Election Security and Audits in Plain Terms

Election security in Idaho is built in layers. No single layer is perfect, and none has to be. A ballot design mistake that slips past one check is supposed to be caught by the next. When you hear a security claim, the useful question is which layer it says failed, and what record from that layer shows.

The layers

Layer	What it does	Idaho rule
Paper ballots	Voters mark paper. The paper is the record a recount or audit goes back to.	Idaho election officials have stated that all Idaho votes are recorded on paper (Boise State Public Radio, 2021).
Equipment certification	The Secretary of State examines and approves voting machines and tally systems before counties may use them.	Idaho Code 34-2409, 34-2410
No network connection	Tabulators may never connect to the internet and may not send or receive data wirelessly. Electronic poll books are handled separately.	Idaho Code 34-2410(3)
Public logic and accuracy test	Before election day, the clerk runs a prepared set of ballots through each system and compares the result with the expected answer.	Idaho Code 34-2426 (added 2024)
Chain of custody and reconciliation	Ballots issued, spoiled and cast are counted and must balance. Seals and logs track who handled what.	Title 34 and Secretary of State directives
Canvass	Commissioners review the returns and the reconciliation before certifying.	Idaho Code 34-1205
Post-election audit	Hand count of ballots in randomly drawn precincts, compared with the machine count.	Idaho Code 34-1203A (added 2022)
Recount	A new count on request in a close or contested race.	Title 34, Chapter 23

Some small Idaho counties count every ballot by hand, with no tabulator at all. Officials cited at least seven such counties in 2021. Hand counting has its own error patterns (fatigue, tally mistakes), which is why hand-count counties also reconcile and canvass.

Logic and accuracy tests

Idaho Code 34-2426, added in 2024, made public logic and accuracy testing a statutory requirement. The county clerk must post notice on the county website (or in the office, if there is no website) at least ten days before the public test. The test has to:

• Show that every contest position and every ballot style can be voted and is counted accurately.
• Include overvotes and undervotes for each race, and write-ins where they apply.
• Use a marking pattern with expected results worked out in advance.
• Produce a zero report showing no ballots had been counted before the test.

The test passes only when actual results match expected results. If they do not, the clerk has to find out why and run it again until they match.

What the test cannot do: it checks that the machine counts correctly on the day of the test. It does not prove the machine will be used correctly on election day or that every real ballot was handled correctly. That is the job of the custody logs, the canvass and the audit.

Post-election audits

Idaho Code 34-1203A, added in 2022, has the Secretary of State order audits after the county canvasses are done. The audit can cover any federal race, the governor's race, the statewide race and the statewide ballot question with the narrowest margins, and one legislative race within a county.

• Precincts are chosen by lot, without a computer, at an open public meeting.
• Up to 5 percent of a county's precincts or one precinct, whichever is greater. Precincts may be combined if together they have fewer than 2,100 ballots.
• For early and absentee ballots stored by batch, day or machine instead of by precinct, the Secretary of State may audit those units.
• The audit includes a hand recount of the selected ballots, compared with the county's reported results.
• News media may attend. Candidates, parties and committees active on an audited question may appoint observers.
• If the findings warrant it, the Secretary of State may order more audits focused on the kind of problem found.

Claims and evidence

Election security claims come from every direction. Some are about machines. Some are about voter rolls, mail ballots, foreign interference or officials' conduct. Some turn out to be right in part: a ballot misprint, a precinct where reconciliation did not balance, a poll book glitch. Treat each claim as something to check, not something to dismiss or amplify.

Idaho has a well-documented test case. In 2021, MyPillow chief executive Mike Lindell claimed that votes in Idaho's 2020 presidential race had been electronically switched, and published specific vote counts for Idaho counties. The Secretary of State's office hand recounted the 2020 ballots in two of the named counties and planned a partial recount in a third. Boise State Public Radio reported a combined 10-vote discrepancy across the two counties, against claimed switches of 116 and 54 votes. Officials also pointed out that at least seven Idaho counties count without electronic components and that no certified machine in Idaho can connect to the internet. The claim had made a specific, checkable prediction about the paper ballots, the ballots were counted by hand, and the prediction did not hold up.

That is the model. A fair check of any security claim:

1. States the claim precisely, in the claimant's words where possible.
2. Asks what evidence was offered and what record would confirm or refute it (a ballot count, a custody log, a test report, a poll book).
3. Gets that record or explains why it is unavailable.
4. Says plainly where the evidence points. If the paper ballots were hand counted and matched, say so. If a real error was found, say that too, with its size.

The same method works when a claim comes from the other direction, such as a warning that a new ID or signature rule will keep eligible voters from casting a ballot. That claim is also checkable: ask the county for affidavits signed, voters turned away and absentee ballots rejected and why, compare with the last comparable election, and go by what the numbers show.