Module 20: The Sixth Amendment

How We Got Here: Six Trial Rights, Six Histories

If the Fifth Amendment covers what the government must do before and while it accuses, the Sixth covers the trial itself. It lists the rights of a person who is already charged: a speedy and public trial, an impartial jury, notice of the accusation, confrontation of witnesses, compulsory process for defense witnesses, and a lawyer. Like the Fifth, it gathers guarantees with separate pedigrees.

Speed

The Constitution Annotated traces the demand for quick justice to Magna Carta in 1215 ("We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right," in the words the Supreme Court quoted) and to the Assize of Clarendon in 1166. Coke listed speed among the essential qualities of justice, and several state constitutions already guaranteed the right when the Sixth Amendment was ratified in 1791.¹

Openness

Criminal trials in England and America were generally open, and the public trial was one of the traits that separated the common law's accusatorial system from the inquisitorial one. The Court has described the guarantee as "a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution." The usual outlier cited is the Court of Star Chamber, abolished in 1641.²

The jury

Juries in criminal cases grew in England after the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 ended trial by ordeal. The old story that Magna Carta guaranteed jury trial has been called "one of the most revered of legal fables." What the Framers did know was Blackstone, who described a presentment and a trial by jury as a "two-fold barrier" between the people's liberties and the prerogative of the crown, and who said an accusation should be confirmed "by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours." The drafters of the Amendment argued over whether to require a local jury and a right to strike jurors, and the final language reads as a compromise that left room for varied colonial practice.³

Counsel

At English common law a person charged with a felony could not retain counsel, though one charged with a misdemeanor could, and judges softened the rule in practice by letting lawyers argue points of law. The records of Congress and the ratifying conventions say little about the counsel clause. In the Act of April 30, 1790, Congress provided that anyone indicted for treason or another capital crime "shall be allowed to make his full defense by counsel learned in the law," and that the court would assign counsel on request. The Constitution Annotated reads the 1790 statutes as suggesting the First Congress thought the right reached mainly a defendant who could afford a lawyer.⁴

Confrontation

The Court has traced confrontation to the common law's rejection of testimony by deposition and affidavit. In its 1895 words, the clause's "primary object" was "to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits" from being used against the defendant. The famous English example is the 1603 treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, where the accusations of Lord Cobham were read to the jury and Raleigh was not allowed to question him. Crawford v. Washington opens its history there.⁵⁶

The Text

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."

U.S. Const. amend. VI, as transcribed by the National Archives

Congress sent it to the states on September 25, 1789 as "Article the eighth," and it was ratified with nine others by December 15, 1791. It has 81 words.⁷

Reading the list

• "In all criminal prosecutions." The rights belong to the "accused" in a criminal case. The Constitution Annotated notes that the Amendment does not govern deportation proceedings, that the right to counsel on appeal rests on due process, and that the Court treats contempt proceedings as criminal prosecutions for these purposes.⁸
• "Speedy and public." Two separate guarantees, covered in the next two sections.
• "Impartial jury of the State and district." This one clause carries the jury's size, unanimity, impartiality and local character.
• "Informed of the nature and cause of the accusation." This lesson did not open a source on the case law under this clause, and does not describe it beyond the text.
• "Confronted with the witnesses against him." Cross-examination and the rule against untested testimonial statements.
• "Compulsory process." The defendant's power to bring witnesses to court.
• "Assistance of Counsel." The right to a lawyer, and, since Gideon, to a free one for a person who cannot pay.

States are bound too

The Amendment's own text binds only the federal government. The Constitution Annotated reports that the House adopted a jury-trial guarantee against the states in August 1789, that the Senate rejected it, and that Twitchell v. Commonwealth in 1869 ended doubt that the Amendment did not itself reach the states. The Court has since applied the Sixth Amendment's rights to state prosecutions through the Fourteenth Amendment, a process this course covers in Module 10. Speedy trial came in 1967, compulsory process the same year, jury trial in 1968, confrontation in 1965, public trial in the 1948 case In re Oliver, and counsel in 1963.⁸⁹¹⁰

The Right to a Speedy Trial

Why speed matters

The Court has named three purposes: to prevent "undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial," to "minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation," and to "limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself." In Klopfer v. North Carolina (1967) the Court held the right "as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment" and applied it to the states.¹¹

When the clock starts

In United States v. Marion (1971) the Court held the speedy trial right does not apply before a person is arrested or formally charged. A delay before charges can still raise a due process claim, and statutes of limitations also limit old prosecutions, but the Sixth Amendment clock starts at arrest or accusation.¹¹

Barker: no stopwatch

The leading case is Barker v. Wingo (June 22, 1972). Willie Mae Barker was tried for murder more than five years after his arrest. Most of the delay came from the prosecution's decision to try a co-defendant first, and it took six trials over more than four years to convict him. Barker did not object until roughly three and a half years into the delay. The Court refused two rigid rules, a fixed number of days within which trial must occur and a rule that a defendant who does not demand a trial has waived the right, and adopted a balancing test: "The approach we accept is a balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed." It then named four factors: "Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." A balancing test, the Court said, "necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis."¹²¹³

On the facts, the Court called the case close. The first two factors favored Barker, since five years is an extraordinary delay and the prosecution's reason did not justify four years. But the prejudice was "minimal." Barker spent ten months in jail before trial and lived under a cloud of suspicion, but no defense witness died or disappeared. And his failure to demand a trial during most of the period suggested he had gambled on his co-defendant's acquittal. The Court held there was no violation. Of the three interests the right protects, the Court said, "the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system."¹²¹³

How long is too long

The length of delay works as a "triggering mechanism": only a delay long enough to be "presumptively prejudicial" requires the other factors to be weighed, and the Court has set no number. The Constitution Annotated reports that the Court treated as presumptively prejudicial a 90-month delay after arrest in United States v. Loud Hawk (1986) and an eight and one-half year delay after indictment in Doggett v. United States (1992), and that lower courts have generally found postaccusation delay presumptively prejudicial "at least as it approaches one year." The less serious the charge, the less delay a court should tolerate.¹⁴

Statutes fill the gap

Because the Constitution gives no number, legislatures supplied one. The federal Speedy Trial Act requires that trial begin within seventy days of the filing of the indictment or information or the defendant's first appearance, whichever is later, and sets thirty days from arrest to indictment. Excluded periods extend the clock, and when the deadlines are missed the charge "shall be dismissed or otherwise dropped," with or without prejudice depending on the seriousness of the offense, the circumstances, and the effect of reprosecution.¹⁵

Idaho has its own version, discussed below. The existence of both a loose constitutional test and strict statutory clocks explains a common experience: a defendant may lose a constitutional claim after a long delay and still win dismissal under a statute.

The Right to a Public Trial

The public trial right belongs to the accused. The Court has said that "the requirement of a public trial is for the benefit of the accused," that "the presence of interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility," and that "[t]he sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend [a criminal trial] gives assurance that established procedures are being followed and that deviations will become known." The press and public have their own claim to attend, which rests on the First Amendment and is a separate subject.¹⁰

Beyond the trial itself

The right covers the trial and also at least two pretrial proceedings. In Waller v. Georgia (May 21, 1984), where the trial court had closed a suppression hearing over the defendants' objection, the Court held that "any closure of a suppression hearing over the objections of the accused must meet the tests" set for closing a trial, because "suppression hearings often are as important as the trial itself." In Presley v. Georgia (January 19, 2010), the Court held "the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to the voir dire of prospective jurors." The Constitution Annotated reports that the Court has never decided whether the right applies at sentencing.¹⁶¹⁷¹⁰

The four-part test

A closure can be justified, but only if: "the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure." Presley added that trial courts must consider alternatives to closure "even when they are not offered by the parties."¹⁶¹⁷

The test reflects a balance. Privacy of a witness, the safety of a juror or protection of a child may justify a closure, and a judge who meets the four steps can close part of a proceeding. A judge who skips them, even for a good reason, has not met the standard.

The Right to an Impartial Jury

Incorporation: Duncan

For most of American history the Sixth Amendment jury right did not bind the states. Duncan v. Louisiana (May 20, 1968) changed that. Gary Duncan was convicted of simple battery, a misdemeanor punishable by up to two years in prison and a $300 fine, after Louisiana refused him a jury because its constitution granted one only where capital punishment or hard labor could be imposed. The Court held that "trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice" and that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases that would come within the Sixth Amendment if tried in a federal court.¹⁸

Petty offenses

The guarantee has never covered every offense. Duncan itself expressed "no constitutional doubts" about "prosecuting petty crimes without extending a right to jury trial." Where does petty end? In Baldwin v. New York (1970) a plurality drew a bright line: "no offense can be deemed 'petty' for purposes of the right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized." Two other Justices would have gone further, and later cases treat the six-month rule as the standard.¹⁸¹⁹

How many jurors

Historical practice was twelve, and the Court said so in 1898. In Williams v. Florida (1970) the Court rejected that history-based view and upheld a six-person jury, reasoning that the jury's essential feature is "the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen." In Ballew v. Georgia (1978) the Court held five too few. The result is a floor of six, which looks like a compromise that neither the text nor the founding practice fully explains, and the Constitution Annotated says as much by describing the shift as one from historical to functional analysis.²⁰

Unanimity: Ramos

Must the verdict be unanimous? In federal court, yes, a rule the Court had stated since at least 1898. For state courts, a splintered 1972 decision, Apodaca v. Oregon, allowed Oregon to convict on a 10 to 2 vote, with Justice Powell's concurrence resting on the view that the Fourteenth Amendment did not carry the unanimity requirement to the states. Two states, Oregon and Louisiana, used nonunanimous verdicts for serious crimes. Burch v. Louisiana (1979) required unanimity for six-person juries.²¹

Ramos v. Louisiana (April 20, 2020) ended the split. Evangelisto Ramos was convicted of a serious crime by a 10 to 2 vote and sentenced to life without parole. Justice Gorsuch wrote that "in 48 States and federal court, a single juror's vote to acquit is enough to prevent a conviction. But two States, Louisiana and Oregon, have long punished people based on 10-to-2 verdicts." The Court held that the Sixth Amendment's "trial by an impartial jury" carries a unanimity requirement, that the Amendment's rights mean the same thing against states as against the federal government ("if the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial requires a unanimous verdict to support a conviction in federal court, it requires no less in state court"), and that Apodaca should be overruled. The opinion noted that Louisiana first endorsed nonunanimous verdicts for serious crimes at an 1898 constitutional convention whose avowed purpose, according to a committee chairman, was to "establish the supremacy of the white race."²²

The judgment was six to three. Parts of the opinion commanded a majority and parts only a plurality. Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, and Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and, in most of it, Justice Kagan, dissented. The majority applied the stare decisis factors and concluded they did not favor keeping Apodaca, whose plurality and concurring opinions it called "gravely mistaken." This lesson read the syllabus and parts of the majority opinion, not the dissent or the concurrences in full.²²

Juries, Facts and Fair Selection

Who finds the facts that raise a sentence

The jury right has a second life in sentencing. In Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) the Court held that "other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Blakely v. Washington (June 24, 2004) applied it to a state guideline system. Blakely pleaded guilty to kidnapping his estranged wife, the facts he admitted supported a sentence of up to 53 months, and the judge imposed 90 months after finding "deliberate cruelty." The Court held that "the 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." Five Justices joined the opinion and four dissented.²³²⁴

The most recent application is Erlinger v. United States (June 21, 2024). A federal statute raises the penalty for a felon unlawfully possessing a firearm from a maximum of ten years to a mandatory minimum of fifteen when the defendant has three prior convictions for offenses committed on different occasions. A judge had decided the "different occasions" question. The Court, six to three, held that Erlinger "was entitled to have a jury resolve ACCA's occasions inquiry unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt." Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justice Alito and in part by Justice Jackson, dissented, and Justice Jackson also dissented separately.²⁵

A fair cross-section and no discrimination

Impartiality has two parts, a jury pool drawn from a fair cross-section of the community and jurors without bias. Taylor v. Louisiana (1975) held that "trial by jury presupposes a jury drawn from a pool broadly representative of the community as well as impartial in a specific case." Racial discrimination in picking jurors is barred by the Equal Protection Clause under Batson v. Kentucky (1986): "the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the State will not exclude members of his race from the jury venire on account of race."²⁶

The Court returned to Batson in Pitchford v. Cain (May 28, 2026). Terry Pitchford was a Black teenager charged with capital murder after a 2004 grocery store robbery in Mississippi, and the prosecutor struck four Black prospective jurors. On federal habeas review, a five-Justice majority held that the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably applied Batson and unreasonably found that Pitchford waived his chance to rebut the prosecutor's race-neutral reasons, because the trial court never reached Batson's third step and had assured counsel that the objection was preserved. The Court said "the job of enforcing Batson rests first and foremost with trial judges." Four Justices dissented. The decision turned on the demanding federal habeas standard, so it does not by itself decide whether the strikes were discriminatory, and this lesson read the syllabus, not the opinion or dissent.²⁷

Confrontation

Crawford: from reliability to cross-examination

For decades the test for admitting an absent witness's out-of-court statement came from Ohio v. Roberts (1980): the statement was admissible if it bore "adequate indicia of reliability." Crawford v. Washington (March 8, 2004) threw that test out for testimonial statements. Michael Crawford stabbed a man who had allegedly tried to rape his wife, Sylvia. The State played for the jury Sylvia's tape-recorded police statement, offered to show the stabbing was not in self-defense, although Crawford had no chance to cross-examine her; Washington's marital privilege kept her off the stand.⁶

Justice Scalia wrote for seven Justices that the Framers would not have allowed "testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination." On reliability, the Court was blunt. The Clause's ultimate goal is reliable evidence, but it is "a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee": it does not require that evidence be reliable as a judge sees it, and requires that reliability be tested through cross-examination. And: "Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty." The Court declined to define "testimonial" fully but said that "whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations." Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor, concurred only in the judgment in a separate opinion that this lesson did not read in full.⁶

The history and the text point one way for many readers and the other for some. The majority read "witnesses against him" as a reference to the common-law right, with its exceptions for dying declarations and forfeiture by wrongdoing, which the Court noted but did not decide. The Roberts test had let a judge decide that a statement was reliable enough, and Crawford held that the Clause does not allow a judge's finding of reliability to replace the defendant's chance to question the witness. Those who prefer a functional approach to hearsay may still see value in flexible tests, and the Court itself has had to work out what "testimonial" means case by case.⁶²⁸

What counts as testimonial

If a statement is not testimonial, the Clause does not apply. Davis v. Washington (June 19, 2006) drew a line for police questioning: statements are nontestimonial when made "under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency," and testimonial when the circumstances show no such emergency and "the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." A frantic 911 call during an assault qualified for the first category, and an account given to officers when no emergency was in progress fell in the second. Michigan v. Bryant (2011) applied the emergency idea to a mortally wounded man's statements to police.²⁹

Lab reports and expert witnesses

In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (June 25, 2009), by a five to four vote, the Court held that certificates in which state analysts reported that a seized substance was cocaine were testimonial, so the analysts could be cross-examined. Bullcoming v. New Mexico (2011) held that a different analyst could not stand in for the one who signed the report. Williams v. Illinois (2012) fractured the Court on whether an expert may relate an absent analyst's findings as the basis for her own opinion.³⁰²⁸

Smith v. Arizona (June 21, 2024) took up that question. Jason Smith was found with a large quantity of what appeared to be drugs. The analyst who tested the items, Elizabeth Rast, left the lab, and the State had another analyst, Greggory Longoni, give an "independent opinion" that conveyed to the jury what her notes and report showed. The Court held that "when an expert conveys an absent analyst's statements in support of the expert's opinion, and the statements provide that support only if true, then the statements come into evidence for their truth." The Clause's hearsay limit applies only to statements offered for their truth, so labeling the statements the basis for an opinion does not avoid it. Justice Kagan wrote for the Court, with Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joining parts, and Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, concurred in the judgment. The Court vacated and left to the state court whether the statements were testimonial.³¹

No "opening the door" exception

In Hemphill v. New York (January 20, 2022), a child was killed by a stray bullet in the Bronx. Another man, Nicholas Morris, had been at the scene, and the defense elicited testimony that police found ammunition in his apartment. Morris could not testify. The trial court let the prosecution read parts of his plea allocution, in which he admitted possessing a different gun, on the theory that the defense had "opened the door." The Court, eight to one, held that this violated the Clause: "If Crawford stands for anything, it is that the history, text, and purpose of the Confrontation Clause bar judges from substituting their own determinations of reliability for the method the Constitution guarantees." Justice Thomas dissented.³²

Compulsory Process

The clause gives the accused the power of the court to bring in witnesses, the counterpart of confrontation. In Washington v. Texas (June 12, 1967), a Texas statute barred anyone charged as a participant in the same crime from testifying for another defendant, though the prosecution could call them. Jackie Washington, convicted of murder, wanted to call Charles Fuller, who the evidence showed had been at the shooting with a shotgun. The Court held the right applicable to the states and the statute unconstitutional. It described the right: "The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies." The Framers, the Court said, "did not intend to commit the futile act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testimony he had no right to use." Justice Harlan concurred in the result.³³

The Right to Counsel and Gideon

From Powell to Gideon

Before 1963, federal courts had to supply a lawyer to a defendant who could not afford one, while states were governed by Betts v. Brady (1942), which asked case by case whether the lack of a lawyer had made the trial unfair. The Constitution Annotated describes the circumstances the Court weighed: the defendant's own characteristics, the complexity of the charge, and problems at trial.³⁴

Clarence Earl Gideon was charged in Florida with breaking into a poolroom with intent to commit a misdemeanor, a felony under Florida law. He appeared without funds and without a lawyer and asked the court to appoint one. The judge answered: "Under the laws of the State of Florida, the only time the Court can appoint Counsel to represent a Defendant is when that person is charged with a capital offense."³⁵

Gideon v. Wainwright (March 18, 1963) overruled Betts. Justice Black wrote that in the adversary system any person haled into court who cannot afford a lawyer "cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth." He added that "lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries," and that "this noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him." Justices Douglas, Clark and Harlan wrote separately.³⁵

How far does it reach

Gideon involved a felony. In Argersinger v. Hamlin (June 12, 1972) the Court extended it to a misdemeanor: Jon Argersinger was charged with carrying a concealed weapon, an offense punishable by up to six months and a $1,000 fine, and was tried by a judge without a lawyer. The Court held that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial."³⁶

The rule was narrowed in Scott v. Illinois (1979): counsel is required only if the defendant is actually sentenced to imprisonment, not whenever imprisonment is authorized. Alabama v. Shelton (2002) extended the rule to a suspended sentence, since a later jail term would rest on the uncounseled conviction. The Constitution Annotated adds that Gideon applies retroactively, and that an uncounseled conviction cannot be used to prove guilt in a later trial.³⁴

Some states went further than the Constitution requires, and a state can appoint counsel for every case in which jail is possible. Idaho's statute is an example.

Effective Assistance and Representing Yourself

Strickland: what counts as ineffective

A lawyer's presence is not enough. Strickland v. Washington (May 14, 1984) arose from a Florida defendant who pleaded guilty to an indictment that included three capital murder charges and was sentenced to death, and who later argued that his lawyer had not investigated mitigating evidence enough. Justice O'Connor wrote that "the benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." A defendant must show two things: "that counsel's performance was deficient" and "that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense."³⁷

On performance, "the proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms," reviewed in a way that is "highly deferential," avoiding "the distorting effects of hindsight," with "a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." On prejudice, "the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." The Court found no prejudice on the facts. The test is demanding by design. One view holds that it tolerates weak lawyering that courts could remedy, and another holds that second-guessing a lawyer's strategy afterward would make trial lawyers cautious in ways that help no defendant.³⁷

Faretta: the right to go without

The right to a lawyer includes the right not to have one. Faretta v. California (June 30, 1975) held that a defendant who "voluntarily and intelligently elects" to proceed without counsel has a constitutional right of self-representation, and that a state erred in forcing a public defender on a defendant who wanted to defend himself. The Court's reasoning rested on the Sixth Amendment's structure: "forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to do so." To waive counsel the accused must act "knowingly and intelligently" and "be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.'"³⁸

When the Right Attaches and What It Covers

Starting point: formal charge

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel "does not attach until a prosecution is commenced," as the Court said in Rothgery v. Gillespie County (2008). Rothgery held that an initial hearing at which no prosecutor was involved can start it. After that, the Court asks whether a proceeding is a "critical stage," going back to the 1932 observation in Powell v. Alabama that the period from arraignment to trial, "when consultation, thorough-going investigation and preparation [are] vitally important," is one where counsel matters as much as at trial.³⁹

Questioning after charge

The Sixth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment's Miranda rule are different sources of a right to a lawyer. Massiah v. United States (1964) held that questioning a charged defendant without his lawyer violated the Sixth Amendment, and in Kansas v. Ventris (2009) the Court said the Massiah right "is a right to be free of uncounseled interrogation, and is infringed at the time of the interrogation," not only later when the statement is admitted. Miranda in 1966 rested its rules on the Fifth Amendment, which is why police warnings are required before custodial questioning even when no charge has been filed. Module 19 covers that rule.⁴⁰

A 2026 decision: talking to your lawyer during testimony

Can a judge limit what a defendant discusses with his lawyer while the defendant is in the middle of testifying? Villarreal v. Texas (February 25, 2026) answered for an overnight recess. David Villarreal's murder trial was interrupted during his own testimony by a 24-hour recess, and the judge told his lawyers not to "manage his testimony," while saying he could still talk to them about other subjects, such as sentencing. The Court held that "a qualified conferral order that prohibits only discussion of the defendant's testimony for its own sake during a midtestimony overnight recess permissibly balances the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel against the burden of offering unaltered trial testimony."⁴¹

The decision sits between two older cases. In Geders v. United States (1976) a judge could not entirely bar a testifying defendant from conferring with his lawyer overnight, and in Perry v. Leeke (1989) a judge could bar it during a short daytime recess. Justice Jackson wrote for seven Justices, Justice Alito concurred, and Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, concurred in the judgment. This lesson read the syllabus and lineup only.⁴¹

Myths and Misreadings

• "You have a right to a trial within a set number of days." The Constitution sets none. Barker uses a four-factor balancing test, and the fixed deadlines come from statutes such as the federal Speedy Trial Act and Idaho Code section 19-3501.
• "A jury always has twelve people." The Constitution allows six under Williams, and not fewer under Ballew. Idaho allows six in misdemeanor cases.
• "Unanimity was always required everywhere." It was required in federal court for over a century, but Louisiana and Oregon allowed 10 to 2 verdicts until Ramos in 2020.
• "Every court-appointed defense is free for every charge." Under Scott, the federal minimum depends on whether imprisonment is actually imposed. Idaho's statute reaches any offense with a possible jail term.
• "If the testimony is reliable, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied." Crawford rejected that, and Hemphill repeated it.
• "The right to counsel and the Miranda right are the same." The Sixth Amendment right attaches at formal charge, while Miranda is a Fifth Amendment rule about custodial questioning.
• "An expert can repeat what a lab technician wrote." Smith v. Arizona held that when the statements support the opinion only if true, they come in for their truth and the Clause applies.

Short Q&A

Can a defendant give up a jury? Yes. The Court has long accepted waivers, and Idaho's constitution lets a criminal jury be waived "by the consent of all parties, expressed in open court."¹⁸⁴²

Can a court close a hearing to the public? Only after the four steps from Waller: an overriding interest, a closure no broader than necessary, consideration of alternatives, and findings.¹⁶

Does a defendant have to ask for a speedy trial? A defendant's assertion of the right is one of the four factors, and Barker rejected the rule that failing to demand a trial waives the right. But silence counts against the claim.¹²

What if my lawyer is bad? The test is Strickland: deficient performance and a reasonable probability of a different result.³⁷

Landmark Cases

Each case was checked against the opinion text or the Court's syllabus as the footnotes say. Reporter citations are shown only where an opened source gave them; the others appear by docket number.

The Idaho Connection

Idaho's Declaration of Rights speaks to the Sixth Amendment's subjects in article I, sections 7, 13, 18 and 22.

Section 13: speedy, public, counsel, witnesses

Section 13 reads in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the party accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial; to have the process of the court to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf, and to appear and defend in person and with counsel." It follows the federal list for speedy trial, public trial, compulsory process and counsel, and adds an express right to "appear and defend in person." The article's section titles show no separate confrontation or impartial-jury clause, and this lesson did not find one. That does not mean Idaho defendants lack confrontation rights: the federal Clause applies in Idaho courts through the Fourteenth Amendment.⁴³⁴⁴⁹

Section 7: the jury

Section 7 declares: "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate; but in civil actions, three-fourths of the jury may render a verdict, and the legislature may provide that in all cases of misdemeanors five-sixths of the jury may render a verdict. A trial by jury may be waived in all criminal cases, by the consent of all parties, expressed in open court." It also says: "in cases of misdemeanor and in civil actions within the jurisdiction of any court inferior to the district court, whether such case or action be tried in such inferior court or in district court, the jury shall consist of not more than six."⁴²

• Misdemeanor juries. Idaho Code section 19-1902 says a misdemeanor jury "may consist of six (6) or any number less than six (6) upon which the parties may agree in open court" and that "there shall be no right to trial by jury for an infraction." The infraction rule fits the federal petty-offense line, though this lesson did not test it against any Idaho infraction penalty.⁴⁵
• The five-sixths provision. Section 7 allows the legislature to permit five-sixths verdicts in misdemeanor cases. This lesson did not determine whether any Idaho statute uses that option, or whether Ramos, which concerned "serious" offenses, affects it. It is a question for a source this lesson did not open.
• Challenges. Idaho Code section 19-2016 gives each side ten peremptory challenges when the offense is punishable by death or life imprisonment, and six otherwise. Section 19-2316 lets either party have the jury polled on its verdict, and if "a less number" than all answer yes, "the jury must be sent out for further deliberation."⁴⁶⁴⁷

Speedy trial in Idaho

Idaho Code section 19-3501 tells the court to dismiss a prosecution "unless good cause to the contrary is shown" when, among other cases, an information is not filed within six months of arrest, or a defendant "whose trial has not been postponed upon his application" is not brought to trial within six months of the information being filed or of arraignment (for a misdemeanor, six months from a not guilty plea). The statute was amended in 1980, 1984, 2001 and 2004. The six-month clock and the good-cause exception make it a firmer rule than Barker's balancing test, though a defendant's own requests for postponement stop it.⁴⁸

Article I, section 18 adds a general promise: "right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, delay, or prejudice." The section is written about courts generally and this lesson did not examine whether Idaho courts apply it to criminal cases. Article I, section 22, the crime victim provision, gives victims a right "to timely disposition of the case" and "to be present at all criminal justice proceedings," and says it does not authorize a court to dismiss a case or set aside a conviction for its violation.⁴⁹⁵⁰

Counsel: the State Public Defender Act

Idaho changed how it delivers the right to counsel recently. The State Public Defender Act, added in 2023 (chapter 220), creates an office of the state public defender and has the state assume "the full financial and legal obligation to provide indigent public defense required by the sixth amendment to the United States constitution and section 13, article I of the constitution of the state of Idaho." Counties are "released from any further financial or legal obligation" for indigent defense on and after October 1, 2024. Each judicial district has a district public defender, a state employee, and the section on that office was amended in 2025.⁵¹⁵²⁵³

• Who is covered. Section 19-6002 defines a "serious crime" as "any offense for which the penalty includes the possibility of confinement, incarceration, imprisonment, or detention in a correctional facility, regardless of whether actually imposed." That follows the broader Argersinger idea, not the narrower Scott limit. An indigent person detained by police or charged with a serious crime is entitled to a lawyer "to the same extent as a person having his own counsel," with the necessary services and facilities, at public expense, at "all stages" beginning "with the earliest time when a person providing his own counsel would be entitled to be represented," including probation revocation and appeals.⁵⁴⁵⁵
• Notice. Under section 19-6010, officers must, on commencement of detention, "clearly inform" a person of the right to counsel and the right of an indigent person to a lawyer at public expense, and notify the provider if he has none. Judges must repeat the advisement at later proceedings, including the preliminary hearing, arraignment and trial. Section 19-801 separately requires the magistrate at the first appearance to inform the accused "of his right to the aid of counsel in every stage of the proceedings."⁵⁶⁵⁷
• Indigency. Section 19-6011 presumes indigency for a person whose monthly income does not exceed 187 percent of the federal poverty guidelines, or who receives certain public assistance, or who is serving a sentence in a correctional facility, "unless such a determination is contrary to the interests of justice." The statements a person makes to establish indigency cannot generally be used as substantive evidence against him.⁵⁸
• Waiver. Section 19-6013 allows waiver only if the court "finds of record that he has acted with full awareness of his rights and of the consequences," and directs consideration of "age, education and familiarity with the English language and the complexity of the crime involved." That tracks Faretta's requirement of a knowing and intelligent choice.⁵⁹

The version of section 19-6009 this lesson read is the one effective until January 1, 2027, and section 19-6010 shows a later version effective after that date. This lesson did not read the later text, so readers after that date should check the current statute.⁵⁵⁵⁶

This lesson did not open Idaho appellate decisions interpreting article I, sections 7, 13, 18 or 22, or applying Crawford, Strickland or Barker under Idaho law, and so does not state any Idaho holdings.

Where This Shows Up for Officials, Reporters and Citizens

The county commissioner after the state takeover

Elena Ruiz, an invented county commissioner, still gets calls from residents asking why their county no longer runs a public defender's office. The answer is in section 19-6008: since October 1, 2024, the state carries the financial and legal obligation, and a county that was providing office space for a defense office on January 1, 2023 must keep making the same or similar space available to the state office until July 1, 2029, under the conditions the statute sets. She can tell residents that a request for counsel goes to the court and then to the state public defender under section 19-6010, not to her board.⁵²⁵⁶

The magistrate at the first appearance

A magistrate in a small county must tell each accused person of the charge and "the right to the aid of counsel in every stage of the proceedings," decide indigency under the 187 percent presumption, and notify the state defender. A careful record of the advisement and of any waiver, with the findings section 19-6013 lists, protects the case later, because Rothgery treats that first appearance as a point where the right attaches.^57585939

The prosecutor tracking the clock

A county prosecutor in Idaho watches two clocks, the six-month period in section 19-3501 and the Barker factors. A continuance the defense asks for stops the statutory clock. One the prosecution asks for does not, and it counts against the State under Barker when the reason is weak.⁴⁸¹²

The forensic lab supervisor

A lab supervisor, an invented figure named Marcus Hale, is asked whether a colleague who left the lab can be replaced on the stand by a reviewer. After Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming and Smith, the answer depends on whether the reviewer will simply relay the departed analyst's findings as true. If so, the Clause may require the analyst, or a prior chance to cross-examine her. A reviewer who gives an independent opinion based on raw data, and does not repeat the other analyst's conclusions, raises a different question that Smith did not decide.³⁰³¹

The reporter covering a closed hearing

When a judge closes part of a hearing, a reporter can ask whether the judge made findings on the four Waller factors and considered alternatives. A closure order that says only "for privacy" may not meet the test. The Sixth Amendment right belongs to the defendant, while the press has a separate claim from the First Amendment, so the two arguments are worth keeping apart in a story.¹⁶¹⁷

The juror waiting in the hallway

A person called for a felony jury in Idaho should know that Idaho allows six jurors in misdemeanors, requires the parties to agree to waive a jury, and that after Ramos a felony verdict must be unanimous. A juror asked in open court whether a verdict is his own can be polled, and a single "no" sends the jury back out.^42454722

Related Modules

• Module 19, The Fifth Amendment: grand juries, double jeopardy, Miranda and due process.
• Module 18, The Fourth Amendment: the search and seizure that often starts the case.
• Module 21, The Seventh Amendment: the civil jury.
• Module 22, The Eighth Amendment: bail, fines and punishment after conviction.
• Module 10, The Civil War Amendments: the Fourteenth Amendment and incorporation against the states.

Sources & Further Reading

Primary Sources

• National Archives, The Bill of Rights: A Transcription
• 18 U.S.C. 3161 (Speedy Trial Act)
• 18 U.S.C. 3162 (sanctions)
• Idaho Constitution, art. I, sec. 7
• Idaho Constitution, art. I, sec. 13
• Idaho Constitution, art. I, sec. 18
• Idaho Constitution, art. I, sec. 22
• Idaho Code 19-3501 (dismissal)
• Idaho Code 19-1902 (trial by jury)
• Idaho Code 19-2016 (peremptory challenges)
• Idaho Code, title 19, chapter 60 (State Public Defender Act)
• Idaho Code 19-801 (right to counsel at first appearance)

Court Opinions

• Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
• Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)
• Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)
• Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)
• Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)
• Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)
• Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984)
• Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)
• Crawford v. Washington (2004)
• Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)
• Davis v. Washington (2006)
• Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009)
• Presley v. Georgia, No. 09-5270 (2010)
• Ramos v. Louisiana (2020)
• Hemphill v. New York (2022)
• Smith v. Arizona (2024)
• Erlinger v. United States (2024)
• Villarreal v. Texas (2026)
• Pitchford v. Cain (2026)

Secondary Sources and Further Reading

• Constitution Annotated, Sixth Amendment (table of contents)
• Constitution Annotated: Overview of the Sixth Amendment
• Constitution Annotated: Modern Doctrine on Right to a Speedy Trial
• Constitution Annotated: Right to a Public Trial Doctrine
• Constitution Annotated: Unanimity of the Jury
• Constitution Annotated: Admissibility of Testimonial Statements
• Constitution Annotated: Modern Doctrine on Right to Have Counsel Appointed
• Constitution Annotated: Pretrial Judicial Proceedings and Right to Counsel

Footnotes

1. Constitution Annotated, Amdt6.2.2, Historical Background on Right to a Speedy Trial, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-6/historical-background-on-right-to-a-speedy-trial. It quotes Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967), on Magna Carta (1215) and the Assize of Clarendon (1166), and notes Coke listed speed among the essential qualities of justice.
2. Constitution Annotated, Historical Background on Right to a Public Trial, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-6/historical-background-on-right-to-a-public-trial. It quotes In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948), on the safeguard against courts used as instruments of persecution, and describes the Star Chamber as the outlier.
3. Constitution Annotated, Historical Background on Right to Trial by Jury, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-6/historical-background-on-right-to-trial-by-jury. It quotes Blackstone, 3 Commentaries 343 (1769), and notes the Magna Carta origin story has been called "one of the most revered of legal fables," while crediting the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 with ending the ordeals.
4. Constitution Annotated, Historical Background on Right to Counsel, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-6/historical-background-on-right-to-counsel. It reports that English law denied felony defendants retained counsel, that the records of Congress and the ratifying conventions say little about the counsel language, and quotes the Act of April 30, 1790.
5. Constitution Annotated, Early Confrontation Clause Cases, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-6/early-confrontation-clause-cases. It reports that until 1965 the Court treated the right as limited to federal proceedings.
6. Crawford v. Washington (decided March 8, 2004), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/02-9410. Opinion of Justice Scalia, in which seven Justices joined; Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor, concurred in the judgment.
7. National Archives, The Bill of Rights: A Transcription, https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/bill-of-rights-transcript. The Sixth Amendment was "Article the eighth" of the twelve articles Congress proposed on September 25, 1789. Its 81 words are this lesson's count of the transcription.
8. Constitution Annotated, Amdt6.1, Overview of the Sixth Amendment, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-6/overview-of-sixth-amendment-rights-in-criminal-prosecutions. It reports that the House adopted a state jury-trial proposal in August 1789 which the Senate rejected, that Twitchell v. Commonwealth (1869) ended doubt that the states were beyond the Amendment's direct reach, and that the Court has since protected all Sixth Amendment rights against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
9. Constitution Annotated, Confrontation Clause Cases During the 1960s through 1990s, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-6/confrontation-clause-cases-during-the-1960s-through-1990s. It reports Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965), holding the right "made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment."
10. Constitution Annotated, Right to a Public Trial Doctrine, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-6/right-to-a-public-trial-doctrine. It reports that the right reaches suppression hearings (Waller) and jury selection (Presley), that the Court has not decided whether it covers sentencing, and that its reach to criminal contempt proceedings remains unclear.
11. Constitution Annotated, When the Right to a Speedy Trial Applies, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-6/when-the-right-to-a-speedy-trial-applies. It reports United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971): the right does not attach before arrest or formal charge. This lesson did not open Marion.
12. Barker v. Wingo (decided June 22, 1972), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/407/514. Willie Mae Barker; five years from arrest to trial; the four factors and the "ad hoc basis" language are from Part IV of the opinion.
13. Constitution Annotated, Amdt6.2.5, Modern Doctrine on Right to a Speedy Trial, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-6/modern-doctrine-on-right-to-a-speedy-trial. It describes the six trials of the co-defendant, the seven-Justice majority with two concurring and no dissents, the rejection of a fixed number of days and of the demand-waiver rule, and the outcome.
14. Constitution Annotated, Length of Delay and Right to a Speedy Trial, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-6/length-of-delay-and-right-to-a-speedy-trial. It reports the 90-month delay in Loud Hawk (1986), the eight and one-half year delay in Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992), and the lower-court practice of treating delay approaching one year as presumptively prejudicial. This lesson did not open the Doggett or Loud Hawk opinions.
15. Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161(b) and (c)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/3161; 18 U.S.C. 3162, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/3162. Section 3161(c)(1) sets seventy days from the filing of the indictment or information or the defendant's first appearance, whichever is later; 3161(b) sets thirty days from arrest to indictment. Section 3162 directs dismissal and lists factors for deciding whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice. This lesson did not read the exclusions in 3161(h).
16. Waller v. Georgia (decided May 21, 1984), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/467/39. Syllabus (the four-part test) and Part II.
17. Presley v. Georgia, No. 09-5270 (per curiam, decided January 19, 2010), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/09-5270. This lesson read the per curiam opinion on the Cornell page, which also carries a dissent by Justice Thomas that was not read in full.
18. Duncan v. Louisiana (decided May 20, 1968), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/391/145. Gary Duncan; simple battery with a two-year maximum and a $300 fine.
19. Constitution Annotated, Petty Offense Doctrine and Maximum Sentences Over Six Months, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-6/petty-offense-doctrine-and-maximum-sentences-over-six-months. It reports Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (plurality), and Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542 (1989). This lesson did not open those opinions.
20. Constitution Annotated, Size of the Jury, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-6/size-of-the-jury. It reports Thompson v. Utah (1898), Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (six-person jury allowed), and Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (five-person jury not allowed).
21. Constitution Annotated, Unanimity of the Jury, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-6/unanimity-of-the-jury. It reports Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979), and that Oregon and Louisiana were the two states allowing nonunanimous verdicts.
22. Ramos v. Louisiana, No. 18-5924 (decided April 20, 2020), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/18-5924. The lineup is from the syllabus; the 1898 Louisiana convention discussion is in Part II.
23. Constitution Annotated, Increases to Minimum or Maximum Sentences and Apprendi Rule, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-6/increases-to-minimum-or-maximum-sentences-and-apprendi-rule. It quotes Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
24. Blakely v. Washington (decided June 24, 2004), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/542/296. Syllabus: a 53-month standard maximum and a 90-month sentence; the "statutory maximum" quotation is from the opinion.
25. Erlinger v. United States (decided June 21, 2024), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/23-370. Syllabus and lineup.
26. Constitution Annotated, A Jury Selected from a Representative Cross-Section of the Community, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-6/a-jury-selected-from-a-representative-cross-section-of-the-community. It reports Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), and Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986), the latter resting on the Equal Protection Clause.
27. Pitchford v. Cain (decided May 28, 2026), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/24-7351. Syllabus; this lesson read the syllabus and lineup but not the full opinion or dissent.
28. Constitution Annotated, Admissibility of Testimonial Statements, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-6/admissibility-of-testimonial-statements. It collects the formulations of "testimonial," reports Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011), and Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012), and notes Whorton v. Bockting (2007) held Crawford not retroactive to cases final on direct review.
29. Constitution Annotated, Ongoing Emergencies and Confrontation Clause, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-6/ongoing-emergencies-and-confrontation-clause. It quotes Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006), and reports Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011). The Davis syllabus (decided June 19, 2006) is at https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/05-5224.
30. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (decided June 25, 2009), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/07-591. This lesson read the Cornell page, which carries the syllabus and lineup (five Justices in the majority, four dissenting).
31. Smith v. Arizona (decided June 21, 2024), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/22-899. Syllabus and lineup; Jason Smith, analyst Elizabeth Rast, substitute analyst Greggory Longoni.
32. Hemphill v. New York (decided January 20, 2022), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/20-637. Lineup from the syllabus; the "opening the door" discussion and the quotation about Crawford are in the opinion.
33. Washington v. Texas (decided June 12, 1967), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/388/14. Jackie Washington; the Texas statute barring one participant from testifying for another.
34. Constitution Annotated, Modern Doctrine on Right to Have Counsel Appointed, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-6/modern-doctrine-on-right-to-have-counsel-appointed. It reports Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979), Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002), In re Gault and the retroactivity of Gideon.
35. Gideon v. Wainwright (decided March 18, 1963), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/372/335. Justice Black for the Court; Justices Douglas and Clark filed separate opinions, and Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Gideon is cited in the Washington v. Texas opinion. The Florida trial judge's statement is in the opening paragraphs.
36. Argersinger v. Hamlin (decided June 12, 1972), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/407/25. Justice Douglas for the Court; Jon Argersinger faced up to six months and a $1,000 fine for carrying a concealed weapon.
37. Strickland v. Washington (decided May 14, 1984), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/466/668. Justice O'Connor for the Court; syllabus and Part V.
38. Faretta v. California (decided June 30, 1975), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/422/806. Syllabus and Part IV.
39. Constitution Annotated, Pretrial Judicial Proceedings and Right to Counsel, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-6/pretrial-judicial-proceedings-and-right-to-counsel. It quotes Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 198 (2008), and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
40. Constitution Annotated, Custodial Interrogation and Right to Counsel, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-6/custodial-interrogation-and-right-to-counsel. It reports Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 592 (2009).
41. Villarreal v. Texas (decided February 25, 2026), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/24-557. Syllabus and lineup; this lesson did not read the concurrences in full.
42. Idaho Constitution, art. I, sec. 7, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idconst/ArtI/Sect7/.
43. Idaho Constitution, art. I, sec. 13, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idconst/ArtI/Sect13/.
44. Idaho Constitution, art. I, table of sections, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idconst/ArtI/. This lesson read the section titles, which show no separate confrontation or impartial-jury clause in article I. It did not read every section in full.
45. Idaho Code sec. 19-1902, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title19/T19CH19/SECT19-1902/.
46. Idaho Code sec. 19-2016, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title19/T19CH20/SECT19-2016/.
47. Idaho Code sec. 19-2316, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title19/T19CH23/SECT19-2316/.
48. Idaho Code sec. 19-3501, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title19/T19CH35/SECT19-3501/.
49. Idaho Constitution, art. I, sec. 18, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idconst/ArtI/Sect18/.
50. Idaho Constitution, art. I, sec. 22, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idconst/ArtI/Sect22/.
51. Idaho Code sec. 19-6005, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title19/T19CH60/SECT19-6005/.
52. Idaho Code sec. 19-6008, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title19/T19CH60/SECT19-6008/.
53. Idaho Code sec. 19-6006, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title19/T19CH60/SECT19-6006/.
54. Idaho Code sec. 19-6002, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title19/T19CH60/SECT19-6002/.
55. Idaho Code sec. 19-6009, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title19/T19CH60/SECT19-6009/. The page shows the version effective until January 1, 2027; this lesson did not read the later version.
56. Idaho Code sec. 19-6010, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title19/T19CH60/SECT19-6010/. The page carries a version effective until January 1, 2027 and another effective after that date; this lesson read only the first.
57. Idaho Code sec. 19-801, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title19/T19CH8/SECT19-801/.
58. Idaho Code sec. 19-6011, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title19/T19CH60/SECT19-6011/.
59. Idaho Code sec. 19-6013, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title19/T19CH60/SECT19-6013/.