Module 28: The Fourteenth Amendment

Why the Amendment Was Written

The Thirteenth Amendment ended slavery in December 1865 and said nothing about what freed people were. Were they citizens? Could a state ban them from owning land, signing contracts, testifying in court or leaving a plantation? The Fourteenth Amendment is Congress's answer, and its history explains almost every clause in it.

The Supreme Court described the purpose of the three Reconstruction Amendments in 1873: "the one pervading purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of them would have been even suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him."¹ Justice Miller wrote that in the Slaughter-House Cases, a decision that, as the privileges or immunities section below explains, then narrowed the amendment he was praising.

The Black Codes and the Civil Rights Act of 1866

After the war, legislatures in the former Confederate states passed what are called the Black Codes. Wikipedia's summary of them is that they "limited the freedom of Black Americans but not of white Americans."² This lesson did not open a primary collection of the codes and relies on that summary.

Congress answered first by statute. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, which Justice Thomas's dissent in Trump v. Barbara dates to April 9, 1866, declared that "all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States," and that those citizens, "of every race and color," would have the same rights as white citizens.³⁴ President Andrew Johnson vetoed the bill on March 27, 1866, and Congress overrode the veto about three weeks later, according to Wikipedia.² Opponents argued that Congress had no power to make people citizens by ordinary statute and to set aside Dred Scott that way. The Court's opinion in Barbara records that "Opponents of the Act contended that Congress could not grant such expansive citizenship (and set aside this Court's precedent) by statute alone," and that "To quiet those concerns" Congress "turned to the Fourteenth Amendment."⁴ Wikipedia adds that members unsure of their power to pass and enforce the law, especially if Southern Democrats returned to Congress, began drafting a constitutional amendment.²

The Joint Committee and the long text

Congress set up a Joint Committee on Reconstruction to handle the readmission of the Southern states. Wikipedia reports that more than seventy proposals for an amendment were drafted, that a first version reducing representation for states that denied the vote failed in the Senate, and that a draft by Representative John A. Bingham of Ohio "enabling Congress to safeguard 'equal protection of life, liberty, and property' of all citizens" failed in the House.² In April 1866 the committee forwarded a third version that combined the earlier pieces. That explains why the Fourteenth is the longest amendment and why it covers five unrelated subjects. Each section answered a separate Reconstruction problem.

• Section 1 defined citizenship and limited state power over civil rights.
• Section 2 dealt with representation. When slavery ended, formerly enslaved people, who had counted as three-fifths of a person, would be fully counted for House seats, so the Southern states stood to gain seats while still refusing Black men the vote. The Constitution Annotated says the result was a compromise to "effect a reduction in the representation of any state that discriminated against males in the franchise."⁵
• Section 3 kept former Confederate officeholders out of office. The Court has said it "was designed to help ensure an enduring Union by preventing former Confederates from returning to power in the aftermath of the Civil War."⁶
• Section 4 protected the Union's war debt and voided Confederate debt. The Constitution Annotated says the section "was undoubtedly inspired by the desire to put beyond question the obligations of the government issued during the Civil War."⁷
• Section 5 gave Congress the power to enforce all of it.

The Senate, which had amended Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the House version, passed the amendment on June 8, 1866 by a vote of 33 to 11, according to Wikipedia; this lesson did not confirm that count against the Congressional Globe.² The National Archives records that the amendment was "Passed by Congress June 13, 1866" and submitted to the states on June 16, 1866.⁸

Ratification

Ratification was not smooth. Wikipedia reports that every Southern legislature except Tennessee's refused to ratify, and that Congress then passed the Reconstruction Acts, which conditioned readmission to Congress on ratification.² The National Archives records that on July 28, 1868 the Secretary of State declared the amendment ratified "by the necessary 28 of the 37 States."⁸ Wikipedia adds that New Jersey and Ohio had voted to rescind their earlier ratifications, that Congress declared the rescissions ineffective, and that the Secretary's proclamation listed thirty states; Ohio and New Jersey re-ratified symbolically in 2003, and Oregon, which rescinded in October 1868, re-ratified in 1973.² Those details come from Wikipedia alone in this lesson, and no court has treated them as casting doubt on the amendment's validity; this lesson did not search for such a decision.

The Text

The National Archives transcription of the full amendment follows. Section 1 has four clauses, and each is the subject of a separate section of this lesson.

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, National Archives transcription

Three points about the wording matter before any case is read.

First, the last three clauses of Section 1 say "No State." They restrain state and local governments. The Fifth Amendment's own Due Process Clause binds the federal government, and the Supreme Court applied equal protection principles to Washington through that clause in Bolling v. Sharpe (1954): "it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government."⁹

Second, the clauses do not use the same word for who is protected. The Citizenship Clause and the Privileges or Immunities Clause speak of citizens. The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses protect "any person." The Court has applied that difference. In Plyler v. Doe (1982), the majority wrote: "Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is surely a 'person' in any ordinary sense of that term."¹⁰

Third, the amendment applies to what states do, which the cases call state action. Section 5 gives Congress the power to enforce it, and the courts have limited how far that power reaches. Both subjects have their own sections below.

Citizenship: From Dred Scott to Trump v. Barbara

What the clause repudiated

In 1857 the Supreme Court held in Dred Scott v. Sandford that people descended from enslaved Africans could not be citizens of the United States. The Constitution Annotated summarizes the ruling: Chief Justice Taney held that United States citizenship was enjoyed by only two classes, white persons born in the United States as descendants of those recognized as citizens at the founding, and those naturalized, and that a freed person fell into neither.³ Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment reversed that holding. Years later the Court said so directly: the amendment "overturns the Dred Scott decision by making all persons born within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United States. That its main purpose was to establish the citizenship of the negro can admit of no doubt."¹

The sponsor of the clause in the Senate, Jacob Howard of Michigan, said the language was "simply declaratory of what I regard as the law of the land already, that every person born within the limits of the United States, and subject to their jurisdiction, is . . . a citizen of the United States."³ The phrase "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" was added in the Senate; the House version had contained no citizenship provision.³

The exceptions the early cases recognized

The words "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" meant that some people born on American soil were outside the clause. The Constitution Annotated lists the exceptions the Court has recognized: children of foreign diplomatic representatives, children born of alien enemies in hostile occupation, and children of members of Indian tribes subject to tribal laws.¹¹ The Indian tribe exception came from Elk v. Wilkins (November 3, 1884). John Elk, an Indian who lived in Omaha, sued the registrar who refused to put him on the voter list. Justice Gray wrote for the Court that the words mean "not merely subject in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of the United States, but completely subject to their political jurisdiction, and owing them direct and immediate allegiance," and held that Indians born in a tribe, "although in a geographical sense born in the United States," were no more subject to that jurisdiction "than the children of subjects of any foreign government born within the domain of that government." Justices Harlan and Woods dissented.¹² Congress later granted citizenship by statute. The Indian Citizenship Act became law on June 2, 1924, and the current statute lists, as citizens at birth, "a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof" and "a person born in the United States to a member of an Indian, Eskimo, Aleutian, or other aboriginal tribe."¹³¹⁴

United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898)

Wong Kim Ark was born in 1873 in San Francisco to Chinese parents who were subjects of the Emperor of China. The parties agreed that the parents were "domiciled residents of the United States," had a permanent residence there, did business there and were never employed in any diplomatic capacity. He visited China in 1895 and was refused permission to land at San Francisco on his return, because the collector of customs said he was not a citizen.¹⁵ The Chinese Exclusion laws barred his parents from becoming citizens, so the question was whether the child was one.

On March 28, 1898 the Court held that he was. Justice Gray's opinion wrote: "The fourteenth amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under the protection of the country, including all children here born of resident aliens, with the exceptions or qualifications (as old as the rule itself) of children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on foreign public ships, or of enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory, and with the single additional exception of children of members of the Indian tribes owing direct allegiance to their several tribes." Justice McKenna took no part, and Chief Justice Fuller, joined by Justice Harlan, dissented, so the vote was six to two.¹⁵

The opinion's repeated references to the parents' "permanent domicile and residence" set up a dispute that lasted 128 years. Does Wong Kim Ark hold that a child born to lawfully domiciled parents is a citizen, or does it hold that every child born in the territory is, with the listed exceptions? The next case settled which reading the Court would adopt.

Executive Order 14160 and the 2025 injunction fight

On January 20, 2025 the President issued Executive Order No. 14160, "Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship." In the words the Supreme Court quoted, it declared that "the privilege of United States citizenship does not automatically extend to persons born in the United States" when the mother was unlawfully present, or lawfully but temporarily present, and the father was not a citizen or lawful permanent resident at the child's birth.⁴ District courts quickly blocked the order with injunctions that applied nationwide. On June 27, 2025, in Trump v. CASA, Inc., Justice Barrett wrote for a six-Justice majority. The Court's order granted the government's applications for partial stays "but only to the extent that the injunctions are broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue." In plain terms, a federal court could protect the plaintiffs in front of it but could not, by a universal injunction, protect everyone.¹⁶ The Court did not decide whether the order violated the Citizenship Clause; the applications did not raise that question.¹⁶ The merits came a year later.

Trump v. Barbara (June 30, 2026)

Plaintiffs in New Hampshire sued on behalf of a class of children who would be denied citizenship under the order, and the district court provisionally certified a nationwide class and preliminarily enjoined the order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari before judgment, heard argument on April 1, 2026, and on June 30, 2026 affirmed.⁴

The Court held that "Children born in the United States to parents unlawfully or temporarily present are 'subject to the jurisdiction' of the United States and are citizens at birth under the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause." Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion, joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett and Jackson.⁴ The reasoning moves in four steps.

1. Common law. The opinion's account is that under English common law children born within the sovereign's dominions owed a natural allegiance to the sovereign, "regardless of how 'momentary and uncertain'" their presence, with narrow exceptions: children born in lands the sovereign did not control, children born where the sovereign's control was temporarily lost, and children of foreign ministers. That rule, called jus soli, was carried across the Atlantic.⁴
2. Dred Scott and the 1866 Act. Dred Scott departed from the common law, and Attorney General Edward Bates's wartime opinion declared that "every person born in the country is, at the moment of birth, prima facie a citizen, . . . without any reference to race or color." Congress turned that opinion into law in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.⁴
3. The text. The phrase "subject to the jurisdiction" refers to the power of the United States to govern those within its territory. Chief Justice Marshall had defined jurisdiction in The Schooner Exchange as the nation's "full and complete power . . . within its own territories," with exceptions where exercising it would "degrade the dignity" of foreign sovereigns, as with foreign ministers. Private people who came for "business or caprice" were "amenable to the jurisdiction of the country."⁴
4. Wong Kim Ark. The Court rejected the argument that the 1898 holding rested on the parents' domicile. It reasoned that the earlier Court "exhaustively canvassed the text and history of the Citizenship Clause and at no point identified any evidence that the ratifiers thought themselves to be imposing a domicile limitation."⁴

The opinion ends: "Citizenship, then and now, was the right to have rights, to freely participate in our political community. The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment extended that promise to 'every free-born person in this land.' We keep that promise today."⁴

The separate opinions

The case produced six separate writings, and a student should read their disagreements as the live state of the question.

Justice Kavanaugh, concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part, agreed with the result on a statutory ground. He wrote: "In my view, the Executive Order does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. But the Order does contravene a federal statute, 8 U. S. C. §1401(a)." That statute, enacted in 1940, uses nearly the same words as the amendment. He added that Congress could amend section 1401(a) "or otherwise enact new legislation establishing exceptions to birthright citizenship for children born to foreign citizens unlawfully or temporarily in the country," consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, and noted that "Congress has not yet done so."⁴

Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, dissented. His opinion reads the Civil Rights Act and the Citizenship Clause as guaranteeing citizenship "to persons born and domiciled in the United States regardless of their race," and not "to persons who were not domiciled in the United States."⁴ Justice Alito dissented separately, calling the case "one of the most important decisions in the history of the Court" and "a serious mistake." He would hold that the amendment "confers citizenship on only those children who, at birth, owe allegiance solely to this country," and wrote that his reading "would not require uprooting the millions of children who were born here to mothers who entered or remained in this country illegally."⁴ Justice Gorsuch wrote separately that the facial challenge should fail because the order is lawful "at least to this extent," that is, as applied to children of temporary visitors, and that he harbored doubts about its application to children of parents "who make their permanent home here, but do so in defiance of federal immigration laws."⁴

In sum, five Justices held that the Constitution guarantees citizenship to children of unlawfully or temporarily present parents. Kavanaugh found the order unlawful under the statute and treated the constitutional question as open to Congress. Three Justices would have upheld the order, at least in part. The judgment affirming the injunction therefore carried six votes, and the constitutional holding carried five.

What is settled and what is open

Settled: a child born on American soil to parents who are in the country unlawfully, or lawfully for a time only, is a citizen at birth, and the executive branch cannot narrow that by order. The Court named the exceptions it retains: the "children of ambassadors" and other representatives of foreign sovereigns, and those born in the "alien nations" of Indian tribes.⁴ Open: how the narrow exceptions apply in unusual cases such as children of foreign military forces in hostile occupation, which no party presented here, and whether the Court's reading of the clause will hold if the membership of the Court changes. Wikipedia reports that after the decision a further executive order, number 14418, was issued and that the challengers asked the district court to clarify that it violated the existing ruling; this lesson did not read that order, and an official who needs to act on it should read the order itself.¹⁷

Privileges or Immunities: The Clause the Court Set Aside

The second sentence of Section 1 begins: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." Read cold, it looks like the center of the amendment. It is addressed to the states, it uses the word "citizens" the first sentence has just defined, and it forbids abridgment. Its history is odd. Within five years of ratification the Supreme Court gave it a reading so narrow that, in the words of the Constitution Annotated, it was reduced "to a superfluous reiteration of a prohibition already operative against the states."¹⁸

The Slaughter-House Cases (1873)

Louisiana's legislature gave one company, the Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company, the exclusive right to operate slaughterhouses in New Orleans. Butchers who were shut out sued. They argued that the monopoly violated the Thirteenth Amendment and, more to the point, the Privileges or Immunities Clause: the right to practice a lawful trade was one of the privileges of a citizen, and a state could not take it away.¹

The Court rejected the argument, 5 to 4, in an opinion by Justice Samuel Miller.¹¹⁸ Miller drew a line between two kinds of citizenship. The first sentence of the amendment, he observed, distinguishes a citizen of the United States from a citizen of a state. The privileges or immunities clause protects only the first. The ordinary rights of a person living under state law, such as pursuing a trade, owning property and being protected in one's person, belonged to state citizenship and stayed "left to the State governments for security and protection." What the amendment protected were the rights that "owe their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws."¹⁸¹ Miller's examples were the right to come to the seat of government, to demand federal protection on the high seas or abroad, to petition for redress of grievances, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the right to use the navigable waters of the United States.¹

Miller gave a reason for reading narrowly. Reading the clause broadly, he said, would "constitute this court a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the States, on the civil rights of their own citizens." That, he said, was a "great departure from the structure and spirit of our institutions" that the Congress and the state legislatures could not have intended.¹⁸ Four Justices disagreed. Justices Field and Bradley, in dissent, argued that the right to pursue a lawful calling was exactly the kind of right the clause was written to protect, and Bradley wrote that "A citizen of the United States has a perfect constitutional right to go to and reside in any State he chooses."¹⁹²⁰

The result was a double irony. The amendment's authors had written the clause to stop a repeat of the Black Codes. The Court's first reading left Black citizens in the South to the mercy of state governments that had every reason not to protect them. And the rights the Court did list as protected, such as access to the seat of government and use of the navigable waters, had never needed the Fourteenth Amendment. Federal supremacy already protected them. The Constitution Annotated puts the point bluntly: those privileges had been protected "even prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment."¹⁸

After 1873: a clause with a few uses

For the next century and a half the clause did little. The Constitution Annotated lists the rights the Court has recognized under it: the right to petition Congress, to vote for national officers, to enter public lands, to be protected from violence while in federal custody, to inform federal authorities of violations of law, and to engage in interstate commerce, among others.²¹ In 1935 the Court used the clause in Colgate v. Harvey to strike down a state tax law, and five years later it overruled that decision.²¹ In many other cases, the same source notes, claims under the clause were rejected, including claims about regulation of working hours, the sale of liquor, and the licensing of women to practice law (Bradwell v. Illinois and In re Lockwood).²¹

Saenz v. Roe (1999): the clause returns

In 1992 California limited new residents, for their first twelve months in the state, to the welfare benefits they would have received in the state they came from. At the time, the cash benefit for a mother and one child was $456 a month in California and $275 in Arizona. Two recently arrived residents sued.¹⁹

On May 17, 1999 the Court held the law unconstitutional, 7 to 2. Justice Stevens wrote that the right to travel has three parts: the right to enter and leave another state, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor while temporarily present, and, for those who become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that state. The third part, the Court said, is protected by the new arrival's status as a citizen of the United States, a source of protection "plainly identified in the opening words of the Fourteenth Amendment." Stevens quoted Justice Miller's own words from the Slaughter-House Cases: a citizen of the United States "can, of his own volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bona fide residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State."¹⁹ The Court did not overrule Slaughter-House; it relied on the part of it that nobody had ever disputed.

Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas dissented. Thomas wrote separately that "the Court all but read the Privileges or Immunities Clause out of the Constitution in the Slaughter-House Cases," and added that he "would be open to reevaluating its meaning in an appropriate case." He also warned that the majority had not asked what the framers meant by the clause, and he questioned whether it "should displace, rather than augment, portions of our equal protection and substantive due process jurisprudence."¹⁹

McDonald v. Chicago (2010): the clause declined again

The question came back in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the case that applied the Second Amendment to the states. The petitioners' main argument was that the Privileges or Immunities Clause carried the right to keep and bear arms against state governments. Justice Alito's opinion declined to take that route. The Seventh Circuit had relied on three nineteenth-century cases decided in the shadow of Slaughter-House, and the petitioners asked the Court to revisit it. Alito wrote for a majority that the better route was the Due Process Clause, as the Court had used for decades for other rights.²²

Justice Thomas agreed with the result and not the route. He wrote that the right to keep and bear arms "is a privilege of American citizenship that applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause," and argued that the question is what "ordinary citizens" at the time of ratification would have understood the clause to mean.²³ In Ramos v. Louisiana (2020) he repeated the argument for the Sixth Amendment jury right, concluding that the unanimity requirement applies to the states through the Privileges or Immunities Clause "not the Due Process Clause."²⁴

Settled and open

Settled: Slaughter-House remains the law. The Privileges or Immunities Clause protects the rights of national citizenship in the narrow sense Miller described, plus the right of new residents to equal treatment under Saenz. Open: whether a future majority will reread the clause. Justice Thomas has said he is open to it and has twice written an opinion applying it. No other Justice joined those opinions on that ground in McDonald or Ramos, according to the syllabi of those cases.²²²⁴ Scholars disagree about what the framers intended the clause to cover, and this lesson does not try to settle that debate.

Due Process: Procedure and Substance

The third clause of Section 1 reads: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." The Fifth Amendment has the same words, aimed at the federal government. Every word has been argued over, but two meanings matter most. Procedural due process asks what steps a government must follow before it takes a person's liberty or property: notice, a hearing, a fair decision maker. Substantive due process asks whether a government may take certain things at all, however many hearings it offers. The word "process" in the text makes some readers doubt the second idea. The Court has used both for well over a century.

Procedural due process

The procedural core is the oldest. A state that wants to jail a person, evict a tenant, terminate a licence, or take a home must give notice and a chance to be heard before a neutral decision maker. Officials meet this every day. A county commission that rescinds a permit, a school board that expels a student, and a state agency that cuts off benefits all work inside procedural due process rules. This lesson does not cover the test the Court uses to decide how much process is due in a given setting, which the Court developed in cases this lesson did not open.

Economic liberty and Lochner

Between the 1890s and the 1930s the Court used the Due Process Clause to protect "liberty of contract." The Constitution Annotated traces the idea to the dissents of Justices Field and Bradley in Slaughter-House, and to Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897), which held that liberty includes the right "to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling."²⁰ The best-known application is Lochner v. New York (1905). New York limited bakery employees to ten hours a day and sixty hours a week. The Court held the law was a labor regulation, not a health measure, and so invalid. Justice Harlan dissented, citing evidence that bakers had shorter lives and more lung disease than other workers. Justice Holmes dissented separately: "a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez-faire."²⁰

The Court abandoned the approach in the 1930s. The Constitution Annotated reports that in Nebbia v. New York (1934) the Court "discarded its prior approach to evaluating economic legislation," and that its modern approach is illustrated by Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. (1955), which upheld a law that favored some eye-care providers over others.²⁵ Today an ordinary economic regulation is upheld if it has a rational basis. That is why a state can license barbers, set a minimum wage or ban a product without proving to a court that the law is wise.

Liberty beyond contract: Meyer, Pierce and Griswold

While Lochner was still good law, the Court also read "liberty" to cover family and education. In Meyer v. Nebraska (decided June 4, 1923) the Court struck down a 1919 Nebraska law restricting the teaching of foreign languages to children who had not passed the eighth grade. Robert Meyer, a teacher at the Zion Parochial School, had been convicted of teaching reading in German to a ten-year-old. Justice McReynolds wrote that liberty "denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."²⁶

Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters (decided June 1, 1925), the Court struck down an Oregon law requiring children to attend public school. It said the state could not "standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only," and added: "The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."²⁷

In Griswold v. Connecticut (decided June 7, 1965) the Court struck down a Connecticut law against using contraceptives. The appellants were the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and a Yale physician who served as its medical director, arrested after the League's New Haven center was open for ten days in 1961. Justice Douglas wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance," and that those guarantees "create zones of privacy."²⁸ Critics then and since have said the opinion found a right the text does not mention. Later cases generally rested on the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty clause and not on the Bill of Rights penumbras.

The method: history and tradition

By the 1990s the Court wanted a limit on which unwritten liberties count. In Washington v. Glucksberg (1997), which rejected a claimed right to assisted suicide, the Court said its method "has two primary features: First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,'" and second, "we have required in substantive-due-process cases a 'careful description' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest."²⁹ The test in this form asks what the nation's history shows and what, exactly, the claimant is asking for.

Lawrence, Obergefell and Dobbs

Later decisions show how contested the method is. In Lawrence v. Texas (June 26, 2003) the Court, by a vote of 6 to 3 (Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment on equal protection grounds), struck down a Texas law against same-sex sexual conduct and overruled Bowers v. Hardwick: "Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled."³⁰ Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, dissented.³⁰

In Obergefell v. Hodges (June 26, 2015) the Court held, 5 to 4, that same-sex couples may marry. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that the right to marry is a "fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person" and that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses are "connected in a profound way."³¹ Chief Justice Roberts dissented, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas. He asked, "Just who do we think we are?" and he closed by telling supporters of the result to "do not celebrate the Constitution. It had nothing to do with it."³¹ Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito also wrote dissents.³¹

In Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization (decided June 24, 2022) a majority, applying Glucksberg, overruled Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Justice Alito wrote for five Justices (Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined). The opinion says the Constitution makes "no express reference to a right to obtain an abortion" and that "Roe was also egregiously wrong and on a collision course with the Constitution from the day it was decided."³² Chief Justice Roberts concurred only in the judgment, and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan dissented jointly.³² Justice Alito added that "Nothing in this opinion should be understood to cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abortion."³² Justice Thomas, concurring, wrote that the Court "should reconsider all of this Court's substantive due process precedents, including Griswold, Lawrence, and Obergefell," and suggested the Court could then ask whether any of those rights are protected as "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."³² No other Justice joined that part of his concurrence, according to the syllabus listing; this lesson did not check whether any other Justice addressed it.

Settled and open

Settled: procedure is required before liberty or property is taken; economic regulations get deferential review; Meyer, Pierce and Obergefell remain on the books, and Roe and Casey do not. Open: how far the history-and-tradition method reaches. Dobbs said its opinion did not cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abortion, while Justice Thomas urged reconsidering Griswold, Lawrence and Obergefell, and Obergefell relied on a different account of "liberty" than Glucksberg. A court asked about a new claim must pick a method, and the Justices have disagreed about which.

Incorporation: How the Bill of Rights Reached the States

When the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791 it limited only the federal government. In 1789 the Senate had rejected a proposed amendment that read "The equal rights of conscience, the freedom of speech or of the press, and the right of trial by jury in criminal cases shall not be infringed by any State." James Madison called the rejected language "the most valuable of the whole list."³³ In Barron v. Baltimore (1833) Chief Justice Marshall held that the first eight amendments did not limit the states, and a series of nineteenth-century decisions followed him.³³

The first steps

After 1868 litigants argued that the Fourteenth Amendment changed that. For years the Court said no. As late as 1937 the Court was still rejecting the broad version: in Palko v. Connecticut the Court answered the claim that "Whatever would be a violation of the original bill of rights (Amendments I to VIII) if done by the Federal Government is now equally unlawful by force of the Fourteenth Amendment if done by a state" with the sentence "There is no such general rule."³⁴

The Court nonetheless applied individual rights to the states one at a time, because they were part of liberty. The earliest was the Fifth Amendment's takings protection in Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad v. Chicago (1897).³⁵ In Gitlow v. New York (decided June 8, 1925) the Court wrote: "For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press, which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress, are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States."³⁶ Gitlow's conviction was affirmed, so he lost the case, but the sentence began a long line. Near v. Minnesota (1931) applied the press protection, and Hamilton v. Regents, Cantwell v. Connecticut and Everson v. Board of Education extended the principle to religion.³⁵

Palko and the "ordered liberty" test

In Palko (decided December 6, 1937) Justice Cardozo set out the test that dominated for thirty years. A right applied to the states if it was "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Rights that met that test, he wrote, "have been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the states." Palko's own claim, a protection against being tried twice for the same offense, was held not to meet it.³⁷ That holding did not last, because the Court later incorporated the double jeopardy clause in Benton v. Maryland (1969).³⁵

Total incorporation and selective incorporation

Two theories competed. Justice Black argued in Adamson v. California (1947), joined by three others, that the Fourteenth Amendment made the entire Bill of Rights applicable to the states. His research, he wrote, left him in no doubt that the first section of the amendment "was thought by those responsible for its submission to the people, and by those who opposed its submission, sufficiently explicit to guarantee that thereafter no state could deprive its citizens of the privileges and protections of the Bill of Rights."³⁴ Historians have argued over this since; the Constitution Annotated cites the scholarly exchange between Charles Fairman and others.³⁴ The Court never adopted Black's view. In the 1960s it adopted a middle course, selective incorporation, in which each right is asked whether it is a basic part of the system of justice. Justice White's opinion in Duncan v. Louisiana (decided May 20, 1968) held that "trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice," and that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a jury trial in every criminal case that would require one in federal court.³⁸

The Court's decisions in this period reshaped every state's criminal justice system. Mapp v. Ohio (1961) applied the exclusionary rule to state searches. Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) held that a person too poor to pay for a lawyer cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided, calling the point "an obvious truth."³⁹ Other decisions applied the rights against self-incrimination, confrontation, a speedy and public trial, and compulsory process.³⁵

McDonald, Timbs and Ramos

Three recent decisions show the doctrine at work. In McDonald v. City of Chicago (argued March 2, decided June 28, 2010) the Court applied the Second Amendment to the states in a 5 to 4 decision. Justice Alito's opinion asked whether the right is "fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty" or "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," and answered yes, relying on Heller's finding that self-defense is "the central component" of the right.²² The Court noted that, apart from the Second Amendment, the rights not yet incorporated were few. The opinion's own footnote lists the Third Amendment, the Fifth Amendment's grand jury clause, the Seventh Amendment's civil jury, and the Eighth Amendment's excessive fines clause.²²

The last of those fell in Timbs v. Indiana (argued November 28, 2018, decided February 20, 2019). Tyson Timbs pleaded guilty to dealing in a controlled substance and conspiracy to commit theft, and the state tried to take his $42,000 Land Rover, which he had bought with insurance money after his father died. Justice Ginsburg wrote for eight Justices that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to the states, noting that "Protection against excessive fines has been a constant shield throughout Anglo-American history for good reason: Such fines undermine other liberties. They can be used, e.g., to retaliate against or chill the speech of political enemies."⁴⁰ The syllabus adds that once a Bill of Rights protection is incorporated, "there is no daylight between the federal and state conduct it prohibits or requires." Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, and Justice Gorsuch, concurring, acknowledged that "the appropriate vehicle for incorporation may well be the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause, rather than, as this Court has long assumed, the Due Process Clause."⁴⁰

Ramos v. Louisiana (argued October 7, 2019, decided April 20, 2020) concerned Evangelisto Ramos, who was convicted of a serious crime in Louisiana by a 10 to 2 jury and sentenced to life without parole. Two states, Louisiana and Oregon, allowed such verdicts. Justice Gorsuch's opinion held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, "as incorporated against the States by way of the Fourteenth Amendment," requires a unanimous verdict to convict of a serious offense. The Court overruled Apodaca v. Oregon, an earlier case in which a four-Justice plurality had upheld nonunanimous juries and a fifth Justice, Justice Powell, had reached the same result by a "dual-track" theory of incorporation. The opinion traced Louisiana's rule to its 1898 constitutional convention, whose avowed purpose was to "establish the supremacy of the white race," and Oregon's to the rise of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1930s.²⁴ The vote on the judgment was 6 to 3. Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment on privileges or immunities grounds, and Justice Alito dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and, in part, Justice Kagan.²⁴

Settled and open

Settled: nearly every right in the first eight amendments binds the states, and when a right is incorporated it means the same thing against a state as against the federal government (Ramos noted that the Court had rejected the "dual-track" idea, under which an incorporated right could mean less against a state, years before). The Constitution Annotated lists the exceptions it knows of: the grand jury clause, the civil jury clause, and, because no case has decided it, the Third Amendment.³⁵ Open: whether the Court will ever use the Privileges or Immunities Clause as the vehicle, whether the grand jury and civil jury rights will be incorporated, and how the Court's 2020 decision applies to the few states that still allow smaller juries for minor offenses. This lesson did not research the last point, or the retroactive effect of Ramos.

Equal Protection: Race, Sex and Everyone Else

The last clause of Section 1 says no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." It protects "any person," not only citizens, so it covers noncitizens living in the state. It is the most litigated sentence in the amendment. This section follows it through four stages: the first cases, Plessy and Brown, the rules courts use to decide how closely to look at a law, and the modern disputes over sex, sexual orientation, immigration status and race-conscious programs.

The first cases: Strauder and Yick Wo

The Court first gave the clause real force in Strauder v. West Virginia (term of 1879). A Black man, indicted for murder in Ohio County, West Virginia, argued that a state law made only white men eligible for grand and petit jury service. Justice Strong wrote that the law was a denial of equal protection, and he explained that the clause did not protect only Black citizens. A law excluding "all white men from jury service" in a state with a Black majority, he wrote, would equally be a denial of equal protection, and the same would be true of one excluding "all naturalized Celtic Irishmen."⁴¹

In Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) San Francisco required a special consent for wooden laundries. The petition alleged that more than 150 Chinese laundry owners had been arrested for operating without it while some eighty laundries run by people who were not Chinese were left unmolested. The Court held that even a law "fair on its face, and impartial in appearance" violates the amendment "if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances." The Court also said the guarantee applies "without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality."⁴²⁴³ The case is an early statement of the idea that the way officials apply a neutral law can make government action unconstitutional.

Plessy and Brown

In Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) the Court upheld a Louisiana law of 1890 requiring separate railway cars for white and "colored" passengers. Justice Brown wrote for the Court. Justice Harlan dissented in words that later generations quoted: "Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law."⁴⁴

On May 17, 1954, in Brown v. Board of Education, the Court ruled unanimously, in an opinion by Chief Justice Warren, that segregated public schools violated the clause: "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."⁴⁵⁴⁶ The same day, in Bolling v. Sharpe, the Court held that segregation in the District of Columbia's schools violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, since the Fourteenth applies only to states.⁹ The pairing shows that the federal government is held to an equal protection standard through the Fifth Amendment, a point that later mattered for federal race-conscious programs.

Levels of review

A court deciding an equal protection claim first asks what the law does, then how hard to look at it. The Court's decisions sort laws into three tiers.

• Rational basis. The default. The law is upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. Most economic and social legislation falls here. In Skrmetti the Court applied it to a state law restricting certain medical treatments for minors because the law classified by age and medical use.⁴⁷
• Intermediate scrutiny. For classifications by sex. The government must show the classification is "substantially related" to an "important" objective, the formulation the Court restated in 2026.⁴⁸
• Strict scrutiny. For classifications by race and certain other traits. The government must show a compelling interest and a narrowly tailored means. The Constitution Annotated describes the test this way: "the government must demonstrate a compelling interest," and its use of race must be "narrowly tailored to further that compelling interest."⁴⁹

The seed of the tiers is a footnote. In United States v. Carolene Products Co. (1938) the Court suggested that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."⁵⁰ The Court did not decide a case on that sentence. Over the next decades it became the rationale for treating race, and later sex, differently from ordinary classifications.

Race: Korematsu, Loving and the strict scrutiny rule

In Korematsu v. United States (December 18, 1944) the Court upheld the exclusion of Americans of Japanese descent from the West Coast. It said it was applying strict examination: all legal restrictions that curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are "immediately suspect" and call for "rigid scrutiny," but it nonetheless deferred to the military.⁵¹⁴⁹ In Trump v. Hawaii (June 26, 2018) Chief Justice Roberts wrote that Korematsu "was gravely wrong the day it was decided," "has been overruled in the court of history," and "has no place in law under the Constitution," the last phrase borrowed from Justice Jackson's dissent in that case.⁵²

In Shelley v. Kraemer (May 3, 1948) the Court held that state courts' enforcement of racially restrictive covenants denied equal protection (the state-action section below returns to the case).⁵³ In Loving v. Virginia (argued April 10, decided June 12, 1967) the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Warren, struck down Virginia's ban on interracial marriage. Mildred Jeter, "a Negro woman," and Richard Loving, "a white man," had married in the District of Columbia in June 1958 and returned to Virginia. The Court said it reached its conclusion "for reasons which seem to us to reflect the central meaning of those constitutional commands," and it wrote that marriage is "one of the 'basic civil rights of man.'"⁵⁴ The Constitution Annotated records that Loving said racial classifications "bear a far heavier burden of justification" than other classifications.⁴⁹

By 1995 the Court settled on a single rule. In Adarand Constructors v. Pena the Court held that strict scrutiny applies to every racial classification, including one meant to help a group the government wants to help. The Constitution Annotated summarizes the holding this way: "there is no intermediate standard applicable to 'benign' racial classifications," because the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments "protect persons, not groups."⁵⁵

Sex: Reed, Craig and VMI

For a century the Court treated sex classifications like economic ones. The change began in an Idaho case. When Richard Lynn Reed, a minor, died in Ada County, Idaho, on March 29, 1967, his adoptive parents, who had separated, both sought to administer his estate. Idaho's probate code gave men preference over women when applicants were otherwise equally entitled. Sally Reed lost in the Idaho courts. In Reed v. Reed (decided November 22, 1971) Chief Justice Burger wrote for the Court that giving "a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."⁵⁶

Craig v. Boren (December 20, 1976) struck an Oklahoma law that let women buy 3.2 percent beer at eighteen but made men wait until twenty-one, applying the rule that gender classifications must substantially further important governmental objectives.⁵⁷ In United States v. Virginia (June 26, 1996) the Court held that the Virginia Military Institute's male-only admission policy violated the clause. Justice Ginsburg wrote that a party defending sex-based government action "must establish an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the classification."⁵⁸ Her opinion had the votes of six Justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment, Justice Scalia dissented, and Justice Thomas took no part.⁵⁸

Sexual orientation, immigration status and rational basis with teeth

In Romer v. Evans (decided May 20, 1996) the Court struck down Colorado's "Amendment 2," a state constitutional amendment adopted by referendum that barred any government in the state from protecting people based on "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships." Justice Kennedy wrote for six Justices, and Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas.⁵⁹

Plyler v. Doe (decided June 15, 1982) held unconstitutional a Texas statute that withheld state funds for the education of children who were not "legally admitted" to the United States and authorized local school districts to deny them enrollment. Justice Brennan's opinion said undocumented residents are not a "suspect class" and education is not a "fundamental right," yet the Texas law could not be rational unless it furthered "some substantial goal of the State," and it rejected the argument "that the undocumented status of these children vel non establishes a sufficient rational basis for denying them benefits that a State might choose to afford other residents."¹⁰ The Court was divided; dissenting Justices argued the status of the children was a rational basis.¹⁰

Skrmetti and the 2026 sports cases

Two recent decisions turn on how far heightened review reaches. In United States v. Skrmetti (argued December 4, 2024, decided June 18, 2025) the Court, 6 to 3, upheld Tennessee's SB1, which bars giving puberty blockers or hormones to minors to treat gender dysphoria, gender identity disorder or gender incongruence, while allowing the same drugs for other purposes. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion. The Court held that the law "is not subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and satisfies rational basis review," because it classifies by age and medical use. Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justice Jackson and, in part, Justice Kagan, and Justice Kagan filed a separate dissent.⁴⁷

On June 30, 2026, in West Virginia v. B.P.J. and Little v. Hecox, the Court held that West Virginia and Idaho did not violate the Equal Protection Clause by maintaining girls' and women's sports teams for biological females. Justice Kavanaugh wrote for six Justices (Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch and Barrett joined). The opinion treated the laws as sex-based classifications that must be substantially related to important objectives, held that "safety and competitive fairness" are important and the classification substantially related to them, and held that under Skrmetti the laws did not classify on gender identity or transgender status. It also held that Title IX allows schools to define sports teams by biological sex.⁴⁸ Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part.⁴⁸ The Idaho half of the case is covered in the Idaho section below.

Race-conscious admissions: Bakke, Grutter and SFFA

In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (decided June 28, 1978) Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court and wrote that racial classifications "call for the most exacting judicial examination," that diversity could be a compelling goal that justifies considering race "under some circumstances," and that the Davis program, which reserved 16 of 100 places, was invalid.⁶⁰ In Grutter v. Bollinger (decided June 23, 2003) a majority upheld the University of Michigan Law School's individualized use of race.⁶¹

In Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard and v. University of North Carolina (argued October 31, 2022, decided June 29, 2023) the Court reversed in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett. Justice Jackson took no part in the Harvard case and dissented in the North Carolina case.⁴³ The opinion held that both programs failed strict scrutiny. It said "Eliminating racial discrimination means eliminating all of it," and that "our precedents have identified only two compelling interests that permit resort to race-based government action": remediating specific, identified instances of past discrimination that violated the Constitution or a statute, and avoiding "imminent and serious risks to human safety in prisons, such as a race riot."⁴³

The Court left two openings. A footnote says the United States argued that race-based admissions programs further compelling interests at the nation's military academies, and the opinion "does not address the issue, in light of the potentially distinct interests that military academies may present." The opinion also says nothing in it "should be construed as prohibiting universities from considering an applicant's discussion of how race affected his or her life, be it through discrimination, inspiration, or otherwise."⁴³ Admissions offices have worked within that second sentence since 2023.

Settled and open

Settled: laws that classify by race get strict scrutiny, whoever is burdened or helped. Laws that classify by sex get intermediate scrutiny. Government cannot treat private people differently out of animus toward a group, and cannot exclude children from public schools on the basis of status without some substantial reason. Open: which other traits qualify for heightened review (the Court declined to add transgender status in Skrmetti), how to apply SFFA to scholarships, hiring and contracting by government, and whether military academies or other settings have a distinct interest.

Representation, Voting and the Equal Protection Clause

The Fourteenth Amendment reaches elections in three ways. Section 2 sets the rule for counting people. The Equal Protection Clause governs how districts are drawn and ballots are counted. Section 5 supports voting legislation with the Fifteenth Amendment.

Section 2: counting everyone, and the penalty that never came

When slavery ended, people who had counted as three-fifths of a person would be counted in full in apportioning seats in the House, which raised the prospect that readmitted Southern states would gain seats without letting Black men vote. Section 2 was the compromise: if a state denies the vote to adult male citizens or abridges it, except for participation in rebellion or other crime, its representation is to be reduced in proportion.⁵ In practice, the Constitution Annotated reports, "No serious effort was ever made in Congress to effectuate Section 2, and the only judicial attempt was rebuffed."⁵

The section had one significant use in court. In Richardson v. Ramirez (1974) the Court relied on the exception for "participation in rebellion, or other crime" to uphold a state law disenfranchising convicted felons even after they had served their sentences, which the Constitution Annotated summarizes as holding that "because of Section 2 the Equal Protection Clause was simply inapplicable." Justices Marshall, Douglas and Brennan dissented.⁵ A claim that a state's felon disenfranchisement law, as such, violates equal protection therefore runs into Richardson.

One person, one vote

In Reynolds v. Sims (decided June 15, 1964) the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause requires both houses of a state legislature to be apportioned by population. Chief Justice Warren wrote that "Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests."⁶² The decision reached every state legislature. The Court extended the logic to local governments in later cases that this lesson did not open.

In Bush v. Gore (per curiam, December 12, 2000) the Court held that Florida's recount standards violated equal protection, because "Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote over that of another." The Court added that its consideration "is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities."⁶³ That caveat is why the decision has been cited less than its fame suggests.

Race and redistricting: Callais (April 29, 2026)

Race-based districting sits at the junction of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the Voting Rights Act. In Louisiana v. Callais (argued October 15, 2025, decided April 29, 2026) a federal court had held that Louisiana's 2022 congressional map likely violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act because it lacked a second majority-Black district. Louisiana drew a new map with one, and challengers sued, arguing the new map was a racial gerrymander. The three-judge court held the new map violated the Equal Protection Clause.⁶⁴

The Supreme Court, by a vote of 6 to 3, affirmed. Justice Alito's opinion concluded that "because the Voting Rights Act did not require Louisiana to create an additional majority-minority district, no compelling interest justified the State's use of race in creating SB8," and that the map was an unconstitutional gerrymander. In reaching that, the Court read Section 2 to impose liability only "when the evidence supports a strong inference that the State intentionally drew its districts to afford minority voters less opportunity because of their race," and said that reading was consistent with the limits of Congress's enforcement power, quoting Boerne: Congress cannot "enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is."⁶⁴ Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, dissented: "Today's decision renders Section 2 all but a dead letter."⁶⁴

This lesson reports the holding as the opinion states it. The consequences for specific maps in other states had not been decided in any case this lesson reviewed. The Fifteenth Amendment module covers the Voting Rights Act in detail.

Settled and open

Settled: legislative districts must have roughly equal population; a state cannot sort voters by race without satisfying strict scrutiny; a state's felon disenfranchisement is not barred by equal protection because of Section 2. Open: how Callais applies to maps drawn under other state-law frameworks, and how lower courts will apply its updated framework for Section 2 claims.

State Action: Whom the Amendment Binds

The amendment begins its second sentence, "No State shall." It limits governments, not private people. The Court said so in the Civil Rights Cases (1883): "It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment."⁶⁵ That is why a private business is bound by civil rights statutes such as Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, whose authority the Constitution Annotated traces to the Commerce Clause, and not by the Equal Protection Clause directly.⁶⁶

"State action" still covers a great deal. The Court wrote in Ex parte Virginia (1880) that "A State acts by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities. It can act in no other way," so any official acting with the state's power, from a legislature to a county clerk to a judge, can violate the amendment.⁶⁶ In Shelley v. Kraemer the Court held that a state court's enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant was state action: "the States have denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws." The Court stressed that these were not cases in which the states had "merely abstained from action." Rather, the states had "made available to such individuals the full coercive power of government."⁵³

The doctrine is a boundary question officials face often. A school board, a police officer, a county clerk issuing a licence, a public university and a state agency are all state actors. A private homeowners association, a private employer and a private club are not, though other statutes bind them. The Constitution Annotated notes that the harder cases involve private parties in "a special relationship with governmental authority," and quotes Justice Frankfurter: "The vital requirement is State responsibility, that somewhere, somehow, to some extent, there be an infusion of conduct by officials, panoplied with State power."⁶⁶

Section 3: The Disqualification Clause

Section 3 bars a person from being a Senator or Representative, an elector of the President and Vice President, or from holding "any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State," if the person, "having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof." The disability can be lifted: "Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability."⁸

How it was used after the Civil War

The Constitution Annotated calls Section 3 a clause that "has rarely been applied." Congress passed the Enforcement Act of 1870 under Section 5, authorizing federal prosecutors to bring civil actions to remove anyone holding a nonlegislative office in violation of Section 3, and making it a federal crime to hold or attempt to hold such an office.⁶⁷⁶ A federal circuit court under Chief Justice Chase ruled in Griffin's Case (1869) that Congress had to pass legislation for removal from office before Section 3 could be enforced against persons already in office.⁶⁷⁶

The clause then faded. In 1872 Congress removed the disability from nearly all former Confederates except certain former members of Congress, judges, military and naval officers, heads of departments and foreign ministers, and in 1898 it enacted broader legislation removing "the disability imposed by section 3 . . . incurred heretofore."⁶⁷ A successor to the 1870 criminal provision remains on the books today at 18 U.S.C. section 2383.⁶

Trump v. Anderson (March 4, 2024)

In 2023, four Republican and two unaffiliated Colorado voters asked a Colorado court to keep former President Donald J. Trump off the state's presidential primary ballot, arguing that his conduct leading up to the January 6, 2021 breach of the Capitol made him ineligible under Section 3. After a five-day trial the state district court found that he had "engaged in insurrection" within the meaning of the clause, and the Colorado Supreme Court ordered the secretary of state to exclude him from the Republican primary ballot and to disregard write-in votes for him.⁶

The Supreme Court reversed in a per curiam opinion: "Because the Constitution makes Congress, rather than the States, responsible for enforcing Section 3 against federal officeholders and candidates, we reverse." The Court drew a line. "States may disqualify persons holding or attempting to hold state office. But States have no power under the Constitution to enforce Section 3 with respect to federal offices, especially the Presidency."⁶ Its reasons included these:

• Section 3 requires some process to decide whom it covers. The Court quoted Chief Justice Chase in Griffin's Case: "proceedings, evidence, decisions, and enforcements of decisions, more or less formal, are indispensable," and said the Constitution empowers Congress to prescribe how those determinations are made.⁶
• Federal officers "owe their existence and functions to the united voice of the whole, not of a portion, of the people," so state power over their qualifications must be specifically delegated to the states, and the Court found that the respondents had not identified "any tradition of state enforcement of Section 3 against federal officeholders or candidates" after ratification.⁶
• Congress, not the states, has long given effect to Section 3 for federal officeholders, through the Enforcement Act of 1870 and later legislation, and the House and Senate have judged challenges to the seating of their own members.⁶
• A state-by-state approach would produce a "patchwork" in which one candidate might be ineligible in some states and not others on the same conduct. The Court said the patchwork would sever "the direct link that the Framers found so critical between the National Government and the people of the United States."⁶

The Court also noted that Section 5 gives the power to enforce the amendment to "the Congress," so any congressional enforcement law would have to show "congruence and proportionality," the test from Boerne that the Section 5 section below explains.⁶

The Court was unanimous in the judgment. The per curiam opinion says the colleagues who wrote separately agreed with many of its reasons and objected only to its reliance on the distinctive way Section 3 works and on Section 5.⁶ A joint opinion of Justices Sotomayor, Kagan and Jackson and a separate opinion by Justice Barrett followed.⁶ The Constitution Annotated describes the case as "its only decision specifically interpreting Section 3."⁶⁷

What the Court did not decide

The opinion's holding is about who enforces Section 3 against federal candidates. The opinion reports the Colorado courts' rulings, including the finding that the former President had engaged in insurrection and the Colorado Supreme Court's 4 to 3 conclusion that the Presidency is an office under the United States, but it reverses on the enforcement question without reviewing them. This lesson takes no position on either question. News accounts that say the Supreme Court "cleared" a candidate of the charge of insurrection misdescribe the case.

Settled and open

Settled: states have no power to enforce Section 3 against federal officeholders and candidates, including for President; states may apply it to state offices; and Congress can remove the disability by two-thirds votes. Open: what legislation Congress could pass to enforce Section 3 within the Boerne limits, and how a federal candidate's eligibility would be decided if Congress has not acted. The Court noted that "Neither we nor the respondents are aware of any other legislation by Congress to enforce Section 3" beyond the 1870 Act and section 2383.⁶

Section 4: The Public Debt

Section 4 says "The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned." It also bars the United States and every state from paying "any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave," and declares all such debts and claims "illegal and void."⁶⁸

The Constitution Annotated says the section "was undoubtedly inspired by the desire to put beyond question the obligations of the government issued during the Civil War," but its language "indicates a broader connotation," embracing "whatever concerns the integrity of the public obligations," and applying to bonds issued after the amendment as well as before.⁶⁸ The case that gave it that reach is Perry v. United States (1935), in which the Court concluded that a 1933 joint resolution, insofar as it tried to override the gold clause in a Fourth Liberty Loan bond, "went beyond the congressional power."⁶⁸

The Constitution Annotated page that this lesson relied on for Section 4 describes only Perry and a few lower-court Confederate-bond cases. This lesson did not research later uses of Section 4, including whether it has been invoked in modern debates over the federal debt limit, and makes no claim about them.

Section 5: Congress and the Power to Enforce

Section 5 reads in full: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."⁸ It makes Congress a partner in enforcing the amendment, and the cases ask how far that partnership reaches.

Katzenbach v. Morgan (1966)

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 included a section, 4(e), providing that no one who had completed the sixth grade in a school in Puerto Rico where the language of instruction was other than English could be denied the right to vote because of an inability to read or write English. New York City voters challenged it, arguing it overrode New York's English literacy requirement. Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court (decided June 13, 1966) upheld the section as an exercise of Congress's Section 5 power.⁶⁹

City of Boerne v. Flores (1997)

That reading met a limit in City of Boerne v. Flores (argued February 19, decided June 25, 1997). The Catholic Archbishop of San Antonio applied for a permit to enlarge a church in Boerne, Texas. Local zoning authorities denied it under a historic preservation ordinance, and the Archbishop sued under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). Congress had passed RFRA in response to Employment Division v. Smith (1990), which had declined to apply a strict balancing test to a neutral law of general applicability. RFRA restored the test, for federal and state governments alike.⁷⁰

The Court held that RFRA "exceeds Congress' power." Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Thomas and Ginsburg and, in most of it, Justice Scalia. Justices O'Connor, Souter and Breyer dissented.⁷⁰ The opinion's central sentence is: "Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is."⁷⁰ The Court wrote that Congress may pass laws to deter or remedy violations, including laws that reach conduct that is not itself unconstitutional, and the Court added a requirement: there must be "congruence and proportionality" between the injury and the means. The Constitution Annotated adds that, unlike the pervasive suppression of the Black vote that led to the Voting Rights Act, there was no similar "egregious predicate" of religious persecution for RFRA, which had no geographic limits or end date.⁷¹

What followed

The test shaped decisions about state sovereign immunity. After Seminole Tribe (1996) held that Congress cannot use its Article I powers to authorize damages suits against states, litigants looked to Section 5, which Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer (1976) had held can abrogate that immunity.⁷¹ Applying Boerne, the Court rejected abrogation for patent law (Florida Prepaid, 1999), age discrimination (Kimel, 2000), employment disability discrimination (Garrett, 2001) and, later, copyright (Allen v. Cooper, 2020). It accepted abrogation for family-care leave in Hibbs (2003), where the Court noted that sex discrimination triggers heightened scrutiny.⁷¹ The Eleventh Amendment module covers that line of cases.

The 2024 and 2026 decisions still use Boerne. In Anderson it limited what Congress could enact to enforce Section 3.⁶ In Callais the Court quoted it, "Congress cannot 'enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is,'" while reading Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act under the Fifteenth Amendment's parallel enforcement clause.⁶⁴

Settled and open

Settled: Congress may adopt remedial and preventive legislation, but it cannot redefine the rights in Section 1. Open: where "congruence and proportionality" falls for a given statute. The Court has been stricter when the underlying classification gets only rational basis review, and more willing when heightened scrutiny applies, and has said little about statutes this lesson did not review.

Myths and Misreadings

"The Fourteenth Amendment applied the Bill of Rights to the states in 1868."

It did not do that on its own. The Court took the rights over one at a time between 1897 and 2019, and a few have never been incorporated. The Court rejected the idea of a general rule in Palko (1937), and the Constitution Annotated lists the grand jury and civil jury clauses as not applied to the states, and the Third Amendment as a question no case has decided.³⁴³⁵

"Birthright citizenship depends on the parents' papers."

On June 30, 2026 the Court held that children born in the United States to parents who are unlawfully or temporarily present are citizens at birth, and affirmed the injunction against Executive Order 14160.⁴ The earlier decision in Trump v. CASA (June 27, 2025) decided only a question about remedies, and the Court said it did not address the Citizenship Clause itself.¹⁶ News stories that treated the 2025 decision as a ruling on the order's constitutionality were wrong.

"Equal protection means the government must treat everyone the same."

Governments classify people constantly: by age for driving, by income for benefits, by residence for tuition. The clause asks whether a classification is justified. Ordinary classifications need a rational basis, sex classifications an important objective with a substantial relationship, and race classifications a compelling interest and narrow tailoring.⁴⁹⁴⁸

"The amendment prohibits private discrimination."

It addresses state action. Private employers, landlords and businesses are covered by statutes, not the amendment, so the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Idaho Human Rights Act do the work.⁶⁵⁶⁶⁷²

"Section 3 only applied to Confederates."

The text is general. It covers anyone who took the listed oaths and later engaged in insurrection or rebellion or aided the nation's enemies. The Court's 2024 decision dealt with its use against a candidate in that year's election and held that enforcement against federal candidates belongs to Congress.⁶

"The Supreme Court decided that January 6 was not an insurrection."

The Court did not decide that. Anderson held that Colorado lacked power to enforce Section 3 against a candidate for federal office.⁶

"Congress can use Section 5 to enact any rule it prefers."

It cannot. Boerne holds that Congress may enforce the amendment's rights and may not redefine them.⁷⁰

"Due process only guarantees a fair hearing."

The Court has also read the clause to protect some liberties against any procedure. The reading is contested, and the Court's 2022 decision in Dobbs described its limits, but the clause is not only procedural.²⁹³²

Landmark Cases

Each case was checked against the opinion text or the Constitution Annotated. Where only a docket number is given, the reporter citation was not opened for this lesson.

Idaho Connections

The Idaho Constitution mirrors the amendment

Idaho's Declaration of Rights has its own versions of several Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. Article I, section 1 declares that "All men are by nature free and equal, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property; pursuing happiness and securing safety."⁷³ Section 2 says "Government is instituted for their equal protection and benefit" and bars "special privileges or immunities" that cannot be revoked by the legislature.⁷⁴ Section 3 declares that Idaho "is an inseparable part of the American Union, and the Constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the land."⁷⁵ Section 13 protects the accused's rights to counsel and a speedy and public trial, and says no one shall be "twice put in jeopardy," "compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," or "deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."⁷⁶ Section 21 reserves "other rights retained by the people."⁷⁷ A person whose rights are violated by Idaho officials may have a claim under the Idaho Constitution, under the Fourteenth Amendment, or both. This lesson did not locate the Idaho Supreme Court's test for equal protection claims under article I, section 2.

Reed v. Reed: an Idaho case that changed the law

The case that began the Court's modern review of sex classifications came from Ada County. When Richard Lynn Reed died on March 29, 1967, his adoptive parents, who had separated, were the parties; the Idaho probate code gave preference to men. The Court's syllabus describes the provision as "based solely on a discrimination prohibited by and therefore violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."⁵⁶ Idaho returned to the Court in 2026 as one of the two states whose laws were before it in B.P.J. and Hecox.

Sports: the Fairness in Women's Sports Act

Idaho's 2020 Fairness in Women's Sports Act, Idaho Code title 33, chapter 62, requires that school and college athletic teams be designated "based on biological sex" as males, females or coed, and provides that "Athletic teams or sports designated for females, women, or girls shall not be open to students of the male sex." If a student's sex is disputed, the school resolves the dispute by requesting a health care provider's statement relying only on reproductive anatomy, genetic makeup or normal endogenously produced testosterone levels.⁷⁸ The legislature's findings cite United States v. Virginia for the point that "inherent differences" between men and women remain.⁷⁹ A student who is deprived of an athletic opportunity or harmed by a violation has a private cause of action against the school or institution.⁸⁰

The Court's June 30, 2026 decision held that Idaho and West Virginia did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The challenger in the Idaho case, Hecox, had filed a suggestion of mootness after the Court granted review, saying Hecox would stop playing women's sports covered by the law; the Court held that "Hecox's case is not moot."⁴⁸ What happens on remand in the Idaho case was not researched here. Idaho also has a statute on medical treatment of minors, Idaho Code section 18-1506C (the Vulnerable Child Protection Act); the Court's reasoning in Skrmetti concerned Tennessee's statute, and this lesson did not research how it applies to Idaho's statute or any litigation over it.⁸¹⁴⁷

Marriage

The Ninth Circuit held in Latta v. Otter (filed October 7, 2014) that Idaho's and Nevada's laws "preventing same-sex couples from marrying" and "refusing to recognize same-sex marriages validly performed elsewhere" violated the Equal Protection Clause.⁸² In 2015 Obergefell settled the question nationally.³¹ The text of Idaho Code section 32-201 still reads "Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract between a man and a woman," and the Idaho Legislature's website carries that text as current law; the federal decisions control where they conflict, as Idaho's own Constitution says in article I, section 3.⁸³⁷⁵

Juries, religion and civil rights statutes

• Juries. Article I, section 7 of the Idaho Constitution allows the legislature to provide that "in all cases of misdemeanors five-sixths of the jury may render a verdict," and sets six-person juries for misdemeanors. Ramos concerned a conviction for a serious offense, and this lesson did not examine whether Idaho has used the five-sixths option or how Ramos applies to misdemeanors.⁸⁴²⁴
• Religious liberty. In 2000, three years after Boerne held that RFRA exceeded Congress's power, Idaho enacted its own law. Idaho Code section 73-402 says government "shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability" unless it shows the burden is "essential to further a compelling governmental interest" and is "the least restrictive means." A person burdened may bring a claim or defense, and a prevailing party "shall recover attorney's fees and costs." Congress could not impose this standard on the states under Section 5, but a state can adopt it for itself.⁸⁵⁷⁰
• Private discrimination. The Idaho Human Rights Act makes it a prohibited act to discriminate "because of, or on a basis of, race, color, religion, sex or national origin" in employment and the other settings it lists, and covers age and disability in some of them. The statute reaches private employers, which the Fourteenth Amendment does not.⁷²

Questions this lesson did not answer for Idaho

This lesson did not find or research any Idaho procedure for challenging a candidate's qualifications under Section 3 for state office, which Anderson leaves to the states. It did not research Idaho school enrollment rules after Plyler, Idaho practice on felon voting rights under Richardson, or any Idaho appellate decision on incorporation. Where the lesson says "not researched," the information is missing, not negative.

Where This Shows Up for Officials, Reporters and Citizens

The county clerk and the marriage license

A clerk who reads Idaho Code section 32-201 finds language about "a man and a woman." The clerk also works under article I, section 3 of the Idaho Constitution, which makes the United States Constitution the supreme law of the land, and under Obergefell, which holds that states must license and recognize marriages between same-sex couples. When a state statute's text and a Supreme Court decision conflict, the decision controls what the clerk does.⁸³⁷⁵³¹

The school registrar

The school district is a state actor, so the Equal Protection Clause binds its staff. In Plyler the Court held a Texas statute allowing districts to deny enrollment to children not "legally admitted" invalid. A registrar who is asked to adopt a policy of that kind should read what the Court held, that denying these children an education "must be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest."¹⁰

The city council and fines

A city that funds its budget partly through fines and forfeitures is bound by the Excessive Fines Clause since Timbs. The Court wrote that excessive fines can be used "as a source of revenue" and that such fines "undermine other liberties."⁴⁰ A councilmember voting on a fee schedule can ask whether the penalty is proportionate to the offense.

The athletic director

Idaho schools designate teams "based on biological sex" under Idaho Code section 33-6203, and the Court held in 2026 that the equal protection and Title IX challenges failed. If a student's sex is disputed, the statute sets the procedure, including the health care provider's statement.⁷⁸⁴⁸ Staff can explain the process without commenting on any individual.

The reporter checking a claim

Three questions catch most errors. First, who is the actor? The amendment limits states and local governments, not private companies. Second, which clause and which standard? A claim about race, sex or a general economic rule draws a different level of review. Third, what did the Court actually decide? CASA was about remedies, Anderson was about who enforces Section 3, and Barbara was the birthright citizenship merits decision.¹⁶⁶⁴

The citizen on a jury or in a voting booth

A juror in an Idaho felony trial should know that a federal rule since Ramos requires a unanimous verdict to convict of a serious offense in state court.²⁴ A voter or candidate reading about eligibility fights should know that, for federal office, Anderson puts enforcement of Section 3 with Congress.⁶

The university admissions office

After SFFA, race-based admissions programs like those at Harvard and the University of North Carolina fail strict scrutiny, and the decision's reasoning governs public universities under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court wrote that nothing in its opinion "should be construed as prohibiting universities from considering an applicant's discussion of how race affected his or her life, be it through discrimination, inspiration, or otherwise," and left the military academies' interests for another day.⁴³ Admissions staff and journalists describing a school's policy should keep those two sentences apart.

Related Modules

Related lessons: Module 10, The Civil War Amendments (the three amendments together) and Module 27, The Thirteenth Amendment (the amendment this one answers); Module 29, The Fifteenth Amendment (voting, the Voting Rights Act and Callais); Module 25, The Eleventh Amendment (Section 5 abrogation and Fitzpatrick); Module 19, The Fifth Amendment and Module 20, The Sixth Amendment (rights incorporated against the states); Module 22, The Eighth Amendment (excessive fines after Timbs); Module 8, The Second Amendment (McDonald); Module 7, The First Amendment (Gitlow and free exercise); Module 23, The Ninth Amendment (unenumerated rights and Griswold); Module 24, The Tenth Amendment (state powers); Module 5, Federalism and the States; Module 14, Article IV: The States and the Union (the original privileges and immunities clause).

Sources & Further Reading

Primary Sources

• National Archives, 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
• National Archives, The Constitution of the United States: A Transcription
• National Archives, Brown v. Board of Education
• National Archives, Indian Citizenship Act
• 8 U.S.C. section 1401 (Cornell LII)
• Constitution Annotated, Fourteenth Amendment (Cornell LII edition)

Supreme Court Opinions

• Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873)
• Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)
• Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884)
• Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)
• Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)
• Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
• United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)
• Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
• Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
• Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)
• Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)
• United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938)
• Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
• Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
• Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
• Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)
• Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
• Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)
• Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
• Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)
• Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
• Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)
• Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)
• Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)
• Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
• Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)
• Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)
• United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)
• City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)
• Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)
• Saenz v. Roe, No. 98-97 (1999)
• Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)
• Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
• Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
• McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010)
• Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556 (2015)
• Trump v. Hawaii, No. 17-965 (2018)
• Timbs v. Indiana, No. 17-1091 (2019)
• Ramos v. Louisiana, No. 18-5924 (2020)
• Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, No. 19-1392 (2022)
• Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard, No. 20-1199 (2023)
• Trump v. Anderson, No. 23-719 (2024)
• United States v. Skrmetti, No. 23-477 (2025)
• Trump v. CASA, Inc., No. 24A884 (2025)
• Louisiana v. Callais, No. 24-109 (2026)
• West Virginia v. B.P.J. and Little v. Hecox, Nos. 24-43 and 24-38 (2026)
• Trump v. Barbara, No. 25-365 (2026)
• Latta v. Otter, Nos. 14-35420 and 14-35421 (9th Cir. 2014)

Idaho Law

• Idaho Const. art. I, section 1 (inalienable rights)
• Idaho Const. art. I, section 2 (political power; equal protection)
• Idaho Const. art. I, section 3 (inseparable part of the Union)
• Idaho Const. art. I, section 7 (jury trial)
• Idaho Const. art. I, section 13 (criminal guaranties; due process)
• Idaho Const. art. I, section 21 (reserved rights)
• Idaho Code section 32-201 (marriage)
• Idaho Code sections 33-6201 to 33-6205 (Fairness in Women's Sports Act)
• Idaho Code section 67-5909 (Human Rights Act)
• Idaho Code section 73-402 (free exercise of religion)
• Idaho Code section 18-1506C (Vulnerable Child Protection Act)

Secondary Sources and Further Reading

• Wikipedia, Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (for items marked as resting on this page)
• Wikipedia, Trump v. Barbara (for the report of a later executive order)
• Wikipedia, Indian Citizenship Act
• National Constitution Center, Interactive Constitution: Amendment XIV

Related Training Modules

• Module 10: The Civil War Amendments
• Module 27: The Thirteenth Amendment
• Module 29: The Fifteenth Amendment
• Module 25: The Eleventh Amendment
• Module 19: The Fifth Amendment
• Module 20: The Sixth Amendment
• Module 22: The Eighth Amendment
• Module 8: The Second Amendment
• Module 5: Federalism and the States
• Course index: The United States Constitution

Footnotes

1. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/83/36. Source for the "one pervading purpose" passage, Justice Miller's distinction between national and state citizenship, the list of rights of national citizenship (the seat of government, protection abroad, petition, habeas corpus, the navigable waters) and the facts of the Louisiana monopoly. The vote (5 to 4) and the dissents of Justices Field and Bradley are as described in the Constitution Annotated and the Saenz opinion.
2. "Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution," Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourteenth_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution (secondary source, opened October 2026). Relied on for the Black Codes description, the veto and override timing, the Joint Committee on Reconstruction and the failed drafts, the Senate vote of June 8, 1866, the refusal of the former Confederate legislatures and the Reconstruction Acts, and the ratification and rescission history. Each of those items rests on this page alone; this lesson did not open the Congressional Globe or a primary collection of the Black Codes.
3. Constitution Annotated, Historical Background on Citizenship Clause (Cornell LII edition), https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/historical-background-on-citizenship-clause. Source for the Civil Rights Act of 1866 language ("all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed") and its role in the framing of the amendment.
4. Trump v. Barbara, No. 25-365 (argued April 1, decided June 30, 2026), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-365_4hdj.pdf and https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/25-365. Source for the holding, the four steps of the Court's reasoning, the quotations from the Chief Justice's opinion, the description of Executive Order 14160, the separate opinions of Justices Kavanaugh, Thomas and Alito, and the exceptions the Court retained. Cited by slip opinion; the U.S. Reports pagination was not available.
5. Constitution Annotated, Overview of Apportionment of Representation (Section 2) (Cornell LII edition), https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/overview-of-apportionment-of-representation. Source for the compromise on representation, the statement that "No serious effort was ever made in Congress to effectuate Section 2," and the description of Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974), including the dissent of Justices Marshall, Douglas and Brennan. This lesson did not open Richardson itself.
6. Trump v. Anderson, No. 23-719 (decided March 4, 2024) (per curiam), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/23-719. Source for the facts, the holding that "States have no power under the Constitution to enforce Section 3 with respect to federal offices, especially the Presidency," the reasoning (Griffin's Case, the Enforcement Act of 1870, the lack of state enforcement tradition, the patchwork), the Section 5 discussion and the description of the separate opinions. The Court's observation that "Neither we nor the respondents are aware of any other legislation by Congress to enforce Section 3" is from the same opinion.
7. Constitution Annotated, Overview of Public Debt Clause (Section 4) (Cornell LII edition), https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/overview-of-public-debt-clause. Source for the statement that the section "was undoubtedly inspired by the desire to put beyond question the obligations of the government issued during the Civil War."
8. National Archives, 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (milestone document), https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/14th-amendment. Source for the text of all five sections, the date the amendment was passed by Congress (June 13, 1866) and ratified (July 9, 1868), and the transmittal of June 16, 1866.
9. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (decided May 17, 1954) (Warren, C.J.), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/347/497. Source for the holding that segregation in the District of Columbia schools violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and for the sentence "it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government."
10. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (argued December 1, 1981, decided June 15, 1982) (Brennan, J.), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/457/202. Source for the facts of the Texas statute, the statement that an alien "is surely a 'person' in any ordinary sense of that term," the holding that the statute fails rational basis review without a "substantial goal," and the Court's rejection of the argument that undocumented status "establishes a sufficient rational basis." The vote was not stated in this lesson because it was not confirmed.
11. Constitution Annotated, Citizenship Clause Doctrine (Cornell LII edition), https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/citizenship-clause-doctrine. Source for the list of exceptions the Court has recognized to the Citizenship Clause.
12. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/112/94. Source for the quotations about Indians born in a tribe, the holding that John Elk was not a citizen by birth, and the dissent of Justices Harlan and Woods.
13. "Indian Citizenship Act," Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Citizenship_Act (secondary source). Source for the enactment date of June 2, 1924; the National Archives milestone-document page on the Act was also opened in the research.
14. 8 U.S.C. section 1401, Cornell LII, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8/1401. Source for the statutory list of citizens at birth, including "a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof" and the provision for members of aboriginal tribes. Justice Kavanaugh's statement that section 1401(a) was enacted in 1940 is from Trump v. Barbara.
15. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/169/649. Source for the facts (birth in San Francisco to Chinese parents, the 1895 trip, the refusal to land) and the holding.
16. Trump v. CASA, Inc., No. 24A884 (decided June 27, 2025), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/24A884. Source for the order granting the applications for partial stays "but only to the extent that the injunctions are broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue," and for the statement that the applications did not raise the Citizenship Clause question. The syllabus language on universal injunctions was not quoted as the Court's own words.
17. "Trump v. Barbara," Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trump_v._Barbara (secondary source, opened October 2026). Source only for the report that Executive Order 14418 followed the decision. That item is unconfirmed: this lesson did not read the order.
18. Constitution Annotated, Privileges or Immunities of Citizens and the Slaughter-House Cases (Cornell LII edition), https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/privileges-or-immunities-of-citizens-and-the-slaughter-house-cases. Source for the quotations about a "perpetual censor," the "great departure from the structure and spirit of our institutions," the privileges "left to the State governments," the "owe their existence to the Federal Government" test and the description of the clause as reduced to "a superfluous reiteration."
19. Saenz v. Roe, No. 98-97 (argued January 13, decided May 17, 1999), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/98-97. Stevens, J., for the Court, joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.; Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined by Thomas, J.; Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J. Source for the facts (the 12-month limit, the $456 and $275 figures), the three components of the right to travel, the Miller and Bradley quotations, and Justice Thomas's dissent.
20. Constitution Annotated, Liberty of Contract and Lochner v. New York (Cornell LII edition), https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/liberty-of-contract-and-lochner-v-new-york. Source for the origin of liberty of contract in the Slaughter-House dissents, Allgeyer (1897), Lochner (1905) and the dissents of Justices Harlan and Holmes.
21. Constitution Annotated, Modern Doctrine on Privileges or Immunities Clause (Cornell LII edition), https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/modern-doctrine-on-privileges-or-immunities-clause. Source for the list of rights recognized under the clause, the 1935 Colgate v. Harvey decision and its 1940 overruling, and the cases in which claims were rejected.
22. McDonald v. City of Chicago, No. 08-1521 (argued March 2, decided June 28, 2010) (Alito, J.), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/08-1521.ZO.html. Source for the incorporation test, the reliance on Heller, the Seventh Circuit's reliance on Cruikshank, Presser and Miller v. Texas, and footnote 13 listing the rights not incorporated. The 5 to 4 vote is from the judgment line and the dissents.
23. McDonald v. City of Chicago (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/08-1521.ZC1.html.
24. Ramos v. Louisiana, No. 18-5924 (argued October 7, 2019, decided April 20, 2020), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/18-5924. Gorsuch, J., announcing the judgment, joined in part by Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kavanaugh, JJ.; Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment; Alito, J., dissenting, joined by Roberts, C.J. and, in part, Kagan, J. Source for the facts, the holding, the discussion of Apodaca and the dual-track theory, and the history of Louisiana's 1898 convention and Oregon's rule. This lesson did not research the retroactive effect of the decision.
25. Constitution Annotated, Overview of Economic Substantive Due Process (Cornell LII edition), https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/overview-of-economic-substantive-due-process. Source for Nebbia v. New York (1934) and Williamson v. Lee Optical (1955).
26. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (argued February 23, decided June 4, 1923) (McReynolds, J.), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/262/390. Source for the facts and the passage on liberty.
27. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (argued March 16 and 17, decided June 1, 1925), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/268/510. Source for the quotations about standardizing children and the child not being "the mere creature of the state."
28. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (argued March 29, decided June 7, 1965) (Douglas, J.), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/381/479. Source for the facts and the passages on penumbras and zones of privacy. The vote was not stated.
29. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (argued January 8, decided June 26, 1997), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/521/702. Source for the two "primary features" of the method.
30. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (decided June 26, 2003), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/539/558. Kennedy, J., for the Court, joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.; O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment; Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Thomas, J. Source for the overruling of Bowers v. Hardwick.
31. Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556 (decided June 26, 2015), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/14-556. Kennedy, J., for the Court, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ.; Roberts, C.J., Scalia, Thomas and Alito, JJ., each dissenting. Source for the quotations from Justice Kennedy and from the Chief Justice's dissent.
32. Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, No. 19-1392 (argued December 1, 2021, decided June 24, 2022), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/19-1392. Alito, J., for the Court, joined by Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett, JJ.; Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment; Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ., dissenting. Thomas, J., concurring, is the source of the passage on reconsidering other substantive due process precedents. Source for the quotations on the lack of express reference, the "egregiously wrong" passage and the limit on other precedents.
33. Constitution Annotated, Overview of Incorporation of the Bill of Rights (Cornell LII edition), https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/overview-of-incorporation-of-the-bill-of-rights. Source for the 1789 Senate rejection of an amendment applying rights to the states, Madison's description of it, and Barron v. Baltimore (1833).
34. Constitution Annotated, Early Doctrine on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights (Cornell LII edition), https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/early-doctrine-on-incorporation-of-the-bill-of-rights. Source for the Palko passage rejecting a general rule, Justice Black's Adamson dissent and the scholarly debate.
35. Constitution Annotated, Modern Doctrine on Selective Incorporation of Bill of Rights (Cornell LII edition), https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/modern-doctrine-on-selective-incorporation-of-bill-of-rights. Source for the lists of rights incorporated and not incorporated (the grand jury clause, the civil jury clause and the Third Amendment), the dates of the cases, the incorporation test and the rule that incorporated rights mean the same against states and the federal government.
36. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (decided June 8, 1925), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/268/652. Source for the sentence assuming speech and press are protected against the states and for the affirmance of the conviction.
37. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (decided December 6, 1937) (Cardozo, J.), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/302/319. Source for the "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" passage.
38. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (decided May 20, 1968) (White, J.), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/391/145. Source for the holding that trial by jury in criminal cases is "fundamental to the American scheme of justice."
39. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Black, J.), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/372/335. Source for the holding on counsel for defendants who cannot afford it and the phrase "an obvious truth."
40. Timbs v. Indiana, No. 17-1091 (argued November 28, 2018, decided February 20, 2019), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/17-1091. Ginsburg, J., for the Court, joined by Roberts, C.J. and Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, JJ.; Gorsuch, J., concurring; Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment. Source for the facts ($42,000 Land Rover), the holding and the quotations.
41. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (term of 1879) (Strong, J.), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/100/303. Source for the facts and the passage about excluding white men or naturalized Irishmen.
42. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (filed May 10, 1886), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/118/356. Source for the petition's allegations (more than 150 arrests, about eighty non-Chinese laundries) and the "evil eye and an unequal hand" passage.
43. Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, No. 20-1199, and v. University of North Carolina, No. 21-707 (argued October 31, 2022, decided June 29, 2023), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/20-1199. Roberts, C.J., for the Court, joined by Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett, JJ.; Jackson, J., not participating in No. 20-1199. Source for the quotations on eliminating discrimination, the two compelling interests, the military academies footnote and the lived-experience sentence.
44. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/163/537. Source for the Louisiana statute of 1890 and Justice Harlan's dissent.
45. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), text on the Cornell LII page https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/347/483 and the National Archives transcription cited above. Source for "Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."
46. National Archives, Brown v. Board of Education (milestone document), https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/brown-v-board-of-education. Source for the dates (argued December 9, 1952, reargued December 8, 1953, decided May 17, 1954) and the description of the unanimous ruling.
47. United States v. Skrmetti, No. 23-477 (argued December 4, 2024, decided June 18, 2025), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/23-477. Roberts, C.J., for the Court, joined by Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett, JJ., and, as to Parts I and II-B, Alito, J.; Sotomayor, J., dissenting, joined by Jackson, J. and, as to Parts I-IV, Kagan, J.; Kagan, J., dissenting separately.
48. West Virginia v. B.P.J., No. 24-43, and Little v. Hecox, No. 24-38 (argued January 13, decided June 30, 2026), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-43_2b35.pdf. Kavanaugh, J., for the Court, joined by Roberts, C.J. and Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch and Barrett, JJ.; Thomas and Gorsuch, JJ., concurring; Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Source for the holdings, the description of the Idaho law, the mootness discussion and the restated intermediate scrutiny test. Cited by slip opinion.
49. Constitution Annotated, Overview of Race-Based Classifications (Cornell LII edition), https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/overview-of-race-based-classifications. Source for the description of strict scrutiny, the description of Korematsu ("immediately suspect," "rigid scrutiny") and its overruling, and the description of Loving.
50. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/304/144. Source for footnote 4 on legislation aimed at discrete and insular minorities and the narrower presumption of constitutionality.
51. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (decided December 18, 1944) (Black, J.), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/323/214.
52. Trump v. Hawaii, No. 17-965 (decided June 26, 2018), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/17-965. Source for the passage on Korematsu.
53. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (decided May 3, 1948) (Vinson, C.J.), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/334/1.
54. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (argued April 10, decided June 12, 1967) (Warren, C.J.), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/388/1. The unanimity of the decision was not confirmed and is not stated.
55. Constitution Annotated, Modern Doctrine on Appropriate Scrutiny (Cornell LII edition), https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/modern-doctrine-on-appropriate-scrutiny. Source for the summary of Adarand (515 U.S. 200 (1995)), including "there is no intermediate standard applicable to 'benign' racial classifications" and "protect persons, not groups."
56. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (argued October 19, decided November 22, 1971) (Burger, C.J.), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/404/71. Source for the facts (Ada County, March 29, 1967), the syllabus statement and the quotation on arbitrary legislative choice. The Idaho Supreme Court decision below is reported at 93 Idaho 511.
57. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (argued October 5, decided December 20, 1976) (Brennan, J.), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/429/190.
58. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (argued January 17, decided June 26, 1996) (Ginsburg, J.), case page cited by docket Nos. 94-1941 and 94-2107; text opened in the research from the Court's opinion. Ginsburg, J., for the Court, joined by Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter and Breyer, JJ.; Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment; Scalia, J., dissenting; Thomas, J., taking no part.
59. Romer v. Evans, No. 94-1039 (argued October 10, 1995, decided May 20, 1996), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/517/620. Kennedy, J., for the Court, joined by Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.; Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Thomas, J.
60. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (argued October 12, 1977, decided June 28, 1978), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/438/265. Source for the 16 of 100 seats, the judgment and Justice Powell's conclusions.
61. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (argued April 1, decided June 23, 2003) (O'Connor, J.), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/539/306.
62. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (argued November 13, 1963, decided June 15, 1964) (Warren, C.J.), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/377/533.
63. Bush v. Gore, No. 00-949 (per curiam, December 12, 2000), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/531/98. Source for the quotations on equal treatment of voters and on the limited scope of the holding. This lesson did not state the vote.
64. Louisiana v. Callais, No. 24-109, and Robinson v. Callais, No. 24-110 (argued October 15, 2025, decided April 29, 2026), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-109_21o3.pdf. Alito, J., for the Court, joined by Roberts, C.J. and Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett, JJ.; Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Gorsuch, J.; Kagan, J., dissenting, joined by Sotomayor and Jackson, JJ. Source for the facts, the holding, the "strong inference" standard, the Boerne quotation and the dissent. Cited by slip opinion. The effect on maps outside Louisiana was not researched.
65. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/109/3.
66. Constitution Annotated, State Action Doctrine (Cornell LII edition), https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/state-action-doctrine. Source for the Title II and Commerce Clause point, the Ex parte Virginia quotation and Justice Frankfurter's quotation on state responsibility.
67. Constitution Annotated, Overview of the Insurrection Clause (Disqualification Clause) (Cornell LII edition), https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/overview-of-the-insurrection-clause-disqualification-clause. Source for the Enforcement Act of 1870, Griffin's Case, the Amnesty Act of 1872, the Act of June 6, 1898 and the description of Anderson as the only decision interpreting Section 3.
68. Constitution Annotated, Overview of Public Debt Clause (Section 4) (Cornell LII edition), https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/overview-of-public-debt-clause. Source for the text and the description of Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935). This lesson did not open Perry itself.
69. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (argued April 18, decided June 13, 1966) (Brennan, J.), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/384/641.
70. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (argued February 19, decided June 25, 1997), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/521/507. Kennedy, J., for the Court, joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Stevens, Thomas and Ginsburg, JJ., and, in all but Part III-A-1, Scalia, J.; O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer, J. except as to a portion of Part I; Souter and Breyer, JJ., dissenting.
71. Constitution Annotated, Modern Doctrine on Enforcement Clause (Cornell LII edition), https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/modern-doctrine-on-enforcement-clause. Source for the description of Boerne ("congruence and proportionality," the "egregious predicate"), and the cases applying it: Florida Prepaid, Kimel, Garrett, Hibbs, Allen v. Cooper.
72. Idaho Code section 67-5909 (acts prohibited under the Idaho Human Rights Act), https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title67/T67CH59/SECT67-5909/. Only the lead-in and the employment subsections were read closely.
73. Idaho Const. art. I, section 1, Idaho Legislature, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idconst/ArtI/Sect1/.
74. Idaho Const. art. I, section 2, Idaho Legislature, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idconst/ArtI/Sect2/.
75. Idaho Const. art. I, section 3, Idaho Legislature, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idconst/ArtI/Sect3/.
76. Idaho Const. art. I, section 13, Idaho Legislature, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idconst/ArtI/Sect13/.
77. Idaho Const. art. I, section 21, Idaho Legislature, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idconst/ArtI/Sect21/.
78. Idaho Code section 33-6203 (designation of athletic teams), https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title33/T33CH62/SECT33-6203/.
79. Idaho Code section 33-6202 (legislative findings and purpose), https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title33/T33CH62/SECT33-6202/.
80. Idaho Code section 33-6205 (cause of action), https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title33/T33CH62/SECT33-6205/.
81. Idaho Code section 18-1506C (Vulnerable Child Protection Act), https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title18/T18CH15/SECT18-1506C/. Cited only to show that the statute exists; its constitutionality was not researched.
82. Latta v. Otter, Nos. 14-35420 and 14-35421 (9th Cir. filed October 7, 2014) (Reinhardt, J.), https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2014/10/07/14-35420.pdf. The quoted descriptions are from the summary prepared by court staff at the head of the opinion. Later history was not researched.
83. Idaho Code section 32-201, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title32/T32CH2/SECT32-201/ (page opened October 2026; history line: amended 1995).
84. Idaho Const. art. I, section 7, Idaho Legislature, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idconst/ArtI/Sect7/.
85. Idaho Code section 73-402 (free exercise of religion protected), https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title73/T73CH4/SECT73-402/ (history line: added 2000, ch. 133).