🎓 Journalism Training
Courses › Digital Safety for Writers

Lesson 9 of 9 · about 18 minutes

Securing Your Site and Recovering From a Hack

You'll be able to

  • Turn on registrar lock and two-factor at your domain registrar and understand registry lock
  • Replace FTP with SFTP, keep the CMS and plugins updated, and back up the site off-server
  • Protect a newsletter account and its subscriber list
  • Work through a hacked-account and hacked-site recovery in the right order

Your website and newsletter are your printing press. If someone takes the domain, they also take every email address on it and every link you have ever shared. If someone takes the newsletter account, they get your readers' trust and their email addresses. These accounts deserve the strongest protection you own.

The domain registrar

The registrar is the top of the chain. Whoever controls your registrar account can point your domain anywhere, including at a fake copy of your site, or transfer it away.

  • Two-factor with a security key on the registrar account (lesson 3). This is one of your six most important accounts.
  • Registrar lock on. ICANN's status codes include clientTransferProhibited, which tells the registry to "reject requests to transfer the domain," plus clientUpdateProhibited and clientDeleteProhibited (ICANN). Most registrars bundle these as a "domain lock" toggle. Check that yours is on.
  • Registry lock, if your registrar offers it, sets the server-level version. Removing it takes manual steps between registrar and registry. For a solo writer, that slowness is the feature.
  • Auto-renew on, with a valid card. Expired domains get scooped up and used to impersonate the former owner.
  • Contact email on a different domain. If the registrar's alerts go to an address on the same domain and the domain is hijacked, you lose your alerts with it.
  • Privacy service on so your home address does not appear in public domain records.

Hosting and file access

ItemRisky setupSafer setup
File uploadsPlain FTP, which sends the password unencryptedSFTP, or SSH keys with a passphrase
Hosting control panelPassword only, shared with the web designerTwo-factor, a separate account for each person
Old accessFTP accounts for a designer who left in 2022Delete accounts you do not use; rotate passwords after anyone leaves
Database passwordSame as the hosting passwordUnique, generated, stored in the password manager
BackupsOnly on the same serverCopies off-server, downloaded on a schedule

The CMS and its plugins

Most website break-ins come through outdated plugins and themes, not the core software. For WordPress, the developer documentation says minor core releases (maintenance and security) and translations update automatically, and have since version 3.7. Plugins and themes do not update automatically by default except in special cases like critical security patches (WordPress). So:

  1. Turn on auto-updates for every plugin and theme you keep.
  2. Delete plugins and themes you do not use. Deactivated is not deleted; inactive code can still be attacked.
  3. Give every person their own login with the lowest role that works. Guest writers do not need Administrator.
  4. Turn on two-factor for admin logins.
  5. Check the user list monthly for accounts you do not recognize.

The newsletter account

  • Strongest two-factor the platform offers, on the owner account and every collaborator.
  • Export your subscriber list monthly and keep it in your encrypted backup. If the account is lost, the list is your audience.
  • Review who has access and remove anyone who no longer needs it.
  • Connect payouts to a bank account with its own two-factor, and watch for changes to payout details.
If your newsletter suddenly sends something you did not write, your readers are the victims. Warn them fast, through your social accounts or a fresh post, and tell them what not to click.

Recovering from a hack, step by step

Order matters. Fixing things in the wrong order lets the attacker back in. Work from a device you trust: if the takeover might have come through malware, use a different computer or a freshly updated phone.

StepWhat to doWhy
1. ContainDisconnect a suspect device from the internet. Do not wipe it yet.Stops further theft; keeps evidence
2. Email firstUse the provider's official account recovery page, typed in yourself, not a link from a messageEmail resets everything else
3. Lock it back downNew passphrase, sign out all sessions, re-add your two-factor, remove methods you did not addKicks out the attacker and closes their door back in
4. Hunt for leftoversCheck forwarding rules, filters, recovery phone and email, connected apps, app passwords, linked devicesAttackers plant these to keep reading your mail after you change the password
5. Work outwardPassword manager, carrier, Apple or Google, bank, registrar, host, newsletter, socialSame order as lesson 2
6. Money and identityCall your bank's fraud line; freeze credit; use IdentityTheft.gov if personal numbers were exposedLimits financial damage
7. Warn peopleContacts, sources (through Signal), editor, readersAttackers use your account to phish the people who trust you
8. Clean the deviceScan, and if in doubt, back up your files and reinstall the operating systemRemoves anything that could steal the new passwords
9. ReportThe platform, ic3.gov, and police if there is extortion or a threatCreates a record; IC3 tracks patterns
10. ReviewHow did they get in? Update your threat model from lesson 1So it does not happen the same way twice

Example: a recovery timeline

Dana, the Cutter Falls newsletter writer, gets a text from a reader at 7:02 p.m.: "Did you just email me about a crypto donation?"

  • 7:05: She checks sent mail on her phone. Forty messages she did not write. She grabs her partner's laptop, since her own laptop was where she clicked a "records request" link that morning.
  • 7:10: On the partner's laptop she goes to her email provider's recovery page. The attacker changed the password but not the recovery phone. She gets in.
  • 7:16: New passphrase. Signs out all sessions. Finds a filter forwarding every message with "Signal" or "source" in it to an outside address, and deletes it. Removes an unknown recovery email.
  • 7:25: Adds her security key, which she had been meaning to do for a month. Removes SMS recovery.
  • 7:40: Password manager, registrar, newsletter platform: new passwords, sessions signed out. The newsletter shows no unauthorized sends.
  • 8:10: Messages her source on Signal: the email account was compromised, nothing about you was in it, but use Signal only.
  • 8:30: Short post to readers explaining what happened and what not to click.
  • Next morning: reinstalls her laptop's operating system after copying her files to the backup drive, files a report at ic3.gov, and updates her threat model.

Time from first warning to email secured: 7:02 to 7:25, 23 minutes. Time to everything locked: about 1 hour 28 minutes. The forwarding filter is the detail that matters. If she had only changed the password, the attacker would have kept getting copies of her mail for weeks.

If the website itself is hacked

  1. Put the site in maintenance mode or ask the host to take it offline, so it does not spread malware to readers.
  2. Change the hosting panel, SFTP, database and CMS admin passwords, from a clean device.
  3. Look for admin users you did not create, and delete them.
  4. Restore from a clean backup made before the break-in. If you do not know when it started, go back further.
  5. Update the CMS, every plugin and every theme before going back online. Otherwise the same hole lets them back in.
  6. Check that the domain's DNS records and registrar contacts have not changed.
  7. Ask Google Search Console to review the site if it was flagged as dangerous.

Common mix-ups

  • Claim: "Changing the password fixes a hacked account." What the evidence shows: Open sessions, forwarding rules, connected apps and swapped recovery details can all survive a password change. Recovery means checking each one.
  • Claim: "My host backs up my site, so I'm covered." What the evidence shows: Host backups may be short, may be on the same server, and may already contain the infection. Keep your own off-server copies.
  • Claim: "I should delete everything the hacker touched." What the evidence shows: Save evidence first: screenshots, sent messages, filter rules, the time you noticed. Platforms and investigators need it, and so does your own review.

Reporting angle

When a local news site, a candidate's site or a government page gets defaced or hijacked, ask: when was it detected, how did the attacker get in (stolen password, outdated plugin, expired domain), what was changed or taken, were visitors exposed to malware, and was it reported to IC3. Domain history and registration records can show whether a domain expired and was re-registered by someone else. Be careful attributing a hack to any group without evidence; "hacked by" banners are often fake.

Checklist

  • Registrar: security key, domain lock on, auto-renew on, alerts to another domain
  • Host: SFTP only; old accounts removed; unique database password
  • CMS: auto-updates for plugins and themes; unused ones deleted; 2FA on admins
  • Newsletter: 2FA, subscriber list exported monthly, collaborator list reviewed
  • Recovery plan printed with your lost-device plan

Try it

Log in to your domain registrar and screenshot the security page: lock status, two-factor method, contact email, auto-renew. Fix anything weak. Then do a tabletop drill: pretend your main email was taken over at 7 p.m. tonight. Write your own version of the recovery timeline, with the real recovery pages, the device you would use, and the people you would warn. Store it with your lost-device plan. If you run a site, also confirm you have an off-server backup from the last 30 days.

Pictures, Numbers and Infographics

The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center counts what people report, so the real totals are higher. The counts still show which attacks are common and which are rare.

Carved wooden Great Seal of the United States displayed with the listening device that was hidden inside it
The Great Seal bug at the National Cryptologic Museum, Fort Meade, Maryland. A carved seal given to the U.S. ambassador in Moscow hid a listening device with no battery. It was a gift, and it looked harmless. Credit: Daderot, 2013. CC0 (public domain dedication), via Wikimedia Commons.

By the numbers

  • 1,008,597: complaints filed with the FBI's IC3 in 2025, with reported losses of $20.877 billion. FBI IC3, 2025 Internet Crime Report
  • 26%: increase in reported losses from 2024 to 2025. FBI IC3, 2025
  • 191,561: phishing and spoofing complaints in 2025, the most of any crime type by count. FBI IC3, 2025
  • 67,456: personal data breach complaints in 2025, with losses of $1,314,923,988. FBI IC3, 2025
  • 21,557: harassment and stalking complaints in 2025, up from 11,672 in 2024. FBI IC3, 2025
  • 971: SIM swap complaints in 2025, with reported losses of $17,366,758. FBI IC3, 2025
  • 3,611: ransomware complaints in 2025. FBI IC3, 2025
  • 4,479: IC3 complaints from Idaho in 2025, with $88,725,284 in reported losses. FBI IC3, 2025
Losses reported to the FBI IC3, billions of dollars $6.9B 2021 $10.3B 2022 $12.5B 2023 $16.6B 2024 $20.877B 2025
Losses reported to IC3 roughly tripled from 2021 to 2025. Source: FBI IC3, 2025 Internet Crime Report.
2025 IC3 complaints, selected crime types Phishing/spoofing 191,561 Extortion 89,129 Personal data breach 67,456 Identity theft 31,675 Harassment/stalking 21,557 Ransomware 3,611 SIM swap 971
Complaint counts for the crime types this module covers. Phishing dwarfs the rest. Source: FBI IC3, 2025 Internet Crime Report.

Check yourself

1. What does the EPP status clientTransferProhibited do?

2. Why should you stop using plain FTP to upload files to your web host?

3. By default, what does WordPress update automatically on an existing site?

4. After getting back into a hijacked email account, what is a sneaky change attackers often leave behind that you must check?

5. In the recovery timeline example, why does Dana change passwords from her partner's laptop instead of her own?

6. What does the FTC's IdentityTheft.gov provide?

Terms in this lesson

Registrar
The company you pay for your domain name, which controls where the domain points.
Registrar lock
Status codes such as clientTransferProhibited that block transfers, updates or deletion of a domain without your action.
Registry lock
A stronger lock set at the registry level, which takes extra manual steps to remove.
SFTP
Secure File Transfer Protocol, which uploads files over an encrypted SSH connection.
CMS
Content management system, the software such as WordPress that runs a website.
Session
A signed-in state on a device. Signing out all sessions kicks out anyone using a stolen login.

Full glossary

Sources