The Reconstruction Amendments: 13, 14 and 15

The Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were ratified between 1865 and 1870, after the Civil War. Together they abolished slavery, defined citizenship, required states to give every person due process and equal protection, and barred race discrimination in voting. They also gave Congress new power to enforce those promises by legislation.

The first cases under these amendments are some of the most studied decisions in American law, partly because so many of them read the amendments narrowly. That is history worth telling plainly. This lesson walks through the first case on each major clause, what the Court held, and where the rule stands now.

The Thirteenth Amendment: slavery and involuntary servitude

Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIII, Section 1, passed by Congress January 31, 1865, ratified December 6, 1865 (National Archives transcription)

A first in a lower court: United States v. Rhodes (1866)

The first important court test of the Thirteenth Amendment came within a year of ratification, and not in the Supreme Court. Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 relying on the amendment's enforcement clause. In Kentucky, white men were prosecuted under the Act for burglarizing the home of an African American woman. They argued that the Act was unconstitutional.

Justice Noah Swayne of the Supreme Court, sitting as a circuit judge with District Judge Bland Ballard, upheld the Act in United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866). He reasoned that the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and that Congress could enforce it by protecting the rights the Act listed. The Federal Judicial Center describes it as the first federal court opinion interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1866. (Federal Judicial Center.)

The first Supreme Court interpretation, and peonage

The earliest Supreme Court decision on the Thirteenth Amendment listed in the Constitution Annotated is the Slaughter-House Cases (1873), discussed below, where the Court said the amendment forbids slavery and involuntary servitude imposed on people of any race. (Constitution Annotated, Thirteenth Amendment.)

The amendment did its most direct work against peonage, the practice of forcing people to work off a debt. In Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905), the Court confirmed that Congress could prohibit peonage. Then came Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911). Alonzo Bailey signed a one year contract to work as a farm hand for the Riverside Company at $12 a month and received a $15 advance. He worked about a month and left without repaying it. Alabama law made a failure to work or repay, without just cause, prima facie evidence of intent to defraud, which turned a broken labor contract into a crime. Bailey was convicted and fined $30 plus costs, with hard labor if he could not pay.

Justice Hughes, writing for the Court, reversed. A state cannot do indirectly, through a legal presumption, what it cannot do directly: punish a worker as a criminal for failing to work off a debt. The law violated the Thirteenth Amendment and the federal anti-peonage statute. Justice Holmes dissented, joined by Justice Lurton.

What came after: "badges and incidents of slavery"

In the Civil Rights Cases (1883), covered below, the Court held that refusing service in an inn or theater was not a badge of slavery Congress could reach under the Thirteenth Amendment. Eighty five years later, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), Justice Stewart wrote for the Court that a federal law dating from 1866, now 42 U.S.C. 1982, bars all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property, and that Congress may use the Thirteenth Amendment to eliminate the "badges and incidents of slavery." Jones is the leading case on Congress's Thirteenth Amendment power today.

The Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1: citizenship, privileges or immunities, due process and equal protection

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1, passed by Congress June 13, 1866, ratified July 9, 1868 (National Archives transcription)

Before this amendment, Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833) had held that the Bill of Rights limited only the federal government. Section 1 was written to limit the states, and it later became the vehicle for applying most of the Bill of Rights to them. Those incorporation cases are covered in lessons 8 and 9.

The first interpretation: the Slaughter-House Cases (1873)

An early equal protection landmark: Strauder v. West Virginia (1880)

A West Virginia statute limited jury service to white male citizens. Taylor Strauder, a Black man indicted for murder in Ohio County (Wheeling), asked to move his case to federal court, arguing that he could not get equal protection in a court where Black citizens were barred from the jury. The state court refused, and he was convicted.

In Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, decided March 1, 1880, Justice Strong wrote for the Court that the law discriminated against Black citizens and denied them the equal protection of the laws. The Court also upheld the federal removal statute as a valid way to enforce that guarantee, and reversed the conviction. Justice Field dissented, joined by Justice Clifford. The West Virginia Encyclopedia calls it "the first decision of the U.S. Supreme Court to use the equal protection clause" to invalidate a state law. (e-WV.)

Neutral words, unequal enforcement: Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886)

San Francisco required laundries in wooden buildings to get the consent of the board of supervisors. About 310 of the city's 320 laundries were in wooden buildings. Yick Wo, a Chinese subject who had run his laundry for 22 years, was refused consent, arrested and fined. About 200 other Chinese applicants were refused, while nearly all non-Chinese applicants were approved.

In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), Justice Matthews wrote for the Court that equal protection covers all persons within the jurisdiction, whatever their race or nationality. A law may be "fair on its face and impartial in appearance," yet still violate the clause when officials apply it "with an evil eye and an unequal hand." The ordinance gave the supervisors purely arbitrary power, and the convictions were reversed.

The leading citizenship clause case: United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898)

The Court had read the Citizenship Clause before. In Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884), John Elk, a Native American born in the United States who said he had severed his tribal relations, sued an Omaha registrar who refused to register him to vote. Justice Gray, for the Court, held that Elk was not a citizen under the clause because he had not been born "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States in the required sense. Justices Harlan and Woods dissented.

Wong Kim Ark was born in San Francisco in 1873 to Chinese parents who lived and ran a business there. After a visit to China, he was refused permission to land in 1895 on the ground that he was not a citizen. In United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), Justice Gray wrote for the Court that a child born in the United States to parents in that situation was a citizen at birth under the first sentence of Section 1. It remains the leading case on birthright citizenship.

State action and "separate but equal"

Two decisions limited what the amendment could reach.

In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), five consolidated cases challenged the public accommodations sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which guaranteed equal access to inns, public conveyances, theaters and other places of amusement. Justice Joseph Bradley, for an 8 to 1 majority, held that the Fourteenth Amendment restricts only state action, so Section 5 did not let Congress ban private discrimination, and that refusing service was not a badge of slavery under the Thirteenth Amendment. Justice John Marshall Harlan dissented alone. This "state action" rule still governs the Fourteenth Amendment.

In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), Homer Plessy took a seat in a whites only railroad car on June 7, 1892, in a planned test of Louisiana's Separate Car Act of 1890. He was arrested, and his case went before Judge John H. Ferguson in New Orleans. Justice Henry Billings Brown, for a 7 to 1 majority, upheld the law as a reasonable exercise of police power. Justice Brewer did not participate. Justice Harlan dissented alone: "Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."

In Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, decided May 17, 1954, a unanimous Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Earl Warren, held that segregated public schools violate the Equal Protection Clause: "Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."

The Fourteenth Amendment, Section 3: disqualification for insurrection

No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 3 (National Archives transcription)

The earliest case we found: Griffin's Case (1869)

Caesar Griffin, a Black man, was indicted in the county court of Rockbridge County, Virginia, for shooting with intent to kill. He was convicted and sentenced to two years in the penitentiary. The trial judge, Hugh W. Sheffey, had taken an oath to support the U.S. Constitution as a legislator before the war and had then supported the Confederacy. Griffin sought release on habeas corpus, arguing that Section 3 disqualified Sheffey from office, so the judgment against him was void. A federal district judge ordered Griffin released.

Chief Justice Salmon Chase, sitting as circuit justice in Virginia, reversed in Griffin's Case, 11 F. Cas. 7 (C.C.D. Va. 1869). Section 3, he held, did not remove officeholders by its own force; Congress had to pass legislation to carry it out. Sheffey's acts were valid, and Griffin was not discharged. It is the earliest court decision on Section 3 that we found.

The Supreme Court's ruling: Trump v. Anderson (2024)

Section 3 did not reach the Supreme Court until 2024. Colorado voters asked a state court to keep Donald Trump off the 2024 Republican primary ballot under Section 3, based on his conduct around January 6, 2021. The Colorado Supreme Court, by a 4 to 3 vote, ordered him removed.

In Trump v. Anderson, decided March 4, 2024, the Court reversed in an unsigned per curiam opinion, with all nine Justices agreeing on the result. The Court held that states may disqualify people holding or seeking state office, but have no power to enforce Section 3 against federal officeholders and candidates, including for the Presidency; that responsibility rests with Congress under Section 5. Justice Barrett concurred in part and in the judgment. Justices Sotomayor, Kagan and Jackson concurred only in the judgment, arguing that the majority decided more than it needed to about how Congress must act.

The Fifteenth Amendment: race and the right to vote

The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude--U.S. Constitution, Amendment XV, Section 1, passed by Congress February 26, 1869, ratified February 3, 1870 (National Archives transcription)

The first interpretations: Reese and Cruikshank (1876)

Congress enforced the new amendment with the Enforcement Act of 1870. The first Supreme Court tests came in two cases decided on March 27, 1876, which the Constitution Annotated describes as the Court's "initial interpretations of the Fifteenth Amendment" (Constitution Annotated, Right to Vote Clause Generally).

In United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, two inspectors of a municipal election in Lexington, Kentucky, in 1873 refused to receive and count the vote of William Garner, a Black citizen. Chief Justice Waite wrote for the Court that the Fifteenth Amendment does not itself give anyone the right to vote; it protects against discrimination in voting on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude. Sections 3 and 4 of the Enforcement Act were not limited to racial discrimination, so the Court held they went beyond what the amendment authorized, and the indictment failed. Justice Hunt dissented. Justice Clifford, whose opinion the reports label a dissent, agreed that the indictment was bad "but for reasons widely different from those assigned by the Court."

In United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, decided the same day according to the Federal Judicial Center, the prosecutions arose from the 1873 Colfax Massacre in Grant Parish, Louisiana, in which armed whites killed more than a hundred African American men in a political dispute. A federal grand jury indicted more than 100 people under the Enforcement Act, and three were convicted. Chief Justice Waite held the indictment defective. The Fourteenth Amendment, he wrote, restricts states and "adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another." The voting counts failed because they did not allege that the defendants acted because of the victims' race: "We may suspect that race was the cause of the hostility, but it is not so averred." The defendants were discharged. (Cruikshank's First and Second Amendment holdings are covered in lesson 8.)

Striking down the grandfather clause: Guinn v. United States (1915)

In 1910 Oklahoma amended its constitution to impose a literacy test for voting, but exempted anyone who had been entitled to vote on January 1, 1866, or earlier, and their lineal descendants. The exemption let many white voters skip the test while many Black citizens were excluded. Federal prosecutors charged election officers named Guinn and Beal with conspiring to keep qualified Black citizens from voting in a 1910 congressional election.

In Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, decided June 21, 1915, Chief Justice White wrote for the Court that the grandfather clause violated the Fifteenth Amendment and was void, and because the literacy test could not be separated from it, the whole 1910 amendment fell. Justice McReynolds took no part. It is the earliest Supreme Court decision we found striking down a state voting law under the Fifteenth Amendment.

The leading case today: Shelby County v. Holder (2013)

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is the modern enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment. In Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), Chief Justice Roberts wrote for a 5 to 4 majority that the Act's Section 4(b) coverage formula, which determined which jurisdictions needed federal approval before changing voting rules, was unconstitutional because it rested on decades old data. The Court wrote that it issued "no holding on §5 itself, only on the coverage formula." Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan.

Summary table

Clause	First case	Year	What kind of first
Thirteenth Amendment	United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky.)	1866	First federal court opinion on the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (circuit court)
Thirteenth Amendment	Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36	1873	Earliest Supreme Court interpretation listed by the Constitution Annotated
Thirteenth Amendment (peonage)	Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219	1911	Struck down a state peonage law
Fourteenth, Privileges or Immunities	Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36	1873	First Supreme Court interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
Fourteenth, Equal Protection	Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303	1880	Generally cited as first state law struck down under the clause
Fourteenth, Equal Protection	Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356	1886	Unequal enforcement of a neutral law; protects noncitizens
Fourteenth, Citizenship	Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94	1884	Early holding on the clause (citizenship denied); the Slaughter-House Cases (1873) and Minor v. Happersett (1875) had discussed the clause before
Fourteenth, Citizenship	United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649	1898	Leading birthright citizenship case
Fourteenth, Section 5 and state action	Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3	1883	Leading early state action case under Section 5
Fourteenth, Section 3	Griffin's Case, 11 F. Cas. 7 (C.C.D. Va.)	1869	Earliest court decision we found (circuit court)
Fourteenth, Section 3	Trump v. Anderson	2024	Earliest Supreme Court ruling we found
Fifteenth Amendment	United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214	1876	One of the Court's "initial interpretations" per the Constitution Annotated (decided with Cruikshank)
Fifteenth Amendment	Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347	1915	Earliest state voting law we found struck down under it