwood systems delayed from early 2018 to end of 2018; 339 million guests; 0.11 percent of 2018 turnover; COVID-19 reduction) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  12. Firemen's Retirement System of St. Louis v. Sorenson, C.A. No. 2019-0965-LWW, 2021 WL 4593777 (Del. Ch. Oct. 5, 2021) (Marriott International derivative litigation dismissed; board and audit committee "routinely apprised" of cyber risks), as summarized by Potter Anderson and Corroon LLP (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  13. Becker's Hospital Review, "Optum, Change Healthcare Complete $7.8B Merger," Oct. 3, 2022 (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  14. Andrew Witty, Chief Executive Officer, UnitedHealth Group, written testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, May 1, 2024 (Feb. 12, 2024 entry through a Change Healthcare Citrix portal with compromised credentials; portal without multi-factor authentication; ransomware deployed Feb. 21), as read for module 108 on Nov. 13, 2026 and cited (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  15. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights, "Change Healthcare Cybersecurity Incident Frequently Asked Questions" (about 192.7 million individuals affected as of July 31, 2025), as read for module 108 on Nov. 13, 2026 and cited (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  16. Idaho Code 28-51-104 and 28-51-105 (definitions; duty of an agency, individual or commercial entity that owns or licenses computerized personal information of Idaho residents to investigate and notify), as in force through the 2026 session (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  17. Federal Trade Commission, "FTC Takes Action Against Drizly and its CEO James Cory Rellas for Security Failures that Exposed Data of 2.5 Million Consumers," Oct. 24, 2022 (order later made final) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  18. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, "Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy, Governance, and Incident Disclosure," Release Nos. 33-11216 and 34-97989, 88 Fed. Reg. 51896 (Aug. 4, 2023), including Form 8-K Item 1.05 (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  19. 17 CFR 229.106 (Regulation S-K Item 106, Cybersecurity), paragraphs (b) risk management and strategy, including (b)(1)(iii) on third-party service providers, and (c) governance, eCFR (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  20. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Form 8-K and General Instructions, Items 1.01 (Entry into a Material Definitive Agreement), 1.05 (Material Cybersecurity Incidents), 2.01 (Completion of Acquisition or Disposition of Assets) and 8.01 (Other Events) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  21. National Institute of Standards and Technology, The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29, Feb. 26, 2024 (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  22. 15 U.S.C. 18a (Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, Clayton Act Section 7A), subsections (b) waiting period and (g) civil penalty, via Legal Information Institute (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  23. 16 CFR 1.98(a), Adjustment of civil monetary penalty amounts (Clayton Act Section 7A(g)(1): $53,088 for penalties assessed after Jan. 17, 2025), eCFR version for Nov. 1, 2026 (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  24. Federal Trade Commission, "Premerger Notification Program" (notices on the revised HSR form effective Feb. 10, 2025; district court vacatur of Feb. 12, 2026; Fifth Circuit administrative stay of Feb. 19, 2026 and denial of a stay pending appeal on March 19, 2026; return to the pre-Feb. 10, 2025 form; 2026 thresholds effective Feb. 17, 2026) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  25. 31 CFR 800.248, TID U.S. business, eCFR version for Nov. 1, 2026 (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  26. 31 CFR 800.241, Sensitive personal data, eCFR version for Nov. 1, 2026 (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  27. 31 CFR 800.401, Mandatory declarations, eCFR version for Nov. 1, 2026 (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  28. Covington and Burling LLP, "Treasury Department Publishes Final Rule to Enhance CFIUS's Enforcement Authorities," Nov. 27, 2024, summarizing the final rule at 89 Fed. Reg. 93179 (Nov. 26, 2024), effective Dec. 26, 2024 (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  29. 28 CFR 202.601, Determination of countries of concern, eCFR version for Nov. 1, 2026 (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  30. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  31. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, News Release 2020-101, "OCC Assesses $80 Million Civil Money Penalty Against Capital One," Aug. 6, 2020, as read for module 108 on Nov. 13, 2026 and cited (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  32. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, News Release 2020-134, "OCC Assesses $60 Million Civil Money Penalty Against Morgan Stanley," Oct. 8, 2020, as read for module 108 on Nov. 13, 2026 and cited (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  33. U.S. Government Accountability Office, High-Risk List, area "Strengthening Department of Homeland Security Management Functions" (on the list since 2003). GAO's site refused automated retrieval on the read date, so the current status was not re-read (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  34. Idaho Office of Information Technology Services, "IT Statutes and Executive Orders" (Idaho Code 67-827 to 67-837; House Bill 607, 2018 session; Executive Orders 2015-07 and 2017-02) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  35. Idaho Office of Information Technology Services, "IT Modernization Initiative" (scope, phases, goals; consolidation complete; modernization on track for completion in 2027) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  36. Idaho Code 67-827A, Office of Information Technology Services, powers and duties, including multifactor identification for access to state systems, as amended in 2025 and in force through the 2026 session (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  37. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, EDGAR full-text search (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  38. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights, Breach Portal: Notice to the Secretary of HHS of Breaches of Unsecured Protected Health Information affecting 500 or more individuals (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  39. Free Law Project, CourtListener (federal and state court opinions and RECAP copies of PACER dockets) (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩
  40. Idaho Code Title 74, Chapter 1, Public Records Act, including its exemptions, as in force through the 2026 session (read Nov. 15, 2026). Read it online. ↩

Check yourself

1. By how much did Verizon reduce the price for Yahoo's operating business after Yahoo disclosed its 2014 breach?

2. What did the Verizon and Yahoo amendment say about the breaches and the 'Business Material Adverse Effect' clause?

3. Which term appears in the October 2024 multistate Marriott settlement, according to North Carolina's announcement?

4. How long did the Starwood guest reservation intrusion go undetected, according to the FTC?

5. What did UnitedHealth Group's chief executive tell the Senate about the Change Healthcare server that was exploited?

6. Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, what is the general waiting period after filing for most deals?

7. In CFIUS rules, which business can be a 'TID U.S. business' because of data alone?

8. What did CFIUS fine T-Mobile $60 million for in 2024?

9. When did the Justice Department's Data Security Program rule, 28 CFR Part 202, take effect?

10. In a carve-out, what is a transition services agreement?

Terms in this lesson

Due diligence
The buyer's investigation of a target before committing to a deal, covering finance, legal, operations and, increasingly, cybersecurity and privacy.
Representation and warranty
A statement of fact the seller makes in the purchase agreement, such as that it has had no security breaches except those listed; if false, it can support a claim.
Knowledge qualifier
Words such as 'to the seller's knowledge' that limit a representation to what named people knew; the list of people matters.
Disclosure schedule
An attachment to the purchase agreement in which the seller lists exceptions to its representations, such as known incidents.
Specific indemnity
The seller's promise to pay for losses from a named risk, such as a known incident, regardless of whether a representation was breached.
Escrow or holdback
Part of the purchase price set aside for a period to fund claims against the seller.
Material adverse effect clause
A term letting the buyer refuse to close if an event substantially damages the business before closing; parties often carve out known events.
Representation and warranty insurance
A policy, usually bought by the buyer, that pays for losses from breached representations; it excludes issues that diligence found.
Compromise assessment
A structured search of logs, endpoint and identity data for evidence that an intruder is or was present in an environment.
Clean team
A small, restricted group allowed to see competitively sensitive information in a deal between competitors, reporting only summaries.
Gun-jumping
A buyer taking operational control of, or coordinating with, a target before antitrust waiting periods end, which the law forbids.
TID U.S. business
Under CFIUS rules, a U.S. business dealing in critical technologies, certain critical infrastructure, or sensitive personal data of U.S. citizens.
Mitigation agreement
Conditions, often called a national security agreement, that CFIUS imposes to clear a deal, frequently including data access and security terms.
Transition services agreement (TSA)
A contract under which the seller keeps providing named services to a divested business for a set period after closing.
Network gating
Connecting an acquired network to the parent's only after it passes defined security checks, and then only through narrow, controlled links.

Full glossary

Sources