Lesson 8 of 12 · about 55 minutes · Updated November 14, 2026
Vendors and Supply Chain
You'll be able to
- Explain why regulators hold organizations responsible for work they outsource, citing the interagency guidance, the FTC Safeguards Rule, HIPAA, Regulation S-P, 23 NYCRR 500.11 and Idaho Code 28-51-105.
- Tier vendors by data, access, dependence and replaceability, and match due diligence and review cycles to each tier.
- Read a SOC 2 Type 2 report for its opinion, scope, exceptions, subservice organizations and complementary user entity controls, and know what a bridge letter does and does not prove.
- List the contract clauses that carry weight, including incident notice timing that fits regulators' clocks, audit rights, subcontractors, data return, insurance, indemnity and liability caps.
- Describe the software supply chain rules as of November 2026, including Executive Order 14028, the rescission of the federal attestation mandate in OMB M-26-05, and the 2026 SBOM minimum elements.
- Identify managed service provider, fourth-party and concentration risks, and plan for the failure of a critical vendor.
Start here: the short version
- Large organizations now run on other companies: cloud hosts, software makers, payment processors, clearinghouses, managed service providers, law and accounting firms, shredding companies. Each one can open a door into your network, hold your data, run something you cannot work without, or put code inside your systems.
- The law does not let you hand off the responsibility along with the work. The federal banking agencies say plainly that "the use of third parties does not diminish or remove banking organizations' responsibilities," and the FTC Safeguards Rule, HIPAA, the SEC's Regulation S-P, New York's Part 500 and Idaho's breach statute all put vendor oversight duties in writing.1
- The public record is full of vendor failures: Target's 2013 breach began with a heating and refrigeration contractor's stolen login; Change Healthcare's 2024 ransomware attack exposed data on about 192.7 million people; one faulty CrowdStrike update on July 19, 2024 crashed 8.5 million Windows devices.234
- A working program has six parts: an inventory you trust, risk tiers, due diligence that produces evidence, contract clauses that carry weight, monitoring for the life of the relationship, and a planned exit.
- A SOC 2 Type 2 report is the most useful single document most vendors can give you, but only if someone reads the exceptions, the carved-out subservice providers and the controls the vendor expects you to run.
- Software supply chain rules changed in 2026: the Office of Management and Budget rescinded the federal secure software attestation mandate on Jan. 23, 2026, while CISA and partner agencies issued new minimum elements for a software bill of materials (SBOM) on July 29, 2026. Buyers now set their own terms.56
- The newest worry is concentration: when one vendor serves most of an industry, a single failure stops thousands of organizations at once. The defense is knowing which vendors you cannot do without, and having a tested way to keep working when one goes dark.
Rule versions and documents described: Interagency Guidance on Third-Party Relationships: Risk Management (Federal Reserve, FDIC and OCC, 88 FR 37920, June 9, 2023); FTC Safeguards Rule, 16 CFR 314.4(f) (eCFR text current as of Oct. 23, 2026); HIPAA, 45 CFR 164.308(b), 164.314(a), 164.410 and 164.504(e); SEC Regulation S-P amendments adopted May 16, 2024 (compliance dates Dec. 3, 2025 and June 3, 2026); New York 23 NYCRR 500.11 as amended Nov. 1, 2023, and the NYDFS Industry Letter of Oct. 21, 2025; Idaho Code 28-51-105; NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 (Feb. 26, 2024), Govern category GV.SC; NIST SP 800-161 Rev. 1 (May 2022, Update 1 of Nov. 1, 2024); Executive Order 14028 (May 12, 2021); OMB Memorandum M-26-05 (Jan. 23, 2026); CISA and partners, 2026 Minimum Elements for a Software Bill of Materials (July 29, 2026); DFARS 252.204-7012 as applied under Class Deviation 2026-O0025 Revision 3 (Sept. 3, 2026). All read or re-checked Nov. 13, 2026. Rules, guidance and enforcement priorities change; check the regulator's current text before relying on any point.
Before you change anything. Plan changes to production systems, test them first, keep a way back, and follow your change management process. For clinical, plant-floor or other safety systems, involve the vendor, your safety lead and qualified engineers (see modules 109 and 111).
Early on Friday, July 19, 2024, a security company pushed a routine content update to the software that guards millions of Windows computers. Those computers began to crash and restart, over and over. Airlines, hospitals, banks and broadcasters reported outages, and some organizations needed days to recover. No criminal was involved. Microsoft counted 8.5 million affected devices, "less than one percent of all Windows machines," and that small share was enough to stop parts of several industries at once.4
Five months earlier, criminals had logged in to a remote access portal at Change Healthcare, a company most Americans had never heard of. It processes health insurance claims and payments between providers and payers. The portal, the company's chief executive told the Senate, "did not have multi-factor authentication." Nine days later the criminals deployed ransomware. Pharmacies could not check coverage, clinics could not bill, and the parent company advanced more than $6.5 billion in accelerated payments and loans to keep providers afloat.7 The federal health privacy office now counts about 192.7 million people whose data was involved, the largest health data breach ever reported to it.3
Neither organization was the one most of the victims had chosen to trust. The hospitals trusted their claims vendor; the airlines trusted their security vendor. That is the subject of this lesson: the companies your organization depends on, the companies they depend on, and the software that comes from all of them. It is written for boards and executives, general counsel's offices and compliance officers, CISOs and security teams, procurement and vendor managers, internal auditors, and the public officials, reporters and advocates who ask questions about them.
Module 73 covers the basics for small and medium businesses: building a vendor list, simple tiers, reading a SOC 2 for the first time, offboarding, and SaaS sprawl. If you are new to the subject, read Vendors, Contracts and Third-Party Risk first. This lesson goes further, at the scale of a hospital system, a bank or credit union, an insurer, a public company, a defense contractor or a state agency: hundreds or thousands of vendors, regulators who examine the program, and boards that must answer for it. Health care readers will find the full business associate rules in Business Associates, Cloud and AI Vendors; manufacturers will find remote vendor access to plant equipment in Remote Access, Vendors and Supply Chain.
Why a vendor's failure is your failure
There are two reasons a vendor's problem becomes yours. The first is practical: the harm lands on your customers, patients, members or citizens, and they will not care whose server it was. The second is legal: nearly every regulator that oversees large organizations has written down that the organization remains responsible for work it outsources.
The rules say you cannot outsource responsibility
The clearest statement comes from the three federal bank regulators. In June 2023 the Federal Reserve, the FDIC and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency replaced their separate vendor guidance with one joint document, the Interagency Guidance on Third-Party Relationships: Risk Management. It says a bank's use of third parties "does not diminish or remove" its responsibilities, and that the bank must still operate safely and follow the law "to the same extent as if its activities were performed by the banking organization in-house."1 The guidance does not create new rules, but examiners use it, and it is the most detailed public description of what regulators expect from a vendor program. Its life cycle (planning, due diligence and selection, contract negotiation, ongoing monitoring, and termination, with governance running through all of them) is the frame used in this lesson.
Other regulators say the same thing in their own words:
- The FTC Safeguards Rule (for non-bank financial institutions such as mortgage brokers, auto dealers that finance cars, tax preparers and payday lenders) requires a covered business to "oversee service providers" by taking reasonable steps to select providers "capable of maintaining appropriate safeguards," requiring the safeguards by contract, and "periodically assessing your service providers based on the risk they present."8
- HIPAA requires a written business associate agreement before a vendor creates, receives, keeps or transmits protected health information for a covered entity, and says a covered entity that knows of a "pattern of activity or practice" by its vendor that breaks the agreement is itself out of compliance unless it acts to cure the problem or ends the contract.9
- The SEC's amended Regulation S-P (for broker-dealers, investment advisers, investment companies, funding portals and transfer agents) requires written policies for "oversight of service providers," including a requirement that a service provider notify the firm "as soon as possible, but no later than 72 hours after becoming aware" of a breach of a customer information system it keeps. Larger firms had to comply by Dec. 3, 2025, and smaller ones by June 3, 2026.10
- New York's cybersecurity regulation for financial services, 23 NYCRR Part 500, requires a written third-party service provider policy in section 500.11. In an Oct. 21, 2025 industry letter the Department of Financial Services wrote that covered entities "may not delegate responsibility for compliance" to a vendor or affiliate, and said weak vendor oversight will count against them in examinations and enforcement.11
- Idaho Code 28-51-105(2) runs the other way: a company or agency that keeps personal information it does not own must notify the owner "immediately following discovery" of a breach when misuse of an Idaho resident's information has occurred or is reasonably likely, and must share what it knows.12 The owner, not the vendor, then carries the duty to notify Idaho residents. Lesson 11 covers the full Idaho statute in Breach Notification: Federal, State and Idaho.
The NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0, published Feb. 26, 2024, made the same point by moving supply chain risk into its new Govern function. Its category GV.SC, Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management, has ten outcomes, from a supply chain risk program and strategy (GV.SC-01), through "Suppliers are known and prioritized by criticality" (GV.SC-04), contract requirements (GV.SC-05) and due diligence before signing (GV.SC-06), to including suppliers in incident planning (GV.SC-08) and planning for what happens "after the conclusion of a partnership or service agreement" (GV.SC-10).13 For organizations that follow NIST, that list is a ready-made checklist for a vendor program. The deeper NIST guide is SP 800-161 Rev. 1, Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Systems and Organizations, published in May 2022 and updated on Nov. 1, 2024 to clarify its guidance on vulnerability advisories and SBOMs.14 The standards map in lesson 3 shows how these frameworks relate.
Four ways a vendor can hurt you
Security teams sort vendor risk many ways. For boards and managers, four plain questions cover most of it.
- Can the vendor get into our systems? A heating contractor with a billing portal login, a managed service provider with administrator rights, a software maker that pushes updates, a help desk with password reset powers. Every one of these is a door. Target in 2013 and Kaseya in 2021 are the classic cases.
- Does the vendor hold our data? Cloud hosts, payroll processors, claims clearinghouses, file transfer services, call centers, records storage and shredding companies. When they are breached, the data is gone even if your own network is spotless. MOVEit in 2023 is the classic case.
- Do we depend on the vendor to operate? A dealer management system, an electronic health record host, a core banking processor, a payment network. When it stops, you stop. Change Healthcare and CDK Global in 2024 are the classic cases.
- Is the vendor's code inside our systems? Commercial software, open source libraries, firmware, security agents with deep access to the operating system. A flaw or a planted backdoor there is a flaw in you. SolarWinds in 2020 and the CrowdStrike outage in 2024 are the classic cases, one malicious and one accidental.
Many vendors fall into more than one group, and the worst cases combine them: a vendor that holds your data, runs your critical service and has standing access to your network deserves a very different level of attention from one that sells you office chairs.
Eight cases every board should know
These cases come from government reports, court records, company securities filings and federal advisories. Each one taught a different lesson about vendors, and together they explain why regulators now ask about vendor programs in every examination.
Target, 2013: the contractor's login
In March 2014 the majority staff of the Senate Commerce Committee published "A 'Kill Chain' Analysis of the 2013 Target Data Breach." It traced the intrusion to Fazio Mechanical Services, a refrigeration and heating contractor in Sharpsburg, Pennsylvania, that had a login to Target's external billing and project management system. The report describes Fazio as "a small Pennsylvania HVAC company, which did not appear to follow broadly accepted information security practices." Attackers reportedly stole the vendor's credentials through malware-laden email at least two months before the theft began, used them to reach the vendor portal, and then moved from there deeper into Target's network until they reached the store payment terminals.2
About 40 million payment card accounts were exposed in U.S. stores between Nov. 27 and Dec. 18, 2013, and non-financial personal data on up to 70 million customers was also taken; the committee's release summed it up as "as many as 110 million consumers."15 The report also found that Target's intrusion detection tools raised alerts as the malware was installed and that "Target's security team neither reacted to the alarms nor allowed the FireEye software to automatically delete the malware."2
The lessons have not aged: a low-risk vendor (a refrigeration contractor) was given a login that connected, however indirectly, to the most sensitive part of the business; nothing kept the vendor's portal apart from the payment network; and alerts went unread. Network separation for vendor access is covered in lesson 6, Network and Cloud Security.
SolarWinds, 2020: the poisoned update
On Dec. 14, 2020, SolarWinds told the SEC in a Form 8-K that it had been told of "a highly sophisticated, targeted and manual supply chain attack by an outside nation state." Malicious code had been inserted into updates of its Orion network monitoring software "released between March and June 2020." The company had contacted about 33,000 Orion customers and believed "fewer than 18,000" had installed an affected version.16 The day before, CISA had issued Emergency Directive 21-01 ordering federal civilian agencies to disconnect or power down affected Orion products.17
The customers did nothing wrong in the ordinary sense: they installed a signed update from a trusted supplier, which is what security teams tell everyone to do. That is why SolarWinds changed federal policy. Within six months the White House issued Executive Order 14028, with a full section titled "Enhancing Software Supply Chain Security."18 The SEC later sued SolarWinds and its chief information security officer over the company's pre-attack security statements; a federal judge dismissed most of the claims on July 18, 2024, and the SEC voluntarily dismissed the rest, with prejudice, on Nov. 20, 2025.19 Lesson 4, Governance, Boards, Officers and Disclosure, covers that case and what it means for disclosure.
Kaseya, 2021: one tool, many victims
Kaseya sells VSA, a remote monitoring and management tool that managed service providers (MSPs) use to run their clients' computers. On Friday, July 2, 2021, criminals used previously unknown flaws in the on-premises version of VSA to get past its sign-in and run commands, then used the product's own normal features to push ransomware out to endpoints. Kaseya counted "fewer than 60" of its own customers directly compromised and "fewer than 1,500 downstream businesses" affected.20
The Justice Department charged a Ukrainian national, Yaroslav Vasinskyi, in November 2021 with deploying the Sodinokibi (REvil) ransomware in the attack.21 On May 1, 2024 he was sentenced in Texas to 13 years and seven months in prison and ordered to pay more than $16 million in restitution; prosecutors said he had carried out more than 2,500 ransomware attacks and demanded over $700 million in ransoms.22
Kaseya showed how an MSP multiplies risk. A small or mid-sized organization hires an MSP precisely because it lacks its own security staff; the MSP's tool then becomes a single point from which every client can be reached. The section on managed service providers below covers the controls.
MOVEit, 2023: the file transfer server
MOVEit Transfer is a product for moving large files between organizations, often payroll, benefits, pension and student records. CISA and the FBI reported that beginning May 27, 2023, the CL0P ransomware gang exploited "a previously unknown SQL injection vulnerability (CVE-2023-34362)" in its web application, installed a web shell called LEMURLOOT, and stole data from the servers. CISA added the flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on June 2, 2023.23 CL0P did not bother to encrypt anything; it stole the files and then threatened to publish them, a pattern called extortion.
MOVEit's victims were often not MOVEit customers at all. A state pension fund, a university or a large employer found out that its payroll or benefits vendor, or that vendor's vendor, had run MOVEit. Private trackers counted thousands of affected organizations; those counts are not official and vary by source. For vendor programs MOVEit taught two things: ask every vendor that holds your data what file transfer and internet-facing products it runs, and require it to tell you quickly when one of them is on CISA's exploited list.

Change Healthcare, 2024: the clearinghouse
Change Healthcare, part of UnitedHealth Group, sits between doctors, hospitals and pharmacies on one side and insurers on the other, moving claims, eligibility checks and payments. UnitedHealth's chief executive, Andrew Witty, told the Senate Finance Committee on May 1, 2024: "On February 12, criminals used compromised credentials to remotely access a Change Healthcare Citrix portal." He added: "The portal did not have multi-factor authentication." Nine days later, on Feb. 21, a criminal group calling itself ALPHV or BlackCat deployed ransomware. Witty said the decision to pay a ransom was his, and that UnitedHealth had advanced more than $6.5 billion in accelerated payments and no-interest, no-fee loans to providers as of April 26, 2024.7
The HHS Office for Civil Rights reports that Change filed its breach report on July 19, 2024 with a placeholder count of 500 people, raised the estimate to about 190 million in January 2025, and told OCR on July 31, 2025 that "approximately 192.7 million individuals have been impacted."3 OCR's report to Congress for calendar year 2024 shows how much of health care's exposure now sits with vendors: breaches at business associates were 106 of 663 large breach reports (16 percent) but affected about 206.9 million people, 85 percent of the total.24
Change taught three lessons. A vendor can be a single point of failure for an entire industry. A vendor's missing control (multifactor sign-in on one remote portal) can become every customer's crisis. And contingency plans that assume a vendor will be back in a day or two are not plans; providers that had no second clearinghouse under contract had to arrange one under pressure. Lesson 5, Identity and Access, covers the sign-in controls.
CDK Global, 2024: the dealer system
CDK Global provides a hosted dealer management system that car dealers use for sales, financing paperwork, service, parts, inventory and accounting. On June 19, 2024 it notified customers of a cyberattack and shut systems down. CDK serves more than 15,000 dealers in North America. Five publicly traded dealer groups (Sonic Automotive, Penske Automotive Group, AutoNation, Group 1 Automotive and Lithia Motors) told investors about the outage in SEC filings within days; Lithia said it had "not yet determined whether the incident is reasonably likely to materially impact" its results.25 Many dealers fell back to paper deal jackets and manual workarounds while CDK restored service.
The CDK filings are a useful lesson for public companies: a vendor's incident can trigger your own disclosure analysis, because the SEC's 2023 rules ask about material cybersecurity incidents affecting the registrant's information systems, including systems it uses but does not own. Lesson 4 explains the Form 8-K Item 1.05 test.
CrowdStrike, 2024: the accident
The July 19, 2024 outage involved no attacker. A faulty content update for CrowdStrike's Falcon sensor, an endpoint protection agent that runs with deep access to the Windows operating system, caused affected machines to crash. Microsoft, which helped with recovery, wrote that "CrowdStrike's update affected 8.5 million Windows devices, or less than one percent of all Windows machines."4 The machines were concentrated in large enterprises that buy top-tier security tools, which is why the effects were so visible: airlines, hospitals and banks. Many had to repair machines one at a time by hand, and machines protected with full-disk encryption needed recovery keys that some organizations could not find quickly.
CrowdStrike is the clearest example of concentration risk: a vendor so widely used, and so deeply placed, that its ordinary mistake becomes a national event. It also showed that the security tools you buy are themselves vendors to be governed, with questions about how they test and stage updates, and whether you can control when updates reach your most critical machines.
Salesloft Drift, 2025: the connected app
In September 2025 the FBI warned that two criminal groups were stealing data from companies' Salesforce accounts. One, which the FBI calls UNC6040, phoned call centers pretending to be IT support and talked employees into approving a malicious "connected app," a step that bypasses passwords and multifactor sign-in. The other, UNC6395, used stolen OAuth tokens (the digital keys one cloud service uses to act on another) belonging to the Salesloft Drift chatbot, which many companies had connected to Salesforce. On Aug. 20, 2025 Salesloft and Salesforce revoked all Drift tokens. The FBI's advice to customers was a vendor management checklist: review every third-party app connected to your environment, rotate keys and tokens for each integration, especially after a vendor is compromised, restrict access by network address and least privilege, watch for unusual data pulls, and require phishing-resistant multifactor sign-in.26
Drift matters because most organizations do not count "integrations" as vendors at all. An employee in sales or marketing clicks "allow," and a new company now has standing access to the customer database. A modern vendor inventory has to include these connections.
A third-party risk program, step by step
A vendor program at a large organization is less about any one vendor than about a repeatable process that touches procurement, contracts, security, privacy, finance and the business unit that wants the service. The steps below follow the bank regulators' life cycle and the NIST GV.SC outcomes, scaled for an organization with hundreds or thousands of vendors.113
- Find every vendor. Build the inventory from accounts payable, purchasing cards, contract files, single sign-on logs, cloud app discovery, firewall records and connected apps in major platforms. Expect to find far more than procurement knows about.
- Tier them. Sort vendors by what they can touch and how badly you would be hurt if they failed or were breached.
- Do due diligence before signing. Match the depth of review to the tier, and collect evidence, not promises.
- Write the contract. Put security requirements, breach notice timing, audit rights, subcontractor rules, data return and insurance in the agreement itself.
- Monitor for the life of the relationship. Reassess on a schedule set by tier, watch for incidents and exploited flaws in vendor products, and track open findings until they close.
- Plan the exit. Know how you would leave, how you would get your data back, and how you would keep operating if the vendor disappeared tomorrow.
- Report to leadership. Tell the board which vendors are critical, which carry open risk, and where the organization depends on a single provider.
Building an inventory at scale
Small businesses can list their vendors on a spreadsheet; module 73 shows how. Large organizations need a system of record (often a module in a governance, risk and compliance platform, sometimes the contract management system) with one owner for each vendor relationship, a record of what data and systems the vendor touches, the contract dates, the tier, the last assessment and any open findings. The banking guidance tells banks to keep an inventory of relationships and, "as appropriate to the risk," the related subcontractors.1
Four sources of vendors are routinely missed. Free and low-cost cloud services signed up with a corporate card or no payment at all. Connected apps and integrations authorized through OAuth in email, file sharing, customer relationship and code platforms, as the Drift case showed. Professional firms such as law, accounting, actuarial and consulting firms, which often hold the most sensitive data an organization has but are bought through a different budget. Affiliates and parent companies, which NYDFS treats like any other third-party service provider when they hold the regulated entity's information.11 Lesson 12's privacy and data inventory worksheet helps connect the vendor inventory to the data inventory.
Tiering vendors by risk
No organization can review 2,000 vendors in depth every year. Tiering decides where the effort goes. NYDFS says covered entities should classify providers considering their access to systems, the sensitivity of data, location and how critical the service is.11 The bank regulators call for more thorough diligence and monitoring for "higher-risk activities, including critical activities."1 The questions most programs use are these:
- What regulated or sensitive data will the vendor hold, and how much? Health records, account numbers, Social Security numbers, controlled unclassified information, student records, criminal justice information.
- What access will the vendor have to our network, cloud tenants or production systems, and with what privileges?
- How long could we operate without this vendor? An hour, a day, a month?
- How hard would it be to replace? Are there other providers, and how long would a switch take?
- Does a law, regulator or customer contract name this kind of vendor (a HIPAA business associate, a GLBA service provider, a defense subcontractor handling covered defense information)?
- Where is the vendor, and where will our data be stored or accessed from?
Two refinements matter at scale. First, tier the relationship, not the company: the same cloud provider may host a critical claims system for one department and a cafeteria menu for another. Second, let a vendor's tier rise automatically when something changes, such as a new data feed, a new integration, or an acquisition of the vendor by a company in a high-risk jurisdiction.
Due diligence that produces evidence
The bank regulators list the topics a thorough review covers: the vendor's strategy and goals, legal and regulatory compliance, financial condition, business experience including its complaint history, the qualifications and backgrounds of key personnel, risk management, information security, management of information systems, operational resilience, incident reporting and management, physical security, reliance on subcontractors, insurance coverage, and its contracts with other parties.1 NYDFS adds specific security items: access controls, data segmentation and encryption, unique traceable accounts, audit trails, high-risk jurisdictions, the vendor's management of its own vendors, incident response and continuity testing, and external audits such as SOC 2, ISO 27001 or HITRUST. Where a vendor is the only realistic choice, NYDFS says to document the risk, add compensating controls and reassess.11
For a critical vendor, good diligence usually includes the following, and each item should leave a document in the file:
- The vendor's most recent independent assurance report (SOC 2 Type 2, ISO/IEC 27001 certificate with its statement of applicability, HITRUST certification, or a FedRAMP authorization for cloud services sold to federal agencies), read and summarized by someone qualified.
- A completed security questionnaire, with follow-up on every "no" and every vague answer.
- A summary of the vendor's most recent penetration test, with the date and whether serious findings were fixed.
- Its incident response plan summary and its record of past incidents, including any public breach notices, regulator orders and SEC filings.
- Its business continuity and disaster recovery plan, with the date of the last real test and the recovery times it achieved.
- A list of its subcontractors that will touch your data or systems, and where they are.
- Evidence of cyber insurance, and financial statements for critical vendors whose failure would hurt you.
- A check of public sources: news, court dockets, the HHS breach portal for health vendors, state attorney general breach lists, CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog for the vendor's products, and Treasury sanctions lists.27
Questionnaires: SIG and CAIQ
Two standard questionnaires dominate. The Standardized Information Gathering questionnaire (SIG), published by the Shared Assessments Program, is a licensed product updated each year that covers many risk domains and comes in shorter and longer forms; many large buyers send it, and many large vendors keep a completed copy ready.28 The Consensus Assessments Initiative Questionnaire (CAIQ), published by the Cloud Security Alliance, is free and maps to the alliance's Cloud Controls Matrix; cloud providers can post their completed answers publicly in the alliance's STAR registry, so buyers can read them without asking.29
Questionnaires have real limits. A vendor answers its own questions, often through a sales or compliance team rather than the engineers who run the systems, and the answers are rarely tested. Large vendors receive thousands of different questionnaires a year and answer them with libraries of standard text. Use a standard questionnaire where you can, so vendors can answer from a library and you can compare them; add a short set of your own questions on the items that matter most to you (multifactor sign-in on every remote access path, backups that attackers cannot delete, notice timing, data location); and treat the answers as statements you will later check against an independent report and the contract.
Reading SOC 2 reports and bridge letters
System and Organization Controls (SOC) reports are examinations of a service organization's controls performed by an independent CPA firm under standards set by the American Institute of CPAs (AICPA). A SOC 1 report covers controls relevant to customers' financial reporting, and matters to your auditors. A SOC 2 report covers controls relevant to the AICPA's Trust Services Criteria: security, and optionally availability, processing integrity, confidentiality and privacy. A SOC 3 report is a short public summary of a SOC 2.30 The criteria themselves are an AICPA publication, and the AICPA has released an exposure draft of proposed 2027 Trust Services Criteria; check which version a report uses.
A Type 1 report says the controls were suitably designed as of a single date. A Type 2 report says whether they were designed and operating effectively over a period, commonly six or twelve months, and lists the auditor's tests and results. For any vendor in the top two tiers, ask for Type 2. Then read these parts, in this order:
- The opinion. Is it unqualified ("clean"), or qualified because some control objective or criterion was not met? A qualified opinion is a red flag that needs a written explanation.
- The scope and period. Does the system described actually include the product and data centers you are buying? Does the period end recently? A report that ended 11 months ago tells you little about today.
- Exceptions. In the testing section, look for deviations: a sample of terminated employees whose access was not removed, a quarter in which access reviews did not happen. Read the vendor's management response for each.
- Subservice organizations. Most SaaS vendors run on a cloud provider. Under the "carve-out" method the report excludes that provider's controls, so you may need the cloud provider's own report too. Under the "inclusive" method its controls are covered.
- Complementary user entity controls. This list says what the vendor expects you to do for its controls to work: manage your own users, turn on multifactor sign-in, review logs, protect your keys. If nobody at your organization owns these, the vendor's clean report does not protect you.
A bridge letter (also called a gap letter) is a short statement from the vendor's management, not the auditor, saying that no material changes to its controls have occurred between the end of the report period and the date of the letter. It fills the gap until the next report. Because it is not audited, treat it as a management claim, and ask for a new one if a significant incident or change happens in the meantime.
Other assurance types fill the same role in particular markets. An ISO/IEC 27001 certificate shows that an accredited certification body audited the vendor's information security management system; the scope statement and statement of applicability tell you what it covers (the standard itself is a paid document). FedRAMP authorizes cloud services for federal agencies, and many state governments use a similar state program. HITRUST certification is common among health care vendors. The standards map in lesson 3 compares them.
Ongoing monitoring
The bank regulators expect monitoring to cover the vendor's performance, its financial condition, changes in its business or ownership, its "reliance on, exposure to, and use of subcontractors," and where its subcontractors and data are located.1 NYDFS asks for periodic, risk-based reassessments using evidence such as attestations, penetration test summaries, training records and audits; it asks firms to request vulnerability management updates, confirm that earlier deficiencies were fixed, document and escalate unresolved risks, and include vendors in incident response and continuity planning, including joint testing.11
In practice, large programs combine scheduled reviews (yearly for critical vendors) with event-driven triggers: a vendor breach in the news, a vendor product added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, an acquisition, a missed service level, a regulator's order, or a change in what data the vendor holds. Many also buy outside-in "security ratings" that score vendors from internet-visible signals such as unpatched servers and email settings. Those scores are useful as an early warning but can be wrong about which systems belong to whom; treat them as a reason to ask questions, not as an assessment.
Ending a vendor relationship well
NIST's GV.SC-10 outcome exists because the end of a contract is when data most often goes missing.13 NYDFS lists what termination requires: revoke all vendor access, including personnel, subcontractor, service account, single sign-on and OAuth, API and external storage access; get a certification that your information was destroyed, returned or migrated, including snapshots, backups and cached copies; build a transition plan for critical services; keep data that is under a legal hold before anything is deleted; and finish with a final risk review and documented lessons learned.11 HIPAA's business associate rule requires the vendor at termination to return or destroy protected health information if feasible and "retain no copies," or extend the contract's protections if return is infeasible.9 The SEC's 2022 case against Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, described in Common mistakes, shows what happens when disposal is left to a vendor nobody watches.
Contract clauses that carry weight
Due diligence tells you what a vendor does today. The contract is what lets you insist on it tomorrow. The NIST outcome GV.SC-05 calls for supply chain security requirements to be "integrated into contracts and other types of agreements," and the bank regulators and NYDFS both list the terms they expect to see.13111 The table below gathers them. The words are plain descriptions, not model clauses; the organization's contracts staff and compliance officer turn them into language that fits its law and its bargaining position.
| Clause | What it does | Why it matters | Where regulators ask for it |
|---|---|---|---|
| Security requirements | Names the controls the vendor must keep: multifactor sign-in, encryption in transit and at rest, logging, patching times, background checks, secure disposal | Turns questionnaire answers into promises you can enforce | FTC Safeguards Rule 314.4(f)(2); NYDFS letter (MFA, encryption); HIPAA 164.314(a) |
| Incident notice | Sets how fast the vendor must tell you of a security incident, what it must say, and that it must keep you updated | Your own notice clocks to regulators and customers may start when the vendor tells you, or earlier | SEC Reg S-P (72 hours); HIPAA 164.410 (60 days at most); NYDFS ("immediate or timely") |
| Cooperation and evidence | Requires the vendor to share logs, forensic findings and affected-record lists, and to support your investigation and notices | Without data from the vendor you cannot tell who to notify | Idaho Code 28-51-105(2) ("cooperation includes sharing"); interagency guidance |
| Audit and assessment rights | Lets you or an independent assessor review controls, and requires the vendor to fix findings | Gives you a way to check, and a remedy when something is wrong | Interagency guidance ("right to audit and require remediation") |
| Subcontractors | Requires disclosure of subcontractors that touch your data, flows down the same terms, and lets you object | Your data's security is only as good as the weakest fourth party | Interagency guidance; NYDFS letter; HIPAA 164.504(e)(2)(ii)(D) |
| Data location and use | Says where data may be stored and accessed, limits use to your purposes, and addresses whether data may train AI models | Foreign access, secondary use and AI training create legal and trust problems | NYDFS letter (data location, AI use) |
| Return and destruction | Requires return or certified destruction of data, including backups, at the end | The end of a contract is when data most often goes missing | HIPAA 164.504(e)(2)(ii)(J); NYDFS letter; NIST GV.SC-10 |
| Continuity and exit help | Requires tested continuity plans, recovery targets, and transition help if you leave or the vendor fails | Change Healthcare and CDK showed how long an outage can run | Interagency guidance (operational resilience; default and termination) |
| Insurance | Requires cyber and errors-and-omissions coverage at stated amounts, with notice of changes | Makes sure money exists to pay for the vendor's failures | Interagency guidance ("commensurate with the risk of possible losses") |
| Indemnity and liability limits | Indemnity means the vendor pays defined costs you incur because of its failure; a limitation of liability caps what it will pay in total | A low general cap can leave you paying for notices, credit monitoring and claims after the vendor's breach | Interagency guidance (indemnification and limits on liability) |
| Regulatory access | Agrees that the vendor's work is subject to examination by your regulators | Banking, insurance and health regulators may need to see the vendor's records | Interagency guidance (regulatory supervision); HIPAA 164.504(e)(2)(ii)(I) |
A note on indemnity and liability caps in plain terms. Vendors' standard contracts often cap total liability at the fees paid over the prior 12 months. For a $50,000-a-year service that holds a million customer records, that cap would not pay for the mailing. Buyers with bargaining power negotiate a separate, higher cap (sometimes called a super cap) for data breaches and confidentiality failures, or name specific costs the vendor must cover, such as notification, call centers, credit monitoring and forensic work. Buyers without that power, facing a cloud giant's click-through terms, can still document the gap, buy insurance for it, and limit what data they put in the service. NYDFS acknowledges that service agreements are often drafted by the vendor and that covered entities may lack the bargaining power to negotiate many of their terms, and where vendor options are limited it expects firms to document the risks and add compensating controls.11

Breach notice timing in vendor contracts
The notice clause is where vendor contracts and regulators' clocks meet. Your organization may owe notice to a regulator in 72 hours, to investors in four business days after a materiality decision, and to customers in 30 days. If the vendor can wait 60 days to tell you, those clocks are already broken. The chart below sets the main clocks side by side.
Most large buyers now ask for notice of a confirmed or reasonably suspected security incident affecting their data or service within 24 to 72 hours, with updates as facts develop, and they define the trigger as the vendor's discovery, not the end of its investigation. Some regulated firms go further for critical vendors. The bank regulators' 2021 computer-security incident notification rule already requires a bank service provider to notify its bank customers "as soon as possible" when an incident has disrupted or degraded, or is reasonably likely to disrupt or degrade, covered services for four or more hours.31 Remember too that CIRCIA, the 2022 federal law that will require critical infrastructure entities to report significant incidents to CISA within 72 hours and ransom payments within 24 hours, still has no final rule in effect as of Nov. 14, 2026; CISA sent the draft final rule for White House review on Oct. 1, 2026, and it was still listed as pending there in early November.32 Lesson 10, Detection and Incident Response, sets out every clock in detail.
What sector rules require
Each regulated sector has its own vendor rule. They differ in wording but agree on the core: know your vendors, put security in the contract, check them, and stay responsible.
Health care: HIPAA business associate agreements
Under HIPAA a business associate is a person or company that creates, receives, maintains or transmits protected health information on behalf of a covered entity (a health plan, a clearinghouse, or a provider that bills electronically). The Security Rule, at 45 CFR 164.308(b) and 164.314(a), requires a written contract before a business associate handles electronic protected health information, and the Privacy Rule at 164.504(e)(2) lists what the contract must say. Among other things it must limit the vendor's uses and disclosures; require appropriate safeguards and compliance with the Security Rule; require the vendor to report improper uses and breaches; make the vendor's subcontractors agree to the same restrictions; make records available to the Secretary of HHS; and require return or destruction of the information at termination.9 HHS publishes sample business associate agreement provisions, dated Jan. 25, 2013, which it describes as "only sample language."33 A business associate must tell the covered entity of a breach of unsecured protected health information without unreasonable delay and "in no case later than 60 calendar days from the discovery of the breach."3
Missing agreements are among the most common HIPAA findings. North Memorial Health Care of Minnesota paid $1.55 million in 2016 after a laptop holding data on nearly 10,000 people was stolen from an employee of its billing vendor, Accretive Health; OCR found North Memorial had given the vendor access to data on more than 250,000 people without a business associate agreement.34 Module 109 covers the full rule, cloud providers and AI vendors in Business Associates, Cloud and AI Vendors.
Financial services: GLBA and the FTC Safeguards Rule
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act's safeguards requirement is carried out by different agencies for different institutions. For non-bank financial institutions under FTC jurisdiction, 16 CFR 314.4(f) requires three things: reasonable steps to select and retain service providers "capable of maintaining appropriate safeguards for the customer information at issue," a contract requiring those safeguards, and periodic assessment of providers "based on the risk they present and the continued adequacy of their safeguards."8 The rule's Qualified Individual must report to the board at least yearly on the information security program, and vendor risk belongs in that report. Accounting and tax firms will find the rule applied to them in Accounting and Tax Firms: GLBA, Safeguards and the IRS.
Banks: the interagency guidance and the Bank Service Company Act
For banks the main text is the 2023 interagency guidance, which replaced OCC Bulletin 2013-29, Federal Reserve SR 13-19 and FDIC FIL-44-2008.1 It is principles-based: it expects more for critical activities, it calls for board oversight and periodic reporting that includes "dependency on a single provider for multiple activities," and it lists the contract terms in the table above. The National Credit Union Administration was not one of the issuing agencies; credit unions follow NCUA's own guidance. Federal banking regulators can also examine many bank technology service providers directly, which is one reason the largest core processors are used to examiner visits. For Idaho, many community banks and credit unions rely on a handful of national core processors, so the concentration questions later in this lesson apply to them with special force.
Broker-dealers and advisers: SEC Regulation S-P
The SEC adopted amendments to Regulation S-P on May 16, 2024. Covered institutions must have an incident response program, notify affected customers "as soon as practicable, but not later than 30 days" after becoming aware of unauthorized access to sensitive customer information, and keep written policies requiring "oversight of service providers," including that providers notify the firm within 72 hours of becoming aware of a breach of a system they maintain. Larger entities had to comply by Dec. 3, 2025; smaller ones by June 3, 2026.10 A firm whose service contracts lack the 72-hour term needs either amended contracts or documented policies that get it the same result. The SEC's earlier enforcement shows it treats vendor oversight as part of the safeguards duty, as the Morgan Stanley case below shows.
New York's Part 500, section 500.11
The NYDFS cybersecurity regulation applies to banks, insurers, money transmitters, virtual currency firms and others licensed in New York, many of them national companies. Section 500.11 requires written policies on third-party service providers covering identification and risk assessment, minimum security practices, due diligence, and periodic assessment, and it calls for contract terms on access controls including multifactor sign-in, encryption, notice of cybersecurity events, and representations and warranties about the provider's security. Section 500.17 requires a covered entity to notify the superintendent "as promptly as possible but in no event later than 72 hours after determining that a cybersecurity incident has occurred" at the entity, its affiliates, "or a third-party service provider," so a vendor's incident can start New York's clock.35 The Oct. 21, 2025 industry letter adds detail across the full life cycle and warns of a trend of firms outsourcing core cybersecurity compliance work without enough oversight; it says senior governing bodies should be able to give "a credible challenge to management's cybersecurity-related decisions."11
Defense contractors: flow-down and CMMC
Defense contracts push security requirements down the supply chain by clause. DFARS 252.204-7012 requires contractors that handle covered defense information to protect it under NIST SP 800-171, to report cyber incidents to the Defense Department within 72 hours of discovery, and to include the clause in subcontracts that involve such information, so a machine shop three tiers down can carry the same duties as the prime. The Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) program adds assessment requirements; its contract rule took effect Nov. 10, 2025, but the department suspended the move to Phase 2 (third-party assessments in more contracts) on July 13, 2026, and a Sept. 3, 2026 class deviation continues to require baseline NIST SP 800-171 Revision 2 compliance and self-assessments posted in the Supplier Performance Risk System.36 Primes are expected to check their subcontractors' status before sharing controlled information. Manufacturers will find the details in Sector Rules.
Idaho public agencies and their vendors
Idaho's breach statute applies to state agencies, cities and counties as well as businesses. Under Idaho Code 28-51-105(1), an agency that owns or licenses the data must investigate a breach, notify affected Idaho residents, and notify the Idaho attorney general within 24 hours of discovering a breach; state agencies must also report breaches as Idaho Technology Authority policies require. Subsection (2) puts the vendor's duty in law: a vendor that keeps the data must notify the agency "immediately following discovery" when misuse has occurred or is reasonably likely, and must cooperate.12 Agencies cannot shorten the statute, but they can and should write tighter notice and cooperation terms into their contracts. Vendor contracts held by Idaho public agencies are generally public records under Idaho Code Title 74, which matters for the reporters' section at the end of this lesson.
The software supply chain
Every organization runs code it did not write: commercial applications, cloud services, operating systems, firmware, and the open source libraries inside all of them. A software supply chain attack plants malicious code somewhere along that path (SolarWinds), and a software supply chain failure ships a flaw or a bad update that the buyer installs in good faith (CrowdStrike). The defenses fall into three groups: buy from makers that build securely, know what is inside what you buy, and be ready to act when a component turns out to be bad.
Executive Order 14028 and what changed in 2026
Executive Order 14028, signed May 12, 2021, set the federal government's software supply chain policy after SolarWinds. Section 4, "Enhancing Software Supply Chain Security," begins: "The development of commercial software often lacks transparency," and directed guidance on secure build environments, provenance, vulnerability disclosure programs, providing purchasers a software bill of materials, and attesting to conformity with secure development practices.18 NIST answered with the Secure Software Development Framework, SP 800-218, in February 2022, a list of practices for preparing the organization, protecting the software, producing well-secured software and responding to vulnerabilities.37
The Office of Management and Budget then required agencies, in memoranda M-22-18 (2022) and M-23-16 (2023), to collect a self-attestation from software producers that they followed those practices, and CISA published a standard Secure Software Development Attestation Form for the purpose. Many software makers that never sold to the federal government adopted the form anyway, because large private buyers began asking for it too.
That federal mandate is gone. On Jan. 23, 2026, OMB issued Memorandum M-26-05, "Adopting a Risk-based Approach to Software and Hardware Security," which rescinded M-22-18 and M-23-16. It criticized "unproven and burdensome software accounting processes that prioritized compliance over genuine security investments," left each agency to set its own software and hardware assurance policy based on its risks, kept the requirement for complete software and hardware inventories, and said agencies may put contract terms in place requiring producers to provide a current SBOM on request. The CISA attestation form remains available for agencies that want to use it.5 An earlier change came in June 2025, when Executive Order 14306 amended the January 2025 Executive Order 14144 and dropped several of its software attestation provisions.38
For private organizations the practical result is that there is no single federal checklist to point to. A bank, hospital or manufacturer that wants secure development evidence from its software suppliers must ask for it in its own contracts and questionnaires. Many still use the CISA form or the NIST SSDF as the reference, because suppliers already know them.
Software bills of materials
A software bill of materials (SBOM) is a machine-readable list of the components inside a piece of software, with their versions and suppliers. When a flaw like Log4Shell appears, an organization with SBOMs for its critical software can search them in minutes to see where the vulnerable component is; an organization without them sends emergency questionnaires to hundreds of vendors and waits.
On July 29, 2026, CISA, the NSA, the FBI and cybersecurity agencies from more than a dozen partner countries published the "2026 Minimum Elements for a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)," which describes an SBOM as "a nested inventory, a list of ingredients that make up software applications and systems." It lists 17 minimum data fields, including the component name, version, producer, identifiers, dependency relationships, license, a cryptographic hash of each component, and fields describing who made the SBOM, with what tool, and at what point in the build.6 The hash and generation context fields are new since the 2021 version and make an SBOM easier to verify.
Sector rules already require SBOMs in some places. Medical device makers must give the FDA an SBOM for "cyber devices," as module 109 explains in Medical Devices and Clinical Technology. For everyone else, SBOMs are a contract matter. Sensible buyer terms ask the supplier to provide an SBOM in a standard format for each major release on request, to tell the buyer within a set time when a listed component has a known exploited vulnerability, and to say whether the product is actually affected (a statement called a VEX, for Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange). An SBOM nobody reads helps no one, so the program also needs a tool or service that matches SBOMs against vulnerability data.
Secure by Design and the pledge
CISA's Secure by Design campaign argued that software makers, not customers, should carry more of the security burden: memory-safe languages, no default passwords, multifactor sign-in on by default, and evidence of intrusions available to customers at no extra charge. In May 2024 CISA announced that 68 software manufacturers had signed a voluntary Secure by Design pledge; the pledge's seven goals include increasing use of multifactor authentication, reducing default passwords, reducing entire classes of vulnerability, increasing installation of security patches, publishing a vulnerability disclosure policy, transparency in vulnerability reporting, and giving customers the ability to gather evidence of intrusions. The pledge is "voluntary and not legally binding."3940 By April 2025, when the initiative's two leaders left CISA, about 300 companies had signed; on Nov. 9, 2026 Nextgov reported that the two had launched a nonprofit Software Safety Institute to continue the work outside government.41 Whether a vendor signed, and what its public progress reports say, is a reasonable diligence question.
Open source components
Most commercial software is built largely from open source libraries maintained by volunteers or small teams. Two cases show the risk. In December 2021 a flaw in Log4j, a widely used Java logging library, could let attackers run code remotely on servers that logged attacker-controlled text; CISA issued Emergency Directive 22-02 on Dec. 17, 2021 requiring federal agencies to find and fix affected systems.42 In March 2024 a developer noticed that the xz Utils compression library, which ships with many Linux distributions, contained a deliberately planted backdoor, added by a contributor who had gradually gained the maintainer's trust and commit access; CISA issued an alert on March 29, 2024 advising users to "downgrade XZ Utils to an uncompromised version."43 The xz case was caught before it spread widely, largely by luck.
For a large organization the controls are: know which open source components your own developers use (a software composition analysis tool produces an SBOM for your code), pin versions and pull from trusted repositories, watch vulnerability feeds, and ask software suppliers how they do the same. Organizations that build software for others should follow the NIST SSDF and give customers SBOMs.
SaaS integrations and OAuth tokens
The Salesloft Drift case points to a gap that grew fast after 2020: integrations between cloud services. When a user connects a scheduling app to email, a chatbot to the customer database, or an AI assistant to file storage, the integration usually receives a long-lived token that keeps working without a password or multifactor prompt. Attackers who steal the token from the integration vendor get the access without touching your sign-in controls. The FBI's checklist for this is short: inventory all connected apps, restrict who can approve new ones, rotate tokens and keys after any vendor incident, apply least privilege and network restrictions to integrations, and monitor for bulk data pulls.26 Lesson 5 covers service accounts and API keys in Identity and Access.
Managed service providers and remote management tools
Managed service providers run IT for clients: help desk, patching, backups, security monitoring, sometimes the whole network. Large organizations use them for specialized work or remote sites; smaller hospitals, school districts, cities and counties often depend on one entirely. MSPs typically use remote monitoring and management (RMM) software with administrator rights on every client machine, which is what made the Kaseya attack so damaging.20
In May 2022 the cybersecurity agencies of the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand published a joint advisory, AA22-131A, on protecting MSPs and their customers. It urged MSP customers to make sure their contracts spell out who is responsible for which security tasks, to require multifactor sign-in on MSP accounts with access to the customer, to require logging and keep the logs, to understand the MSP's own supply chain, and to manage the MSP's accounts by least privilege.44 The issue has not gone away. On Aug. 11, 2026, NYDFS warned regulated companies of an active campaign exploiting known vulnerabilities in N-able's N-central RMM platform, used by some MSPs, in which attackers could keep access after stolen credentials were revoked and move from a compromised MSP into customer networks with administrator privileges. NYDFS told companies to find out whether any of their providers used the product, check for unauthorized persistent access, confirm patches, and keep reporting incidents that start at a vendor.45
Questions a large organization should be able to answer about each MSP:
- Which of its accounts can reach our systems, and is each protected by phishing-resistant multifactor sign-in?
- Does it use separate administrator accounts for each client, or shared credentials across clients?
- Which RMM and remote access tools does it use, and how fast does it patch them when CISA lists a flaw as exploited?
- Can we see its activity logs in our environment, and do we keep them?
- If the MSP is compromised, can we cut its access in minutes, and do we know how?
- Who at the MSP reports an incident to us, how fast, and does our contract say so?
Any change that cuts or restructures an MSP's access to production systems should be planned, tested and paired with a way back, so a security fix does not become an outage.
Fourth parties and concentration risk
A fourth party is your vendor's vendor: the cloud provider under your SaaS application, the data center under your cloud provider, the subcontracted call center under your claims processor. You rarely have a contract with them, often do not know who they are, and can still be stopped by them. The bank regulators expect banks to consider a vendor's "reliance on, exposure to, and use of subcontractors" and where subcontractors and data sit, and NYDFS lists the vendor's own vendor management among the diligence items.111 The SOC 2 carve-out section, described above, is often the best map you will get of a vendor's own critical suppliers.
Concentration risk is the system-wide version. When most of an industry relies on one clearinghouse, one dealer management system, one endpoint security agent, one identity provider or one cloud region, a single failure hits everyone at once, and the usual fallback (borrow capacity from a peer) does not work because the peer is down too. The CrowdStrike, Change Healthcare and CDK events in 2024 were all concentration events.

What a large organization can do:
- Map critical dependencies. For each critical business service, list every vendor and fourth party it needs to run: hosting, identity, payments, communications, security tools.
- Find the single points. Mark where one vendor's failure stops the service and no contracted alternative exists.
- Decide, in advance, what you will do. A second clearinghouse under contract, a manual process that has been practiced, a staged rollout of security updates to critical machines, offline copies of essential data, printed procedures.
- Test it. Run a tabletop exercise in which your most important vendor is gone for two weeks. Include the vendor if you can, as NIST GV.SC-08 suggests.13
- Report it. Give the board a short list of concentration points, what the fallback is, and how long the organization could operate on it.
Regulators abroad have gone further. The European Union's Digital Operational Resilience Act, which has applied since Jan. 17, 2025, lets European financial supervisors directly oversee technology providers designated as critical to the financial sector.46 No U.S. law gives a single agency that power across sectors, though bank regulators can examine many bank service providers. Information sharing among companies about threats to shared vendors depends partly on the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, whose liability protections lapsed briefly in 2025 and have since run on short extensions; the Congressional Research Service reported in September 2026 that they now expire Dec. 11, 2026.47
Who owns vendor risk
Vendor risk fails most often in the gaps between departments: procurement buys, the business unit uses, security reviews (sometimes), legal signs, and nobody watches afterward. A clear division of roles is the cure. The table shows a common pattern at large organizations; adapt the titles to yours.
| Role | Owns |
|---|---|
| Board or its risk or audit committee | Approves the vendor risk policy and risk appetite; receives at least yearly reports on critical vendors, open findings, incidents and concentration; asks for exit plans for the most important vendors |
| Senior management (often a chief risk officer) | Runs the program, sets tiers and standards, accepts or escalates residual risk |
| Business owner of each relationship | Explains what the vendor does and what data it gets; owns the risk day to day; starts the review before buying |
| CISO and security team | Security due diligence, technical reviews, monitoring of vendor incidents and exploited flaws, vendor access controls |
| Privacy officer | Data mapping, data use limits, cross-border transfer review, privacy terms |
| Procurement and contracts staff | Makes sure no contract is signed without the required review; keeps standard security terms; tracks renewals |
| General counsel's office and compliance officer | Contract terms, regulatory requirements by sector, notice duties, business associate and service provider agreements |
| Internal audit | Independently tests whether the program works as written |
Lesson 4, Governance, Boards, Officers and Disclosure, covers board duties in general, and lesson 2, Risk Management in Plain Terms, explains how vendor risks go into the enterprise risk register.
Sample: Vendor and Third-Party Risk Management Policy
The policy below is a starting point for a large or regulated organization. It sits under the top-level Information Security Policy in lesson 4 and works with the Access Control Policy in lesson 5, the Incident Response Plan in lesson 10 and the Breach Notification Procedure in lesson 11.
Sample only. Adapt it to your organization's risks, systems and laws, have qualified people review it, and do not treat it as a substitute for a risk assessment.
Follows: Interagency Guidance on Third-Party Relationships: Risk Management (88 FR 37920, June 9, 2023); NIST CSF 2.0 category GV.SC (Feb. 26, 2024); NIST SP 800-161 Rev. 1 (Update 1, Nov. 1, 2024); 16 CFR 314.4(f); 45 CFR 164.308(b), 164.314(a) and 164.504(e); SEC Regulation S-P as amended May 16, 2024; 23 NYCRR 500.11 and the NYDFS Industry Letter of Oct. 21, 2025; Idaho Code 28-51-105.
Vendor and Third-Party Risk Management Policy (sample)
1. Purpose. [Organization name] relies on vendors, service providers, contractors, software suppliers, professional firms, affiliates and connected applications ("third parties") to deliver services and run its systems. Using a third party does not reduce [Organization name]'s responsibility for the security of its information, the continuity of its services, or its compliance with law. This policy sets how third parties are selected, contracted, monitored and ended.
2. Scope. This policy covers every arrangement in which a third party (a) receives, stores, processes or can access [Organization name] information classified as [Confidential or Restricted]; (b) has logical or physical access to [Organization name] networks, systems, cloud accounts or facilities; (c) provides a service that a critical business process depends on; or (d) supplies software, firmware, hardware or cloud services used in production. It covers paid and free services, purchases on corporate cards, and connected applications authorized by any employee.
3. Roles. The [Board or Risk Committee] approves this policy and receives a report on third-party risk at least [annually]. The [Chief Risk Officer or title] owns the program. Each relationship has a named business owner. The [CISO] performs security due diligence and monitoring. The [Privacy Officer] reviews data use and transfers. [Procurement] ensures no agreement is signed, renewed or expanded without the reviews this policy requires. The [General Counsel's office and Compliance Officer] own contract terms and regulatory requirements. [Internal Audit] tests the program.
4. Inventory. The program keeps a single inventory of third parties recording the business owner, services, information and systems involved, data locations, subcontractors known to handle [Organization name] information, contract dates, tier, last assessment date and open findings. Business owners update it when a relationship changes.
5. Risk tiers. Every third party is assigned a tier before contracting and at each renewal: Tier 1 (critical), Tier 2 (high), Tier 3 (moderate) or Tier 4 (low), using the criteria in [Appendix A]: sensitivity and volume of information, level of system access, operational dependence, ease of replacement, legal or contractual designation, and location. A third party is re-tiered when its access, data or ownership changes.
6. Due diligence. Before an agreement is signed, the [CISO] and [Privacy Officer] complete the review required for the tier in [Appendix B]. Tier 1 and Tier 2 reviews include a current independent assurance report (SOC 2 Type 2, ISO/IEC 27001 certificate with statement of applicability, HITRUST certification or FedRAMP authorization, as applicable), a standard security questionnaire, evidence of multifactor authentication on all remote and administrative access, backup and recovery capabilities, incident history, subcontractor list, and evidence of insurance. Findings are recorded, and any risk above [risk appetite] is accepted in writing by [title] or remediated before go-live.
7. Required contract terms. Agreements with Tier 1 and Tier 2 third parties include, unless [title] approves an exception in writing: (a) security requirements consistent with [Organization name] standards; (b) notice to [Organization name] of any security incident affecting its information or services within [24 to 72] hours of discovery, with ongoing updates; (c) cooperation in investigations, including access to relevant logs and records; (d) audit and assessment rights and a duty to remediate findings; (e) disclosure and approval of subcontractors handling [Organization name] information, with the same obligations flowed down; (f) limits on data use, including [prohibition on use of data to train artificial intelligence models without written consent]; (g) data location and transfer restrictions; (h) return or certified destruction of information, including backups, at termination; (i) business continuity and transition assistance; (j) insurance of at least [amounts]; (k) indemnity for costs arising from the third party's security failures, with a liability cap for data breaches of not less than [amount or multiple]; and (l) access by [Organization name]'s regulators where required. Sector terms are added as required: a HIPAA business associate agreement under 45 CFR 164.504(e); service provider terms under 16 CFR 314.4(f) or Regulation S-P, including notice within 72 hours; terms under 23 NYCRR 500.11; and DFARS flow-down clauses.
8. Software and supply chain. Suppliers of software used in production provide, on request, a software bill of materials meeting [the CISA 2026 Minimum Elements], notice within [number] days when a component has a known exploited vulnerability, and a statement of secure development practices referencing [NIST SP 800-218]. Updates to security agents and other software with privileged access are deployed in stages where the product allows.
9. Connected applications. Only [roles] may approve third-party applications that connect to [Organization name] email, file storage, customer, finance or code platforms. Integrations are inventoried, given the least access needed, reviewed [quarterly], and their tokens and keys are rotated after any incident at the integration provider.
10. Monitoring. Tier 1 third parties are reassessed at least annually, Tier 2 at least every [two] years, and Tier 3 at renewal. The program also reassesses on events: a reported incident, a product listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, a change of ownership, a regulatory action, or a significant service failure. Open findings are tracked to closure.
11. Incidents. A third-party incident is handled under the [Incident Response Plan]. The [CISO] determines within [hours] whether [Organization name] information or services are affected, and the [Compliance Officer] determines notice duties, including regulator clocks that may start from the third party's notice.
12. Concentration and exit. For each Tier 1 third party, the business owner keeps an exit and continuity plan stating how the service would continue if the third party failed for [two weeks], tested at least [annually]. The program reports single points of failure to the [Board or Risk Committee].
13. Termination. At the end of a relationship, all access is revoked (including accounts, tokens, API keys and remote tools), information is returned or destroyed with written certification, information under legal hold is preserved, and the inventory is updated.
14. Exceptions and review. Exceptions are approved in writing by [title], recorded with an expiration date and reported to the [Risk Committee]. This policy is reviewed at least annually. Approved by [name, title] on [date].
Pictures, Numbers and Infographics
The numbers in this lesson, with their sources. Every figure comes from a government report, a filing, or a federal advisory, and carries the year it describes.
| Figure | Number | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Payment card accounts exposed in Target's breach (Nov. 27 to Dec. 18, 2013) | About 40 million; up to 70 million customer records; "as many as 110 million consumers" overall | Senate Commerce Committee staff report and release, March 2014215 |
| SolarWinds Orion customers contacted / possibly affected (2020) | About 33,000 / "fewer than 18,000" | SolarWinds Form 8-K, Dec. 14, 202016 |
| Kaseya VSA customers compromised / downstream businesses (July 2021) | Fewer than 60 / fewer than 1,500 | Kaseya incident overview, July 202120 |
| Prison sentence for the REvil affiliate charged in the Kaseya attack | 13 years 7 months; over $16 million restitution (May 1, 2024) | U.S. Attorney, N.D. Texas22 |
| Start of MOVEit exploitation | May 27, 2023 (CVE-2023-34362; added to KEV June 2, 2023) | CISA and FBI advisory AA23-158A23 |
| Days from Change Healthcare portal access to ransomware (2024) | 9 (Feb. 12 to Feb. 21) | Witty testimony, May 1, 20247 |
| Money UnitedHealth advanced to providers after the Change attack | More than $6.5 billion (as of April 26, 2024) | Witty testimony7 |
| People affected by the Change Healthcare breach | About 192.7 million (July 31, 2025 update) | HHS OCR FAQ3 |
| Share of people in 2024 large health breaches whose breach occurred at a business associate | 85 percent (about 206.9 million people; 106 of 663 reports) | OCR report to Congress, calendar year 202424 |
| Dealers served by CDK Global (June 2024) | More than 15,000 | Cybersecurity Dive, June 24, 202425 |
| Windows devices crashed by the CrowdStrike update (July 19, 2024) | 8.5 million, "less than one percent of all Windows machines" | Microsoft, July 20, 20244 |
| Morgan Stanley Smith Barney penalty for vendor disposal failures (2022) | $35 million; about 15 million customers affected | SEC, Sept. 20, 202248 |
| North Memorial Health Care HIPAA settlement for a missing business associate agreement (2016) | $1.55 million | OCR settlement as reported March 201634 |
| Vendor breach notice to the firm under amended Regulation S-P | No later than 72 hours; compliance Dec. 3, 2025 (larger) and June 3, 2026 (smaller) | SEC compliance guide10 |
| Business associate breach notice to the covered entity under HIPAA | No later than 60 calendar days after discovery | HHS OCR FAQ; 45 CFR 164.4103 |
| Idaho agency notice to the Idaho attorney general | Within 24 hours of discovering a breach | Idaho Code 28-51-105(1)12 |
| Minimum data fields in an SBOM (2026 version) | 17 | CISA and partners, July 29, 20266 |
| Companies that signed CISA's Secure by Design pledge | 68 at launch (May 2024); about 300 by April 2025 | CISA; Nextgov, Nov. 9, 20264041 |
| Supply chain outcomes in NIST CSF 2.0's GV.SC category | 10 (GV.SC-01 to GV.SC-10) | NIST CSWP 29, Feb. 26, 202413 |
The other infographics in this lesson are the incident timeline, the four-tier vendor model and the notice clock chart. The photographs show a container port (supply chains in physical form), a contract signature (the moment of bargaining power) and a data center server room (where much of the risk now lives).
Common mistakes
Each of these failures is drawn from an enforcement order, a government report, sworn testimony or a federal advisory.
Handing data disposal to a vendor nobody watched
On Sept. 20, 2022 the SEC announced that Morgan Stanley Smith Barney would pay a $35 million penalty over failures affecting about 15 million customers. The firm hired a moving and storage company with no data destruction experience to decommission thousands of hard drives and servers and did not adequately monitor its work; the mover sold devices to a third party, and some were resold on an internet auction site with customer data still on them. The firm had encryption capability on the devices but had not turned it on for years. The SEC found violations of Regulation S-P's Safeguards Rule and Disposal Rule; Enforcement Director Gurbir Grewal called the failures "astonishing."48 A disposal vendor is a Tier 1 or Tier 2 vendor if it handles drives full of customer data, whatever the size of the contract.
Sharing data before the agreement is signed
North Memorial Health Care gave its billing vendor access to protected health information on more than 250,000 people for months without a business associate agreement, and paid $1.55 million after a vendor employee's unencrypted laptop was stolen.34 The fix is procedural: procurement and IT should not open a data feed or create accounts until the required agreement is on file.
Giving a low-risk vendor a path to high-risk systems
Target's refrigeration contractor needed a billing portal, not a route to point-of-sale terminals, yet the Senate staff report traced the attackers' path from the vendor's stolen login into the payment network, and found that intrusion alerts were not acted on.2 Vendor access belongs in its own segment, limited to the system the vendor actually uses, and monitored.
Accepting remote access without multifactor sign-in
UnitedHealth's chief executive testified that the Change Healthcare portal the criminals entered "did not have multi-factor authentication."7 For customers of a critical vendor, the lesson is to ask directly, in writing, whether every remote access path to systems holding their data requires multifactor sign-in, and to put the answer in the contract. NYDFS now lists multifactor sign-in as a baseline vendor contract term.11
Never reviewing connected apps
The 2025 Salesforce data thefts worked because companies had approved connected apps and integrations, sometimes after a phone call from someone posing as IT support, and had not inventoried them or rotated their tokens. The FBI's first recommendation was to review every third-party integration.26
Outsourcing compliance itself
NYDFS reported in October 2025 that it had found weaknesses in vendor due diligence, contract terms, monitoring and policies, and a trend of regulated firms outsourcing critical cybersecurity compliance functions without adequate oversight. Its answer: firms "may not delegate responsibility for compliance."11 A managed security provider can run the tools; the organization still owns the decisions and must be able to show it understood them.
Trusting one MSP tool with every key
Kaseya's customers, and their customers, learned that a remote management platform with administrator rights everywhere is a single point of compromise.20 The joint 2022 advisory on MSPs and NYDFS's 2026 alert on an exploited RMM platform both tell customers to know which tools their providers use, require strong sign-in on them, and keep logs of what the provider does.4445
Questions people ask
Do we need a SOC 2 report from every vendor?
No. Ask for independent assurance from vendors in the top tiers, where the cost of being wrong is high. For lower tiers, a short questionnaire and good contract terms are enough. Some critical vendors will offer an ISO/IEC 27001 certificate, a HITRUST certification or a FedRAMP authorization instead; each can serve if its scope covers the service you buy. What matters more than which report is that a qualified person reads it, including the exceptions and the controls the vendor expects you to run.
What if a large cloud vendor will not negotiate its contract?
The largest cloud and software companies offer standard terms to almost everyone. You can still read their published assurance reports and data processing terms, configure the service securely (much of the risk in cloud services comes from the customer's own settings), limit the data you put in, buy insurance for the gap, and document the decision. NYDFS expects exactly that: where negotiation room is limited, record the risk and add compensating controls.11
Is a vendor's breach our breach under notice laws?
Usually, yes, for the duty to notify people. Most state laws, including Idaho's, make the owner or licensee of the data responsible for notifying residents and require the vendor that keeps the data to tell the owner promptly.12 HIPAA makes the covered entity responsible for notice even when the business associate had the breach, though the work can be delegated to the vendor.3 Contracts should say who pays for and handles notices. Lesson 11 has the details.
How often should we reassess vendors?
No federal rule sets a single frequency; the FTC and NYDFS both say "periodic" and "based on the risk they present."835 A common practice is yearly for critical vendors, every one to two years for high-risk vendors, and at renewal for the rest, plus a review whenever something changes: an incident, an exploited flaw in the vendor's product, an acquisition, or a new kind of data.
Do we have to collect SBOMs from our software suppliers?
Outside a few areas such as FDA cyber devices, no U.S. law requires a private buyer to collect them, and since January 2026 federal agencies are not required to either; OMB left it to agency contracts.5 Large organizations increasingly ask for them for critical software anyway, because they cut the time to answer "are we affected?" when the next Log4j appears. Start with the handful of applications that run your most critical services, and make sure someone or something will actually read them.
Should security tools update themselves automatically?
This is a real trade-off. Fast, automatic updates are how security tools keep up with new attacks; the CrowdStrike outage showed that one bad update can also take down everything at once.4 Many organizations now ask their security vendors whether updates can be staged (a small test group first, then the rest), whether critical servers can lag a few hours behind, and how the vendor tests updates before release. Like any change to production systems, a change in update policy should be planned, tested and reversible.
Are our law and accounting firms vendors?
Yes, and often among the most sensitive ones: they hold merger plans, litigation files, tax records, employee investigations and regulators' correspondence. Include them in the inventory and tier them like anyone else. Module 110 describes the security duties those firms carry, starting with Competence, Confidentiality and Supervision.
Who pays when a vendor's breach forces us to send notices?
Whatever the contract says, and if it says nothing, often you do. That is why the indemnity and liability cap terms in the contract table matter, and why cyber insurance policies should be checked for coverage of incidents that begin at a vendor. Lesson 10 and module 73's lesson on Continuity, Recovery and Cyber Insurance discuss insurance.
Hard questions
Should regulators oversee critical technology vendors directly?
For: Change Healthcare, CDK and CrowdStrike each stopped thousands of organizations that had done their own homework. Customers cannot audit a giant vendor effectively, and individual contracts cannot fix a risk that belongs to a whole sector. The European Union decided this argument in favor of direct oversight in its Digital Operational Resilience Act.46 Against: Direct oversight adds a layer of federal regulation to companies that already answer to their customers, could entrench the largest vendors by raising costs for new ones, and might give customers false comfort that someone else is watching. U.S. bank regulators already examine many bank service providers without a new law. What the evidence shows: the 2024 events show concentration is real and that individual customer diligence did not prevent them; there is not yet U.S. evidence on whether direct oversight would have. Customers can act now by mapping their own single points of failure.
Was ending the federal software attestation mandate relief or retreat?
Relief: OMB said the attestation regime created "unproven and burdensome software accounting processes that prioritized compliance over genuine security investments," and that agencies should judge suppliers by their own risk assessments.5 A signed form does not prove secure code, and suppliers spent heavily on paperwork. Retreat: The single federal form gave every buyer, public and private, a common baseline that suppliers could not ignore, and its removal means each agency and company must negotiate its own terms, which favors large buyers and large suppliers. What the evidence shows: there is no published study measuring whether the attestation requirement improved software security between 2022 and 2026. The underlying practices in NIST SP 800-218 remain the reference either way.37
Should software makers be liable for insecure products?
For: Buyers cannot see inside software, and license terms usually disclaim almost all responsibility, so makers bear little cost for shipping flaws that customers pay to clean up. Liability, supporters argue, would do what voluntary programs such as the Secure by Design pledge could not.39 Against: Software is complex and flaws are inevitable; broad liability could slow updates, drive small developers and open source maintainers out, and raise prices without making code safer. Contracts between sophisticated parties can already allocate risk. What the evidence shows: repeated large incidents involving well-known classes of flaws suggest market pressure alone has been slow; the size of any liability effect is untested in the United States, where Congress has not enacted a software liability law.
Do vendor questionnaires make anyone safer?
Yes: They force a conversation, create a written record the buyer can rely on in a contract dispute, and catch vendors with no program at all. No: Vendors answer their own questions, large vendors answer thousands of them with standard text, and the questions are rarely checked. Target's vendor and Change Healthcare's portal both show that the decisive facts (a vendor with weak practices, a portal without multifactor sign-in) are the kind a questionnaire can miss.27 What the evidence shows: regulators have moved toward evidence: NYDFS asks for penetration test summaries, attestations and audit results, not just answers.11 The best programs ask fewer questions and verify more of them.
How fast should a vendor have to tell you about an incident?
Faster: Every hour a vendor waits is an hour you cannot revoke its access, warn customers or start your own regulator clock; 24 hours or less for critical vendors is common in negotiated contracts. Slower: Early reports are often wrong, and a vendor forced to notify hundreds of customers within hours may spend its first day on notices instead of containment. What the rules show: regulators have settled on 72 hours in several places (Regulation S-P for service providers, DFARS, NYDFS), with the bank rule asking for notice "as soon as possible" for long disruptions, while HIPAA still allows business associates up to 60 days.10313 Contracts can and often do set a shorter clock than the law.
For reporters and advocates
Vendor failures leave public records, if you know where to look.
- SEC filings on EDGAR. Public companies file Form 8-K under Item 1.05 for material cybersecurity incidents, including incidents at vendors that affect their systems, and describe their risk management in Form 10-K Item 1C, where many say how they oversee third-party service providers. Full-text search can find every company that named a given vendor.49
- The HHS breach portal. OCR's public list of health breaches affecting 500 or more people shows the covered entity, the count, the type of breach and whether a business associate was involved.50
- State attorney general breach lists. Several states publish breach notices, and the notices often name the vendor where the breach happened. The Maine attorney general's list is one of the most detailed.
- Enforcement orders. SEC, FTC, OCR and NYDFS orders describe vendor oversight failures in detail, as the Morgan Stanley order shows.48
- Federal advisories. CISA advisories and the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog show when a vendor's product was under attack, which lets you compare a company's public timeline with the government's.27
- Court records. Class actions after vendor breaches are filed on PACER and indexed on CourtListener; large ones are often consolidated before a single federal judge, as happened after MOVEit.
- Idaho public records. Contracts between Idaho public agencies and their technology vendors, business associate agreements of public hospitals, and breach notices sent to the Idaho attorney general under Idaho Code 28-51-105 are generally requestable under Idaho Code Title 74, subject to its security exemptions.12
Questions to ask an agency, hospital, bank or company after a vendor incident: Which vendor was it, and what data or service did it have? Was the vendor in your highest risk tier, and when was it last assessed? What did the contract require for notice, and when did the vendor actually tell you? Did the vendor's remote access require multifactor sign-in? Did you have a backup provider or manual process, and how long did the disruption last? Who on your board or council was told, and when? For public bodies in Idaho: was the Idaho attorney general notified within the 24 hours the statute requires?
Watch for vague language such as "a third-party vendor experienced an incident" with no name, notice letters that arrive many months after the vendor's own discovery, and disclosures that describe the vendor's controls rather than the organization's own oversight. The big picture lesson in this module lists the national databases in full.
Where to go next
- NIST SP 800-161 Rev. 1, Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management Practices (Update 1): NIST's full guide to supply chain risk management, with controls and templates. Free. For CISOs and risk managers building or auditing a program; start with the chapters on enterprise integration and the appendix templates.
- NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0, GV.SC category: The ten supply chain outcomes in the Govern function. Free. Use them as a checklist for board reporting and program gap analysis.
- Interagency Guidance on Third-Party Relationships (Federal Register): The bank regulators' full life-cycle guidance, with lists of diligence topics and contract terms. Free. Useful well beyond banking as a model program description.
- NYDFS Industry Letter on Third-Party Service Providers: A regulator's 2025 list of baseline contract terms and termination steps, including AI use of data. Free. For compliance officers and contracts staff drafting standard terms.
- CISA, 2026 Minimum Elements for a Software Bill of Materials: The current government statement of what an SBOM should contain. Free. For software buyers writing SBOM contract terms and for software makers producing them.
- HHS Sample Business Associate Agreement Provisions: HHS's sample contract language for HIPAA business associates. Free. For health care organizations and their vendors; adapt it, since HHS calls it only sample language.
- CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog: The federal list of flaws known to be exploited. Free, with a data feed. Match it against vendor products in your inventory to trigger vendor reviews.
Still being checked (6 items)
These points could not be fully confirmed against a primary source when this lesson was written and fact checked in November 2026. The text above states each one as uncertain.
- OMB Memorandum M-26-05 (Jan. 23, 2026) was not retrieved directly; its title, date, rescission of M-22-18 and M-23-16 and quoted language come from a Mayer Brown summary of February 2026.
- The exact scope of the changes Executive Order 14306 (June 6, 2025) made to the software attestation provisions of Executive Order 14144 could not be confirmed against the Federal Register text, which would not load; the lesson describes them only in general terms.
- Counts of organizations affected by the MOVEit campaign come from private trackers and are described only as thousands; no official total exists.
- The current versions and pricing of the SIG and CAIQ questionnaires were not checked.
- Descriptions of the CrowdStrike outage's effects on airlines, hospitals, banks and broadcasters, and of dealers working on paper during the CDK outage, rest on widely reported press accounts rather than a single primary document.
- The statement that about 300 companies had signed the Secure by Design pledge by April 2025 comes from Nextgov (Nov. 9, 2026); CISA's pledge page says only hundreds.
Last verified November 14, 2026. General education, not legal, compliance, audit or other professional advice; rule versions and dates are stated in the text, and the sources used are listed in the Notes and Sources below. Check the regulator's current text before relying on any point.
Notes
- Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Interagency Guidance on Third-Party Relationships: Risk Management, 88 FR 37920, June 9, 2023 (final June 6, 2023; replaces OCC Bulletin 2013-29, Federal Reserve SR 13-19/CA 13-21 and FDIC FIL-44-2008; life cycle, due diligence topics, contract provisions, subcontractor and termination considerations) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Majority Staff Report for Chairman Rockefeller, A "Kill Chain" Analysis of the 2013 Target Data Breach, March 26, 2014 (Fazio Mechanical Services; about 40 million card accounts, up to 70 million customer records; FireEye alerts) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights, Change Healthcare Cybersecurity Incident Frequently Asked Questions (updates of Oct. 22, 2024, Jan. 24, 2025 and July 31, 2025: "approximately 192.7 million individuals"; business associate notice no later than 60 calendar days; content last reviewed Aug. 13, 2025) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- David Weston, Microsoft, Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage, July 20, 2024 ("CrowdStrike's update affected 8.5 million Windows devices, or less than one percent of all Windows machines") (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Office of Management and Budget, Memorandum M-26-05, Adopting a Risk-based Approach to Software and Hardware Security, Jan. 23, 2026, rescinding M-22-18 and M-23-16, as summarized and quoted in Mayer Brown, OMB Rescinds Biden-Era Software Security Memoranda, February 2026 (the memo itself was not retrieved for this lesson) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- CISA, NSA, FBI and international partners, 2026 Minimum Elements for a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM), Version 2.1, July 29, 2026 (17 minimum data fields) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Andrew Witty, Chief Executive Officer, UnitedHealth Group, written testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, May 1, 2024 (Citrix portal without multi-factor authentication; access Feb. 12, ransomware Feb. 21; more than $6.5 billion advanced as of April 26) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Federal Trade Commission, Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information (Safeguards Rule), 16 CFR 314.4(f), eCFR text up to date as of Oct. 23, 2026 (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- 45 CFR 164.504(e), "Standard: Business associate contracts," including (e)(1)(ii) and (e)(2)(i) to (iii); see also 45 CFR 164.308(b) and 164.314(a). Text via Cornell Legal Information Institute (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Regulation S-P: Small Entity Compliance Guide for the amendments adopted May 16, 2024 (service provider notice "as soon as possible, but no later than 72 hours after becoming aware"; customer notice not later than 30 days; compliance Dec. 3, 2025 for larger entities and June 3, 2026 for smaller entities); 17 CFR 248.30 (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- New York State Department of Financial Services, Industry Letter, Guidance on Managing Risks Related to Third-Party Service Providers, Oct. 21, 2025 (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Idaho Code 28-51-105, "Disclosure of breach of security of computerized personal information by an agency, individual or a commercial entity," subsections (1) to (3), Idaho Legislature website (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- National Institute of Standards and Technology, The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29, Feb. 26, 2024, Govern function, category GV.SC (GV.SC-01 to GV.SC-10) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- NIST Computer Security Resource Center, New NIST Errata Update: C-SCRM, Nov. 1, 2024, on SP 800-161 Rev. 1, Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Systems and Organizations (May 2022; Update 1 clarifies vulnerability advisory reports and SBOMs) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, press release, Rockefeller: Staff Report Details Target's Missed Opportunities to Stop Massive Data Breach, March 25, 2014 ("as many as 110 million consumers") (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- SolarWinds Corporation, Form 8-K, filed Dec. 14, 2020, SEC EDGAR (about 33,000 Orion customers contacted; "fewer than 18,000" may have installed affected updates released March to June 2020) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- CISA, Emergency Directive 21-01, Mitigate SolarWinds Orion Code Compromise, Dec. 13, 2020 (date and order confirmed in a second fact check, Nov. 14, 2026) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Executive Order 14028, Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity, May 12, 2021, 86 FR 26633 (May 17, 2021), Section 4, "Enhancing Software Supply Chain Security" (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Covington and Burling, Inside Privacy, SEC Voluntarily Dismisses SolarWinds Litigation, November 2025 (SEC dismissal with prejudice announced Nov. 20, 2025; July 18, 2024 ruling by Judge Paul Engelmayer, S.D.N.Y.) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Kaseya, Incident Overview and Technical Details, July 2021 ("fewer than 60 Kaseya customers" using VSA on-premises; "fewer than 1,500 downstream businesses") (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Ukrainian Arrested and Charged with Ransomware Attack on Kaseya, Nov. 8, 2021 (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- U.S. Attorney's Office, Northern District of Texas, Sodinokibi/REvil Affiliate Sentenced for Role in $700M Ransomware Scheme, May 1, 2024 (13 years and seven months; over $16 million restitution) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- CISA and FBI, Cybersecurity Advisory AA23-158A, #StopRansomware: CL0P Ransomware Gang Exploits CVE-2023-34362 MOVEit Vulnerability, June 7, 2023, updated June 16, 2023 (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- HHS Office for Civil Rights, Annual Report to Congress on Breaches of Unsecured Protected Health Information, calendar year 2024 (663 reports of 500 or more; business associates 106 reports, 16 percent, about 206.9 million people, 85 percent), as cited in module 109 (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Cybersecurity Dive, CDK cyberattack coverage, June 24, 2024 (more than 15,000 dealers; SEC disclosures by Sonic Automotive, Penske Automotive Group, AutoNation, Group 1 Automotive and Lithia Motors) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Federal Bureau of Investigation, FLASH-20250912-001, Cyber Criminal Groups UNC6040 and UNC6395 Compromising Salesforce Instances for Data Theft and Extortion, Sept. 12, 2025 (TLP:CLEAR) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- CISA, Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, continuously updated (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Shared Assessments, Standardized Information Gathering (SIG) Questionnaire, product page (licensed; current version and pricing not checked for this lesson) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Cloud Security Alliance, STAR Registry and the Consensus Assessments Initiative Questionnaire (free; maps to the Cloud Controls Matrix; current version not checked for this lesson) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- AICPA and CIMA, System and Organization Controls: SOC Suite of Services (Trust Services Criteria relevant to security, availability, processing integrity, confidentiality or privacy; exposure draft of proposed 2027 SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- FDIC, Financial Institution Letter FIL-74-2021, Computer-Security Incident Notification Final Rule, Nov. 18, 2021 (bank notice within 36 hours; bank service provider notice "as soon as possible" for incidents disrupting covered services four or more hours; compliance May 1, 2022) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Covington and Burling, Inside Privacy, CISA Submits Final CIRCIA Rule for OMB Review, Oct. 8, 2026; CIRCIA, 6 U.S.C. 681 to 681g, and the proposed rule at 89 FR 23644 (April 4, 2024). Nextgov/FCW, Nov. 9, 2026, reported the final rule still pending White House review; no final rule had been published as of Nov. 14, 2026 (read Nov. 14, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- HHS Office for Civil Rights, Business Associate Contracts: Sample Business Associate Agreement Provisions, Jan. 25, 2013 (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Mintz, Pay Attention to Business Associate Agreements, March 22, 2016 (North Memorial Health Care of Minnesota, $1.55 million resolution announced by HHS March 16, 2016) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- New York State Department of Financial Services, 23 NYCRR Part 500, Cybersecurity Requirements for Financial Services Companies, as amended Nov. 1, 2023, sections 500.11 (third-party service provider security policy) and 500.17(a) (notice within 72 hours) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Department of Defense (Department of War), DFARS Class Deviation 2026-O0025, Revision 3, signed Sept. 3, 2026, implementing the July 13, 2026 memorandum suspending CMMC Phase 2; DFARS 252.204-7012 (72-hour reporting, subcontract flow-down); DFARS CMMC acquisition rule, 90 FR 43560 (Sept. 10, 2025), effective Nov. 10, 2025; facts as compiled in this site's module 111 fact sheet and re-read (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- NIST, SP 800-218, Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) Version 1.1, February 2022 (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Executive Order 14306, Sustaining Select Efforts to Strengthen the Nation's Cybersecurity and Amending Executive Order 13694 and Executive Order 14144, June 6, 2025, Federal Register June 11, 2025 (the Federal Register page could not be loaded for this lesson; the scope of the changes to Executive Order 14144 is stated in general terms) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- CISA, Secure by Design Pledge (goals; "voluntary and not legally binding") (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- CISA, CISA Announces Secure by Design Commitments from Leading Technology Providers, May 2024, archived page (68 software manufacturers) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- David DiMolfetta, Nextgov/FCW, CISA's former Secure by Design chiefs launch their own software safety organization, Nov. 9, 2026 (about 300 signers by April 2025; Software Safety Institute) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- CISA, Emergency Directive 22-02, Mitigate Apache Log4j Vulnerability, Dec. 17, 2021 (date confirmed against CISA's archived Dec. 17, 2021 announcement, Nov. 14, 2026) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- CISA, Alert, Reported Supply Chain Compromise Affecting XZ Utils Data Compression Library, CVE-2024-3094, March 29, 2024 (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- CISA, NSA, FBI and the cybersecurity authorities of the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, Cybersecurity Advisory AA22-131A, Protecting Against Cyber Threats to Managed Service Providers and their Customers, May 11, 2022 (recommendations confirmed against the advisory PDF as republished by the UK National Cyber Security Centre, Nov. 14, 2026) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- New York State Department of Financial Services, Industry Letter, Cybersecurity Alert: N-central Vulnerability Affecting Some Managed Service Providers, Aug. 11, 2026 (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 of the European Parliament and of the Council on digital operational resilience for the financial sector (DORA), applying from Jan. 17, 2025, including its oversight framework for critical ICT third-party service providers (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- Congressional Research Service, The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015: Expiring Provisions, IF12959, updated Sept. 3, 2026 (provisions extended to Dec. 11, 2026), as compiled in this site's module 111 fact sheet (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, press release, Morgan Stanley Smith Barney to Pay $35 Million for Extensive Failures to Safeguard Personal Information of Millions of Customers, Sept. 20, 2022, and order in Release No. 34-95832, as reproduced by Mondo Visione (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, EDGAR Full Text Search; Form 8-K Item 1.05 and Form 10-K Item 1C under the cybersecurity disclosure rules adopted July 26, 2023 (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
- HHS Office for Civil Rights, Breach Portal: Notice to the Secretary of HHS Breach of Unsecured Protected Health Information (cases affecting 500 or more individuals) (read Nov. 13, 2026). Read it online. ↩
Check yourself
1. According to the 2023 Interagency Guidance on Third-Party Relationships, what happens to a bank's responsibilities when it uses a vendor?
The Federal Reserve, FDIC and OCC guidance (88 FR 37920, June 9, 2023) states that the use of third parties does not diminish or remove banking organizations' responsibilities.
2. Under the SEC's amended Regulation S-P, how quickly must a service provider notify a covered firm after becoming aware of a breach of a customer information system it maintains?
The SEC's Regulation S-P compliance guide for the May 16, 2024 amendments requires notice as soon as possible, but no later than 72 hours after becoming aware.
3. What did UnitedHealth's chief executive tell the Senate about the Change Healthcare portal the criminals used in February 2024?
Andrew Witty's May 1, 2024 written testimony to the Senate Finance Committee: the Citrix portal did not have multi-factor authentication.
4. In a SOC 2 report, what are complementary user entity controls?
AICPA SOC reports list complementary user entity controls, the customer-side duties such as managing users and enabling multifactor sign-in, which customers must perform for the vendor's controls to be effective.
5. What did OMB Memorandum M-26-05 of Jan. 23, 2026 do?
M-26-05 rescinded M-22-18 and M-23-16 and left software assurance to each agency's risk-based policy, while keeping the CISA form available (Mayer Brown summary, February 2026).
6. How many minimum data fields does the 2026 Minimum Elements for a Software Bill of Materials list?
The July 29, 2026 document from CISA, NSA, FBI and partners lists 17 minimum data fields, including component hash and SBOM generation context.
7. Under Idaho Code 28-51-105(2), what must a company that keeps personal information it does not own do after discovering a breach?
Idaho Code 28-51-105(2) requires notice to and cooperation with the owner or licensee immediately following discovery when misuse has occurred or is reasonably likely; the 24-hour attorney general notice in subsection (1) applies to agencies.
8. According to Kaseya, how many downstream businesses were affected by the July 2, 2021 VSA ransomware attack?
Kaseya's incident overview counted fewer than 60 of its customers compromised and fewer than 1,500 downstream businesses.
9. Why did the SEC fine Morgan Stanley Smith Barney $35 million in 2022?
The SEC's Sept. 20, 2022 order found the firm hired a moving and storage company with no data destruction experience and did not adequately monitor it, violating Regulation S-P's Safeguards and Disposal Rules.
10. What does New York's 23 NYCRR 500.17 say about cybersecurity incidents at a third-party service provider?
Section 500.17(a)(1) requires notice no later than 72 hours after determining that a cybersecurity incident has occurred at the covered entity, its affiliates, or a third-party service provider.
Terms in this lesson
- Third-party risk management (TPRM)
- The program an organization uses to identify, assess, contract with, monitor and end relationships with vendors and other outside parties, in proportion to the risk each one carries.
- Fourth party
- A vendor's own vendor or subcontractor, such as the cloud provider under a SaaS application, with which the customer usually has no direct contract.
- Concentration risk
- The risk that many organizations, or many of one organization's services, depend on the same provider, so that a single failure affects all of them at once.
- Vendor tiering
- Sorting vendors into risk levels based on data, access, operational dependence and replaceability, so review effort goes where the risk is.
- SOC 2 Type 2 report
- An independent CPA's examination of whether a service organization's controls relevant to the AICPA Trust Services Criteria were suitably designed and operated effectively over a period, usually six to twelve months.
- Bridge letter
- A short statement from a vendor's management, not audited, that no material control changes occurred between the end of its last SOC report period and the letter's date.
- Carve-out method
- A SOC reporting approach that excludes a subservice organization's controls from the report, so the customer may need that subservice organization's own report.
- Complementary user entity controls (CUECs)
- Controls a vendor's SOC report says its customers must perform for the vendor's controls to work, such as managing their own users and enabling multifactor sign-in.
- SIG and CAIQ
- Two standard security questionnaires: the licensed Standardized Information Gathering questionnaire from Shared Assessments, and the free Consensus Assessments Initiative Questionnaire from the Cloud Security Alliance.
- Business associate agreement (BAA)
- The written contract HIPAA requires before a vendor creates, receives, maintains or transmits protected health information for a covered entity, with terms listed in 45 CFR 164.504(e).
- Software bill of materials (SBOM)
- A machine-readable list of the components in a piece of software, with versions, suppliers and relationships; CISA's 2026 minimum elements list 17 data fields.
- VEX
- Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange: a supplier's statement of whether a known vulnerability in a component actually affects its product.
- Remote monitoring and management (RMM)
- Software that managed service providers use to administer many clients' computers remotely, usually with administrator rights.
- OAuth token
- A digital credential that lets one application act on a user's behalf in another, often for long periods without a new password or multifactor prompt.
- Super cap
- A contract term setting a separate, higher limit on a vendor's liability for data breaches or confidentiality failures than its general liability cap.
Sources
- Interagency Guidance on Third-Party Relationships: Risk Management, 88 FR 37920 (2023-06-09) checked 2026-11
- FTC Safeguards Rule, 16 CFR 314.4 (2026-10-23) checked 2026-11
- 45 CFR 164.504, business associate contracts (2026-11-13) checked 2026-11
- SEC Regulation S-P Small Entity Compliance Guide (2024 amendments) (2024-05-16) checked 2026-11
- NYDFS Industry Letter: Guidance on Managing Risks Related to Third-Party Service Providers (2025-10-21) checked 2026-11
- 23 NYCRR Part 500 (2023-11-01) checked 2026-11
- Idaho Code 28-51-105 (2026-11-13) checked 2026-11
- NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 (CSWP 29) (2024-02-26) checked 2026-11
- Senate Commerce Committee, A Kill Chain Analysis of the 2013 Target Data Breach (2014-03-26) checked 2026-11
- Andrew Witty testimony, Senate Finance Committee (2024-05-01) checked 2026-11
- Executive Order 14028, Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity (2021-05-12) checked 2026-11
- CISA and partners, 2026 Minimum Elements for a Software Bill of Materials (2026-07-29) checked 2026-11
- FBI FLASH-20250912-001 on UNC6040 and UNC6395 (2025-09-12) checked 2026-11
- CISA and FBI advisory AA23-158A (MOVEit) (2023-06-07) checked 2026-11
- HHS OCR Change Healthcare Cybersecurity Incident FAQ (2025-08-13) checked 2026-11