⚖️ Elected Officials Training
Journal Tools › Elected Officials Training › Sheriffs

Sheriffs · Module 2

Sheriff Authority: Landmark Court Cases

State and federal rulings that define, restrict, and affirm the constitutional power of the county sheriff, and what every sheriff and citizen must know about the law that governs law enforcement.

Last updated: April 3, 2026 · By Jeff A. Pierson

Why Court Cases Matter for Sheriffs

Statutes tell a sheriff what duties the law assigns. The Constitution tells a sheriff what limits the law imposes. But court cases tell a sheriff what happens when those duties and limits collide with the reality of law enforcement, and what the consequences are when an officer gets it wrong.

Every sheriff in Idaho should understand the landmark court decisions that define the boundaries of law enforcement authority. These cases are not abstract legal theory. They are the rules of engagement. A sheriff who does not know Graham v. Connor does not know the legal standard for every use of force by every deputy in the department. A sheriff who does not know Monell v. Department of Social Services does not understand when the county itself can be sued for the sheriff's policies. A sheriff who does not know Printz v. United States does not understand the constitutional foundation for refusing unconstitutional federal directives.

This module organizes the most important cases into categories: those that affirm and expand sheriff authority, those that restrict it, and those that define the legal framework within which every sheriff operates.

Cases That Affirm Sheriff Authority

Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)

What happened: Sheriff Jay Printz of Ravalli County, Montana, and Sheriff Richard Mack of Graham County, Arizona, challenged the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act's requirement that local sheriffs conduct background checks on handgun purchasers as an interim federal measure.

What the Court held: The Supreme Court held 5-4 that the federal government cannot "commandeer" state and local officers to enforce federal regulatory programs. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, declared: "The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program."[1]

Why it matters for sheriffs: Printz is the constitutional foundation for the sheriff's independence from federal commandeering. The federal government may enforce its own laws with its own officers, but it cannot draft the sheriff into federal service. A sheriff who chooses to cooperate with federal agencies does so voluntarily, and a sheriff who declines to enforce federal directives that the sheriff believes exceed federal authority or violate constitutional rights has constitutional ground to stand on. This case was brought by sheriffs, decided in favor of sheriffs, and remains the most important anti-commandeering precedent in American law.

Liberty Perspective

Printz affirmed what the founding generation understood: law enforcement is a local function, and the federal government has no business commanding the county sheriff. Every Idaho sheriff should know this case by name and understand its holding. When a federal agency pressures a sheriff to execute a federal program, the sheriff's first question should be: "Am I being commandeered?" If the answer is yes, the Constitution says the sheriff can refuse.

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)

What happened: Congress required states to either regulate radioactive waste according to federal instructions or "take title" to the waste. New York challenged the law as an unconstitutional commandeering of state government.

What the Court held: The Supreme Court held that Congress cannot compel states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program. The "take title" provision was unconstitutional because it forced states to choose between two unconstitutional alternatives.[2]

Why it matters for sheriffs: New York v. United States established the anti-commandeering doctrine that Printz later applied directly to local law enforcement officers. Together, these cases stand for the principle that the federal government operates through its own agents, not through conscripted state and local officers. The sheriff is an agent of the state and the county, not the federal government.

Murphy v. NCAA, 584 U.S. 453 (2018)

What happened: Congress prohibited states from authorizing sports gambling. New Jersey argued this was unconstitutional commandeering.

What the Court held: The Supreme Court struck down the federal prohibition, holding that Congress cannot prohibit states from modifying or repealing their own laws. Justice Alito wrote that the anti-commandeering doctrine is "the expression of a fundamental structural decision incorporated into the Constitution", not merely a rule of convenience.[3]

Why it matters for sheriffs: Murphy reaffirmed and extended the anti-commandeering doctrine into the 21st century. For sheriffs, it confirms that the federal government cannot tell states, or their officers, what laws to enforce or not enforce. This principle bears on immigration enforcement, firearms regulation, and any other area where federal and state authority may conflict, though how it applies to a particular federal program depends on the program.

Cases That Restrict Sheriff Authority

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)

What happened: A Memphis police officer shot and killed Edward Garner, an unarmed fifteen-year-old who was fleeing after a suspected burglary. The officer was acting under a Tennessee statute that authorized deadly force against any fleeing felon.

What the Court held: The Supreme Court held 6-3 that the "fleeing felon rule" violated the Fourth Amendment. Deadly force may be used to prevent escape only when "the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others."[4]

Why it matters for sheriffs: Garner ended the common-law rule that officers could shoot any fleeing felon. The decision requires a threat assessment before deadly force can be used against a fleeing suspect. Every sheriff's use-of-force policy must comply with Garner. Every deputy must be trained on its standard. Failure to comply exposes both the deputy and the sheriff's office to civil liability and criminal prosecution.

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)

What happened: Dethorne Graham, a diabetic experiencing an insulin reaction, was stopped, handcuffed, and roughed up by officers who believed he was behaving suspiciously. Graham sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming excessive force.

What the Court held: The Supreme Court established the "objective reasonableness" standard for evaluating law enforcement use of force under the Fourth Amendment. The question is "whether the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation." The Court identified three factors for evaluation: (1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat, and (3) whether the suspect is actively resisting or attempting to evade arrest.[5]

Why it matters for sheriffs: Graham is the governing standard for every use-of-force decision by every deputy in every sheriff's office in America. The "objective reasonableness" test, judged "from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene" rather than with "the 20/20 vision of hindsight," is the benchmark against which all force is measured. Sheriffs must train deputies on Graham, build use-of-force policies around Graham, and review force incidents through the Graham framework.

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)

What happened: Cleveland police officers entered Dollree Mapp's home without a valid search warrant, looking for a bombing suspect. They found obscene material and charged her under Ohio law.

What the Court held: The Supreme Court applied the exclusionary rule to state and local law enforcement: "All evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court."[6]

Why it matters for sheriffs: Before Mapp, evidence obtained through unconstitutional searches could still be used in state court prosecutions. After Mapp, it cannot. Every search conducted by a sheriff's deputy must comply with the Fourth Amendment, or the evidence will be excluded, and the case will be lost. This is not merely a technical rule. It is the mechanism by which the Fourth Amendment has teeth. A sheriff who tolerates sloppy warrant practices or warrantless searches is not just violating the Constitution; that sheriff is sabotaging prosecutions.

Liberty Perspective

The exclusionary rule is sometimes criticized as a "technicality" that lets guilty people go free. From a liberty perspective, it is anything but. The exclusionary rule is the enforcement mechanism of the Fourth Amendment, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. Without it, the Fourth Amendment would be words on paper. Officers would have no incentive to obtain proper warrants or respect constitutional boundaries. The exclusionary rule says to every law enforcement officer: if you want convictions to stand, respect the Constitution. A sheriff who trains deputies to do it right protects both liberty and public safety.

Qualified Immunity: Shield and Limitation

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)

What the Court held: Government officials performing discretionary functions are shielded from civil liability unless their conduct "violate[s] clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."[7]

The doctrine in practice: Qualified immunity protects sheriff's deputies (and the sheriff personally) from individual civil liability when their actions, even if later found unconstitutional, did not violate "clearly established" law at the time. The practical effect is that a deputy will not be held personally liable unless the specific conduct was previously held unconstitutional in a factually similar case.

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987)

What the Court held: When officers conduct a search that violates the Fourth Amendment, they are entitled to qualified immunity if a "reasonable officer" could have believed the search was constitutional.[8]

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)

What the Court held: Courts are no longer required to determine whether a constitutional right was violated before determining whether the right was "clearly established." Judges may grant qualified immunity on either prong, in either order.[9]

Constitutional Tension

Qualified immunity is one of the most debated doctrines in American law. Supporters argue it is essential to allow officers to make split-second decisions without fear of personal financial ruin. Critics, including some Supreme Court justices, argue it has become an "absolute shield" that allows officers to violate constitutional rights with impunity, particularly when courts decline to define what rights are "clearly established." Justice Sotomayor, dissenting in Kisela v. Hughes (2018), wrote that a one-sided approach to qualified immunity "transforms the doctrine into an absolute shield for law enforcement officers, gutting the deterrent effect of the Fourth Amendment." A sheriff committed to constitutional policing cannot rely on qualified immunity as a substitute for constitutional compliance. Qualified immunity may protect an officer from personal liability, but it does not make unconstitutional conduct lawful, and it does not protect the sheriff's office from Monell liability (discussed below).

Sheriff Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)

What happened: Female employees of New York City's Department of Social Services challenged a policy that forced them to take unpaid leave during pregnancy.

What the Court held: Local governments (including counties and sheriff's offices) are "persons" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when "execution of a government's policy or custom ... inflicts the injury." However, the municipality cannot be held liable on a pure respondeat superior theory, merely employing an officer who violates someone's rights is not enough. The plaintiff must show that a policy, custom, or practice of the government entity itself caused the constitutional violation.[10]

Why it matters for sheriffs: Monell means that the sheriff's office can be sued, and the county can pay damages, when a sheriff's official policy, widespread custom, or deliberate indifference to training causes a constitutional violation. A sheriff who fails to train deputies on use-of-force standards, who tolerates a custom of warrantless searches, or who maintains a policy that violates due process exposes the county to potentially enormous liability. Monell puts the sheriff's policies and training practices directly in the legal crosshairs.

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)

What happened: A woman arrested by Canton, Ohio police fell ill in custody. Officers did not provide medical attention despite obvious signs of distress.

What the Court held: A municipality can be held liable under § 1983 for failure to train its employees when that failure amounts to "deliberate indifference" to constitutional rights. The inadequate training must be "closely related to the ultimate injury."[11]

Why it matters for sheriffs: Canton means that a sheriff who fails to provide adequate training on constitutional requirements, use of force, search and seizure, inmate medical care, due process, can be held liable when that failure results in a constitutional violation. Training is not optional; it is a legal obligation. Deliberate indifference to training needs is a direct path to Monell liability.

Fourth Amendment: Search, Seizure, and the Sheriff

The Fourth Amendment is the constitutional provision most frequently implicated in sheriff's office operations. It protects the people against "unreasonable searches and seizures" and requires warrants to be supported by "probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."[12]

Key Fourth Amendment Standards

Warrant Requirement: The default rule is that searches and seizures require a warrant. The Supreme Court has recognized exceptions, including search incident to arrest, exigent circumstances, automobile exception, plain view, consent, and Terry stops, but each exception has specific requirements that must be met.

Probable Cause: A warrant may issue only upon probable cause, a reasonable basis to believe that evidence of a crime will be found at the place to be searched or that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. Probable cause is more than a hunch but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Knock and Announce: The Supreme Court held in Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995), that the common-law "knock and announce" rule is part of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness analysis. Officers must generally knock, announce their identity and purpose, and wait a reasonable time before forcibly entering a residence to execute a warrant.[13]

Particularity: The Fourth Amendment requires warrants to "particularly" describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. General warrants, authorizing broad, unspecified searches, are unconstitutional. The founding generation specifically rejected the "writs of assistance" used by the British Crown to conduct general searches of colonial homes and businesses.

Liberty Perspective

The Fourth Amendment was written by men who had experienced government searches without warrants, without probable cause, and without limits. The writs of assistance allowed Crown officers to search any home, any business, any ship, for any reason. The founders said: never again. When a sheriff's deputy serves a search warrant, that deputy is participating in a constitutional process that traces directly to the founding generation's insistence that the government cannot intrude upon the people's homes and property without legal justification. A sheriff who respects the Fourth Amendment is honoring the founding principle that the people's homes are their castles.

Eighth Amendment: Jail Conditions and Excessive Fines

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)

What the Court held: Deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the Eighth Amendment.[14]

Why it matters for sheriffs: As keeper of the county jail, the sheriff has a constitutional obligation to provide adequate medical care to inmates. Deliberate indifference, knowing of and disregarding a substantial risk to an inmate's health, violates the Eighth Amendment. A sheriff who underfunds jail medical care, who ignores inmates' medical complaints, or who fails to train detention officers on recognizing medical emergencies risks both individual and Monell liability.

Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 146 (2019)

What happened: Indiana sought to forfeit Tyson Timbs's $42,000 Land Rover after he sold heroin to undercover officers on two occasions. The trial court found the forfeiture grossly disproportionate to the offense.

What the Court held: The Supreme Court unanimously held that the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause applies to state and local governments through the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Ginsburg wrote that protection against excessive fines has been "a constant shield throughout Anglo-American history."[15]

Why it matters for sheriffs: Timbs directly constrains civil asset forfeiture by sheriff's offices. Forfeiture that is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense violates the Eighth Amendment. Sheriffs who rely on forfeiture revenue must ensure that every seizure is proportionate and constitutionally justified. This case is discussed further in Module 5 (Special Subjects).

Due Process: The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)

What the Court held: The prosecution's suppression of evidence favorable to the accused violates due process, regardless of the good or bad faith of the prosecution. The duty extends to all material evidence, evidence that is "material either to guilt or to punishment."[16]

Why it matters for sheriffs: Although Brady is directed primarily at prosecutors, the sheriff's office is the investigative agency that collects evidence. Deputies who discover exculpatory evidence, evidence that tends to prove the defendant's innocence or mitigate guilt, must disclose it to the prosecution. A sheriff's office that hides, destroys, or fails to preserve favorable evidence participates in a Brady violation. Training deputies on evidence preservation and disclosure obligations is not merely good practice, it is a constitutional requirement.

Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011)

What happened: John Thompson spent eighteen years in prison, fourteen on death row, after prosecutors in New Orleans suppressed blood evidence that would have exonerated him. Thompson sued under § 1983, arguing the district attorney's failure to train prosecutors caused the Brady violation.

What the Court held: In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that a single Brady violation, absent a pattern of similar violations, is insufficient to establish Monell liability for failure to train. Justice Ginsburg dissented, arguing that the evidence showed the district attorney's office had failed to train its prosecutors on their Brady obligations.[17]

Why it matters for sheriffs: Connick raises the Monell liability threshold for failure-to-train claims, but it does not eliminate the risk. A pattern of Brady violations, or a single violation so egregious that it demonstrates deliberate indifference, can still support liability. More importantly, the moral of the case is inescapable: an innocent man spent fourteen years on death row because law enforcement withheld evidence. A sheriff committed to justice, not merely to convictions, must ensure that evidence disclosure is a training priority.

Second Amendment: The Sheriff's Unique Obligation

The Second Amendment states: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."[18]

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)

What the Court held: The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess firearms unconnected with militia service, for traditionally lawful purposes such as self-defense within the home.[19]

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010)

What the Court held: The Second Amendment right recognized in Heller is incorporated against state and local governments through the Fourteenth Amendment.[20]

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)

What the Court held: The government may not prohibit law-abiding citizens from carrying handguns publicly for self-defense. The standard for evaluating firearms regulations requires consistency with the "historical tradition of firearm regulation."[21]

Why this trio matters for sheriffs: Heller, McDonald, and Bruen together establish that the right to keep and bear arms is an individual constitutional right enforceable against all levels of government. In Idaho, where Article I, Section 11 of the Idaho Constitution independently declares that "the people have the right to keep and bear arms, which right shall not be abridged", the sheriff's obligation is reinforced by both federal and state constitutional law. A sheriff who enforces firearms regulations that go beyond what the Constitution permits violates both the oath of office and the rights of the people.

Liberty Perspective

The sheriff occupies a unique position with respect to the Second Amendment. The sheriff is both a law enforcement officer and a protector of constitutional rights. When the federal government or a state legislature enacts a firearms regulation, the sheriff is the officer who may be called upon to enforce it. If that regulation violates the Second Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Heller, McDonald, and Bruen: the oath-bound sheriff faces a choice. Idaho has addressed part of this at the state level: Senate Bill 1332 (2014), which passed both chambers without a dissenting vote, added Idaho Code § 18-3315B, which penalizes a state or local official who knowingly and willfully orders an employee to enforce a federal measure issued on or after the act's effective date that is contrary to Article I, Section 11 of the Idaho Constitution. A sheriff weighing a firearms directive should read that statute closely, because it is narrower than a general license to decline federal law.

Idaho-Specific Rulings and Statutes

Idaho Senate Bill 1332 (2014): Federal Firearm, Magazine and Register Ban Enforcement Act

The Idaho Legislature passed the Idaho Federal Firearm, Magazine and Register Ban Enforcement Act without a dissenting vote (Senate 34-0 with one absent, House 68-0 with two absent), and the Governor signed it on March 19, 2014. It is codified at Idaho Code § 18-3315B. The act applies to federal executive orders, agency orders, laws, rules and regulations issued on or after its effective date. An official, agent or employee of the state or a political subdivision who knowingly and willfully orders another to enforce such a federal measure on a personal firearm, firearm accessory or ammunition, contrary to Article I, Section 11 of the Idaho Constitution, faces a civil penalty of up to $1,000 for a first violation and a misdemeanor for later violations. The Legislature stated its intent to protect officers from being directed to violate their oath of office; the act does not penalize officers who follow orders, and it excludes acts done solely to facilitate transfers of firearms under federal law.[22]

Idaho Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform: HB 447 (2018)

The Idaho Legislature reformed civil asset forfeiture law in 2018. According to the bill's statement of purpose, HB 447 provided that vehicles would not be subject to forfeiture in connection with mere possession of a controlled substance, that property merely in proximity to a controlled substance is not subject to forfeiture without a meaningful connection to a violation, that the presence of currency alone is not sufficient cause for seizure or forfeiture, that a right of replevin exists while proceedings are pending (on a showing of necessity and security), that courts must determine whether a forfeiture is proportionate to the crime alleged, that innocent owners are absolved of the state's costs, and that reporting requirements apply to forfeited property. The bill passed the House 68-0 with one absent and was signed by Governor Otter in March 2018.[23]

Constitutional Tension

Whenever law enforcement groups resist forfeiture reform designed to protect citizens' property rights and honor the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause, it raises a question that every sheriff must answer personally: does the sheriff serve the institutional interests of law enforcement, or the constitutional rights of the people? The answer should be obvious for any officer who has taken the oath. Revenue from forfeiture is not a constitutional entitlement of the sheriff's office. Property rights are a constitutional entitlement of the people. A sheriff whose budget depends on taking citizens' property has a structural conflict of interest that undermines the public trust.

Dillon's Rule and Sheriff Authority

Idaho courts have generally described county powers as limited to those the Constitution and the Legislature grant, expressly or by necessary implication. While this doctrine applies primarily to the Board of County Commissioners, it has implications for sheriffs as well: the sheriff's statutory authority is defined by Idaho Code, and the sheriff cannot exercise powers not granted by statute or the Constitution. However, the sheriff's constitutional standing under Article XVIII, Section 6 provides a foundation of authority that is not subject to legislative abolition.[24]

Conclusion: The Law as the Sheriff's Foundation

The cases in this module are not merely legal history. They are the working rules that govern every action a sheriff takes. A sheriff who knows these cases, who trains deputies on Graham and Garner, who builds policies that comply with Monell, who respects the Fourth Amendment standards of Mapp, who understands the anti-commandeering principles of Printz: is a sheriff who can exercise authority with confidence, knowing that the law supports the exercise of that authority.

A sheriff who does not know these cases is operating blind. And in law enforcement, operating blind gets people hurt, the public, the deputies, and the sheriff personally.

The oath of office is not a formality. The Constitution is not a suggestion. The court cases that interpret the Constitution are not academic exercises. They are the law. And the sheriff, above all law enforcement officers, is the one who swore before the people to uphold it.

Pictures, Numbers and Infographics

Several of the rulings that define a sheriff's authority, from Printz to Connick, were decided by a single vote. The chart lays out the margins, and the figures give the size of the office those rulings govern.

West front of the U.S. Supreme Court building in Washington, D.C.
The U.S. Supreme Court building in Washington, photographed by Carol M. Highsmith between 1980 and 2006. The federal cases in this module were decided here. Credit: Carol M. Highsmith, Library of Congress. Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons.

By the numbers

  • 5 to 4: Printz v. United States (1997), the anti-commandeering case, and Connick v. Thompson (2011) on failure-to-train liability. Oyez
  • 5 to 4: District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) and McDonald v. Chicago (2010) on the Second Amendment. Oyez
  • 9 to 0: Graham v. Connor (1989), which set the objective reasonableness test for force, and Timbs v. Indiana (2019) on excessive fines. Oyez
  • 7 to 2: Monell v. Department of Social Services (1978), which opened local governments to suits under § 1983. Oyez
  • 17% and 24%: Sheriffs' offices made up 17% of U.S. law enforcement agencies in 2018 and employed about 24% of full-time sworn personnel. BJS, 2022
  • 76%: of U.S. sheriffs' offices had fewer than 50 full-time-equivalent sworn officers in 2020. BJS, 2022
  • 1,195: full-time sworn officers worked in Idaho sheriffs' offices as of October 31, 2025. ISP, Crime in Idaho 2025
Majority votes in the module's Supreme Court cases (out of 9) Mapp v. Ohio, 1961 6 to 3 Brady v. Maryland, 1963 7 to 2 Estelle v. Gamble, 1976 8 to 1 Monell, 1978 7 to 2 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 1982 8 to 1 Tennessee v. Garner, 1985 6 to 3 Anderson v. Creighton, 1987 6 to 3 Graham v. Connor, 1989 9 to 0 Canton v. Harris, 1989 6 to 3 New York v. U.S., 1992 6 to 3 Printz v. U.S., 1997 5 to 4 D.C. v. Heller, 2008 5 to 4 Pearson v. Callahan, 2009 9 to 0 McDonald v. Chicago, 2010 5 to 4 Connick v. Thompson, 2011 5 to 4 Murphy v. NCAA, 2018 6 to 3 Timbs v. Indiana, 2019 9 to 0
Orange bars are one-vote cases. Bruen (2022) is left off because the vote source used here lists no tally for it. Source: Oyez case records, read October 2026.

Knowledge Check

Test your understanding. No scores are saved: this is for your own review.

1. Under Graham v. Connor, what standard governs use-of-force claims?

2. What does the exclusionary rule from Mapp v. Ohio require?

3. Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, when can a county be sued?

4. What did Timbs v. Indiana establish about asset forfeiture?

5. Under Tennessee v. Garner, when can an officer use deadly force against a fleeing suspect?

Footnotes & Citations

  1. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the Brady Act's interim provisions requiring local chief law enforcement officers to conduct background checks violated the Tenth Amendment's anti-commandeering principle.
  2. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). The Court struck down provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act that compelled states to take regulatory action, establishing the anti-commandeering doctrine.
  3. Murphy v. NCAA, 584 U.S. 453 (2018). Justice Alito, writing for the majority, reaffirmed and expanded the anti-commandeering doctrine, calling it "the expression of a fundamental structural decision incorporated into the Constitution."
  4. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). Justice White, writing for the majority, held that the common-law "fleeing felon rule" authorizing deadly force against any fleeing felony suspect violated the Fourth Amendment.
  5. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the unanimous Court, established the "objective reasonableness" standard for evaluating all law enforcement use-of-force claims under the Fourth Amendment.
  6. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Justice Clark, writing for the majority, applied the exclusionary rule to state and local law enforcement, holding that evidence obtained through unconstitutional searches is inadmissible in state courts.
  7. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). The Court established the modern objective test for qualified immunity, replacing the subjective "good faith" standard.
  8. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). The Court applied qualified immunity to officers conducting a warrantless search, holding that the relevant inquiry is whether a "reasonable officer" could have believed the search was constitutional.
  9. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). The Court relaxed the Saucier sequencing requirement, allowing courts to decide qualified immunity on either prong in either order.
  10. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The Court held that local governments are "persons" under § 1983 but may be held liable only for injuries inflicted by an official policy or custom, not on a respondeat superior theory.
  11. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989). The Court held that a municipality's deliberate indifference to the need to train employees on constitutional requirements can establish § 1983 liability when that failure causes a constitutional violation.
  12. U.S. Constitution, Amendment IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
  13. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995). Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the common-law "knock and announce" requirement is part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry.
  14. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). The Court held that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners" constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
  15. Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 146 (2019). The Court unanimously incorporated the Excessive Fines Clause against the states, constraining civil asset forfeiture at all levels of government.
  16. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Court held that the prosecution must disclose material exculpatory evidence to the defense, regardless of good or bad faith.
  17. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011). The 5-4 majority held that a single Brady violation is insufficient for failure-to-train Monell liability absent a pattern of violations. Justice Ginsburg's dissent argued that the evidence showed a failure to train that warranted liability.
  18. U.S. Constitution, Amendment II.
  19. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). Justice Scalia, writing for the 5-4 majority, held that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess firearms for traditionally lawful purposes such as self-defense within the home.
  20. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). The Court incorporated the Second Amendment against state and local governments through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
  21. New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, held that the government must affirmatively prove that any firearms regulation is consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation.
  22. Idaho Senate Bill 1332 (2014): "Idaho Federal Firearm, Magazine and Register Ban Enforcement Act." Passed House 68-0 (two absent), Senate 34-0 (one absent), signed by Governor Otter on March 19, 2014. Codified at Idaho Code § 18-3315B. Imposes a civil penalty, and for repeat violations a misdemeanor, on a state or local official who knowingly and willfully orders enforcement of a covered federal measure issued on or after its effective date that is contrary to Article I, Section 11 of the Idaho Constitution.
  23. Idaho House Bill 447 (2018): Civil asset forfeiture reform. Per the statement of purpose: no vehicle forfeiture for mere possession of a controlled substance, a right of replevin pending proceedings, a court determination of proportionality, relief from the state's costs for innocent owners, and reporting requirements. Signed in March 2018 (2018 Session Laws, ch. 221). The Institute for Justice publishes reports on Idaho's forfeiture laws and practices.
  24. Idaho Constitution, Article XVIII, Section 6, and the general rule that counties have only the powers the Constitution and Legislature grant. See also the discussion of Dillon's Rule in Module 1 of the County Commissioner training track.

Sources & Further Reading

  • U.S. Constitution: Amendments II, IV, V, VIII, X, XIV
  • Idaho Constitution: Article I (Sections 1, 11, 17), Article XVIII (Section 6)
  • Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)
  • Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)
  • Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)
  • Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
  • Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)
  • Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 146 (2019)
  • District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)
  • NYSRPA v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)
  • Idaho Senate Bill 1332 (2014): Federal Firearm, Magazine and Register Ban Enforcement Act
  • Idaho House Bill 447 (2018): Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform
  • Institute for Justice, "Policing for Profit" (Idaho state profile): ij.org
  • Congressional Research Service, "Policing the Police: Qualified Immunity and Considerations for Congress" (LSB10492)