Lesson 1 of 9 · about 16 minutes
The Fourth Amendment in Eight Cases
You'll be able to
- Explain the reasonable expectation of privacy test and the older property test
- Describe the third-party doctrine and where the Supreme Court has refused to extend it
- Summarize Jones, Riley, Carpenter and Chatrie v. United States in a sentence each
- Tell what a court ruling did and did not decide, and spot a summary that overstates it
The Fourth Amendment is 54 words long. It protects "persons, houses, papers, and effects" against "unreasonable searches and seizures" and says warrants need probable cause and must particularly describe what is to be searched. Every argument about plate readers, face scans and phone data comes back to those words. And the words were written for a world of wax seals and horse-drawn carts, so courts have had to build tests on top of them.
You do not need a law degree to follow a surveillance fight. You do need to know which test a court used, what it decided, and what it carefully left alone. Most bad claims about surveillance law, from either side, fail on that last part.
Two tests for a search
The amendment only kicks in when the government does a search or a seizure. If an action is not a search, no warrant is needed. So the first fight in nearly every case is over that word.
The older test is about property. If police physically intrude on your home, your papers or your car to get information, that is a search. For most of American history this was the whole test.
Then came Katz v. United States in 1967. FBI agents taped a listening device to the outside of a public phone booth and recorded Charles Katz placing illegal bets. No trespass into anything he owned. The Court said it did not matter: "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." Justice Harlan's concurrence wrote the version courts still quote. A search happens when a person has an actual expectation of privacy and society is prepared to call that expectation reasonable. That is the reasonable expectation of privacy test, and it is slippery on purpose.
The third-party doctrine
A decade later the Court drew a line that powers much of modern surveillance. In United States v. Miller (1976), investigators got a man's bank records from his bank with a subpoena. In Smith v. Maryland (1979), police had the phone company install a pen register to record the numbers dialed from a robbery suspect's home phone. Both times the Court found no search. You gave that information to a business, the reasoning went, so you took the risk the business would hand it over.
That is the third-party doctrine. Think about what it covers today: your email provider, your phone carrier, your grocery loyalty card, your car's connected app, the doorbell company's cloud. If the doctrine applied without limit, almost nothing digital would be protected.
The digital turn
The Court has spent the last 15 years deciding how far to stretch the old rules.
| Case and year | Facts in one line | What it held | What it left open |
|---|---|---|---|
| Katz v. United States, 1967 | Bug on a phone booth | Eavesdropping was a search; created the expectation test | How to judge "reasonable" |
| United States v. Miller, 1976 | Bank records by subpoena | No search; records belonged to the bank | Digital records |
| Smith v. Maryland, 1979 | Pen register on dialed numbers | No search; numbers shared with the phone company | Content of calls (protected separately) |
| United States v. Jones, 2012 | GPS tracker on a car for 28 days | Attaching the tracker was a search (property test); five justices also worried about long-term tracking | Tracking without touching the car |
| Riley v. California, 2014 | Phones searched after arrests | Officers generally need a warrant to search a phone's contents | Emergencies (exigent circumstances still apply) |
| Carpenter v. United States, 2018 | 127 days of cell-site records from carriers | Getting 7 or more days of historical records is a search; warrant generally required | Real-time tracking, tower dumps, security cameras |
| Chatrie v. United States, 2026 | Geofence warrant for Google Location History near a bank robbery | Getting the Location History was a search; third-party doctrine did not apply | Whether this multi-step warrant was valid; the good-faith exception |
Jones matters because of the concurrences. Justice Alito, writing for four justices, said long-term GPS monitoring would impinge on expectations of privacy even without the physical tracker. Justice Sotomayor agreed. Those five votes pointed toward the idea that collecting many small public facts can add up to something private. Scholars call this aggregation theory. You will see it argued in every plate reader case.
Riley is the case you cite when someone says a phone is just like a wallet. Chief Justice Roberts wrote for a unanimous Court that a modern phone holds "the privacies of life," and the answer to what police must do before searching one is simple: get a warrant.
Carpenter is the big one. The FBI got Timothy Carpenter's cell-site records with a court order under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2703(d), which only needs "reasonable grounds" to believe the records are relevant. The records covered 127 days and 12,898 location points. The 5 to 4 majority, written by Roberts, held that this was a search and that the 2703(d) standard falls short of probable cause. The third-party doctrine did not apply to this kind of detailed, automatic location trail.
Example: the arithmetic in Carpenter
12,898 points divided by 127 days is about 101.6 points per day. That works out to a location roughly every 14 minutes around the clock (1,440 minutes in a day divided by 101.6). The Court did not set a minimum, but it said seven days of records was enough to count as a search. Seven days at that rate is about 711 points.
The 2026 geofence decision
A geofence warrant asks a company for every device that was inside a drawn area during a window of time. In 2019, police investigating a bank robbery in Virginia got one from Google for the area around the bank. The warrant worked in steps: anonymized device list first, then more data on some devices, then names for a few. Okello Chatrie was identified and convicted.
Courts split hard. In 2024 the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Smith, called geofence warrants unconstitutional general warrants. In 2025 the full Fourth Circuit affirmed Chatrie's conviction in a one-sentence order, with separate opinions splitting 7 to 7 on whether a search had even occurred. The Supreme Court granted review on January 16, 2026, heard argument April 27, and decided on June 29, 2026.
The vote was 6 to 3. Justice Kagan wrote the opinion of the Court, joined by Roberts, Sotomayor, Kavanaugh and Jackson; Gorsuch agreed with the result in a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. The holding: police conducted a search when they got Chatrie's Location History from Google, and a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in that cell phone location data. The Court said no good reason exists to treat Location History differently from the cell-site records in Carpenter. Two hours of data was enough.
Then the part people most often skip. The Court did not decide whether the warrant met the particularity and probable cause requirements at each step. It did not decide the good-faith exception. It vacated the judgment and sent the case back to the Fourth Circuit. Justice Jackson, joined by Sotomayor, would have gone further and found steps two and three invalid. Justice Alito's dissent argued the good-faith exception independently supported the conviction. Justice Barrett wrote that Chatrie had no reasonable expectation of privacy in data about public movements he chose to share with Google.
Other courts to know
Lower courts apply these cases to new tools all the time. In Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Baltimore Police Department (2021), the full Fourth Circuit voted 8 to 7 that Baltimore's aerial surveillance plane program, which photographed much of the city by day, was a search under Carpenter because the data let police retrace people's movements. Plate reader cases have mostly gone the other way so far. Lesson 3 covers a January 2026 federal ruling that a city's network of about 200 plate cameras was not a search.
Common mix-ups
- Claim: Anything in public is fair game, full stop. What the evidence shows: A single glance at a public street is not a search. But Carpenter, Chatrie and the Baltimore plane case show courts will treat long-term, automatic tracking of public movements as a search.
- Claim: The Fourth Amendment limits companies and neighbors. What the evidence shows: It limits the government. A private doorbell camera or data broker is governed by state law, contracts and FTC rules, until police get involved.
- Claim: Carpenter requires a warrant for all phone data. What the evidence shows: It covered historical cell-site records of seven days or more and expressly left real-time tracking and tower dumps open.
Reporting angle
When an agency adopts a new tool, ask what legal process it uses to get data: a warrant, a subpoena, a 2703(d) order, consent, or nothing. Ask whether its policy changed after Carpenter (2018) or after Chatrie (June 2026). Get the policy in writing. When a court rules, read the opinion's final paragraph, the part that says "affirmed," "reversed," or "vacated and remanded," before you write the headline.
Research angle
- Carpenter v. United States, the full opinion on cell-site location records.
- Chatrie v. United States docket: filings, briefs and the order of events.
- The Chatrie opinion of June 29, 2026, to read the holding yourself.
- United States v. Jones (2012), the GPS tracker case, with syllabus and concurrences.
- Riley v. California (2014), on searching a phone seized during an arrest.
- Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle, the en banc Fourth Circuit opinion on aerial surveillance.
Check yourself
1. Which case gave us the 'reasonable expectation of privacy' test?
Katz involved a bug on a public phone booth. Justice Harlan's concurrence framed the two-part expectation of privacy test that courts still use.
2. In Smith v. Maryland and United States v. Miller, why did the Court find no search?
This is the third-party doctrine: information you hand to a business is generally treated as outside your Fourth Amendment protection.
3. What did Carpenter v. United States (2018) hold?
The Court held that getting seven or more days of historical cell-site records is a search. It said it was not deciding tower dumps or real-time tracking.
4. In Chatrie v. United States (June 29, 2026), what did the Supreme Court decide?
The Court, by a 6 to 3 vote, held acquiring the data was a search and declined to apply the third-party doctrine. It left particularity and probable cause to the Fourth Circuit, and the good-faith question stays open there.
5. Which case dealt with police searching the contents of a phone taken at arrest?
Riley (2014) held that officers generally need a warrant to search the digital contents of a phone seized during an arrest.
6. A post online says 'Supreme Court bans geofence warrants.' What is the best correction?
Chatrie decided the search question and left the warrant's validity to the court of appeals. 'Bans' overstates it.
Terms in this lesson
- Search (Fourth Amendment)
- Government action that intrudes on a reasonable expectation of privacy or physically intrudes on a protected area to get information. A search generally needs a warrant or an exception.
- Reasonable expectation of privacy
- The Katz test: a person showed an actual expectation of privacy, and society is prepared to recognize it as reasonable.
- Third-party doctrine
- The rule from Smith and Miller that information voluntarily given to a business, like dialed numbers or bank records, generally loses Fourth Amendment protection.
- Good-faith exception
- A rule that evidence is not suppressed when officers reasonably relied on a warrant or law later found invalid.
- Particularity
- The Fourth Amendment requirement that a warrant describe the place to be searched and things to be seized with enough precision.
- Cell-site location information (CSLI)
- Records a phone company keeps showing which cell towers a phone connected to and when.
Sources
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) checked 2026-10
- Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) checked 2026-10
- United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) checked 2026-10
- United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) checked 2026-10
- Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) checked 2026-10
- Carpenter v. United States, No. 16-402 (2018), opinion checked 2026-10
- Chatrie v. United States, No. 25-112, docket checked 2026-10
- Chatrie v. United States, No. 25-112 (June 29, 2026), opinion checked 2026-10
- Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Baltimore Police Dept., No. 20-1495 (4th Cir. 2021, en banc) checked 2026-10
- Venable: Supreme Court to settle constitutionality of geofence warrants (Feb. 2026) checked 2026-10