Lesson 2 of 18 · about 24 minutes
Layered Defense Architecture
You'll be able to
- Name the eleven layers of a business security program and the owner of each
- Match each stage of an attack, using MITRE ATT&CK tactic names, to the layers that interrupt it
- Explain zero trust in plain words and what a small business can do about it this year
- Place your company on a four-step maturity scale and pick the next layer to add
- Build a minimum viable security stack and a first-year budget for your company size, and know which prices are sourced and which are rough
Start here: the short version
- No single tool stops attacks. A business needs several layers that each assume the one before has failed: governance, identity, endpoints, email, network, data, applications, cloud and SaaS, monitoring, response and recovery.
- If you can only do three things this quarter, do these: multi-factor authentication on every account that matters, a tested backup copy that an attacker cannot delete, and a patching routine with a named owner.
- Zero trust is not a product. It means no one gets trusted just for being inside the office network. Identity, device health and permission get checked for each request.
- Prices in this lesson are of two kinds, and each is labeled. Two vendor list prices were read from the vendors' own pages in October 2026. Everything else is a rough planning figure by the author, to be replaced by real quotes.
Lesson 01 explained why management owns the risk. This lesson answers the next question an owner asks: what, exactly, are we supposed to have? The answer is a stack of controls arranged so that an attacker who beats one has to beat another. This lesson describes the stack and what it costs. The hands-on steps for each control are in the sibling modules, Securing Your Small Business Data and Systems for the office and cloud, and Securing Your Home Computer, Phone and Money for personal devices and remote workers. This lesson stays at the decision level and does not repeat their steps.
Why layers, and how many
The idea is called defense in depth, and it is old. A castle had a moat, a wall, a gate and a keep. The point was not that any one was unbreakable. The point was that an attacker had to win four fights in a row, and the defenders got time to react between them.
Modern attacks are a chain of steps, not one event. A criminal buys a stolen password, signs into email, reads for a week, sends a fake invoice to your accounts payable clerk and, if that fails, drops ransomware on the file server. Each step is a chance to stop the chain. A business with three layers that each stop 70 percent of what reaches them lets about 2.7 percent through, since 0.3 multiplied by itself three times is 0.027. A business with one layer stopping 90 percent lets 10 percent through. Those percentages are an illustration of why layers beat a single strong wall, not measured rates, and real layers are never fully independent. A stolen administrator password can defeat several layers at once, which is why identity gets its own layer and the most attention.
The NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 (published February 26, 2024) organizes security outcomes in six functions: Govern, Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond and Recover. The CIS Critical Security Controls v8.1 list 18 controls, from asset inventory through penetration testing. The eleven layers below are a management view that maps onto both, so you can speak to an auditor in their language without handing your staff a 150-page standard.
The eleven layers
| # | Layer | What it protects | Core controls for a business your size | Usual owner | CSF 2.0 function |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Governance | The program itself | Named owner, written policies, risk register, board reporting, budget, vendor review | Owner or CEO, security lead | Govern |
| 2 | Identity and access | Accounts, the way most attackers get in | MFA everywhere, a password manager, least privilege, quarterly access review, separate admin accounts, fast offboarding | IT provider, HR for joiners and leavers | Protect |
| 3 | Endpoint | Laptops, desktops, servers, phones | Automatic patching, disk encryption, EDR, device management, no local admin rights for ordinary users | IT provider | Protect, Detect |
| 4 | Email and web | The channel for phishing and fraud | Filtering, link and attachment scanning, domain authentication records (SPF, DKIM, DMARC), banking-change call-back rule | IT provider, finance | Protect |
| 5 | Network | The path between systems and the internet | Business-grade firewall, patched edge devices, segmented guest and device networks, secured remote access, no open admin ports | IT provider | Protect |
| 6 | Data | The information itself | Classification, encryption at rest and in transit, access by need, retention limits, data loss controls for the most sensitive sets | Data owners, privacy lead | Protect |
| 7 | Application | Software you build or customize | Secure development practices, dependency updates, code review, tests before release | Whoever builds, or the vendor | Protect, Identify |
| 8 | Cloud and SaaS | Data in Microsoft 365, Google Workspace and other services | Secure configuration baselines, sharing limits, app approval, logging switched on, vendor review | IT provider, business owners | Protect, Identify |
| 9 | Monitoring | Early warning | Central logs, alert rules, EDR, someone who reads alerts at 2 a.m. (usually an MDR service) | Security lead, MDR provider | Detect |
| 10 | Response | What happens in the first hours | Written incident plan, contact list, roles, a practiced tabletop exercise, notification clock table | Security lead, executives | Respond |
| 11 | Recovery | Getting back to work | Immutable or offline backups, restore tests, recovery targets, alternate ways to take orders and pay staff | IT provider, operations | Recover |
The eleven layers. Top bands prevent, middle bands limit damage and watch, the bottom bands respond and recover.
Layers 1 and 2 matter more than their place in a list suggests. Without governance, nobody maintains the rest, and without strong identity controls, an attacker walks around layers 3 through 8. Layer 11 is the one that decides whether a bad day becomes a business-ending one. CISA's #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023) recommends phishing-resistant MFA on email, VPNs and accounts that reach critical systems, offline encrypted backups that are tested regularly, and prompt patching with priority on internet-facing servers. Those three items map to layers 2, 11 and 3.
Zero trust, in plain words
The old model was a castle: everyone inside the office network was trusted, and the firewall kept strangers out. That broke when staff began working from home, using personal phones and storing files in cloud services. NIST SP 800-207, Zero Trust Architecture (August 2020) describes the shift: defenses move from fixed network perimeters to users, assets and resources, and trust is not granted automatically because of network location or because a device is company owned. Authentication and authorization happen before a session with a resource begins.
For a business without a security department, that comes down to these habits.
- Every sign-in uses MFA, whether the person is at a desk or on the road.
- Access to a file, system or application depends on the person's job, and expires or gets reviewed.
- The device is checked too: is it patched, encrypted and managed by the company? Many cloud tools can block sign-ins from devices that fail the check.
- Remote access goes to specific applications, not to the whole office network.
- Everything is logged, so you can answer who touched what.
CISA's Zero Trust Maturity Model Version 2.0 (April 2023) is written for federal agencies, but its structure is useful to anyone: five pillars (identity, devices, networks, applications and workloads, and data), three cross-cutting capabilities, and four maturity stages (Traditional, Initial, Advanced, Optimal). A company with 80 people does not need to hit "Optimal" in any pillar. It needs to know which stage it is in for each pillar and to move the weakest one first.
What each layer stops: the attack chain
MITRE ATT&CK is a public catalog of how attackers behave. Its Enterprise matrix organizes behavior into tactics, which are the attacker's goals at each stage. As of October 2026 the ATT&CK Enterprise tactics page (version 20) lists 15, from Reconnaissance to Impact. The list has changed over time. The current version shows Stealth and Defense Impairment where earlier versions had a single Defense Evasion tactic, so older training slides may show 14.
| ATT&CK tactic (ID) | What the attacker is doing | Example in a 120-person firm | Layers most likely to stop or catch it |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reconnaissance (TA0043) | Gathering information on you | Collecting staff names and email format from the website and social media | Governance (data minimization on what you publish), Email |
| Resource Development (TA0042) | Building tools and infrastructure | Registering a look-alike domain, buying stolen credentials | Email (domain authentication, filtering), Identity (unique passwords, MFA) |
| Initial Access (TA0001) | Getting in | Phishing email, stolen password, unpatched internet-facing device | Identity, Email, Endpoint, Network, Cloud |
| Execution (TA0002) | Running malicious code | Staff open a booby-trapped attachment | Endpoint (EDR, application controls), Email |
| Persistence (TA0003) | Staying in | New hidden mail forwarding rule, new admin account, scheduled task | Monitoring, Identity (admin account alerts), Cloud logging |
| Privilege Escalation (TA0004) | Getting higher access | Using a shared local admin password to become domain administrator | Identity (least privilege, separate admin accounts), Endpoint |
| Stealth (TA0005) | Avoiding being seen | Running tools that blend in with normal administration | Monitoring, Endpoint (EDR) |
| Defense Impairment (TA0112) | Turning off the defenders | Disabling security software and deleting logs before encrypting | Endpoint (tamper protection), Monitoring (logs stored off the machine) |
| Credential Access (TA0006) | Stealing more passwords | Dumping saved passwords from a browser or server memory | Identity (MFA, password manager), Endpoint |
| Discovery (TA0007) | Looking around | Mapping file shares and finding where backups live | Network (segmentation), Monitoring |
| Lateral Movement (TA0008) | Moving to other systems | Using remote desktop from a phished PC to the file server | Network (segmentation), Identity, Monitoring |
| Collection (TA0009) | Gathering the target data | Zipping the HR share and the customer database | Data (access limits, encryption), Monitoring |
| Command and Control (TA0011) | Talking to the attacker's server | A hidden program checking in to an outside address | Network (outbound filtering), Monitoring |
| Exfiltration (TA0010) | Taking the data out | Uploading 40 GB to an outside storage service | Network, Data (loss controls), Cloud logging |
| Impact (TA0040) | Damage: encrypt, delete, extort, defraud | Ransomware on servers, or a fraudulent wire | Recovery (immutable backups), Response, Email and finance call-back rule |
The table matters for a simple reason. If every control you own acts at Initial Access, one slip loses everything. A layered stack also has controls that make the later stages hard (Privilege Escalation through Exfiltration) and controls that make the final stage survivable (Impact). Verizon's 2026 DBIR reports that exploiting vulnerabilities is now the most common way in, at 31 percent of breaches, and that third parties were involved in 48 percent. That reads as a case for patching discipline and for vendor control, which are layers 3 and 1.
Maturity: where are we, and what comes next
NIST CSF 2.0 describes four Tiers that characterize the rigor of governance and risk management: Partial, Risk Informed, Repeatable and Adaptive. The tiers are optional, and an organization uses them to inform its target profile. For a business, a four-step scale that mixes the CSF tiers with common sense is easier to use.
| Level | How it looks | Typical evidence | Next move |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Ad hoc (CSF: Partial) | Security depends on one helpful person. No policies, backups untested, MFA on some accounts. | Nothing written | Turn on MFA, fix backups, name an owner |
| 2. Defined (CSF: Risk Informed) | Policies exist, basic controls cover most systems, risks discussed but not tracked. | Policy set, asset list, patch report | Start a risk register, test a restore, add EDR |
| 3. Managed (CSF: Repeatable) | Controls are checked on a schedule, metrics reach management, incidents are practiced. | Quarterly reports, tabletop record, access reviews | Add monitoring by an MDR service, pursue an outside assessment |
| 4. Optimized (CSF: Adaptive) | Program adjusts to new threats, outside assurance is routine, risk is part of strategic planning. | Audit report or certification, board dashboard | Keep it funded. Most firms under 500 never need more than this. |
CIS offers a more specific ladder with its Implementation Groups. IG1 is described as "essential cyber hygiene" that every enterprise should start with, IG2 builds on it and IG3 includes all controls. The CIS Controls v8 and v8.1 contain 153 safeguards in total. Lesson 04 gives the counts and a chooser for the frameworks.
The minimum viable stack by company size
Do not expect precise prices. Vendor quotes vary by region, contract length and what a company already owns. Where a price appears below with a link, it is a list price read from the vendor's page in October 2026. The rest are the author's rough planning ranges for 2026 and should be treated as starting points for budgeting, not as quotes. Get at least two quotes before committing.
| Layer | 10 to 25 people | 25 to 100 people | 100 to 500 people |
|---|---|---|---|
| Governance | Owner named as accountable. One-page policy set. Annual review. | Security lead named. Risk register. Quarterly management review. Vendor list. | Security lead or vCISO. Board reporting. Framework chosen and assessed. Internal or external audit. |
| Identity | MFA on email, banking, payroll, admin. Password manager. Admin accounts separate. | Same, plus single sign-on for main apps, quarterly access review, phishing-resistant MFA for admins. | Same, plus conditional access, privileged access management, automated joiner-mover-leaver. |
| Endpoint | Auto-updates, disk encryption, built-in or bundled antivirus plus device management. | EDR on all devices. Managed patching. Mobile device management. | EDR with MDR. Application control on servers. Vulnerability scanning. |
| Email and web | Vendor filtering, SPF/DKIM/DMARC set to enforce. | Add link rewriting, attachment sandboxing, banking-change call-back rule. | Add impersonation protection, DNS filtering, brand monitoring. |
| Network | Business-grade firewall, patched, separate guest Wi-Fi. | Segmented networks, VPN or zero trust access for remote staff. | Segmentation by function, network monitoring, tested firewall rules. |
| Data and cloud | Know where customer and employee data live. Sharing limits in cloud storage. | Data inventory, classification, retention schedule, cloud configuration review. | Data loss controls, tokenization where possible, formal data governance. |
| Monitoring and response | Cloud audit logs on. Written one-page incident card. Phone numbers for insurer and IT. | MDR service. Incident plan. Annual tabletop. | MDR plus a log platform, retained forensic support, two tabletops a year. |
| Recovery | 3-2-1 backups, one copy offline or immutable, restore test twice a year. | Immutable backups for key systems, defined recovery targets, restore tests quarterly for critical systems. | Tiered recovery plans, alternate site or cloud recovery, business impact analysis. |
Cost anchors, sourced and rough
| Item | Figure | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Microsoft 365 Business Premium (email, identity, Defender for Business and Intune device management bundled; 300-user limit) | $22.00 per user per month with Teams, $18.79 without, billed yearly | Sourced: Microsoft's product page, October 2026 |
| CrowdStrike Falcon Go (Security Essentials, capped at 100 devices) | $59.99 per device per year | Sourced: vendor pricing page, October 2026 |
| CrowdStrike Falcon Pro (Enhanced Protection) | $99.99 per device per year | Sourced: same page |
| CrowdStrike Falcon Enterprise (Advanced Protection) | $184.99 per device per year | Sourced: same page |
| Managed detection and response, per endpoint | Roughly $8 to $20 per endpoint per month | Rough planning range by the author. Falcon Complete shows "Contact sales" and no price on the vendor page. |
| Password manager | Roughly $3 to $8 per user per month | Rough |
| Security awareness training | Roughly $2 to $5 per user per month | Rough |
| Immutable cloud backup, small business | Roughly $2,000 to $15,000 a year depending on data volume | Rough |
| vCISO service | Roughly $1,500 to $6,000 a month for a few hours of leadership time | Rough |
| External penetration test | Roughly $8,000 to $30,000 for a small environment | Rough |
Worked example: Northgate Millwork builds its first-year security budget
Northgate Millwork is an invented cabinet and millwork firm with 85 employees, 90 endpoints (laptops, shop-floor terminals and servers) and about $17 million in annual revenue. It has some antivirus, a backup drive in the server closet and a shared admin password. The owner asks for a first-year number. The security lead builds it from the table above.
- Microsoft 365 Business Premium covers identity, email security, device management and endpoint protection in one bundle. At the sourced list price of $22.00 with Teams, 85 users for 12 months costs 85 times $22.00 times 12, or $22,440.
- The owner considers a separate EDR product instead of the bundled Defender. At the sourced Falcon Pro price of $99.99 per device, 90 devices cost $8,999.10 a year. He decides the bundled tool is enough for year one and puts that $8,999.10 in the "year two review" column.
- An MDR service so someone watches alerts at night: 90 endpoints at an assumed $12 a month (the middle of the rough range) is 90 times $12 times 12, or $12,960.
- Immutable cloud backup for the servers: assumed $4,000.
- Security awareness training: 85 users at an assumed $3 a month is 85 times $3 times 12, or $3,060.
- A vCISO at an assumed $2,000 a month for ten hours of time: $24,000 for the year.
- An external penetration test at an assumed $12,000 every second year, annualized to $6,000.
- A log platform and retention for the cloud audit logs: assumed $6,000.
The total is $22,440 plus $12,960 plus $4,000 plus $3,060 plus $24,000 plus $6,000 plus $6,000, which equals $78,460. Divided by 85 employees, that is about $923 per employee per year, and $78,460 divided by $17,000,000 is about 0.46 percent of revenue. Compared with the Lesson 01 pattern, in which a multi-day outage cost a similar firm several hundred thousand dollars, the owner sees the program as insurance with an actual deductible. He also sees how much is new spending: everything except the Microsoft bundle adds up to $56,020, and Northgate already pays for a lower Microsoft tier, so the true added cost of the bundle is only the difference, a figure he will get from his reseller. The numbers marked "assumed" are placeholders until quotes arrive.
The first-year order he approves: identity and MFA in month one, tested immutable backup in month two, MDR in month three, policies and risk register by month four, the first tabletop exercise in month six.
Common mix-ups
- Claim: Our firewall is our security. What the evidence shows: A firewall is one network layer. Verizon's 2026 report puts exploited vulnerabilities at 31 percent of initial access, and internet-facing devices such as firewalls and VPN appliances are among the systems that need patching. A neglected firewall can be the way in.
- Claim: Antivirus is the same as EDR. What the evidence shows: Traditional antivirus matches known bad files. EDR records behavior and lets a responder isolate a machine. Attacks that use stolen credentials and a computer's own built-in tools can look like normal activity to a scanner that only matches known files.
- Claim: Cloud services are secured by the provider, so we do not need to do anything. What the evidence shows: Providers secure their infrastructure. You still control accounts, sharing settings, logging and who has admin rights. Account and configuration mistakes on the customer side are a common cause of SaaS incidents.
- Claim: Zero trust requires replacing everything. What the evidence shows: NIST describes it as an approach and a set of principles. Many small businesses reach most of it by switching on MFA, device checks and conditional access in tools they already pay for.
- Claim: More tools mean more security. What the evidence shows: Tools nobody configures or watches add cost and false comfort. One well-run bundle with an owner usually beats five overlapping consoles.
Reading your own stack: a decision table
| If you find this | The gap is in layer | First fix | Owner and timeframe |
|---|---|---|---|
| Some staff sign in with only a password | 2 Identity | Enforce MFA; stop legacy sign-in methods that skip it | IT provider, 30 days |
| Backups are on a drive attached to the server | 11 Recovery | Add an offline or immutable copy and run a test restore | IT provider, 60 days |
| No one can say how many devices we own | 1 Governance, 3 Endpoint | Build an asset list (Lesson 03) | Security lead, 45 days |
| Alerts go to an inbox nobody checks after 5 p.m. | 9 Monitoring | Contract an MDR service or set up paged on-call | Security lead, 90 days |
| Vendors hold customer data under no written security terms | 1 Governance | Start a vendor register and contract review (Lesson 09) | Business owners, 90 days |
| No written plan for the first hour of an incident | 10 Response | One-page incident card with calls to make (Lesson 11) | Security lead, 30 days |
Questions to ask your IT provider or vendor about the stack
- Show us MFA enrollment by account type. Which accounts, if any, are exempt and why?
- Which of our devices are not covered by endpoint protection, and which are not under management at all?
- How long do critical patches take to reach our systems, and what is the longest outstanding one?
- Where are our backups, who can delete them, and when did we last restore a full system from one?
- Which logs do we keep, for how long, and who looks at them outside business hours?
- Which administrator accounts exist, and are they separate from daily-use accounts?
- Does your service use the CIS Controls or another framework we can name in our own documentation?
Reporting angle
What management should request and report each quarter:
- Coverage figures by layer: percent of accounts with MFA, percent of devices with EDR and encryption, percent of systems on the latest critical patch within policy.
- Recovery proof: date and result of the last restore test for each critical system, and measured recovery time against the tolerance set in Lesson 01.
- Alert handling: alerts received, alerts investigated, median time from alert to action, and who handled the after-hours ones.
- Layer map: a one-page grid of the eleven layers showing owner, current maturity level (1 to 4) and next planned improvement.
- Budget comparison: spend per employee and as a share of revenue, with the sourced and assumed prices marked separately, in the form of the Northgate example.
- Contact points: CISA's reporting page and local FBI field office for incidents, and the state attorney general site for notice questions, kept in the incident card.
Research angle
- NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 and the NIST Small Business Cybersecurity Corner, including its guidance by topic on multi-factor authentication, ransomware and cyber insurance.
- CIS Critical Security Controls v8.1 and the Implementation Groups page.
- NIST SP 800-207 Zero Trust Architecture and the CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model 2.0.
- MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise tactics for current tactic names and IDs.
- CISA #StopRansomware Guide and the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals. As of October 2026, CISA's page says the goals are still being updated to align with CSF 2.0.
- FTC Start with Security, whose ten lessons overlap with the layers above.
Questions and answers
Which layer should we build first?
Identity and recovery, in that order. Stolen credentials are the common way in, and a recoverable business survives even when prevention fails. Governance runs alongside from day one: you need an owner before you need a product.
We are a 20-person firm. Do we really need all eleven layers?
You need all eleven covered, but not with eleven products. The small-company column in the table shows the scale: Layers 2, 3, 4 and 8 can sit largely inside one productivity suite, and layers 10 and 11 are mostly paper and a tested backup.
Is a managed security service worth the money?
If nobody on your team will read alerts at 2 a.m., yes. The cost arithmetic in the Northgate example puts MDR at $12,960 a year for 90 endpoints at an assumed rate. IBM's 2026 report, as summarized by a trade publication (eSecurityPlanet), says organizations making extensive use of security AI and automation had an average breach cost $1.93 million lower. That is a large-company average and it covers automation broadly rather than MDR services specifically, but it points the same direction.
What is the difference between NIST CSF and the CIS Controls?
The CSF is a framework of outcomes in six functions. The CIS Controls are a prioritized list of specific safeguards, 153 in v8.1. Many firms use the CSF to organize and the CIS list to decide what to do. Lesson 04 compares them.
Do we need a separate zero trust product?
No. Zero trust is a way of deciding access. The practical steps are MFA, device checks, least privilege and access to specific apps, and many are included in suites such as Microsoft 365 Business Premium.
How do these layers connect to the home and small office modules?
The home module covers personal devices and travel. The small business module covers accounts, backups, email, phones and the incident playbook. This lesson is the management map above both, and Lessons 10 through 12 add people, response and recovery planning at the program level.
Should we choose our own tools or let the IT provider choose?
The provider can recommend tools, but management should own the standard they are held to. Put the standard in writing, such as "MFA on all accounts, EDR on all devices, immutable backups," and then let the provider show how they meet it.
Hard questions
"We already have antivirus and a firewall. Why spend more?"
Because the frequent attack routes bypass both. Verizon's 2026 data puts exploited vulnerabilities, often in unpatched internet-facing devices, as the leading way in. Stolen credentials and phishing, which IBM's summary calls the most common starting point for the fourth straight year, get past antivirus and firewalls by being legitimate-looking sign-ins. The extra spending covers the routes those two tools do not see.
"Show me proof that layers work, instead of vendors' marketing."
The 70-percent illustration in this lesson is arithmetic, not evidence, and you should not treat it as a measured rate. Better evidence is structural. The FTC's Start with Security guide, built from its enforcement cases, lists failures that combine: no access limits, weak authentication, no monitoring, untested vendors. CISA's ransomware guide ties its advice to what attackers do. Test your own layers instead: simulate a stolen password and see what stops it.
"We cannot afford $78,000 a year."
Then do the first tier of the plan and say plainly what is deferred. The sourced cost of the bundle in the example is $22,440, and much of the first-year benefit comes from turning on controls you may already own. What you cannot do is skip the decision. Record what is not funded, who accepted that, and the date to revisit it, using the risk acceptance process in Lesson 03.
"Our staff will bypass the controls because they slow work."
Some will, and the answer is design, not scolding. Single sign-on reduces password friction, device-based rules cut the number of MFA prompts, and a documented exception route keeps people from building their own. Lesson 10 covers policies and training that people follow.
"If zero trust is a principle and not a product, how do we know we have it?"
Use the five pillars as a checklist and mark each Traditional, Initial, Advanced or Optimal. If you can answer for each pillar, who can reach what, from which device, with what check and what record, you have a defensible position. If you cannot, that is where to start.
Next, Lesson 03 shows how to find out which assets and data these layers must protect, and how to rank the risks in a register.
Check yourself
1. A phishing email steals a staff password, but the attacker cannot sign in because the account requires a hardware key. Which layer stopped the attack?
Identity controls such as multi-factor authentication decide who gets into accounts. A stolen password alone fails when a second factor is required.
2. In plain terms, what does NIST SP 800-207 say zero trust changes?
The NIST abstract describes shifting from fixed network perimeters to users, assets and resources, with authentication and authorization before a session starts.
3. As of October 2026, how many Enterprise tactics does the MITRE ATT&CK site list?
The ATT&CK Enterprise tactics page (version 20) lists 15 tactics from Reconnaissance to Impact, with Stealth and Defense Impairment where earlier versions had Defense Evasion.
4. Northgate Millwork has 90 endpoints and pays the list price of $99.99 per device per year for an endpoint product. What does that cost for a year?
90 times $99.99 is $8,999.10. The $99.99 figure is CrowdStrike's published annual list price for its Falcon Pro bundle as of October 2026.
5. Backups sit on a file server that every employee account can reach. Ransomware encrypts the server and the backups. Which design change helps most?
CISA's #StopRansomware Guide says to maintain offline, encrypted backups and test them, because many ransomware variants look for and delete accessible backups.
6. Which statement about the cost ranges in this lesson is correct?
The lesson labels two vendor list prices as sourced and marks everything else as rough, to be replaced with quotes from your own vendors.
Terms in this lesson
- Defense in depth
- Using several independent layers of protection so that when one fails, another still stands in the way.
- Zero trust
- An approach that stops trusting a device or user because of where it sits on the network, and instead checks identity, device health and permission for each request.
- MFA
- Multi-factor authentication: proving who you are with two or more things, such as a password plus a code, app prompt or hardware key.
- EDR
- Endpoint detection and response: software on computers and servers that records activity, spots attacks and lets responders isolate a machine.
- MDR
- Managed detection and response: an outside team that watches your EDR and other alerts around the clock and acts or calls you.
- Least privilege
- Giving each person or system only the access needed for the task, and removing it when the task ends.
- Immutable backup
- A backup copy that cannot be changed or deleted for a set period, even by an administrator account.
- ATT&CK
- MITRE ATT&CK: a public catalog of attacker tactics and techniques used to describe and plan against attacks.
Sources
- NIST SP 800-207, Zero Trust Architecture checked 2026-10
- CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model Version 2.0 checked 2026-10
- MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Tactics checked 2026-10
- NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 (CSWP 29) checked 2026-10
- CIS Critical Security Controls v8.1 list checked 2026-10
- CIS Controls Implementation Groups checked 2026-10
- CISA #StopRansomware Guide (September 2023) checked 2026-10
- CISA Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals checked 2026-10
- Microsoft 365 Business Premium pricing and features checked 2026-10
- CrowdStrike Falcon pricing checked 2026-10
- NIST Small Business Cybersecurity Corner checked 2026-10
- Verizon 2026 Data Breach Investigations Report checked 2026-10
- FTC, Start with Security: A Guide for Business checked 2026-10